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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Septuagint version of Exodus 20:17, translated literally, reads as 
follows: 
 You shall not desire your neighbor's wife. You shall not desire your 
 neighbor's house, nor his field, nor his male servant, nor his female 
 servant, nor his ox, nor his beast of burden, nor any of his flock, nor 
 anything that is your neighbor's.1 
 
This is the last of the Ten Commandments,2 and although Philo of Alexandria 
(ca. 20 B.C. – A.D. 50) must have known the full biblical version,3 he cites the 
Tenth Commandment simply as "You shall not desire" (@Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H), 
                                            
 1 My translation of LXX Exod 20:17 [=LXX Deut 5:21 verbatim]: @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H J¬< (L<"Ã6" J@Ø B80F\@< F@L. @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H J¬< @Æ6\"< J@Ø B80F\@< F@L @ÜJ, JÎ< •(DÎ< "ÛJ@Ø @ÜJ, JÎ< B"Ã*" "ÛJ@Ø @ÜJ, J¬< B"4*\F60< "ÛJ@Ø @ÜJ, J@Ø $@ÎH "ÛJ@Ø @ÜJ, J@Ø ßB@.L(\@L "ÛJ@Ø @ÜJ, B"<JÎH 6JZ<@LH "ÛJ@Ø @ÜJ, ÓF" Jè B80F\@< F@b ¦FJ4<. For details on the text of Exod 
20:17, including ancient versions, see Innocent Himbaza, Le Décalogue et l’histoire du texte: 
Etudes des formes textuelles du Décalogue et leurs implications dans l’histoire du texte de 
l’Ancien Testament (OBO 207; Fribourg: Academic Press, 2004), 155-65 (cf. 68-72). 
 2 Within the biblical canon, the Ten Commandments appear first in Exod 20:1-17 (cf. 
Deut 5:1-21) spoken by God and so become known as the "ten words," or in modern usage the 
"Decalogue" (NB LXX Deut 10:4: J@×H *X6" 8`(@LH). Philo often refers to them as @Ê *X6" 8`(@4 
(e.g., Spec. 1.1, Decal. 154) or *X6" 8`(4" (e.g., Decal. 36, Spec. 3.7). 
 3 Philo used the LXX, not the Hebrew Bible (see Valentin Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire 
de l'écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie [ALGHJ 11; Leiden: Brill, 1977], 50-96, esp. 51-52). No 
evidence for an abbreviated version of the Tenth Commandment exists in the MS tradition of the 
LXX. On the LXX Pentateuch, see the introductory essays in Le Pentateuque d'Alexandrie: text 
grec et traduction (ed. Cécile Dogniez and Marguerite Harl; Bible d'Alexandrie; Paris: Cerf, 2001), 
31-130, including David Runia, "Philon d'Alexandrie devant le Pentateuque," 99-105. 
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indicating that in his view the principle concern of this Commandment is desire 
itself (¦B42L:\"), not desire's object.4 
 This dissertation explains in detail Philo's exposition of the Tenth 
Commandment. As an introduction, this chapter (1) situates Philo's exposition 
within his larger corpus of works, (2) sketches in summary form the nature and 
content of the exposition, (3) explains the value of the exposition, (4) reviews 
prior research, and (5) outlines the plan of the dissertation. 
PHILO'S COMMENTARY ON MOSAIC LEGISLATION 
 Philo describes the contents of the Pentateuch as a sequence of three 
topics: creation, history, and legislation.5 In a series of works known collectively 
                                            
 4 In Spec. 4.78, Philo cites the Tenth Commandment as an abbreviated, two-word 
prohibition: "Let us turn now to the last of the Ten Words (*X6" 8@(\T<) . . . 'You shall not desire' 
(@Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H)" (my translation). (Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Philo’s writings 
are from PLCL.) In Decal. 142, he clearly has this abbreviated version in mind: "Finally, he places 
a prohibition on desiring (J,8,LJ"Ã@< *z¦B42L:,Ã< •B"(@D,b,4), knowing that desire (J¬< ¦B42L:\"<) is crafty and treacherous (<,TJ,D@B@4Î< 6"Â ¦B\$@L8@<)" (my translation). (Cf. Decal. 
173: BX:BJ@< [of the second tablet] *¥ JÎ •<,ÃD(@< J¬< Jä< •*460:VJT< B0(Z<, ¦B42L:\"<; Her. 
173: º *z©JXD" B,<JVH ¦FJ4< •B"(`D,LF4H :@4P,\"H, •<*D@N@<\"H, 68@B−H, R,L*@:"DJLD\"H, ¦B42L:\"H.) In his discussion of the Tenth Commandment (Decal. 142-153, 173-174; Spec. 
4.78b-131), Philo mentions none of the prohibited objects of desire listed in the LXX version 
(@Æ6\", •(D`H, B"ÃH, B"4*\F60, $@ØH, ßB@.b(4@<, 6J−<@H), with the exception of (L<Z, which 
appears once in a list that includes also "reputation" (*`>") and summarily "anything else that 
produces pleasure" (J4<@H –88@L Jä< º*@<¬< •B,D(".@:X<T<) (Decal. 151). Similarly, B80F\@H, 
an essential element of the LXX version (J@Ø B80F\@< F@L; Jè B80F\@< F@b), appears only once 
(Spec. 4.93), and there it involves Platonic psychology: the 2L:`H, or spirited part of the soul, is a 
“neighbor” to the 8`(@H, or rational part.  
 5 "The oracles delivered through the prophet Moses are of three kinds (JD,ÃH Æ*X"H). The 
first deals with the creation of the world (J¬< :¥< B,DÂ 6@F:@B@4\"H), the second with history (J¬< *¥ ÊFJ@D46Z<) and the third with legislation (J¬< *¥ JD\J0< <@:@2,J46Z<)" (Praem. 1). The same 
classification appears in Mos. 2.46-47, although Philo initially identifies only two parts: (1) the 
historical part (ÊFJ@D46Î< :XD@H), which he subdivides into two sections dealing respectively with 
the creation of the world (6`F:@L (,<XF,TH) and genealogy ((,<,"8@(46@Ø), and (2) the part 
dealing with commands and prohibitions (B,DÂ BD@FJV>,4H 6"Â •B"(@D,bF,4H). The part dealing 
with commands and prohibitions is equivalent to the third topic in Praem. 1, while the subdivisions 
of the first part are equivalent to the first two topics in Praem.1. (On the equivalence of (,<,"8@(46`H and ÊFJ@D46`H, see F. H. Colson's note on Mos. 2.47 in PLCL 6, 606; also PLCL 8, 
313, n. a.) This correlation of Praem. 1 and Mos. 2.46-47 is standard—see, for example, Peder 
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as the Exposition of the Law, he offers an exegesis of the Pentateuch using 
these topics as his basic outline.6 The Exposition begins with a treatise on the 
creation of the world (De opificio mundi), continues with a set of treatises on the 
patriarchs (De Abrahamo and De Iosepho),7 and ends with a set of treatises on 
Mosaic legislation (De decalogo, De specialibus legibus 1-4, and De virtutibus).8 
This last set dealing with legislation consists thematically of only two parts, 
despite its formal division into six treatises: the first comprises De decalogo and 
practically all of De specialibus legibus (1.1 – 4.132), the second comprises the 
                                                                                                                                  
Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria," in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period (ed. M. E. Stone; 
vol. 2 of The Literature of the Jewish People in the Period of the Second Temple and the Talmud; 
CRINT 2; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1984), 233-82, 234, n. 5; Richard Hecht, "Preliminary Issues in 
the Analysis of Philo's De Specialibus Legibus," SPh 5 (1978): 1-56, 3; Leopold Cohn, "Einteilung 
und Chronologie der Schriften Philos," PhilSup 7 (1899): 387-436, 405-06.  
 6 On the Exposition of the Law see esp. Peder Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria—A 
Systematic Philosopher or an Eclectic Editor? An Examination of his Exposition of the Laws of 
Moses," SO 71 (1996): 115-34; also Jenny Morris, "The Jewish Philosopher Philo," in Emil 
Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.—A.D. 135): A 
New English Version Revised and Edited by Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar, and Martin Goodman 
(vol. 3, part 2; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1987), 809-89, 840-54. 
 7 Originally, the set included treatises also on Isaac and Jacob (see Ios. 1), which are 
now lost. Most assign these treatises to the "history" portion of the creation-history-legislation 
triad of Praem. 1 (e.g., Peder Borgen, "Philo," 237). Some, however, assign them to the 
legislative portion, based on Philo's claim that the patriarchs themselves represent unwritten 
counterparts to the written laws he begins to consider in De decalogo (see Abr. 3). The historical 
portion, in this configuration, consists of Philo's Allegorical Commentary, a separate series of 
treatises covering most of Genesis (on which see Borgen, "Philo," 243-44; Morris, "Philo," 830-
40). Valentin Nikiprowetzky, for one, holds this view: see PAPM 23, 13, and Commentaire, 234-
35, n. 17. But if the correlation of Praem. 1 and Mos. 2.46-47 is correct, the legislative portion 
mentioned in Praem. 1 corresponds explicitly to "commands and prohibitions" in Mos. 2.46 and 
cannot reasonably include the lives of the patriarchs. For other problems with this view, see 
Cohn, "Einteilung und Chronologie," 406, n. 23; cf. Morris, "Philo," 845-46, n. 134. 
 8 Another treatise, De praemiis et poenis, immediately follows Virt. and concludes the 
Exposition. In Praem. 2-3, Philo states that he has fully discussed (i.e., finished) the legislative 
section in the preceding treatises and is moving on to a new topic: "the rewards and punishments 
which the good and the bad have respectively to expect." De praemiis et poenis thus forms a 
fitting conclusion to the Exposition, insofar as the stipulated rewards and punishments are 
contingent on observance of the laws. But it does not form part of the legislative section proper, 
because it does not deal with the laws themselves. Philo's treatise on Moses, De vita Mosis 1-2, 
is closely connected with, but not part of, the Exposition (see Erwin R. Goodenough, "Philo's 
Exposition of the Law and His De Vita Mosis," HTR 26 [1933]: 109-25). 
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remainder of De specialibus legibus  (4.133-238) and De virtutibus.9 In both 
parts, Philo cites laws then analyzes them, noting mostly their literal bearing on 
practical and ethical matters.10 But the real commentary on Mosaic legislation in 
Philo's Exposition is the first part (Decal. 1.1 – Spec. 4.132), which he frames as 
a unified, systematic, and comprehensive exposition of Mosaic commands and 
prohibitions, using an organizational scheme based entirely on the Ten 
Commandments.11  
 For Philo, the Ten Commandments are absolutely preeminent, and their 
arrangement and content determine the overall arrangement and content of his 
legal commentary in Decal. 1.1 – Spec. 4.132.12 To establish their importance, 
                                            
 9 Philo makes an obvious, explicit transition from one major topic to another in Spec. 
4.132-34. For division of the same material into the same two parts, see points B and C on Peder 
Borgen's outline of the Exposition ("Philosopher or Editor?," 118).   
 10 In Decal. 1.1 Philo announces that his investigation of the written laws will not neglect 
allegorical interpretations, when they are warranted, and indeed it does not (e.g., Spec. 2.29-32). 
Nevertheless, Philo's legal commentary tends to avoid allegory, in some instances offering only a 
literal treatment of laws read allegorically in the Allegorical Commentary (see Colson, PLCL 7, xiii, 
n. c, and Isaak Heinemann, PCH 2, 4, n. 1, for examples, such as Ebr. 14-95 vs. Spec. 2.232 on 
Deut 21:18-21). Samuel Sandmel ("Philo Judaeus: An Introduction to the Man, his Writings, and 
his Significance," ANRW 21.1:3-46, 10) thus goes too far in saying: "The treatises in [the 
'Exposition of the Law'] are no less allegorical than those in the 'Allegory of the Law.'"  
 11 Praem. 2 suggests that part one (Decal. 1.1. – Spec. 4.132) represents, from Philo's 
perspective, the Pentateuch's "legislative part" proper (thus Borgen, "Philosopher or Editor?," 
132-33; cf. Borgen, "Philo," 239-40). Part two (Spec. 4.133-238 and Virt.) has a different 
organizational scheme (categorization by virtues, not Commandments [see Spec. 4.133-35]) and 
is secondary to part one in terms of both length and design. Part one is roughly three times as 
large (ca. 277 vs. ca. 95 pages in PCW); but, more importantly, part one represents Philo's 
principal effort to organize all Mosaic precepts into a single logical system (on which see esp. 
Yehoshua Amir, "The Decalogue According to Philo," in The Ten Commandments in History and 
Tradition [ed. B.-Z. Segal and G. Levi; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990], 121-60, 128-30; idem, 
"Philon und die jüdische Wirklichkeit seiner Zeit," in Die hellenistische Gestalt des Judentums bei 
Philon von Alexandrien [FJCD 5; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1983], 3-51, esp. 42-44 
[="Das System der Gebote"]). In this respect, part two serves as a catchall, accommodating laws 
that do not fit neatly into Philo's primary scheme (see Amir, "Decalogue," 127; Morris, "Philo," 
851).   
 12 On the Decalogue in Philo, see esp. Amir, "Decalogue"; also Ulrich Kellermann, "Der 
Dekalog in den Schriften des Frühjudentums," in Weisheit, Ethos, und Gebot (ed. H.G. 
Reventlow; BThSt 43; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2001), 147-226, esp. 161-70; Paul Kuntz, 
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Philo begins his systematic study of Mosaic legislation with a distinction between 
two categories of law: 
 I will proceed to describe the laws (J@×H <`:@LH) themselves in order, with 
 this necessary statement by way of introduction, that some of them (@áH 
 :X<) God judged fit to deliver in His own person alone without employing 
 any other, and some (@áH *X) through His prophet Moses whom He chose 
 as of all men the best suited to be the revealer of verities. Now we find 
 that those which He gave in His own person and by His own mouth alone 
 are13 both laws and heads summarizing the particular laws (FL:$X$06, 
 6"Â <`:@LH . . . 6"Â <`:T< Jä< ¦< :XD,4 6,NV8"4"), but those in which He 
 spoke  through the prophet all belong to the former class. (Decal. 18-19) 
 
Two key traits set the Ten Commandments apart. First, God delivered them 
personally to the Israelites without a human mediator.14 Second, each of the Ten 
Commandments has a unique dual significance: like any law, it stands on its own 
                                                                                                                                  
"Philo Judaeus: A Decalogue in the Balance," in The Ten Commandments in History: Mosaic 
Paradigms for a Well-Ordered Society (ed. Thomas d'Evelyn; EUSLR; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2004), 11-26; Miguel Lluch Baixauli, "El tratado de Filón sobre el Decálogo," ScrTh  29 (1997): 
415-41; André Myre, "La loi et le Pentateuque selon Philon d'Alexandrie," ScEs 25 (1973): 209-
25, 222-24; Samuel Sandmel, "Confrontation of Greek and Jewish ethics: Philo: De Decalogo," in 
Judaism and Ethics (ed. Daniel J. Silver; New York: Ktav, 1970), 163-76. On the Decalogue as an 
organizational scheme, see in general Hecht, "Preliminary Issues," 3-17; for the scheme's 
presence in Decal. and Spec. see Borgen, "Philosopher or Editor?," 123-28; for details of the 
scheme see Daniel Jastram, Philo's Concept of Generic Virtue (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Wisconsin—Madison, 1989), 30-35, and Cristina Termini, "Taxonomy of Biblical Laws and M37?I+O;3! in Philo," SPhA 16 (2004): 1-29, esp. 1-10.  
 13 Substituting "are" (FL:$X$06,) for Colson's "include," which does not properly 
emphasize the dual nature of each Commandment. Cf. Nikiprowetzky, PAPM 23 ("sont non 
seulement des lois, mais aussi les principes qui commandent le détail des lois particulières"); 
Treitel, PCH 1 ("sind zugleich Gesetze und Grundprinzipien"); Francesca Calabi, Filone di 
Alessandria, De Decalogo (Philosophica 24; Pisa: ETS, 2005) ("sono leggi e principi delle leggi 
particolari"). 
 14 Cf. Spec. 2.189. Philo rejects an anthropomorphic concept of God speaking to the 
Israelites, developing instead the notion of a miraculous "divine voice" created especially for the 
occasion (Decal. 32-35; for analysis see Amir, "Decalogue," 135-48; also Reinhard Weber, 
Das"Gesetz" bei Philon von Alexandrien und Flavius Josephus: Studien zum Verständnis und zur 
Funktion der Thora bei den beiden Hauptzeugen des hellenistischen Judentums (ARGU 11; 
Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2001), 68-77. 
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as a distinct ethical imperative; but it also functions as the "head" (6,NV8"4@<) or 
"summary" of an entire category of particular laws (<`:T< Jä< ¦< :XD,4).15  
 In Philo's view, God delivered each of the Ten Commandments "in the 
form of a summary,"16 stating succinctly what Moses spells out at length by 
means of additional laws found elsewhere in the Pentateuch.17 These other laws 
form a distinct set of subsidiary precepts, which—despite their individual 
variety—all express in some way the moral essence of their respective summary 
Commandment. To characterize this unique relationship of particular law(s) to 
summary Commandment, Philo uses a variety of terms and expressions. In 
terms of status, the particular laws are all subordinate to their respective "heads," 
as Philo's use of ßB` ("under") and related compounds clearly indicates.18 In 
terms of function, they all "refer to" (•<"NXD,F2"4; •<"N@D< 8":$V<,4<) a 
                                            
 15 Cf. Decal. 154: "[W]e must not forget that the Ten Words (@Ê *X6" 8`(@4) are 
summaries of the special laws (6,NV8"4" <`:T< ,ÆFÂ Jä< ¦< ,Ç*,4) which are recorded in the 
Sacred Books and run through the whole of the legislation" (substituting "Words" [8`(@4] for 
Colson's "Covenants"). Thus the title of De decalogo in Greek MSS (G, F, H): B,DÂ Jä< *X6" 8@(\T<, @Ì 6,NV8"4" <`:T< ,ÆF\< (MSS: 8@(\T<, PCW: 8`(T<; PCW & G: @Ë, F & H:). On 6,NV8"4@<, see Termini, "Taxonomy," 5-6. 
 16 6,N"8"4f*,4 JbBå (Spec. 4.78; also Decal. 168). Cf. Gaius 178-79: "We determined 
to give Gaius a document, presenting in a summarized form (6,N"8"4f*0 JbB@<) the story of our 
sufferings and our claims. This document was practically an epitome (¦B4J@:Z) of a longer 
supplication which we had sent to him a short time before through the hands of King Agrippa." 
 17 Decal. 175: "For it was in accordance with His nature that the pronouncements in 
which the special laws were summed up (6,NV8"4" :¥< Jä< ¦< ,Ç*,4 <`:T<) should be given by 
Him in His own person, but the particular laws (<`:@LH *¥ J@×H ¦< Jè :XD,4) by the mouth of the 
most perfect of the prophets whom He selected for his merits and having filled him with the divine 
spirit, chose him to be the interpreter of His sacred utterances." Cf. Cong. 120, where these ten 
are "general heads ((,<46 6,NV8"4"), embracing the vast multitude of particular laws (Jä< 6"J :XD@H •B,\DT< <`:T<), the roots (Õ\."4), the sources (•DP"\), the perennial fountains of 
ordinances (B0("Â •X<"@4 *4"J"(:VJT<) containing commandments positive and prohibitive 
(BD@FJV>,4H 6"Â •B"(@D,bF,4H B,D4,P`<JT<) for the profit of those who follow them."  
 18 For the particular laws as simply "under" (ßB`) their respective heads, see Decal. 170; 
as "arranged under" (ßB@JVFF,F2"4), see Decal. 168, 171; as "falling under" (ßB@B\BJ,4<), see 
Decal. 174 (ßB@FJX88,4< essentially = ßB@B\BJ,4< in Decal. 157, Spec. 4.1, and Spec. 4.132). 
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single summary command, serving or promoting its moral purpose in some 
way.19 But in abstract terms, Philo envisions the relationship between summary 
Commandment and particular law(s) as that of genus to species.20 
 The treatises De decalogo and De specialibus legibus represent, at least 
in part, Philo's painstaking and systematic attempt to illustrate this genus-species 
relationship. His treatise on the Ten Commandments deals with the ten genera, 
expounding each of the Commandments in sequence (Decal. 50-153) and 
introducing the idea of their summary function (Decal. 154-75).21 His treatise on 
the particular laws (Spec.) again expounds the ten genera, in even greater depth, 
but goes on to identify and comment on their respective species. The Pentateuch 
itself never uses a genus-species taxonomy to organize precepts into a coherent 
system, so Philo must construct the system himself. In other words, Philo must 
match species with genera, indicating which laws belong with which of the Ten 
                                            
 19 E.g., Spec. 2.223: "I have now completed the discussion of the number seven [i.e., the 
fourth "head" (cf. Spec. 2.39)] and of matters connected with days and months and years that 
have reference to that number (Jä< ,ÆH "ÛJ¬< •<"N,D@:X<T<)." Spec. 2.242: "I have gone 
through the five heads of laws (6,NV8"4" <`:T<) that belong to the first table, along with 
whatever particular laws have reference to each of them (ÓF" Jä< 6"J :XD@H ,ÆH ª6"FJ@< ¦8V:$"<, J¬< •<"N@DV<)" (my translation). Cf. Leg. 2.102: "This is practically the summation (JÎ 6,NV8"4@<) of the whole Song [of Moses], to which every other part refers (¦NzÔ J –88" BV<J" •<"NXD,J"4)" (my translation). In Hist. eccl. 2.18.5, Eusebius refers to De specialibus legibus as A,DÂ Jä< •<"N,D@:X<T< ¦< ,Ç*,4 <`:T< ,ÆH J FL<J,\<@<J" 6,NV8"4" Jä< *X6" 8`(T< " $ ( *. 
 20 The *X6" 8`(@4 are JV . . . (X<0 Jä< ¦< ,Ç*,4 <`:T< (Spec. 1.1; Spec. 3.125: J (X<0 Jä< ¦< ,Ç*,4 <`:T<) and thus "generic" (Cong. 120: (,<46 6,NV8"4"; Her. 167: Jä< (,<46ä< *X6" <`:T<; Her. 173: (,<46@\ . . . 6"<`<,H). On this as a legal taxonomy in Philo, see esp. 
Jastram, Generic Virtue, 30-35. Jastram's remarks situate the legal taxonomy in the context of 
Philo's broader application(s) of the genus-species concept (see his chapter one, "Theory of 
Genus, Species, and Particular," 10-72). See also Termini, "Taxonomy." Termini argues that 
Philo's application of a genus-species taxonomy to Mosaic legislation is radically innovative, 
although his interest in the systematic organization of legal materials reflects contemporary trends 
in Roman jurisprudence. 
 21 Philo first treats introductory questions such as why God delivered the Ten 
Commandments in the desert (§§2-17), why there were ten (§§20-31), what voice announced the 
Commandments (§§32-35), and why the form of address was second-person singular (§§36-43). 
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Commandments.22 When his work is finished, he leaves no doubt as to his 
purpose: 
 For if we are right in describing the main heads delivered by the voice of 
 God as generic laws (6,NV8"4" (X<0 <`:T<), and all particular laws of 
 which Moses was the spokesman as dependent species (,Ç*0), for 
 accurate apprehension free from confusion scientific study was needed, 
 with the aid of which I have assigned and attached to each of the genera 
 what was appropriate to them throughout the whole legislation (©6VFJå 
 Jä< (,<ä< ¦> BVF0H J−H <@:@2,F\"H J @Æ6,Ã" BD@FX<,4:" 6"Â 
 BD@FXNLF"). (Spec. 4.132)23 
 
The scope of Philo's project is immense: considering each of the generic 
summaries in turn, he has scoured the Pentateuch in search of the 
corresponding specific precepts. In this respect, De specialibus legibus 
                                            
 22 Despite disagreement over the originality of Philo's use of the Decalogue as a 
comprehensive taxonomic framework, consensus suggests that Philo at least did the work of 
matching species with genera. This consensus justifies the study of Philo's view of the Tenth 
Commandment, insofar as it allows for him to decide which laws logically pertain to the Tenth 
Commandment, based on his understanding of that Commandment. For a minimalist position, 
which concedes the originality of Philo's genus-species matching but otherwise attributes his 
basic taxonomy to traditional (rabbinic) Judaism, see Naomi Cohen, Philo Judaeus: His Universe 
of Discourse (BEATAJ 24; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995), 72-85, esp. 84-85. (On Philo's 
understanding of the Decalogue in relation to rabbinic tradition, see esp. Hecht, "Preliminary 
Issues," 3-17.) For a more generous position, which sees Philo as an innovator not only in his 
assignment of species to genus but also in his granting of a special inclusive status to the 
Decalogue, see Termini, "Taxonomy." Borgen, "Philosopher or Editor?," 126, has an intermediate 
position, which nevertheless approximates Cohen's: "Philo seems to develop in a more 
systematic fashion a notion also found in Palestinian tradition, that the Decalogue contained in 
nuce all the commandments of the Mosaic laws. Thus, Philo has a Jewish concept as organizing 
principle, but he has developed it into a broader systematic rewriting than found elsewhere in the 
contemporary Jewish sources."  
 23 Substituting "genera" ((,<ä<) for Colson's "heads." On this passage, see also Termini, 
"Taxonomy," 8. Cf. Spec. 3.7: "Since out of the ten oracles which God gave forth Himself without 
a spokesman or interpreter, we have spoken of five, namely those graven on the first table, and 
also of all the particular laws which had reference to these (ÓF" Jä< 6"J :XD@H FL<XJ,4<,< ,ÆH J"ØJ"), and our present duty is to couple them with those of the second table as well as we can, I 
will again endeavour to fit the special laws into each of the genera (B,4DVF@:"4 BV84< 6"2zª6"FJ@< Jä< (,<ä< ¦N"D:`.,4< J@×H ¦< ,Ç*,4 <`:@LH)" (substituting "genera" [(,<ä<] for 
Colson's "heads"). 
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complements De decalogo by presenting for each Commandment subsidiary 
laws that reflect its moral essence.24 
 Although the scope of Philo's project involves all of the Ten 
Commandments, his procedure makes it simple to extract the remarks devoted 
to any one of them. For the most part, he follows a rigid ten-point outline in both 
Decal. and Spec., introducing each Commandment, saying what he wants to say, 
then moving on to the next.25 As a result, both treatises have an embedded 
series of self-contained units, each with its own topic and structure, each dealing 
essentially with one of the Ten Commandments. Correlating the text unit devoted 
to a particular Commandment in Decal. with the text unit devoted to the same 
Commandment in Spec. provides material for a more or less self-contained 
exposition of that Commandment.26 Each exposition includes Philo's analysis of 
the Commandment itself (the genus), plus his treatment of the subordinate laws 
(the species). 
PHILO'S EXPOSITION OF THE TENTH COMMANDMENT 
 Naturally, the last exposition embedded in Decal. and Spec. deals with the 
Tenth Commandment, which in Philo's Decalogue is the two-word prohibition @Û6 
                                            
 24 Cf. Morris on Spec. ("Philo," 847-48): "In this work Philo makes an extremely 
interesting attempt to bring the Mosaic special laws into a systematic arrangement according to 
the ten rubrics of the Decalogue." 
 25 Structural outlines of the treatises reveal Philo's straightforward sequential movement 
through the list of Ten Commandments. For an outline of Decal., see Borgen, "Philosopher or 
Editor?," 124-25. For an outline of the four books of Spec., see Heinemann, PCH 2, 8-13 
(although, as Heinemann's outline indicates, Philo in effect treats the First and Second 
Commandments as a single unit). 
 26 For a schematic correlation of material from Decal. and Spec., see the outline of the 
Sixth through Tenth Commandments in André Mosès, PAPM 25, 15-16. 
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¦B42L:ZF,4H.27 Philo abbreviates the Septuagint version, which lists various aims 
of desire: a neighbor's wife, house, field, etc.28 Although he never explains or 
justifies this abbreviation, it makes good sense in light of his overall treatment of 
the Ten Commandments, especially the last five, which he views as a pentad 
containing basic prohibitions governing human affairs.29 Superficially, the 
abbreviation accomplishes a stylistic leveling, bringing the Tenth Commandment 
into line with the four other basic prohibitions: @Û :@4P,bF,4H, @Û 68XR,4H, @Û 
N@<,bF,4H, and @Û R,L*@:"DJLDZF,4H—the last of which is itself an abbreviation 
of the Ninth Commandment.30 More importantly, however, a specific formulation 
of the Tenth Commandment would contradict Philo's claim that the 
Commandments are comprehensive, generic summaries—or, as with @Û6 
¦B42L:ZF,4H, generic prohibitions. In his system of thought, limiting the scope of 
the Tenth Commandment to specific objects would blur the distinction between 
genus and species. Rather than a summary, the Commandment would read 
more like a short list of "particular laws."31 Philo does consider various objects of 
                                            
 27 See above, n. 4. 
 28 Cf. LXX Exod 20:17 [=LXX Deut 5:21]. See above, n. 1. 
 29 Decal. 121: •B"(@D,bF,4H Jä< BDÎH •<2DfB@LH. In Philo's view, these five prohibitions 
are comprehensive: "These are general rules forbidding practically all sins (@âJ@4 (,<46@Â FP,*Î< BV<JT< :"DJ0:VJT< ,ÆFÂ 6"<`<,H), and to them the specific sins may in each case be referred 
(¦Nz@áH ª6"FJ@< •<"NXD,F2"4 Jä< ¦< ,Ç*,4 FL:$X$06,<)" (Her 173). For the division of the Ten 
Commandments into pentads, see esp. Decal. 50-51 (also Her. 168). 
 30 NB Philo’s citation @Û R,L*@:"DJLDZF,4H (Spec. 4.41; cf. Decal 172: JXJ"DJ@< *¥ 
[6,NV8"4@<] JÎ B,DÂ J@Ø :¬ R,L*@:"DJLD,Ã<) compared with Lev 20:16 [=Deut 5:20]: @Û R,L*@:"DJLDZF,4H 6"J J@Ø B80F\@< F@L :"DJLD\"< R,L*−. For the other prohibitions, whose 
simple two-word expressions Philo adopts verbatim, see Lev 20:13-15 [=Deut 5:17-19]. Cf. Rom 
13:9 (Codex Sinaiticus): @Û :@4P,bF,4H, @Û N@<,bF,4H, @Û 68XR,4H, @Û R,L*@:"DJLDZF,4H, @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H. 
 31 Although the LXX version does include a general prohibition of ÓF" Jè B80F\@< F@b ¦FJ4<, it never loses the fundamental specification J@Ø B80F\@< F@L. In its full LXX formulation, 
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desire in his exposition, but only as concrete illustrations of the nature and 
function of desire itself, not restrictions on the Commandment's proscriptive 
range of objects.32 
 In its entirety, Philo’s commentary on the Tenth Commandment consists of 
three text units: Decal. 142-53, Decal. 173-74, and Spec. 4.78b-131. The first of 
these units, Decal. 142-53, is the last installment in Philo's initial survey of the 
Ten Commandments (Decal. 50-153). Focusing on what the prohibition entails, 
this unit contains a sketch of the nature, mechanics, and potentially disastrous 
effects of desire, framed initially (§§142-46) as a review of the four cardinal 
BV20: pleasure (º*@<Z), grief (8bB0), fear (N`$@H), and desire (¦B42L:\").33 The 
                                                                                                                                  
the Commandment does not proscribe, for example, the desire for a house per se, only the desire 
for a specific type of house—viz., the house of a neighbor. 
 32 For example, in Spec 4.86-91 Philo wants to illustrate how desire "produces a change 
for the worse in all which it attacks" (§86) by listing various aims of desire and the respective 
vices associated with those aims. The aims are all quite general: "money" (PDZ:"J"), "reputation" 
(*`>"), "power" (•DPZ), "physical beauty" (Ff:"J@H 6V88@H), "the tongue" ((8äJJ") (i.e., desire to 
speak or keep silent), "the belly" (("FJZD) (i.e., desire for food and drink).  
 33 On BV2@H as a philosophical term, see in general F.E. Peters, Greek Philosophical 
Terms: A Historical Lexicon (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 152-55. BV2@H refers 
essentially to something that happens to someone (i.e., an experience one undergoes), so 
"passion" bears literally the sense of its cognate "passive" despite its often active sense. (For an 
ancient [Platonic] discussion of active and passive connotations of BV2@H, see Galen, PHP 6.1.5-
23; cf. Martin Elsky [trans.], "Erich Auerbach, 'Passio as Passion' ['Passio als Leidenshaft']" 
Criticism 43 [2001]: 288-308). As a psychological term, BV2@H refers to an experience undergone 
in one's soul; for example, the experience ("passion," "feeling," "emotion") of fear. Ancient moral 
philosophers proposed various definitions for both BV2@H per se and the individual BV20, along 
with various strategies for how best to manage passion(s). On the four cardinal BV20 see Simo 
Knuuttila and Juha Sihvola, "How the Philosophical Analysis of the Emotions was Introduced," in 
The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy (ed. J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen; TSHP 46; 
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), 1-19, esp. 14-16. For an explanation of the Stoic view of BV2@H over 
against the Platonic-Aristotelian view, see Michael Frede, "The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of 
the Soul," in The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (ed. Malcolm Schofield and 
Gisela Striker; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 93-110. On passion(s) in Philo 
see esp. Helmut Schmidt, Die Anthropoligie Philons von Alexandreia (Würzburg: Konrad Triltsch, 
1933), 86-101; also David Charles Aune, "Mastery of the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabees and 
Earliest Christianity," in Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-
Roman World (ed. Wendy E. Helleman; Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 125-58, 
esp. 125-34; John Dillon, The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (rev. ed.; Ithaca, N.Y.: 
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second unit, Decal. 173-74, briefly restates the pervasive ill effects of desire, then 
previews De specialibus legibus by noting the existence of "many ordinances 
which come under this head," without identifying any of those ordinances. The 
third unit, Spec. 4.78b-131 contains Philo's most comprehensive and sustained 
treatment of the Tenth Commandment and represents the exposition proper.34 
Again he covers the nature, mechanics, and effects of desire, as in the first unit, 
but in much greater depth (Spec. 4.78b-94). Then, in fulfillment of his overarching 
program for Decal. and Spec., Philo cites and expounds the Mosaic dietary laws, 
which in his view are the "particular laws" that belong under the heading @Û6 
¦B42L:ZF,4H (Spec. 4.95-131). Together these three units amount to 374 lines of 
Greek text in PCW, and the exposition proper amounts to 301 lines, all devoted 
to Philo's understanding of the Tenth Commandment. In sheer quantity, Philo’s 
                                                                                                                                  
Cornell University Press, 1996), 151-52; Petra von Gemünden, "La culture des passions à 
l’époque du Nouveau Testament: une contribution théologique et psychologique," ETR 70 (1995): 
335-48, esp. 339-42; Margaret Graver, "Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic AC?A!1+3!3," in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy (ed. Francesca Alesse; 
SPhA 5; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 197-221; repr. from Phronesis 44 (1999): 300-25; Carlos Lévy, 
"Philon d'Alexandrie et les passions," in Réceptions antiques: lecture, transmission, appropriation 
intellectuelle (ed. Lætitia Ciccolini et al.; ELA 16; Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm, 2006), 27-41; idem, 
"Philo's Ethics," in The Cambridge Companion to Philo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 146-71, esp. 154-64 [="The Passions"]; Salvatore Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in 
Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (OTM; London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84-92, esp. 
92; Max Pohlenz, Philon von Alexandreia (NAWG 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1942), 
457-61; David Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (PA 44 ; Leiden: Brill, 1986), 
299-301; Michel Spanneut, "Apatheia ancienne, apatheia chrétienne. Ière partie: L'apatheia 
ancienne," ANRW 36.7: 4641-4717, 4701-04; Walther Völker, Fortschritt und Vollendung bei 
Philo von Alexandrien: Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Frömmigkeit (TUGAL 49.1; Leipzig: J.C. 
Hinrich, 1938), 80-95; David Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," ANRW 21.1:372-416, 400-05; 
idem, "Philo of Alexandria on the Rational and Irrational Emotions," in Passions and Moral 
Progress in Greco-Roman Thought (ed. John T. Fitzgerald; New York: Routledge, 2008), 201-20. 
 34 Because it amounts to a self-contained treatise, the unit Spec. 4.79-135 receives the 
title "De concupiscentia" in some MSS (see PCW 5, xiv, xxvi), and—as Colson notes (PLCL 8, 
56, n. 1)—Cohn "here begins a fresh numeration of chapters." Older studies sometimes refer to 
Spec. 4.79-135 using the Latin title and Cohn's fresh numeration (e.g., Emile Bréhier, Les idées 
philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie [EPM 8; 3d ed.; Paris: J. Vrin, 1950], 253).  
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exposition of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H stands on a par with some of his independent 
treatises—for example, De gigantibus (320 lines in PCW) and De sobrietate (353 
lines in PCW). The importance of this exposition, however, lies in the material 
itself, first in its own right but also in its relation to other first-century treatments of 
the Tenth Commandment and key topics in Philo's ethical theory.  
THE VALUE OF PHILO’S EXPOSITION 
 As a substantive, detailed analysis of the Tenth Commandment from 
arguably the best representative of Hellenistic Judaism in antiquity, Philo’s 
exposition of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H deserves a full and independent analysis. In his 
exposition, he considers in depth both the Commandment itself and the dietary 
laws that in his mind reflect its moral essence, so a careful reading should 
answer two fundamental questions:  
1. In Philo’s view, what does the Tenth Commandment prohibit? (All 
desire? A certain type? What type?) 
 
2. In Philo’s view, how is the Tenth Commandment observed? (What are 
the mechanics of its observance? What role do the dietary laws play in its 
observance?) 
 
Answering these two questions also illuminates broader questions regarding 
Philo's unique fusion of Judaism and Hellenism. For example, how does a first-
century Jew, who is fully committed to the literal observance of the Law of 
Moses,35 who is also an accomplished student of Greek philosophy, interpret the 
                                            
 35 See Migr. 89-93, esp. 93: "Nay, we should look on all these outward observances as 
resembling the body (Ff:"J4), and their inner meanings as resembling the soul (RLP±). It follows 
that, exactly as we have to take thought for the body, because it is the abode of the soul, so we 
must pay heed to the letter of the laws (Jä< Õ0Jä< <`:T< ¦B4:,80JX@<). If we keep and observe 
these, we shall gain a clearer conception of those things of which these are the symbols; and 
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significance of the Decalogue's prohibition of desire (¦B42L:\"), a function of the 
soul that Greek philosophers studied at length? How does an obscure set of 
dietary regulations, which placed observant Jews at odds with the broader 
culture, become the centerpiece of Moses' philosophical training program for the 
management of desire? 36 Philo’s exposition speaks to these and other issues.  
 But Philo’s work is important also for the comparative assessment of a 
broader first-century interest in the Tenth Commandment, attested by two of 
Philo's contemporaries, Paul and the author of 4 Maccabees.37 Both authors, like 
Philo, cite Greek versions of the Tenth Commandment and contemplate its moral 
significance.38 A full appreciation of the similarities and differences among these 
three treatments of the Tenth Commandment, as well as their relation to broader 
                                                                                                                                  
besides that we shall not incur the censure of the many and the charges they are sure to bring 
against us." 
 36 On the Jewish dietary laws in Philo's day, see John M.G. Barclay, Jews in the 
Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE) (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1996), 434-37; Katell Berthelot, "L’interprétation symbolique des lois alimentaires dans la Lettre 
d’Aristée: une influence pythagoricienne," JJS 52 (2001): 253-68; Christoph Heil, Die Ablehnung 
der Speisegebote durch Paulus: Zur Frage nach der Stellung des Apostels zum Gesetz (BBB 96; 
Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum, 1994), 23-123; Hermut Löhr, "Speisenfrage und Tora im Judentum 
des Zweiten Tempels und im entstehenden Christentum," ZNW 94 (2003): 17-37; James N. 
Rhodes, "Diet as Morality: Tracing an Exegetical Tradition" (M.A. thesis; Catholic University of 
America, 2000), esp. chs. three (Aristeas) and four (Philo); E.P. Sanders, "Purity, Food and 
Offerings in the Greek-Speaking Diaspora," in Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah: Five 
Studies (London: SCM Press, 1990), 255-308, 272-83; Abraham Terian, "Some Stock Arguments 
for the Magnanimity of the Law in Hellenistic Jewish Apologetics," JLAS 1 (1985): 141-49. 
 37 See Romans 7:7-25 and 4 Maccabees 2:4-6. The exact dates of the relevant texts 
cannot be determined, but their relative chronology can. The absolute terminus ad quem for 
Philo’s exposition is his death, which by general consensus is hardly later than A.D. 50 (Peder 
Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria," ABD 5:333-42, 333). Paul's letter to the Romans probably was 
written between A.D. 55 and 60 (Joseph Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with Introduction 
and Commentary [AB 33; New York: Doubleday, 1993], 85-88). 4 Maccabees probably was 
written near the end of the first century A.D. (Hans-Josef Klauck, 4. Makkabäerbuch [JSHRZ 3.1; 
Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1989], 668-69).  
 38 Paul's version, like Philo's, is @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H (Rom 7:7; cf. Rom 13:9). 4 Macc has an 
expanded, more specific version, @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H J¬< (L<"Ã6" J@Ø B80F\@< F@L @ÜJ, ÓF" Jè B80F\@< F@b ¦FJ4< (2:5), but the context suggests that a comprehensive scope is understood (NB BVF0H ¦B42L:\"H in 2:4; and esp. :¬ ¦B42L:,Ã< ,ÇD06,< º:H Ò <`:@H in 2:6). 
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trends in biblical exegesis and ethical reflection, is impossible without a proper 
understanding of Philo's work—which is by far the most elaborate of the three.39   
 Finally, a comprehensive investigation of Philo’s exposition of the Tenth 
Commandment promises a better understanding of key topics in Philo's ethical 
theory, which can in turn illuminate broader trends in Middle-Platonic ethical 
theory.40 For example, Philo grounds his exposition in theoretical overviews of 
the BV20, using a variety of technical terms and concepts.41 Clearly, he intends 
to establish at first a working model of ¦B42L:\" as BV2@H and then apply it to his 
discussion of the prohibition @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H. Because Philo is a Middle 
Platonist, his exposition offers valuable insight into the elements of a Middle-
Platonic theory of the "passions," insofar as it deals with passionate desire.42 The 
                                            
 39 For an overview of these three treatments, see Thomas Tobin, Paul's Rhetoric in Its 
Contexts: The Argument of Romans (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2004), 229-32. Tobin 
concludes that the three reflect "broader discussions within Hellenistic Judaism about the function 
of the law in relation to theories about the nature of the passions, particularly desire, in Greco-
Roman philosophy" (232). See also Petra von Gemünden, "Der Affekt der ¦B42L:\" und der <`:@H," in Das Gesetz im frühen Judentum und im Neuen Testament (ed. Dieter Sänger and 
Matthias Konradt; NTOA / SUNT 57; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; Fribourg: Academic 
Press, 2006), 55-74; Stanley Stowers, "Paul and Self Mastery," in Paul in the Greco-Roman 
World: A Handbook (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 2003), 524-
50, 531-34 (cf. Stanley Stowers, A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles [New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994], 58-65). 
40 On the fundamentally Platonic orientation of Philo’s thought, see esp. Thomas H. 
Billings, The Platonism of Philo Judaeus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919; repr., New 
York: Garland, 1979), made more useful by A.C. Geljon and D.T. Runia, "An Index Locorum to 
Billings, The Platonism of Philo Judaeus," SPhA 7 (1995): 169-85. On Philo as a Middle Platonist, 
see esp. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 139-83; also "Special Section: Philo and Middle 
Platonism," SPhA 5 (1993): 95-155. In light of contemporary Middle-Platonic moral psychology, 
Philo’s exposition of the Tenth Commandment looks like the work of a "de facto Middle Platonist," 
one of the six positions outlined in David Runia's typological spectrum (see "Was Philo a Middle 
Platonist? A Difficult Question Revisited," SPhA [1993]: 112-140, 125): "he does not belong to the 
school, but has a philosophical stance which is fundamentally Platonist and might well make him 
welcome in such circles."  
 41 See esp. Decal. 142-46, Spec. 4.79. 
 42 Simply put, Philo’s exposition reflects a Middle-Platonic theory of the passions, insofar 
as it combines a fundamentally Platonic psychology (esp. Spec. 4.92-94) with Stoic technical 
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concept of self-control (¦(6DVJ,4") also bears directly on Philo's understanding 
of the Tenth Commandment.43 When he begins his survey of the "particular 
laws," species of the genus @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, Philo cites the law of first fruits 
(Exod 23:19; Deut 18:4), which in his view exists "for the practice of self-control" 
(BDÎH –F60F4< . . . ¦(6D"J,\"H).44 This phrase suggests not only the importance 
of ¦(6DVJ,4", but also the relevance of another ethical concept, –F60F4H—
specifically, how Mosaic laws regarding food and drink function as practice in the 
cultivation of self-control.45 Understanding Philo’s exposition involves the 
clarification of these and other topics. 
                                                                                                                                  
definitions of passion(s) (esp. Spec. 4.79; cf. Decal. 142)—a combination evident in other Middle-
Platonic texts (e.g., Didask. 32.1 [185.26]). Middle Platonists rework these Stoic definitions, 
enabling them to describe psychological phenomena whose existence "orthodox" (i.e., 
Chrysippean) Stoicism would deny (e.g., non-rational parts of the soul in conflict with a rational 
part). Evidence in Philo’s exposition for this sort of reinvention exists but has not been properly 
assessed. For example, Philo in Spec. 4.79 adds to the Stoic definition of passion as "excessive 
impulse" (B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z; see DL 7.110 [=SVF I 50, 21], ESE 10 [=SVF III 92, 11], PHP IV 
2.8 [=SVF III 113, 15]) the qualifier "unmeasured" (–:,JD@H), which is unattested in the Stoic 
sources and indicates a failure to limit the quantitative force of a non-rational impulse—a notion 
incompatible with the Stoic understanding of impulse as a form of rational assent (on which see 
Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism [Oxford: Clarendon, 1985], esp. chs. 3 
and 5, NB 167-68 on "excessive impulse": "no aspect of the theory [Stoic psychology] . . . admits 
of the sort of variation of degree which would be needed for a more familiar quantitative sense of 
'excessive'."). 
 43 Spec. 4.97, 99, 101, 112 [x2], 124. For the explicit connection of ¦(6DVJ,4" with the 
Tenth Commandment, see, for example, vol. 2 of Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of 
Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (2 vols; 2d rev. print.; Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1948), 235-36; also Stowers, "Paul and Self Mastery," 532. For general 
considerations of ¦(6DVJ,4" in Philo, see esp. Maren Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity and 
Culture (TSAJ 86; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 94-110; also Stowers, "Paul and Self 
Mastery," 531-34 (cf. Stowers, Romans, 58-65). 
 44 Spec. 4.99. Philo twice lists ¦(6DVJ,4" as one of many different kinds of –F60F4H (Her. 
253, Leg. 3.18). Pierre Hadot uses Philo's two lists as a basis for his discussion of different 
"spiritual" exercises in antiquity, by which he means exercises of Greco-Roman philosophers 
pertaining to the soul, not exercises practiced in a religious setting (Pierre Hadot, "Spiritual 
Exercises," in Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault [ed. 
w/intro. Arnold Davidson; trans. Michael Case; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995], 81-125, 84). 
45 In regard to Philo's usage, the term –F60F4H has little to do with modern terms such as 
"ascetic" or "asceticism," whose connotations derive mostly from Christian monasticism. The 
Greek term has no intrinsic association with religious practice (see Hermigild Dressler, The Use 
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 Even an introductory survey of the nature and content of Philo's exposition 
of the Tenth Commandment commends it to further study. Moreover, Philo 
facilitates such study by neatly packaging his material: the structural layout of his 
broader Exposition of the Law makes his exposition of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H a 
complete text in and of itself. Earlier studies of Philo have touched on this text in 
a variety of ways, from a variety of perspectives, with a variety of results. 
HISTORY OF RESEARCH 
 Had Philo chosen to publish his exposition of the Tenth commandment as 
an independent work, it surely by now would have received more attention. But to 
date there is no comprehensive study of this important treatise, one that deals 
exclusively with Philo's view of the Tenth Commandment in light of his interests, 
his agenda, his organization of the material, and his understanding of the 
relevant topics—one that clearly and adequately answers the two basic 
questions of what the Commandment prohibits and how someone observes the 
Commandment. Translators of the units Decal. 142-53, 173-74 and Spec. 4.78b-
131 offer general remarks on Philo's interpretation of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, along 
with commentary on specific passages, but the scope of their work is too broad 
and too sketchy to treat those units—especially the exposition proper—in 
sufficient depth.46 Similarly, a number of works whose aims lie elsewhere offer 
                                                                                                                                  
of z!F6XT and Its Cognates in Greek Documents to 100 AD [CUAPS 78; Washington: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1947]). For Philo, –F60F4H pertains mainly to ethical philosophy, as 
one of three ways to acquire virtue: nature, instruction, and practice (e.g., Abr. 52).  
 46 Translations for the Decal. units (§§142-53, §§173-74) are in chronological order: 
Leopold Treitel, PCH 1 (1909); F. H. Colson, PLCL 7 (1937); Valentin Nikiprowetzky, PAPM 23 
(1965); Francesca Calabi, Filone, Decalogo (2005); cf. Ronald Williamson, Jews in the Hellenistic 
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incidental, often helpful, remarks on Philo's Tenth Commandment, but never in 
an effort to explain his view in full.47 In fact, only two works offer sustained 
treatments of the Tenth Commandment in Philo, and neither satisfies the need 
for a comprehensive study. 
Harry A. Wolfson 
 In an extensive work on Philo, Harry Wolfson devotes part of a chapter on 
ethics to a study of the Tenth Commandment.48 The title of his brief analysis, 
"The Virtue of the Control of Desire," reflects a broader aim on Wolfson's part to 
explore the relationship between law and virtue, in particular where and how 
Philo's understanding of Mosaic law incorporates terms and concepts derived 
from Greek ethical theory (and/or Jewish tradition).49 He does not intend to 
                                                                                                                                  
World: Philo (CCWJCW 1.2; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 255-78. For the 
Spec. 4 unit (§§78b-131): Isaak Heinemann, PCH 2 (1910); F. H. Colson, PLCL 8 (1939); and 
André Mosès, PAPM 25 (1970). 
 47 For example, Amir, "Decalogue," 158-59; Klaus Berger, Die Gesetzesauslegung Jesu 
(WMANT 40.1; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1972), 346-48; Erwin Goodenough, The 
Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), 207-08; 
Walther Houston, "Towards an Integrated Reading of the Dietary Laws of Leviticus," in The Book 
of Leviticus: Composition and Reception (ed. R. Rendtorff and R. Kugler; VTSup 93; FIOTL 3; 
Leiden: Brill, 2003), 142-61, 144-47; Kellermann, "Dekalog," 168; Lluch Baixauli, "Decálogo," 
436-38; William Loader, "The Decalogue" in The Septuagint, Sexuality, and the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2004), 5-25, 12-14; Anita Méasson, Du char ailé de Zeus à 
l’Arche d’Alliance: Images et mythes platoniciens chez Philon d’Alexandrie (Paris: Études 
Augustiniennes, 1987), 154; Thomas E. Phillips, "Revisiting Philo: Discussions of Wealth and 
Poverty in Philo's Ethical Discourse," JSNT 83 (2001): 111-21, 114-15; Alexander Rofé, "The 
Tenth Commandment in the Light of Four Deuteronomic Laws," in The Ten Commandments in 
History and Tradition (ed. B.-Z. Segal and G. Levi; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990), 45-65, 48-
49; Torrey Seland, "The Moderate Life of the Christian paroikoi: A Philonic Reading of 1 Pet 
2:11," in Philo und das Neue Testament (WUNT 172; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 241-64, 
259-63; Stowers, "Paul and Self-Mastery," 531-34 (cf. Stowers, Romans, 58-65); Tobin, Paul's 
Rhetoric, 231-32.    
 48 Wolfson, Philo, 2:225-37.  
 49 Before his discussion of the Tenth Commandment, Wolfson deals with the topics 
"'Under the Law' and 'In Accordance with Nature'" (165-200) and "Commandments and Virtues" 
(200-225). Topics in "The Virtue of the Control of Desire," listed in the table of contents as 
subheadings, are: "Control of actions and control of emotions, 225.—The treatment of the tenth 
commandment as dealing with the control of the pure emotion of desire in native Jewish tradition 
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provide a comprehensive analysis of the contents of Philo’s exposition. Instead, 
as part of a sweeping effort to reconstruct Philo's system of thought, he considers 
the significance within that system of a moral imperative aimed not at action(s) 
but at "pure emotion."50 Although limited, Wolfson's treatment nevertheless 
includes substantive claims about Philo's interpretation of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H. 
 Wofson's most valuable contribution comes at the end of his analysis, 
where he recognizes the central importance of ¦(6DVJ,4" in Philo's overall 
understanding of the Tenth Commandment.51 In particular, he recognizes that 
"[t]he negative tenth commandment is . . . a command to control one's desire."52 
In other words, the negative prohibition implies a positive command to cultivate 
the virtue of ¦(6DVJ,4", which—as Wolfson notes—is "the positive term . . . by 
which the control of excessive desire is to be described."53 But because his 
interests lie elsewhere, he only considers that this is true, not how this is true. He 
never answers the basic question of how someone observes the Tenth 
Commandment or how it in fact promotes ¦(6DVJ,4". Wolfson also realizes that, 
for Philo, other Mosaic laws work along with the Tenth Commandment to 
                                                                                                                                  
and in Philo, 226.—Philo's diatribe against the emotions and the rabbis' diatribes against the evil 
yetzer, 229.—Similarity and difference between Philo on the one hand and Aristotle and the 
Stoics on the other in their treatment of the emotion of desire, 231.—'Continence' as the virtue 
opposed to the vice of 'desire,' 235." 
 50 Wolfson, Philo, 2:225. 
 51 Stanley Stowers (e.g., "Paul and Self Mastery," 532) similarly notes the importance of ¦(6DVJ,4" for Philo’s understanding of the Tenth Commandment. 
 52 Wolfson, Philo, 2:235.  
 53 Wolfson, Philo, 2:235. 
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promote ¦(6DVJ,4".54 But he never mentions the dietary laws, let alone explain 
how—in Philo's view—they pertain to @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H. In this respect Wolfson's 
treatment, even where it does correctly characterize Philo's view of the Tenth 
Commandment, remains sketchy. 
 Although valuable for its emphasis on ¦(6DVJ,4", Wolfson's study 
misconstrues Philo's view of what the Commandment prohibits. He makes the 
unfounded assumption that Philo, with the Septuagint version in mind, 
understands the Tenth Commandment to be a prohibition only of desire for what 
belongs to another person.55 Wolfson does not acknowledge the generalizing 
effect of Philo's abbreviated @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, choosing instead to retain the 
Septuagint version's specification "of your neighbor" (J@Ø B80F\@< F@L).56 He 
admits that this specification does not appear in Philo's commentary but assumes 
it nevertheless: 
 Though Philo speaks of desire in general, that is, of a desire for what we 
 have not, and not of a desire for that which belongs to somebody else, still 
 his discussion, in so far as it is a commentary upon the commandment, 
 implies that the desire of which he speaks is that desire which the 
 commandment explicitly describes as a desire for that which  belongs to 
 another person. (Wolfson, Philo, 2:228)57  
                                            
 54 "It is the virtue of 'continence' . . . that is taught by the tenth commandment as well as 
by all those special laws of which the purpose, as seen by [Philo], is to teach the control of 
desire" (Wolfson, Philo, 2:236).  
 55 Wolfson, Philo, 2:228-29.  
 56 Wolfson takes this in its most general sense of ÓF" Jè B80F\@< F@b ¦FJ4<, as the LXX 
version stipulates. He cites and disagrees with Colson, whose assessment is correct: "The words 
'thy neighbour's,' which are repeated so emphatically in the tenth commandment, as we have it 
and Philo also had it in the LXX, receive little attention from him" (PLCL 8, x). 
 57 Also 2:229: "It is exactly the latter kind of desire, the desire for that which belongs to 
somebody else, that the tenth commandment as a law, and not a mere moral maxim, legally 
prohibits, according to Philo . . .." Ibid.: "In his discussion of the legal prohibition not to desire that 
which belongs to one's neighbor, a prohibition, as we have said, of a mere desire for that which 
belongs to one's neighbor." 
21 
 
 
 
The only evidence Wolfson offers in support of this view involves Philo's first 
example of an object of desire, namely money (PDZ:"J").58 He argues that, 
although Philo does not specify the money's source:  
 the subsequent statement that a desire for money leads to robbery and 
 purse-cutting and house-breaking makes it quite evident that the desire for 
 money spoken of was not a desire for money in general but rather for the 
 money in the pocket or the purse or the house of one particular person.  
 (Wolfson, Philo, 2:228) 
 
But Wolfson fails to cite the entire passage, which goes on to associate the 
desire for money also with, for example, receiving bribes (*TD@*@6\"4H), which 
clearly involves greed per se and not desire for the money "of one particular 
person." Moreover, the other examples of desiderata on Philo's list, none of 
which Wolfson mentions, hardly make sense when construed strictly as 
belonging to another person. This is especially true in the case of desires for food 
and drink, which are, for Philo, governed by the Tenth Commandment's particular 
laws.59  
 Wolfson's study suffers also from an outdated conception of Philo's 
relationship to Greek philosophy. As he investigates select details of Philo's 
"homily on the evils of desire," Wolfson considers Philo an eclectic who adopts 
any number of different philosophical positions ad hoc. Wolfson suggests that in 
most of his analysis of ¦B42L:\" Philo chooses a Stoic position, but "[w]henever 
                                            
 58 Spec 4.87: "If the desire is directed to money it makes men thieves and cut-purses, 
footpads, burglars, guilty of defaulting to their creditors, repudiating deposits, receiving bribes, 
robbing temples and of all similar actions." 
 59 On Philo's association of the Tenth Commandment with dietary laws, Amir notes: "This 
association of ideas is possible only if the Commandment is shorn of its concluding words, 
'anything that is your neighbor's'. For after all, kashrut has nothing to do with issues of ownership, 
of 'mine and thine'. An animal is not forbidden as food because it is stolen goods" ("Decalogue," 
159). 
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forced by certain native Jewish presuppositions, he departs from the Stoics and 
follows some other philosopher or presents a new view of his own."60 Wolfson is 
correct, generally speaking, when he matches various terms and concepts in 
Philo's commentary with the same terms and concepts in sources known to be, 
for example, Stoic.61 But he gives the misleading impression that Philo freely 
vacillates from one philosophical opinion to another, with no underlying 
commitment to one philosophical orientation over another. Philo's "eclectic" 
philosophical mix is instead best understood as a reflection of his Middle 
Platonism; but without this insight Wolfson's study cannot provide an adequate 
understanding of Philo's philosophical perspective.62 
 In sum, Wolfson offers a substantial discussion of the Tenth 
Commandment in Philo, but one whose breadth and depth are severely limited 
due to the relatively minor role it plays within a much larger and more broadly 
oriented work. His answer to the question of what, in Philo's view, the Tenth 
Commandment prohibits is incorrect, since he limits the scope of ¦B42L:\" to 
                                            
 60 Wolfson, Philo, 2:231. Wolfson initially emphasizes Stoic provenance: e.g., 2:230: "It is 
the Stoics . . . whom Philo follows here in the external formulation of his views." . . . "He similarly 
follows the Stoics . . .." 
 61 E.g., Wolfson cites SVF for definitions of emotion comparable to Spec. 4.79, but he 
fails to note the significance of the non-Stoic –:,JD@H in Philo's definition (see above, n. 42). 
 62 Cf. Dillon, Middle Platonists, 182: "My chief thesis (as against such an authority as H.A. 
Wolfson, for example) is that Philo was not so much constructing for himself an eclectic synthesis 
of all Greek philosophy, from the Presocratics to Posidonius, as essentially adapting 
contemporary Alexandrian Platonism, which was itself heavily influenced by Stoicism and 
Pythagoreanism, to his own exegetical purposes." For a fuller, yet still concise, statement of this 
position, in which Dillon rejects the misconceptions of (1) Philo as an "eclectic" who (2) merely 
uses philosophical language to serve exegetical aims, see his preface to Philo of Alexandria: The 
Contemplative Life, The Giants, and Selections (trans. and intro. David Winston; CWS; Mahwah, 
N.J.: Paulist, 1981), xii-xiii. See also David Winston's introduction (idem, 1-37), in which he 
accepts Philo's views as "Middle Platonist, that is, a highly Stoicized form of Platonism, streaked 
with Neopythagorean concerns" (3). 
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only desire for what belongs to another person. Nor does he answer the question 
of how someone observes the Tenth Commandment, although he provides the 
proper context for an answer—namely, the acquisition, development, and 
exercise of ¦(6DVJ,4". Finally, his comments on the nature and function of 
¦B42L:\", although helpful at times, fail to represent Philo's relationship with 
Greek philosophy properly. 
Kathy L. Gaca 
 In her book The Making of Fornication, Kathy Gaca includes a chapter on 
Philo that deals in part with his understanding of the abbreviated Tenth 
Commandment.63 While the broad scope of her work precludes an exhaustive 
treatment of Philo’s exposition, Gaca nevertheless presents a sustained and 
virtually self-contained study of Philo's interpretation of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, offering 
summary conclusions and a bold thesis about Philo's notion of forbidden 
desire.64 Taking all three of the relevant text units into account (Decal. 142-53, 
173-74; Spec. 4.78b-131), she addresses not only the question of what, in Philo's 
view, the Commandment prohibits, but also but also how someone observes the 
Commandment, including an explanation of how the dietary laws promote its 
                                            
 63 Chapter seven [="Philo's Reproductive City of God"] in The Making of Fornication: 
Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity (HCS 40; Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), 190-217. Pages 193-99 deal directly with the Tenth 
Commandment. 
 64 See esp. her section titled "Philo's Revolutionary Conception of Forbidden Desire" 
(Gaca, Making of Fornication, 194-204). The aim of her book is "to resolve an important 
philosophical and historical problem about the making of sexual morality in Western culture: Do 
the patristic sexual rules of second-century Christianity differ notably from the Greek philosophical 
sexual principles that the patristic writers used to help formulate their own? Alternatively, are 
these Christian rules in unison with the Greek philosophical basis that they claim to have" (1). Her 
interest in Philo lies mainly in his contribution to the sexual ethics of "Christian Platonism" (see 
193-94, along with her study of Clement of Alexandria in 247-72). 
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observance.65 In one important general respect Gaca's work breaks new ground 
and sets a worthy standard: in her consideration of Philo's view of @Û6 
¦B42L:ZF,4H, she takes seriously the idea that he is a Middle Platonist, 
consistently bearing in mind his debt to Plato and his acceptance of Platonic 
doctrines pertinent to an analysis of ¦B42L:\".66 But in her analysis of Philo's 
view, Gaca misconstrues the textual data, misreading a number of passages and 
failing to mention others that would readily disprove her claims.67 For this reason, 
and because her study proposes a definitive—but incorrect—account of how 
Philo understands the Tenth Commandment, it deserves a detailed review. 
 Stated in its broadest terms, Gaca's thesis is that Philo's explanation of 
the abbreviated Tenth Commandment combines two elements into one 
innovative "Jewish Middle Platonist notion of forbidden desire"—namely, (1) "the 
Hellenistic Jewish concern about the desire (¦B42L:\") to disobey God's laws" 
and (2) "the Middle Platonist problem of excessive physical appetites (¦B42L:\"4) 
                                            
 65 Gaca does not quote Philo at length, but she does refer to passages from all three 
units of his exposition, indicating her awareness of the extent of his treatment. Her references 
take into account esp. Decal. 142, 173-174 and Spec. 4.78, 85, 87-96, 100-118.  
 66 On Gaca's concept of Philo as a "Jewish Middle Platonist," see Making of Fornication, 
191, n. 2. Although her conclusions are problematic, Gaca's approach is commendable in several 
respects. For example, she brings a Platonic psychological model to bear on the textual data of 
Philo’s exposition, relating his discussion of ¦B42L:\" to Plato's theory that there is in the soul a 
distinct, non-rational source of ¦B42L:\"—i.e., [JÎ] •8`(4FJ`< J, 6"Â ¦B42L:0J46`< [,É*@H] (Resp. 
439 D; NB Spec. 4.92-94 [cf. Tim. 70 D-E]). Moreover, she notes key implications of Plato's 
theory, such as one's inability to remove appetitive ¦B42L:\" entirely and the consequent 
importance of its moderation (e.g., Making of Fornication, 197). Gaca also understands that 
Philo's Middle Platonism involves the reinvention of Stoic terms and definitions: "The Stoic 
definitions of the passions that Philo uses are thus like a label that at first glance looks Stoic, but 
the contents have changed" (201). Gaca's understanding of exactly how Philo changes the 
contents is problematic, but this statement as such is correct.   
 67 Cf. David Runia's review of The Making of Fornication in SPhA 17 (2005): 237-43, esp. 
241-43. Runia's summary assessment of Gaca's study includes a caveat: "[B]ecause its method 
of analyzing and interpreting texts is flawed, it is to be used with caution" (243). 
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for the pleasures of food, drink, and especially sexual activity, contrary to 
reason's judicious sense of moderation."68 What this means is that Philo follows a 
broader exegetical trend within Hellenistic Judaism to treat the Tenth 
Commandment as an abbreviated, two-word prohibition (@Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H), but 
he does not follow the standard line of interpretation, which takes the prohibition 
to mean "that it is wrong or sinful even to desire to act contrary to God's will."69 
Instead, Philo follows Plato's conviction that uncontrolled appetitive desire, 
especially sexual desire, corrupts individuals and societies, and for this reason 
                                            
 68 See Gaca, Making of Fornication, 194-95. Stated differently: "He reinterprets Platonic 
appetition—and sexual desire foremost—in light of the Hellenistic Jewish prohibition against the 
desire (¦B42L:\") to disobey God's will" (197). Gaca frames her thesis as a matter of sexual 
ethics: "Philo's sexual principles are part of an innovative agenda for social order that borrows 
from Plato and the Pentateuch, makes sense only in relation to both, and yet represents neither 
without noteworthy transformation. This is especially true for Philo's reinterpretation of the 
problems Plato sees with sexual desire, which Philo presents in his take on the aphoristic version 
of the Tenth Commandment: 'You will not desire' (@Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H). In Philo's synthesis, 
forbidden desire (¦B42L:\") in the Hellenistic Jewish sense, which signifies any inclination to defy 
God's will, becomes primarily sexual in light of Plato's conviction that uncontrolled desire 
(¦B42L:\") for sexual pleasure is the single biggest source of individual and social corruption" 
(Gaca, Making of Fornication, 193).    
 69 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 153. See 153-54 for Gaca's idea of a "Hellenistic Jewish 
variant on the Septuagint Tenth Commandment." In her discussion of Philo, Gaca speaks of "the 
Hellenistic Jewish Tenth Commandment in its two more traditional forms," by which she means 
(a) the LXX version itself (Exod 20:17 [=Deut 5:21]) and (b) the abbreviated version @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, which omits the list of direct objects (198). She believes that Paul and Philo's 
citations of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H serve as evidence for a hypothetical tertium quid—namely, an 
exegetical tradition that influenced these two authors. Her supposition involves first the claim that 
prior to Philo, who in fact offers the earliest extant citation of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H (see above, n. 37), 
one or more unidentified Hellenistic Jewish exegetes chose to make an abbreviated Tenth 
Commandment their object of inquiry. This is of course plausible, but the alternate supposition 
that Philo himself was the first to cite and interpret @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H is equally plausible and less 
speculative. After all, his is the most extensive extant commentary on the abbreviated version 
and—contingent on unknown facts regarding the publication of his Exposition of the Law—is as 
likely as any to have been the seminal work. Be that as it may, Gaca goes on to attribute a 
standard line of interpretation to this already hypothetical exegetical tradition. ?Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, 
the "newer prohibition" offered by the tradition, means "that it is wrong or sinful even to desire to 
act contrary to God's will" (153). Gaca's view problematically requires Philo to creatively modify a 
tradition for which no evidence exists, at least in terms of an extant text that cites @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, then explicitly offers the interpretive conclusion "that it is wrong or sinful even to 
desire to act contrary to God's will." (On 152 Gaca cites "a broader Hellenistic Jewish and early 
Christian trend that stresses the danger of rebellious impulses very stringently"; but this broader 
trend—even if it did exist—does not constitute evidence for the exegetical trend that Gaca posits.)  
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he interprets @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H as a divine injunction to control appetitive, 
especially sexual, desire. 
 This last idea, that Philo's Tenth Commandment deals especially with 
sexual desire, deserves careful attention, since it in effect answers the question 
of what the Commandment prohibits. Ultimately, this idea derives from a 
reasonable but false assumption on Gaca's part that Philo imports without 
modification a certain concept of desire found in Plato's writings—a concept she 
outlines in an earlier chapter of her study.70 Taken for granted, this assumption 
drives an almost syllogistic logic that informs much of what Gaca has to say 
about Philo’s view of the Tenth Commandment: (a) when Plato thinks of 
¦B42L:\" and its dangerous propensity for excess, he has in mind physical 
appetites, especially the sexual appetite; (b) when Philo thinks of the 
Commandment @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, he has in mind Plato's concept of ¦B42L:\" 
and its dangerous propensity for excess, therefore (c) Philo has in mind physical 
appetites, especially the sexual appetite. A number of sweeping claims ensue: 
 Philo reinterprets this commandment in a Platonic spirit that is very  much 
 in keeping with "nothing in excess," as though @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H meant 
 "you will restrain your physical appetites from becoming excessive," the 
 sexual appetite especially. By @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H in this sense, God too 
 teaches the Platonic doctrine that depravity is grounded primarily in the 
                                            
 70 See Gaca, Making of Fornication, 26-41, esp. 32-33. The accuracy of Gaca's reading 
of Plato on this point bears only secondary importance, since the question is what Philo has to 
say about desire in his exposition of the Tenth Commandment. Even if she has correctly 
understood Plato's concept of appetitive desire, this concept must not serve automatically as the 
interpretive lens for Philo's understanding of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H without proof that Philo too is 
employing the same concept. This is especially true if Philo, as Gaca admits, is a Middle 
Platonist, which implies that he would have employed "Platonic" concepts that had been modified 
in significant respects in light of philosophical developments postdating Plato. 
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 unrestrained sexual appetite and its progeny of vices. (Gaca, Making of 
 Fornication, 196) 
 
Or similarly:  
 In God's social order these iniquities would become a thing of the past, so 
 long as the people heed the commandment @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H by getting 
 their appetitive urges under control, especially sexual desire. (Idem)71 
 
Gaca frames these statements carefully, avoiding the claim that @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H 
deals exclusively with sexual desire. She does, after all, understand that the 
basic operation of Plato's ¦B42L:0J46`< involves desires also for food and 
drink.72 But in some instances there is no clear acknowledgement of the 
relevance of non-sexual desire(s) within the Commandment's purview: "Philo's 
Tenth Commandment is innovative as a Decalogue rule because it valorizes 
sexual desire as the main source of all wickedness."73 In other instances, 
particularly in concluding summaries of her argument, there is no indication that 
anything but sexual desire lies within the proscriptive range of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H: 
 Though Philo supports Plato's argument that uncontrolled sexual desire is 
 the primary and most incorrigible source of all vices, he identifies the 
                                            
 71 The "iniquities" Gaca has in mind appear in Republic 575 B. In her view, Philo cites this 
passage in Spec. 4.87 (certainly an allusion, but Philo's PD,T6@B\"4H J, 6"Â B"D"6"J"206ä< •D<ZF,F4 has no parallel in the Republic passage) to illustrate "proliferating vices that he 
attributes to breaking his version of the Tenth Commandment" (196). But in Spec. 4.87, Philo 
explicitly considers desire directed at "money" (PDZ:"J"), not sexual or even appetitive desire per 
se. Plato does consider PDZ:"J" an object of appetitive desire (see Resp. 580 E), but Philo's 
inclusion of other objects of ¦B42L:\", like "reputation" (*`>"), which Plato does not associate 
with appetitive desire, proves that ¦B42L:\" in his exposition must be conceived more broadly. 
 72 E.g., Plato cites thirst to illustrate the distinction between rational and appetitive 
elements within the soul (see Resp. 439 A-E; cf. 437 D: "'[S]hall we say that the desires 
(¦B42L:4ä<) constitute a class and that the most conspicuous members of that class are what we 
call thirst and hunger?' 'We shall,' said he" [trans. Paul Shorey] [unless otherwise noted, all 
translations of Plato’s writings are from the Loeb Classical Library]).  
 73 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 198. Also: " Philo's version of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, however, 
prohibits unrestrained sexual desire as the primary religious defiance and corruption in the city of 
God" (198). 
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 Hellenistic Jewish notion of desiring to disobey God (¦B42L:\") with the 
 Platonic sexual appetite (¦B42L:\"). (Gaca, Making of Fornication, 297; 
 emphasis added)74  
 
Gaca clearly has an answer to the question of what Philo's Tenth Commandment 
prohibits. Although she ostensibly points to "excessive appetitive desire," she in 
fact has appetitive sexual desire in mind.75 
 But the idea that Philo's concept of desire in his exposition is exclusively—
or even primarily—sexual is incorrect, since Philo associates @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H 
with a generic desire involving any number of different objects, none of which 
looms any larger than another in the Commandment's theoretically limitless 
proscriptive range.76 In fact, the idea that @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H deals with a specific 
desire of any type is inherently implausible, because Philo believes that the Ten 
                                            
 74 Cf. 216, where Philo is said to identify "the Platonic notion of sexual desire (¦B42L:\") 
with the Hellenistic Jewish concern about the inherently wrongful impulse (¦B42L:\") to 
transgress God's laws. He makes this identification most notably through his Jewish Middle 
Platonist explanation of the commandment against forbidden desire (@Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H)" 
(emphasis added). Also 23: "[Plato] would have needed an interpreter to understand how the 
problems that he associates with uncontrolled sexual desire were written into the Tenth 
Commandment that Philo and Clement produced." 
 75 This exclusive focus is confirmed by Gaca's construal of the Mosaic dietary laws, which 
in her view do not ultimately regulate appetitive desires for food and drink, but instead target the 
Tenth Commandment's real concern—sexual desire: "Philo regards Moses' dietary laws as the 
one sure regimen that reduces sexual desire and thereby subdues its offspring of vices" (Making 
of Fornication, 196).  
 76 On this point there seems to be virtually unanimous agreement among commentators, 
with the exception of Gaca. For example, Colson (PLCL 7, 76, n. c): "Philo extends the meaning 
of the word from covetousness of what is another's to desire in general"; Mosès (PAPM 25, 17, 
n.1): Philo's version of the Tenth Commandment "n'admet pas de contenu veritable, puisque le 
désir est lui-même coupe de tout objet précis"; Williamson (Philo, 267): "Philo . . . extends the 
meaning of a desire to include its most general sense." Even Wolfson (2:228), who needlessly 
specifies "desire for that which belongs to another person," nevertheless acknowledges that 
"Philo speaks of desire in general, that is, of a desire for what we have not." On the concept of 
generic desire, note esp. Migr. 155: "It is this mixed multitude which takes delight not in a few 
species of desire only (:¬ :`<@< Ï8\(@4H ,Ç*,F4< ¦B42L:\"H P"\DT<), but claims to leave out 
nothing at all, that it may follow after desire’s entire genus ((X<@H), including all its species (ø B< ,É*@H ¦:NXD,J"4)" (substituting "desire" [¦B42L:\"] and "desire's" [¦B42L:\"H] for Colson's 
"lusting" and "lust's," neither of which the context supports). 
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Commandments are all generic summaries.77 Philo's commentary consistently 
reflects his underlying belief in a prohibition of desire able to subsume any and all 
specific types. For example, in Spec. 4.80 Philo identifies this most troublesome 
passion simply as "desire for what we do not have" (¦B42L:\" Jä< •B`<JT<).78 
When Philo goes on to associate this desire with specific aims, he is merely 
illustrating its troublesome nature, noting that it creates savage hunger and thirst, 
"but not for something to fill the void in their bellies—they hunger for money, 
fame, power, voluptuous bodies, or any of the countless other things that seem 
to them enviable and worthy of struggle" (Spec. 4.82; my translation).79 As this 
list indicates, sexual desire is not foremost in Philo's mind, nor even appetitive 
desire per se.80 At most, sexual desire forms a part, but only a small part, of 
                                            
 77 NB Spec. 4.78b: "[L]et us go on to the last of the Ten Words (*X6" 8@(\T<), which like 
each of the rest was delivered in the form of a summary (6,N"8"4f*,4 JbBå 6"2VB,D 6"Â Jä< –88T< ª6"FJ@<): 'Your shall not desire'" (my translation). Note also the following descriptions of 
the Ten Commandments: Cong. 120: (,<46 6,NV8"4"; Her. 167: Jä< (,<46ä< *X6" <`:T<; 
Her. 173: (,<46@\ . . . 6"<`<,H. 
 78 Philo's immediate specification of "things which seem good, though they are not truly 
good" (ÓF" Jè *@6,Ã< •("2ä<, BDÎH •8Z2,4"< @Û6 Ð<JT<) mitigates the generic sense of ¦B42L:\" somewhat but still allows for most any particular "good" object (cf. the parallel passage 
in Decal. 146: ¦B,4*< *¥ 8"$f< J4H §<<@4"< •("2@Ø :¬ B"D`<J@H ÏDX(0J"4 JLP,Ã< "ÛJ@Ø). Of 
course, when Philo turns to the Tenth Commandment's particular laws (dietary laws) the desire 
for food and drink are singled out, but in a paradigmatic, not absolute, sense (see Spec. 4.96).  
 79 Cf. Spec. 4.86-91.  
 80 In fact, Gaca's proposal that ¦B42L:\" in Philo’s exposition refers specifically to 
Platonic appetitive desire (a function of JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<) collapses with the mention in Spec. 
4.82 of *`>" (cf. §88) and º(,:@<\" (cf. •DPZ in §89)—which represent, in Plato's own reckoning, 
ambitions of the spirited part of the soul, JÎ 2L:@,4*XH. E.g., Resp. 581 A-B: "'[D]o we not say that 
[JÎ 2L:@,4*XH] is wholly set on predominance (JÎ 6D"J,Ã<) and victory (<46<) and good repute 
(,Û*@64:,Ã<)?' 'Yes indeed.' 'And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part 
(N48`<46@<) and that which is covetous of honour (N48`J4:@<)?' 'Most appropriately.'" (On JÎ 2L:@,4*XH see John Cooper, "Plato's Theory of Human Motivation," in Reason and Emotion 
[Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999], 118-37, esp. 130-36; repr. from HPhQ 1 [1984].) 
Schmidt, Anthropologie, 92-93, notes: "Als Gegenstand des Begehrens werden fast durchweg die 
Strebungen, die Platon von dem zweiten und dritten Sellenteil aussagt, zusammengefaßt." This 
conflation of JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`< and JÎ 2L:@,4*XH makes sense in light of Middle-Platonic moral 
psychology, which was influenced by Aristotle's concept of ¦B42L:\" and 2L:`H as two types of 
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Philo's overall concept of desire with respect to the Tenth Commandment.81 Not 
only do Philo's words fail to support the claim that @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H targets 
sexual desire—they positively refute it. 
 Naturally, this raises the question of where and how Gaca finds textual 
support for her idea that the desire proscribed by Philo's Tenth Commandment is 
primarily sexual. She asserts that "Philo accepts Plato's theory of the irrational 
physical appetites as well as his position that the sexual appetite is the most 
domineering and recalcitrant of the lot" (emphasis added), citing Spec. 4.92-94 to 
support her claim:82  
Finally, they determined that desire must reside in the area around the 
navel known as the "diaphragm" (¦B42L:\‘ *¥ JÎ< B,DÂ JÎ< Ï:N"8Î< 6"Â JÎ 6"8@b:,<@< *4VND"(:" PäD@<). Since desire has the least to do with 
reason (»64FJ" :,JXP@LF"< 8@(4F:@Ø), it clearly must reside as far as 
possible from reason's royal domain—practically at the outskirts. Naturally, 
the pasture of this most insatiable and licentious of beasts (BV<JT< 
                                                                                                                                  ÐD,>4H, which both belonged to a single faculty of the soul, the ÏD,6J46`< (see P. A. Vander 
Waerdt: "The Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato's Tripartite Psychology," GRBS 26 [1985]: 283-
302 and "Peripatetic Soul-Division, Posidonius, and Middle Platonic Moral Psychology," GRBS 26 
[1985]: 373-94; cf. Charles Kahn, "Plato's Theory of Desire," RM 41 [1987]: 77-103, 78-80).   
 81 The passage in Philo’s exposition that pertains to sexual desire appears in Spec. 4.89: 
"If the object [of desire] is bodily beauty they are seducers (N2@D,ÃH), adulterers (:@4P@bH), 
pederasts (B"4*,D"FJVH), cultivators of incontinence and lewdness (•6@8"F\"H 6"Â 8"(<,\"H .08TJVH), as though these worst of evils were the best of blessings." In Decal. 168-69, Philo has 
in mind the very same types of immoral sexual behavior, but he is commenting on a different 
Commandment, the 6,NV8"4@< JÎ 6"J :@4Pä<, "under which come many enactments against 
seducers (N2@DXT<) and pederasty (B"4*,D"FJä<), against dissolute living (Jä< 8"(<\FJ,D@< $4@b<JT<) and indulgence in lawless and licentious forms of intercourse (Ò:48\"4H J, 6"Â :\>,F4< ¦6<`:@4H 6"Â •6@8VFJ@4H PDT:X<T<)." The lack of commentary on sexual matters in Philo’s 
exposition of the Tenth Commandment is best explained by his having already dealt with such 
matters in his exposition of the Sixth Commandment, which governs the obviously sexual 
transgression of adultery. The preeminence of the Sixth Commandment, not the Tenth, in Philo's 
consideration of sexual ethics is correctly noted by Baudouin Decharneux, "Interdits sexuels dans 
l’œuvre de Philon d’Alexandrie dit ‘Le Juif,’" Religion et Tabou Sexuel (ed. Jacques Marx; PHR 1; 
Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1990), 17-31, esp. 18-25. 
 82 See Gaca, Making of Fornication, 195. Presumably, Spec. 4.92-94 is the textual 
evidence Gaca has in mind, since it is the only passage she cites in the paragraph other than 
Decal 173-74, which for her serves only to prove that "appetites are an unavoidable part of our 
human and animal nature." 
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•B80FJ`J"J@< 6"Â •6@8"FJ`J"J@< @ÞF"< 2D,::VJT<) is the area of the 
body associated with primal drives for food and sex (¦:$`F6,F24 J`B@4H, ¦< @ÍH JD@N"\ J, 6"Â ÏP,Ã"4). (Spec 4.93-94)83 
 
Philo clearly marks in this passage the Platonic ¦B42L:0J46`< as the seat of 
primal drives for food and sex, but this is ultimately nothing more than an 
endorsement of Plato's tripartite psychology.84 By itself, this passage does not 
prove that Philo saw @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H primarily as a restriction of sexual desire. 
In fact, not one of the passages Gaca cites reflects a special emphasis on sexual 
appetite in Philo’s exposition. She claims that he agrees with Plato that: 
 [t]he sexual appetite and reproductive urge, when fattened and left to their 
 own devices, are the main root of depraved minds and social mores 
 because they stimulate a proliferation of other passions. (Gaca, Making of 
 Fornication, 195) 
 
To support this claim, she cites Spec. 4.85 as follows: "Sexual eros is 'the 
passion at the origin of wrongdoing' (•DPX6"6@< BV2@H) (Spec 4.85)."85 But a 
fuller citation shows that Gaca misreads Philo's statement:  
 For the passion to which the name of originator of evil can truly be given is 
 desire (J`. . . •DPX6"6@< BV2@H ¦FJ4< ¦B42L:\"), of which one and that 
 the smallest fruit the passion of love (½H «< JÎ $D"PbJ"J@< §((@<@<, §DTH) 
 has not only once but often in the past filled the whole world with 
 countless calamities (FL:N@Dä<) . . . (Spec. 4.85) 
 
                                            
 83 My translation. Cf. Tim. 70 D – 71 A. On the relation of Spec. 4.92-94 to the Timaeus 
account, see Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, 304. 
 84 NB 8`(@H, 2L:`H, and ¦B42L:\" in Spec. 4.92. Gaca may be justified in her suggestion 
that Philo here endorses "Plato's theory of the irrational physical appetites" (Gaca, Making of 
Fornication, 195), but Philo says nothing about "[Plato's] position that the sexual appetite is the 
most domineering and recalcitrant of the lot." Gaca assumes that a reference to the Platonic ¦B42L:0J46`< mentioning its characteristic appetites proves ipso facto that Philo holds a highly 
sexualized concept of ¦B42L:\" throughout his exposition.  
 85 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 195. 
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The •DPX6"6@< BV2@H in this passage is clearly ¦B42L:\" (desire involving any 
object), not "sexual eros" as Gaca states.86 Philo does identify §DTH as an 
"offspring" (§((@<@<) of ¦B42L:\", but nothing in the passage requires even this 
word to have a sexual connotation.87 Gaca also misconstrues the phrase 
BV<JT< B0(¬ Jä< 6"6ä< (Spec. 4.84), which she cites four times. The "spring 
of all vices" is indeed ¦B42L:\", but in light of Spec. 4.82 (esp. –88T< •:L2ZJT<) 
it must be understood as desire involving any number of possible objects—not 
sexual desire, or even appetitive desire per se. Gaca first misunderstands the 
sense when she states that "physical appetition in general" (¦B42L:\") is "the 
origin of all wrongdoing,"88 then she provides in each subsequent reference to 
Spec. 4.84 a different rendering of ¦B42L:\": 
                                            
86 Thus, for example, Méasson, Char ailé, 154: "Philon analyse d'abord le désir en lui-
même et, sans reference à aucun objet, le définit: •DPX6"6@< BV2@H, «la passion qui est le 
principe du mal» (§ 85)" (emphasis added). Note also "–88T< •:L2ZJT<" in Spec. 4.82. 
 87 Spec. 4.85 in its entirety shows that the "calamities" (FL:N@Dä<) Philo has in mind 
primarily involve warfare. A parallel passage in Decal. 152-53 also mentions "calamities" 
(FL:N@Dä<) involving warfare, and their source in that passage is the desire (¦B42L:\") for 
money (PD0:VJT<), glory (*`>0H), or pleasure (º*@<−H). In general, Gaca fails to note that §DTH in 
Philo’s exposition is not inherently sexual, given Philo's association of §DTH with a variety of 
objects, as in Decal. 151: "Consider the passion whether for money or a woman or glory or 
anything else that produces pleasure (PD0:VJT< §DTH ´ (L<"46ÎH ´ *`>0H ´ J4<@H –88@L Jä< º*@<¬< •B,D(".@:X<T<): are the evils which it causes small or casual?" Gaca seems to limit the 
scope of §DTH, by definition, to sexual desire alone: "Uncontrolled sexual desire, or eros, is 
especially problematic for Philo and his predecessor Plato" (Gaca, Making of Fornication, 195). 
This is surprising, since Gaca in an earlier chapter on Platonic desire emphatically notes the 
difference between "sexual appetite" and "Platonic eros" (see Making of Fornication, 36-69). On §DTH in Plato, including its orientation in theory toward any object, see David M. Halperin, 
"Platonic Erôs and What Men Call Love," AP 5 (1985): 161-204. Gaca faults Halperin's study for 
"diminish[ing] the opposition" between eros and sexual desire (Making of Fornication, 38, n. 53), 
when in fact he clearly and carefully notes the difference (Halperin, "Platonic Erôs," 170-76). Her 
citation of Halperin, intended to prove his conflation of eros and sexual appetite for sexual 
pleasure, fails to take into account his explicit distinction between the terms "appetite" and 
"desire" (see Halperin, "Platonic Erôs," 170). For the more general notion of §DTH in Plato, see 
esp. Symp. 205 D, where it is defined as º Jä< •("2ä< ¦B42L:\" 6"Â J@Ø ,Û*"4:@<,Ã<. 
 88 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 198. 
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  "sexual and other appetition" is "the origin of all wrongdoing"89 
  "innate sexual desire" is "the origin of wrongdoing"90 
  "eros" is "the origin of wrongdoing"91  
The same word, ¦B42L:\", from the same passage, receives a progressively 
more sexual connotation in the course of Gaca's study, without justification or 
explanation. Gaca can produce no clear evidence for an especially sexual 
connotation of ¦B42L:\" in Philo’s exposition because no such evidence exists. 
Moreover, the principal evidence she cites (three times) from elsewhere in Philo's 
corpus, Opif. 151-52, is inconclusive.92 Although this passage deals with sexual 
attraction, it has little to say about the kind of ¦B42L:\" Philo envisions when 
commenting on the Tenth Commandment.93 In fact, this passage does not even 
contain the word ¦B42L:\", contrary to Gaca's original citation: 
 "The irrational appetite" (¦B42L:\"), and the sexual appetite in particular, 
 "is the beginning of wrongs and violations of the Law" (Opif 151-2).94 
 
The relevant section in full reads: 
 
 And this desire begat bodily pleasure (Ò *¥ B`2@H @âJ@H 6"Â J¬< Jä< 
 FT:VJT< º*@<¬< ¦(X<<0F,<), that pleasure which is the beginning of 
                                            
 89 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 198: "Philo, however, differs dramatically from Plato by 
insisting that sexual and other appetition is a 'great and excessive wickedness, truly the origin of 
all wrongdoing' (Spec 4.84)." 
 90 Gaca, Making of Fornicataion, 200: "For Philo, however, the 'origin of wrongdoing' and 
'of violation of the Law' (Spec 4.84, Opif 151-2) is innate sexual desire and its tendency to 
excessive pleasure . . .." 
 91 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 216: "In support of Plato's political theory, Philo 
formulates a distinctively Jewish Platonist position that sexual desire is the primary root of 
rebellion against God. As he phrases this idea, eros is the 'origin of wrongdoing' and 'of violation 
of the Law' (Spec 4.84, Opif 151-2)." 
 92 See Gaca, Making of Fornication, 198, 200, and 216.  
 93 As part of his commentary on Genesis 1-3, Philo considers the nature and 
consequences of sexual §DTH between Adam and Eve.  
 94 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 198. 
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 wrongs and violation[s] of the law (»J4H ¦FJÂ< •*460:VJT< 6"Â 
 B"D"<@:0:VJT< •DPZ), the pleasure for the sake of which men bring on 
 themselves the life of mortality and wretchedness in lieu of that of 
 immortality and bliss. (Opif. 152)95 
 
Clearly, the passage states that "bodily pleasure" (J¬< Jä< FT:VJT< º*@<Z<), 
and not "irrational appetite" (¦B42L:\"), is •*460:VJT< 6"Â B"D"<@:0:VJT< 
•DPZ.96 The pleasure (º*@<Z) mentioned here arguably involves sexual 
¦B42L:\", but the word ¦B42L:\" simply does not appear, and applying this 
passage to Philo's commentary on the Tenth Commandment is unwarranted. 
Gaca is unable, with this or any other passage, to demonstrate that Philo sees 
@Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H mainly as a proscription of sexual desire, or that he anywhere in 
his exposition singles out sexual desire as especially problematic over against 
any other type. 
 Because her study misidentifies what the Commandment prohibits, its 
explanation of how someone observes the Commandment, particularly the role 
played by the dietary laws, is also incorrect. According to Gaca, and in keeping 
with her overall emphasis, the dietary laws for Philo ultimately target sexual 
                                            
 95 The "desire" mentioned here is B`2@H, which—like §DTH, also in Opif. 152—need not 
have a sexual connotation, although it clearly does in this case. Cf. Opif. 5: §DTJ4 6"Â B`2å F@N\"H; Ebr. 21: B`2@H •D,J−H; Fug. 164: B`2@< ¦B4FJZ:0H; Decal. 148: B`2å J@Ø JD"<T2−<"4 J"ÃH •6@"ÃH JÎ< μP@<. 
 96 Philo's comments in this passage reflect a much broader treatment, attested 
throughout his works, of pleasure (º*@<Z) as a moral danger. On Philo's view of pleasure, see 
esp. Alain Le Boulluec, "La place des concepts philosophiques dans la réflexion de Philon sur le 
plaisir," in Philon d’Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie (ed. Carlos Lévy; Turnhout: 
Brepolis, 1998), 129-52; also Peter Booth, "The Voice of the Serpent: Philo’s Epicureanism," in 
Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World (ed. 
Wendy E. Helleman; Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 159-72; Francesca Calabi, "Il 
serpente e il cavaliere: piacere e 'sophrosyne' in Filone di Alessandria" ASR 8 (2003): 199-215; 
Schmidt, Anthropologie, 92-93; Graziano Ranocchia, "Moses against the Egyptian: The Anti-
Epicurean Polemic in Philo," in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy (ed. 
Francesca Alesse; SPhA 5; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 75-102, esp. 88-100. 
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desire.97 Since a dangerous causal link exists between unrestrained eating and 
unrestrained sexual desire (which in turn causes a proliferation of other vices), 
dietary laws that restrict food intake restrict also sexual desire and thus limit the 
vicious behavior associated with sexual excess.98 But nowhere in Philo's 
discussion of the dietary laws (Spec. 4.96-131) is sexual desire mentioned, much 
less cited as the ultimate concern. This again calls into question Gaca's 
treatment of Philo's text—what does she claim to find and where. She refers to 
Spec. 4.96, where Philo states the rationale of the dietary laws from Moses' 
perspective, but she misinterprets his statement: 
 Moses thus "began to train and chastise the appetite centered on the 
 belly" (Spec 4.96), because he knew God's people needed to put their 
 "love-mad" sexual behavior on the right kind of diet (Spec 3.9-10).99 
 
According to Philo, the reason Moses focused on training the desire "whose field 
of activity is the belly" (J¬< B,DÂ ("FJXD" BD"(:"J,L@:X<0< ¦B42L:\"<) is so 
that "the other forms (JH –88"H) will cease to run riot as before and will be 
restrained by having learnt that the senior and as it were the leader of their 
company (J¬< BD,F$LJVJ0< 6"Â ñH º(,:@<\*") is obedient to the laws of 
temperance" (Spec. 4.96). The desire for food and drink is preeminent and 
                                            
 97 "Restricting diet is an important part of taming sexual desire for both Philo and Plato. 
Philo regards Moses' dietary laws as the one sure regimen that reduces sexual desire and 
thereby subdues its offspring of vices" (Gaca, Making of Fornication, 196). 
 98 Gaca elsewhere makes the connection between food and sexual desire without 
explicitly mentioning dietary laws: "Human beings must keep their appetites under rational guard 
by curbing their wild sexual desire through restricting the intake of food and drink" (Making of 
Fornication, 195). Also: "Sexual eros on Plato's view comes into its own as a raging tyrant once 
surplus nutriment fuels its voracity. The combined sexual appetite and reproductive urge, when 
fattened and left to their own devices, are the main root of depraved minds and social mores 
because they stimulate a proliferation of other passions. Philo fully agrees with Plato on this 
matter" (idem). 
 99 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 196. 
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serves as a "paradigmatic instruction" (B"D"*,4(:"J46± *4*"F6"8\‘ in 4.96), 
whose training is applicable to any other form of desire, including—but certainly 
neither limited nor especially pertinent to—sexual desire. Gaca omits the second 
half of Philo's sentence in Spec. 4.96, which contains his understanding of the 
rationale for training dietary desires, and substitutes a different rationale based 
on a passage from a different treatise, which has no direct application to Philo's 
discussion of the Tenth Commandment.100 As for prohibited animals, Gaca 
understands Philo to say that Moses "knew that the prohibited types of animal 
flesh, such as pork, are particularly laced with an aphrodisiac surplus (Spec 
4.100-18)."101 But Philo says nothing of the sort in Spec. 4.100-18. He does say 
that Moses prohibited animals "whose flesh is the finest and fattest, thus titillating 
and exciting the malignant foe pleasure (J¬< ¦B\$@L8@< º*@<Z<) . . . knowing that 
they set a trap for the most slavish of the senses, the taste ((,ØF4<), and produce 
gluttony, an evil very dangerous both to soul and body" (Spec. 4.100).102 Without 
exploring here the full import of this statement for Philo's understanding of the 
dietary laws, it is enough to note that the sensory pleasure involved is gustatory, 
not sexual.103 Gaca notes also Philo's summary statement concerning Moses' 
                                            
 100 Philo's comments in Spec. 3.9-10 pertain, as he explicitly states, to the Sixth 
Commandment, the first in the second table (see Spec. 3.1-8). 
 101 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 196. Gaca essentially considers only Philo's discussion 
of prohibited animals (Spec. 4.100-18), leaving out Spec. 4.119-31, a section that also treats 
particular laws falling under the rubric @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H. 
 102 Presumably, this is the passage Gaca has in mind, since Philo immediately gives the 
example of pork in Spec. 4.101 and Gaca mentions pork explicitly when citing this passage.  
 103 In any case, the context suggests that Philo's interest is in Moses' proscriptive 
cultivation of self-control (NB Spec. 4.101: BD`H . . . ¦(6DVJ,4"<), not the avoidance of 
"aphrodisiac surplus." Isaak Heinemann, commenting on this passage, correctly notes this 
interest on Philo's part: "Nach SpL. IV 100 ff. will Moses durch seine Speisegesetze vor allem zur 
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prohibition of various animals, that "by this as by the withdrawal of fuel from a fire 
he creates an extinguisher to desire (F$XF4< J−H ¦B42L:\"H)" (Spec. 4.118).104 
But this has no explicit bearing on sexual desire, unless the term ¦B42L:\" is 
presumed to have an especially sexual connotation in Spec. 4.96-131, which it 
does not. In fact, due to an overemphasis on sexual desire, Gaca overlooks the 
fundamental role of the dietary laws from Philo's perspective, which is to promote 
self-control (¦(6DVJ,4")—initially with respect to desire(s) for food and drink, but 
ultimately with respect to desires of any type.105  
 Despite their respective contributions, the studies of Wolfson and Gaca, 
along with other shorter, incidental treatments of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, fail to answer 
with sufficient depth or accuracy the fundamental interpretive questions 
surrounding Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment. As a result, this 
important aspect of Philo's thought remains obscure. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
Selbstbeherrschung anregen; daher sind gerade besonders wohlschmeckende Tiere verboten, 
wie das Schwein" (Philons Griechische und Jüdische Bildung [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1962], 163). 
 104 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 196. 
 105 Other considerations of the dietary laws in Philo, which to various extents emphasize 
the importance of ¦(6DVJ,4" without finding any special concern with sexual desire on his part, 
include Norman Bentwich, Philo-Judaeus of Alexandria (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society 
of America, 1910), 123-24; Peder Borgen, Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time 
(NovTSup 86; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 168-69; Mireille Hadas-Lebel, Philon D'Alexandrie: Un penseur 
en diaspora (Paris: Fayard, 2003), 159-62; Richard Hecht, "Patterns of Exegesis in Philo's 
Interpretation of Leviticus," SPh 6 (1979-80): 77-155, esp.108-15; Heinemann, Bildung, 155-66; 
Houston, "Dietary Laws," 144-47; Alan Mendelson, Philo's Jewish Identity (BJS 161; Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1988), 67-71; Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity, 105-06; James Rhodes, "Diet 
and Desire: The Logic of the Dietary Laws According to Philo," ETL 79 (2003): 122-33; Karl Olav 
Sandnes, Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles (SNTSMS 120; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 128-29; Cristina Termini, "Philo's Thought within the Context of Middle 
Judaism," in The Cambridge Companion to Philo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 95-123, esp. 119-21 [="The Dietary Laws"]; Giovanni Maria Vian, "Purità e culto 
nell'esegesi giudaico-ellenistica," ASE 13 (1996): 67-84, esp. 78-80. 
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PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
 Chapters two and three of this dissertation do not deal directly with Philo's 
exposition of the Tenth Commandment. Instead, they offer an introductory survey 
of terms and concepts that Philo uses in that exposition, situating his moral 
psychology within the philosophical context of Middle Platonism.106 Chapter two 
treats Philo's concept of desire (¦B42L:\"), including explanations of its source, 
nature, function, and problematic malfunction. Chapter three treats Philo's 
concept of self-control (¦(6DVJ,4"), including explanations of its nature, its 
acquisition through –F60F4H, and its role in the proper management of desire. 
With this conceptual backdrop in place, Philo's exposition of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H 
emerges more clearly as a thoughtful, coherent statement of his ethical theory.   
 Chapter four focuses directly on Philo's exposition of the Tenth 
Commandment, Spec. 4.78b-131, although Decal. 142-53 and 173-74 receive 
consideration in connection with relevant sections of the exposition proper. The 
goals of this chapter are to provide (1) an outline of the contents of Philo’s 
exposition, (2) a fresh translation of the PCW text, (3) notes on select passages, 
and (4) commentary on each distinct unit of text. 
 Chapter five summarizes the results of the dissertation by providing direct 
and concise answers to the basic questions regarding Philo's exposition: 
                                            
106 Without assuming or suggesting that Philo intends to write as a systematic 
philosopher, chapters two and three nevertheless demonstrate the existence of coherent strands 
of thought running throughout his exegetical works. Multiple attestation, based on a broad reading 
of Philo's works, confirms the reliability of these strands as accurate representations of his 
thought. 
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1. In Philo’s view, what does the Tenth Commandment prohibit? (All 
desire? A certain type? What type?) 
 
2. In Philo’s view, how is the Tenth Commandment observed? (What are 
the mechanics of its observance? What role do the dietary laws play in its 
observance?) 
 
Chapter five also suggests lines of further research based on the results of this 
investigation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PHILO ON DESIRE (+A31K93!) 
INTRODUCTION 
Understanding Philo's exposition of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H depends on a clear 
understanding of his concept of ¦B42L:\", including its source, nature, function, 
and problematic malfunction. Philo's concept of ¦B42L:\" depends in turn on his 
broader concept of the soul, in particular his moral psychology—his 
understanding of how various elements of the soul's structure and function relate 
to questions of morality. This chapter begins with a survey of the basic moral 
psychology of Philo's Middle-Platonic contemporaries, especially their concept of 
a fundamental bipartition between rational and non-rational components within 
the soul and their concept of various non-rational capacities whose normal 
operation includes instances of ¦B42L:\". Next comes a survey of Philo's moral 
psychology, with a special emphasis on the correspondence between 
contemporary Middle-Platonic views and his own understanding of both 
bipartition and the various capacities involved with ¦B42L:\". The chapter ends 
with a consideration of how Philo views the malfunction of ¦B42L:\" in the soul, 
identifying two grades of problematic desire—passionate and tyrannical desire—
analyzed in light of contemporary Middle Platonism.  
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PHILO'S MIDDLE-PLATONIC CONTEMPORARIES 
 As a de facto Middle Platonist, Philo reflects the views of his Middle-
Platonic contemporaries, in particular Eudorus of Alexandria (fl. ca. 25 B.C.) and 
his associates.1 As representatives of a movement known for its renewed interest 
in the doctrines of Plato, Middle Platonists naturally derived fundamental 
convictions from the writings of Plato himself, but to rely solely on Plato and 
project his views onto later Platonists without qualification ignores centuries of 
philosophical activity postdating Plato.2 For this reason, Middle-Platonic evidence 
                                            
 1 On the notion of a "de facto Middle Platonist," see above, page 15, n. 40. In the 
afterward to his 1996, revised edition of The Middle Platonists, John Dillon reviews his position on 
the relation between Philo and Eudorus: "Despite my cautionary remarks, I have been repeatedly 
accused (or worse, commended), for presenting Philo as a pupil of Eudorus, and as a Middle 
Platonist. Let me make it clear once again that I wish to make neither claim. There is no evidence 
that Philo had ever heard of Eudorus (though I regard it as very probable that he did). All I would 
claim is that Philo shows the influence of a brand of Platonism that is in many ways close to that 
of Eudorus, and the he constitutes good evidence for prevailing trends in contemporary 
Platonism." (Middle Platonists, 438-39; emphasis added). On the relation between Philo and the 
Alexandrian Platonism of Eudorus, see also Mauro Bonazzi, "Towards Transcendence: Philo and 
the Renewal of Platonism in the Early Imperial Age," in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian 
Philosophy (ed. Francesca Alesse; SPhA 5; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 233-51. On Eudorus himself, see 
John Dillon, Middle Platonists, 115-35, 436-39; also Heinrich Dörrie, "Der Platoniker Eudorus von 
Alexandreia," in Platonica Minora (STA 8; München: W. Fink, 1976), 297-309. For fragments of 
his work, see esp. Mazz. 
 2 For example, Middle Platonists adapted Stoic technical terms, infusing them with new 
meaning for use within their fundamentally different system of thought, and a failure to appreciate 
this leads to a false impression of their incoherent adoption of the Stoic principles underlying 
those terms. When Eudorus expounded a dogmatic Platonism in the first century B.C. (after the 
Academy's skeptical phase), an elaborate lexicon of Stoic terms and definitions, with an 
accompanying conceptual vocabulary, had already been systematically formulated. Rather than 
creating de novo an alternative system, with its own terms, definitions, etc., Middle Platonists 
chose to revise the system at hand, creating distinctively Platonic understandings of Stoic 
philosophical language. This was especially true in the field of ethics (e.g., the topic of "passions" 
[BV20], including ¦B42L:\") and moral psychology. On this aspect of Middle-Platonic ethics, note 
Dörrie, "Eudorus," 301-03 (e.g., 302: "Der Platonismus konnte hier [Ethik] nirgends aus dem 
Vollen schöpfen wie in der Physik und der Theologie"; 303: "Die bloße Einteilung der Ethik konnte 
niemanden befriedigen—jetzt galt es, den neuen platonischen Inhalt in diese alte Form zu 
gießen"); also Giovanni Reale, The Schools of the Imperial Age (vol. 4 of A History of Ancient 
Philosophy; ed. and trans. John R. Catan; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 
233: "The eclectic character of Middle Platonic ethics has frequently been emphasized, for in 
addition to Platonic tenets Middle Platonists saw no difficulty in accepting Aristotelian as well as 
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must act as a guide—confirming, supplementing, and modifying what can be 
otherwise known from the Platonic dialogues. And enough evidence exists to 
reconstruct the basic moral psychology and corresponding concept of ¦B42L:\" 
held by Alexandrian Middle Platonists of Philo's day, based—in addition to the 
extant fragments from Eudorus himself (Mazz.)—on the following sources:  
ARIUS DIDYMUS3 (b. ca. 75 B.C.): Arius was a Stoic philosopher, probably a 
native of Alexandria and personal acquaintance of Eudorus.4 He 
composed surveys of contemporary philosophical views, including 
Eudorus and certain "Platonic philosophers" (@Ê 6"J A8VJT<" N48@F@N@Ø<J,H [Eclog. 38.14-15]). Information on this group of 
philosophers (Eclog. 37.18 – 38.15) bears special importance, since it 
most likely depicts contemporary Alexandrian (Middle-)Platonists, and it 
summarizes principal tenets of their moral psychology, providing crucial 
evidence for an otherwise unattested aspect of Eudoran Middle 
Platonism.5 
 
                                                                                                                                  
Stoic doctrines. A great deal of evidence could be brought forward as proof of this assertion. 
Nevertheless, that the Middle Platonists only rarely accepted the results after Plato which are 
opposed to the Platonic spirit has not been adequately appreciated. In fact, in the great majority 
of cases they reinterpret and ground again the new results according to the Platonic spirit" 
(original emphasis). Cf. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 132: "so many of the innovators who 
looked back beyond Stoic monism to the psychological observations made by Plato and Aristotle 
continued to use the terminology of the Stoic theory in setting forth their own doctrines"; John 
Whittaker, "Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire," ANRW 36.1: 81-123, 116: 
"We may in fact conclude that the Stoic element in Middle Platonism, both in the 'Didaskalikos' 
and elsewhere, is generally of a superficial nature and indicates rather a generous disposition 
toward Stoic concepts and terminology than a whole-hearted attempt to accommodate Platonism 
to a Stoic mould."  
3 See David E. Hahm, "The Ethical Doxography of Arius Didymus," ANRW 36.4: 2935-
3055, 3234-43 (indices). 
 4 Hahm, "Arius Didymus," 3035-41. 
 5 Arius presents the definitions currently held by his contemporaries: @àJTH :¥< @Þ< @Ê 6"J A8VJT<" N48@F@N@Ø<J,H ÒD\.@<J"4 (Eclog. 38.14-15). His familiarity with one particular 
Middle-Platonic philosopher from first-century B.C. Alexandria (Eudorus) implies some familiarity 
with other "Platonic philosophers" from the same milieu (whose views he cites, presumably, in 
Eclog. 37.18 – 38.15). The doxographical nature of Arius' report concerning the moral psychology 
of these "Platonic philosophers" suggests that the attested views were standard, which in turn 
suggests that these would have been the views of Eudorus. Without considering the question of 
Eudorus, P. A. Vander Waerdt nevertheless holds that Eclog. 37.18 – 38.15 represents good 
evidence for Middle Platonism (see "Moral Psychology," 378). 
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PSEUDO-TIMAEUS,6 ON THE NATURE OF THE WORLD AND THE SOUL [=TL]: 
Probably composed in the late first century B.C. or the first century A.D., 
this treatise arguably represents Eudoran Middle Platonism, based on its 
distinct profile of agreements with Eudorus on a number of points.7 
Purportedly written by Timaeus of Locri (of Plato's Timaeus), in an 
affected Doric dialect, the treatise generally reads like an epitome of 
Timaeus 27 C – 92 C, although it offers scholastic Middle-Platonic 
elaborations on key topics. 
 
PSEUDO-METOPUS,8 ON VIRTUE [=Ps.-Metop.]: This treatise, probably 
composed in the first century B.C., in a Doric similar to TL, is one of many 
Pseudo-Pythagorean ethical writings that arguably reflect Eudoran Middle 
Platonism.9 The clearly didactic aim of On Virtue suggests a handbook, 
which in turn suggests conventional ethical doctrines.10  
 
PLUTARCH (b. ca. A.D. 45): Plutarch was a Middle Platonist who knew the 
works of Eudorus.11 Furthermore, Plutarch's teacher Ammonius was both 
a contemporary of Philo and a native of Alexandria.12 Assuming Plutarch 
                                            
 6 See Timaios of Locri, On the Nature of the World and the Soul (text, trans., notes, 
Thomas H. Tobin; SBLTT 26; GRRS 8; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1985); also the commentary 
of Matthias Baltes, Timaios Lokros, Über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele (PA 21; Leiden: 
Brill, 1972). 
 7 On the date of TL, see Tobin, Timaios of Locri, 3-7. On the agreements between TL and 
Eudorus, see Baltes, Timaios Lokros, 22-26. Baltes does not believe that Eudorus himself 
composed TL, but that the work is more likely "ein Produkt aus der Schule des Eudor" (25). Tobin 
notes some problems with Baltes' position (Timaios of Locri, 6) but nevertheless affirms the 
likelihood of some connection between TL and Eudorus: "One can probably say that the TL came 
after Eudorus and that the author of the TL was aware of his work" (7). 
 8 See Pseudopythagorica Ethica: I trattati morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo 
(text, trans., comm., Bruno Centrone; Elenchos 17; Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990), esp. 87-94 (text), 
193-216 (comm.).  
 9 On the date of Ps.-Metopus, see Centrone, Pseudopythagorica Ethica, 41-44; on the 
connection with Eudorus, see ibid., 17, n. 10. Centrone suggests that Philo made use of these 
Pseudo-Pythagorean ethical writings (ibid., 30-34, 43-44); cf. David Runia, "Why Does Clement 
Call Philo "The Pythagorean?,’" in Philo and the Church Fathers: A Collection of Papers (VCSup 
32; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 54-76; repr. from VC 49 (1995): 1-22. 
 10 Cf. Centrone, Pseudopythagorica Ethica, 193: "Il trattato di Metopo sulla virtù presenta, 
in forma sintetica e condensate, una serie di loci classici della dossografia etica, amalgamate in 
maniera più o meno felice." 
 11 On Plutarch as a Middle Platonist, see Dillon, Middle Platonists, 184-230. Plutarch 
cites Eudorus by name in De animae procreatione in Timaeo (An. procr.) 1013 B, 1019 E, and 
1020 C. 
 12 On Ammonius see C.P. Jones, "The Teacher of Plutarch," HSCP 71 (1967), 205-13; 
also Dillon, Middle Platonists, 189-92. Jones suggests approximate dates for Ammonius of A.D. 
20 to A.D. 70-80 ("Teacher of Plutarch," 208; cf. Dillon, Middle Platonists, 191: "Ammonius was 
probably dead by about A.D. 80"). Dillon calls Ammonius "a product of Alexandrian Platonism" 
(Middle Platonists, 190), although he taught and died in Athens. John Glucker believes, 
concerning Ammonius' career as a "personal teacher" (6"20(0JZH) and his arrival in Athens, that 
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did not radically depart from his teacher on basic ethical theory, his 
views—especially insofar as they corroborate the testimony of Arius, Ps.-
Timaeus, and Ps.-Metopus—reflect standard views among Philo's Middle-
Platonic contemporaries.13 
 
For the most part, the identification of this material with Eudorus rests on 
reasonable conjecture, not demonstrable fact. But in any case, this material does 
represent Middle-Platonic thought, as general consensus and corroborating 
evidence from, for example, Alcinous' doctrinal handbook the Didaskalikos 
attest.14 Therefore, while the comparison of Philo to Arius Didymus, Ps.-Timaeus, 
Ps.-Metopus, and Plutarch probably illustrates his relation to Eudoran Middle 
Platonism, it certainly illustrates Philo's relation to general trends in Middle-
Platonic thought.  
"IRRATIONAL" AND "NON-RATIONAL" IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
The most fundamental question to ask about ¦B42L:\" in Middle-Platonic 
moral psychology involves the Greek word –8@(@H, which has two radically 
                                                                                                                                  
"[w]hatever philosophy he knew he had already learnt in Egypt" (Antiochus and the Late 
Academy [Hypomnemata 56; Göttingen: Vandernhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978], 133). Jean Daniélou 
suggests that Philo and Plutarch have a similar "platonisme éclectique" because Philo and 
Ammonius were educated in the same Alexandrian philosophical environment (Philon 
D'Alexandrie [Paris: A. Fayard, 1958], 58-59). 
 13 Among Plutarch's works, De virtute morali (Virt. mor.) bears special significance, 
because of its summary representation of a Middle-Platonic (over against Stoic) stance on moral 
psychology and passion(s). Moreover, the moral psychology of Virt. mor. reflects Plutarch's 
broader commitment to a fundamentally Platonic understanding of the soul, such as he 
elaborates in An. procr. (see Jan Opsomer, "L'âme du monde et l' âme de l'homme chez 
Plutarque," in Estudios sobre Plutarco: Ideas religiosas: Actas del III Simposio Internacional 
sobre Plutarco, Oviedo 30 de abril a 2 de mayo de 1992 [ed. Manuela García Valdés; Madrid: 
Ediciones Clásicas, 1994], 33-49). Also important are five ethical treatises—De curiositate 
(Curios.), De cohibenda ira (Cohib. ira)), De garrulitate (Garr.), De vitioso pudore (Vit. pud.), and 
De laude ipsius (De laude)—that pertain directly to moral virtue, in particular the role of "practice" 
(–F60F4H) in management of the passions (see Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp, Plutarchs Schriften über 
die Heilung der Seele [Hypomnemata 34; Göttingen: Vandernhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971]). 
 14 On which see Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism (trans., comm. John Dillon; 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); Alcinoos: Enseignement des doctrines de Platon (ed., comm. John 
Whittaker; trans. Pierre Louis; 2d ed.; Paris: Belles Lettres, 2002). 
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different meanings. On the one hand, –8@(@H can mean "non-rational," indicating 
the absence of reasoning capacity. On the other hand, –8@(@H can mean 
"irrational," indicating the corruption or malfunction of a reasoning capacity that 
nevertheless exists. In a treatise that defends a Platonic view of the passions 
over against the Stoic view of Chrysippus, Galen explains the distinction:  
 [S]ometimes the " negates the meaning of the word to which it is prefixed, 
 and sometimes it does not. And I find the word –8@(@< used in this way by 
 all the ancients and by men of today. When a person says that a fish or a 
 crab is –8@(@<, he completely negates the meaning of the word logos; but 
 when men criticize a particular statement of a particular person by saying 
 that it is –8@(@<, they do not give it this name because it has no logos, but 
 because it is blameworthy and faulty. (PHP IV 4.13-15)15 
 
Philo understands the same distinction just as clearly:  
There are two ways of understanding the absence of reason (JÎ –8@(@<): 
it means either defying the dictates of logos, as when people call the 
senseless man "irrational" (–8@(@<), or having no logos at all, as with the 
non-rational animals (ñH Jä< .æT< J :¬ 8@(46V). (Sacr. 46)16  
 
Do Philo and his Middle-Platonic contemporaries see ¦B42L:\" as an "irrational" 
(–8@(@H) or a "non-rational" (–8@(@H) function of the soul? Plato himself offers the 
best place to begin answering this critical question. 
PLATONIC FOUNDATIONS 
Plato believed that the human soul has three essential components: one 
rational (JÎ 8@(4FJ46`<), one assertive (JÎ 2L:@,4*XH),17 and one intensely 
                                            
 15 Trans. De Lacey (slightly modified). 
 16 My translation. In De animalibus, Philo argues at length that beasts are non-rational 
(see §§77-100), a position he consistently holds throughout his works: e.g., .è" –8@(" in Opif. 
73, Spec. 2.89, and Virt. 160; or simply –8@(", as in Spec. 1.260. 
17 "Assertive" captures the essence of this component of the soul. Cf. John Cooper, 
"Human Motivation," 133-34: "the motivations that Plato classifies under the heading of spirit are 
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desirous (JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<).18 Among these three, the most antagonistic relation 
exists between reason and desire. In fact, Plato establishes the independence of 
desire from reason by noting its capacity for diametric and simultaneous 
opposition to reason, granting desire independent agency as a distinct source of 
motivation in the soul along with reason.19 If the ¦B42L:0J46`< exists in 
contradistinction to reason, it must also operate apart from reason, so Platonic 
                                                                                                                                  
to be understood as having their root in competitiveness and the desire for self-esteem and (as a 
normal presupposition of this) esteem by others." 
 18 Resp. 580 D-E: "But the third part, owing to its manifold forms (*4 B@8L,4*\"<), we 
could not easily designate by any one distinctive name, but gave it the name of its chief and 
strongest element (Ô :X(4FJ@< 6"Â ÆFPLD`J"J@< . . . ¦< "ßJè); for we called it the appetitive part 
(¦B42L:0J46`<) because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love 
(*4 FN@*D`J0J" Jä< B,DÂ J¬< ¦*T*¬< ¦B42L:4ä< 6"Â B`F4< 6"Â •ND@*\F4") and their 
accompaniments (6"Â ÓF" –88" J@bJ@4H •6`8@L2"), and likewise the money-loving part 
(N48@PDZ:"J@<), because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desires (*4 PD0:VJT< :V84FJ" •B@J,8@Ø<J"4 "Ê J@4"ØJ"4 ¦B42L:\"4)." On Platonic tripartition, see Cooper, 
"Human Motivation." On Plato's general theory of desire, see Charles Kahn, "Plato's Theory of 
Desire." On appetitive desire, see esp. Hendrik Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in 
Plato and Aristotle (OPM; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). Lorenz's work outlines the basic 
model of ¦B42L:\" developed by Plato and appropriated in large part by Aristotle. This basic 
model was formative in Middle-Platonic moral psychology and so helps to explain many aspects 
of Philo's thought. For a later Platonist’s concept of the ¦B42L:0J46`< covering the fundamental 
data from Plato's writings, see Phillip De Lacy, "The Third Part of the Soul," in Le Opere 
Psicologiche di Galeno: Atti del Terzo Colloquio Galenico Internazionale, Pavia, 10-12 Settembre 
1986 (ed. Paola Manuli and Mario Vegetti; Elenchos 13; Naples: Biblipolis, 1988), 43-63. 
 19 In the Republic (436 B), Plato posits an axiom that shapes his moral psychology, 
considering it obvious (*−8@<) that "the same thing (J"ÛJ`<) will never do or suffer opposites 
(J•<"<J\" B@4,Ã< ´ BVFP,4<) in the same respect (6"J J"ÛJ`<) in relation to the same thing 
(BDÎH J"ÛJ`<) and at the same time (:"). So that if ever we find these contradictionsin the 
functions of the [soul] (¦< "ÛJ@ÃH; cf. ª6"FJ" in 436 A) we shall know that it was not the same 
thing functioning (@Û J"ÛJ`<) but a plurality (B8,\T)" (substituting "soul" for Shorey’s "mind" [cf. RLP± earlier in 436 B]). Plato argues that the human soul has a 8@(4FJ46`< element ø 8@(\.,J"4 
and a separate •8`(4FJ`< J, 6"Â ¦B42L:0J46`< element ø ¦D” J, 6"Â B,4<± 6"Â *4R± etc., since 
it is otherwise impossible to explain an agent who at the same time desires a drink (via the ¦B42L:0J46`<) but for whatever reason counteracts that desire and abstains from drinking (via 
the 8@(4FJ46`<) (see Resp. 439 A-D). (On the argument for tripartition and the axiomatic 
"Principle of Opposites," see Lorenz, Brute Within, 18-34.) Middle Platonists continued to assert 
the probative force of this axiom as well as the validity of Plato's proof (e.g., Plutarch Virt. mor. 
442 A, esp. [A8VJT<] •B@*,\6<LF4 *¥ J¬< *4"N@DV< etc.; also Didask. 24 [176.43-177.3]; cf. 
Galen, PHP V 7.1-33). 
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¦B42L:\" is plainly “non-rational" (–8@(@H).20 Without rational calculation, without 
deliberating on the best course of action, ¦B42L:\" impulsively pursues pleasure 
(º*@<Z) as its ultimate aim (most notably via food, drink, and sex) whenever 
stimulated by the appropriate thought or sensory impression.21 Reason's task is 
to manage desire, as a rational human being would manage a non-rational 
animal, ensuring that desire's myopic pursuits serve, rather than subvert, the 
greater good, which requires the rational pursuit of the best overall course of 
life.22  
                                            
 20 Resp. 439 D: •8`(4FJ`< J, 6"Â ¦B42L:0J46`<; Tim. 71 D: 8`(@L 6"Â ND@<ZF,TH @Û :,J,ÃP, [JÎ ¦B42L:0J46Î< J−H RLP−H]. For a full explanation of ¦B42L:\" as a non-rational 
phenomenon, see Lorenz, Brute Within, e.g. 9: "The notion of a part of the soul that is incapable 
of reasoning, but capable of giving rise to episodes of behaviour, even to episodes of human 
behaviour, sets the scene for the book's central theme: the idea, shared by Plato and Aristotle, 
that while reason can, all by itself, motivate a person to act, parts or aspects of the soul other 
than reason are equipped with non-rational cognitive resources that are sufficient for the 
generation of fully formed motivating conditions." For explanations of how desire manages to 
operate without the capacity to reason, see esp. Lorenz, Brute Within, 55-95 [="Belief and 
Appearance in Plato"] and 113-86 [="Phantasia and Non-Rational Desire in Aristotle"], esp. 119-
73; also Cooper, "Reason, Virtue, Value," esp. 255-64 [="Non-Rational Desires"]; and idem, 
"Some Remarks on Aristotle’s Moral Psychology," in Reason and Emotion (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 237-52, esp. 241-44; repr. from SJPh supp. (1988): 25-42; cf. the 
discussion of "sense-appetite" in N. J. H. Dent, "Varieties of Desire," PASSV 50 (1976): 153-75, 
esp. 154-58. 
 21 On the connection between ¦B42L:\" and º*@<Z, see e.g. Resp. 439 D: JÎ . . . •8`(4FJ`< J, 6"Â ¦B42L:0J46`<, B80DfF,f< J4<T< 6"Â º*@<ä< ©J"ÃD@<; Phaedr. 238 A: ¦B42L:\"H *¥ •8`(TH ©86@bF0H ¦BÂ º*@<VH. Cf. Cooper, "Human Motivation," 126-30; idem, 
"Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value," in Reason and Emotion (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 253-70; repr. from pages 81-114 in Rationality in Greek Thought (ed. M. Frede and 
G. Striker; Oxford: Clarendon, 1996); David Halperin, "Platonic Erôs," 172; Lohrenz, Brute Within, 
passim, e.g. 2: "Appetite's stubborn and inflexible attachment to whatever happens to give a 
person pleasure renders psychological conflict ineliminable. . ..  Appetite's attachment to what in 
fact gives us pleasure is unreformable"). Later philosophers recognized this association in Plato’s 
writings and formulated it with greater precision (e.g., Aristotle, De an. 414 b 5-6: º ¦B42L:\"q J@Ø (D º*X@H ÐD,>4H "àJ0; Galen, PHP V 5.8: JD4ä< @Þ< J@bJT< º:Ã< @Æ6,4fF,T< ßB"DP@LFä< NbF,4, 6"2zª6"FJ@< Jä< :@D\T< J−H RLP−H ,É*@H: BDÎH :¥< J¬< º*@<¬< *4 JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<). 
 22 The Platonic view of ¦B42L:\" as a non-rational (–8@(@H) force facilitates its 
comparison to a non-rational animal, leading to the Platonic imagery of desire as "beast"; see 
esp. Tim. 70 D-E: ¦B42L:0J46`< . . . ñH 2DX::" –(D4@<; Resp. 588 B – 591 A: 20D\@< . . . 2DX::" 
(cf. Urs Dieraur, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, 
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BIPARTITION IN MIDDLE PLATONISM 
Reason over against z+B42L:\" / 1L:`H 
 Like other Middle Platonists, Ps.-Timaeus endorses Platonic tripartition, 
but in a distinctly modified version:  
With regard to human souls (•<2DTB\<"H RLPH), one part is reasonable 
and intelligent (JÎ :¥< 8@(46`< ¦FJ4 6"Â <@,D`<),23 but the other part is 
without reason and foolish (JÎ *z–8@(@< 6"Â –ND@<). . .. Of the non-
rational part (Jä *z•8`(T :XD,@H), the irascible element is located around 
the heart (JÎ :¥< 2L:@,4*¥H B,DÂ J< 6"D*\"<) and the appetitive element 
around the liver (JÎ *z¦B42L:"J46Î< B,DÂ JÎ ½B"D). (TL 46)24 
 
Although he clearly identifies each of Plato's three "parts," including its respective 
location in the body, Ps.-Timaeus frames this tripartition in dualistic terms: the 
soul, it seems, really has just two parts—the rational and the non-rational (JÎ :¥< 
8@(46`< . . . JÎ *z–8@(@<).25 This bipartite conception of Platonic tripartition 
subsumes the spirited and desiderative parts under a single "non-rational part" 
(–8@(@< :XD@H), coordinating them as one pair that stands over against reason. 
                                                                                                                                  
Anthropologie und Ethik [SAP 6; Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977], 66-89 [="Hinweise auf Tiere in der 
Anthropologie und Ethik Platons"]). This comparison of the ¦B42L:0J46`< (¦B42L:\") to a beast 
appears also in Middle Platonism, see, e.g., Didask. 23 [176.22]: –(D4@< 2DX::"; Plutarch, Virt. 
mor. 447 C: ¦B42L:\" as JÎ 20D\@< (cf. Julia Annas, "Humans and Beasts: Moral Theory and 
Moral Psychology," in Platonic Ethics, Old and New [CSCP 57; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1999], 117-36, esp. 134-36). 
 23 On JÎ :¥< 8@(46`< ¦FJ4 6"Â <@,D`<, cf. John Whittaker, "The Terminology of the 
Rational Soul in the Writings of Philo of Alexandria," SPhA (1996): 1-20. 
24 Cf. TL 82: "Music and philosophy, its guide, which were established by the gods and 
the laws for the correction of the soul, accustom, persuade, and sometimes even coerce the non-
rational part to obey reason (JÎ :¥< –8@(@< Jè 8@(4F:è B,\2,F2"4), the irascible part of the non-
rational soul to be tame (Jä *z•8`(T 2L:Î< :¥< BD@< ,É:,<), and the appetitive part 
(¦B42L:\"< *¥) to remain quiet when the mind summons it either to action or to enjoyment." 
(Unless otherwise noted, all translations of TL are from Tobin, Timaios of Locri.) 
 25 Arius Didymus provides evidence for bipartite psychology among "Platonic 
philosophers" of his day: Eclog. 38.3-4: J@Ø •8`(@L :XD@LH J−H RLP−H . . . Jè 8`(å; Eclog. 38.5-
6: –8@(@< :XD@H J−H RLP−H . . . Jè 8`(å; Eclog. 38.12-13: RLP−H J@Ø •8`(@L :XD@LH . . . Jè 8@(46è. 
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Plato did not formulate tripartition in this way.26 Aristotle, to facilitate his 
discussion of ethics, endorsed a simple dichotomy in the soul between "rational" 
(JÎ 8`(@< §P@<) and "non-rational" (JÎ –8@(@<) (Eth. nic. 1102 a 29-30), but he 
did not use this dichotomy as a frame for Platonic tripartition.27 Instead, this 
formulation derives from an early and highly influential Peripatetic rendering of 
Plato's tripartite psychology, first attested in the Magna Moralia.28 Peripatetic 
philosophers superimposed Aristotle's dichotomy onto Platonic tripartition, 
making his rational part (JÎ 8`(@< §P@<) equivalent to Plato's 8@(4FJ46`<, while 
his non-rational part (JÎ –8@(@<) was taken to comprise Plato's 2L:@,4*XH and 
¦B42L:0J46`< (or 2L:46`<29/2L:`H and ¦B42L:\"). This hybrid version of Platonic 
tripartition, which pits rational against non-rational, became a standard model for 
moral psychology among Middle Platonists.30   
                                            
 26 First, Plato never uses the terminology 8`(@H – –8@(@H in reference to a bipartite 
division of the soul (see Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation," 283-86). Second, Plato's 
tripartition often views reason and JÎ 2L:@,4*XH as a united pair over against JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`< 
(e.g., Resp. 441 A; Phaedr. 253 D – 254 E). But the absence of a particular formulation of 
tripartition as bipartition does not mean that Plato never ascribes bipartition to the soul (see e.g. 
D. A. Rees, "Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy," JHS 77 [1957]: 112-18). 
 27 Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation," esp. 286-87. Cf. idem, "Aristotle's Criticism 
of Soul-Division," AJP 108 (1987): 627-43. 
 28 Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation." On the appropriation of this Peripatetic 
rendering in Middle Platonism, see Vander Waerdt, "Moral Psychology." 
 29 Plato's term for the assertive part is 2L:@,4*XH (e.g., Resp. 441 A: ¦< RLP± JD\J@< ¦FJ4 JÎ 2L:@,4*XH [,É*@H]). Middle Platonists often used the Aristotelian term 2L:46`H instead of 2L:@,4*XH (cf. Leg. 1.70-72, Leg 3.124; also 2L:`H [e.g., Conf. 21; Spec. 4.92]). See Whittaker, 
Alcinoos, 87, n. 73 (NB his citation of Leg. 3.115); Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation," 
286, n. 9; also Jean Bouffartigue, "La structure de l'âme chez Philon: terminologie scolastique et 
metaphors," in Philon d’Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie (ed. Carlos Lévy; Turnhout: 
Brepolis, 1998), 59-75, 60, n. 3 (on Leg. 3.115) 
 30 Vander Waerdt, "Moral Psychology," 378-81, notes six representative examples of 
Middle-Platonic sources that "harmonize bipartition and tripartition in accordance with Peripatetic 
doctrine by collapsing the 2L:46`< and ¦B42L:0J46`< into a single –8@(@< and by opposing this 
to a reasoning faculty" (377): Arius Didymus' epitome, the Didaskalikos, Apuleius, Plutarch, Philo, 
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Reason over against Appetite (ÐD,>4H) 
 Although Middle-Platonic bipartition appears simply to reconfigure Plato's 
three soul parts, and thus appears to leave Plato's conception of those parts 
intact, it actually owes much to Aristotle's theory of desire, which differed from 
Plato's in significant respects.31 Unlike Plato, who envisioned three distinct soul 
parts, each with its own sorts of desires (¦B42L:\"4), Aristotle acknowledged just 
one appetitive faculty of the soul, which generates three different sorts of appetite 
(ÐD,>4H): ¦B42L:\", 2L:`H, and $@b80F4H.32 Of these, ¦B42L:\" and 2L:`H are 
non-rational ÏDX>,4H analogous to the motivations generated by Plato's 
¦B42L:0J46`< and 2L:@,4*XH.33 For example, Aristotle understood 2L:`H to be 
the sort of non-rational motivation at work when people get angry, mirroring 
Plato's concept of the 2L:@,4*XH, which is—among other things—the seat of 
                                                                                                                                  
and Clement. To this list may be added TL 46, 82, and Ps.-Metop. 118.1-5: JH RLPH *b@ :XD,", JÎ :¥< 8@(4FJ46Î< JÎ *¥ –8@(@<, . . . Jä *¥ •8`(T JÎ :¥< 2L:@,4*¥H JÎ *z¦B42L:"J46`<. 
 31 On the fundamental revision of Plato's theory of desire resulting from a bipartite 
conception of tripartition, see Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation," esp. 286-87 and 291-
301. Ultimately the "attribution of the division –8@(@</8`(@< §P@< to Plato is based upon an 
interpretation of tripartition in the terms of Aristotle’s doctrine of ÐD,>4H" (286). 
 32 See, for example, Resp. 580 D and De an. 414 b 2. On Aristotle's theory of desire, see 
esp. Cooper's essays "Aristotle's Moral Psychology" and "Reason, Virtue, Value." }?D,>4H in 
Aristotle serves as the generic term for "appetite," of which there are several specific types. Plato, 
who had no corresponding notion of "generic appetite," never uses the term ÐD,>4H. (The term 
itself derives from ÏDX(T: reach, stretch [LSJ, s.v.], which Plato does use in the context of moral 
psychology: e.g., Resp. 439 B: ÏDX(,F2"4 [reach after].) Because ÐD,>4H only becomes a term of 
moral psychology with Aristotle, its use among Middle Platonists demonstrates their appropriation 
of terms and concepts postdating Plato.  
 33 On ¦B42L:\" and 2L:`H in Aristotle, see Cooper, "Reason, Virtue, Value," esp. 255-64. 
NB 257: "Aristotle seems throughout his career to have accepted from Plato's account of the 
human soul in the Republic the division of our non-rational desires into two types, appetitive and 
spirited (epithumia and thumos)."  
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anger in the soul.34 In addition, Aristotle associated ¦B42L:\" with "bodily" 
desires for food, drink, and sex—the three desires that characterize Plato's 
¦B42L:0J46`<.35 But in two key respects, the Aristotelian conception of 2L:`H 
and ¦B42L:\" underlying Middle-Platonic bipartition differs from that of Plato. 
First, what for Plato are acquisitive aims of the 2L:@,4*XH—things like victory, 
honor, and fame—lose all association with "assertive appetite" (2L:`H) and 
become simply additional objects of "acquisitive appetite" (¦B42L:\"), along with 
food, drink, and sex.36 In other words, Aristotle followed Plato in viewing 
¦B42L:\" as a non-rational desire for pleasure, but he expanded the scope of 
¦B42L:\" to include the intangible—but nevertheless pleasurable—objects of 
                                            
 34 Plato, in fact, argues for the distinct function of the 2L:@,4*XH over against the ¦B42L:0J46`< by citing the story of Leontius, whose anger against his own repugnant desire to 
view corpses demonstrates the separation of 2L:`H and ¦B42L:\" within the soul (see Resp. 439 
E – 440 A, esp. 440 A: Ò 8`(@H F0:"\<,4 J¬< ÏD(¬< B@8,:,Ã< ¦<\@J, J"ÃH ¦B42L:\"4H ñH –88@ Ñ< –88å). On the role of the 2L:@,4*XH in Plato, see Cooper, "Human Motivation," esp. 130-36. 
 35 E.g., Eth. nic. 1147 b 25-29. NB •<"(6"Ã" :¥< J FT:"J46V (1147 b 25-26) (cf. Resp. 
558 C-E, 559 A-D). On Plato's ¦B42L:0J46`<, note Resp. 437 D, where of all ¦B42L:\"4, *\R" 
(¦B42L:\" B@J@Ø) and B,Ã<" (¦B42L:\" ¦*T*−H) are the "most obvious" (¦<"D(,FJVJ"H); also 
Tim. 70 D: JÎ *¥ *¬ F\JT< J, 6"Â B@Jä< ¦B42L:0J46`<. In Spec. 4.96-97 Philo acknowledges as 
chief of all desires J¬< B,DÂ ("FJXD" BD"(:"J,L@:X<0< ¦B42L:\"<, which concerns ¦*T*¬ 6"Â B`F4H (cf. Plato, Leg. 782 E: ¦*T*¬ :¥< 6"Â B`F4H). In Leg. 1.86, ¦B42L:\" (i.e., JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`< 
[see Leg. 1.70-71]) compels one toward F4J\" 6"Â B@JV (cf. Leg. 3.147). Cf. *\R" and B,Ã<" as 
"harsh mistresses" in Mos. 1.191, Spec. 4.82, Virt. 130, Contemp. 37. The desire for sexual 
pleasures (•ND@*\F4") is another basic function of JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`< (e.g., Resp. 580 E [cf. 436 A-
B]). In fact, desires for food, drink, and sex often appear together as the primal triumvirate of 
appetites (e.g., Leg. 782 E; Phaed. 81 B). Although closely tied to bodily requirements and 
conditions, the desires for food, drink, and sex properly belong to the soul (viz. JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<)—there are, for Plato, no desires of the body, only "bodily desires," desires of the 
soul bearing a unique connection to the body (see e.g. R. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of 
Pleasure [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945], 61; cf. 79, n. 4; 112, n. 2; 140, n. 2). 
 36 Cf. Cooper, "Reason, Virtue, Value," 263: "In the Republic Plato gives this intermediate 
kind of desire [sc. 2L:`H] its own special object of pursuit, victory, and/or esteem or honor (timē), 
corresponding to appetite's [sc. ¦B42L:\"] pursuit of pleasure. As we have already seen, Aristotle 
rejects this identification: according to him, akratic lovers of honor and victory are incontinently 
pursuing a pleasure and so are inappropriately subject not to spirited desire but to certain 
appetites, appetites for victory and honor." 
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victory, honor, and fame.37 This broader concept of ¦B42L:\" strips 2L:`H of all 
acquisitive aims, leaving it almost exclusively associated with anger and 
aggression in Middle-Platonic thought.38 In other words, Middle Platonists 
continued to associate ¦B42L:\" with a particular component of the Platonic soul, 
but they conceived it more broadly as the one source for all non-rational 
appetites, pursuing its aim of pleasure through any number of possible objects. 
Second, since Aristotle assigned both 2L:`H and ¦B42L:\" to a single ÏD,6J46`< 
faculty of the soul, and since 2L:`H and ¦B42L:\" constitute the soul’s –8@(@< 
:XD@H in the bipartite version of Platonic tripartition, ÏD,6J46`< and –8@(@< :XD@H 
become interchangeable in Middle-Platonic moral psychology. Attesting this 
trend, Arius Didymus lists JÎ ÏD,6J46Î< :XD@H J−H RLP−H (Eclog. 38.8) as a 
variant Middle-Platonic designation for the soul’s non-rational part over against 
its rational part.39 In fact, Middle-Platonic ethical theory in general, which deals 
                                            
 37 De an. 414 b 5-6: º ¦B42L:\"q J@Ø (D º*X@H ÐD,>4H "àJ0 (cf. Eth. nic. 1119 b 6-8). 
 38 In Plato's Republic (548 C - 550 B), the man ruled by JÎ 2L:@,4*XH is not constantly 
angry: he is rather N\8"DP@H and N48`J4:@H (549 A)—he wants power and honor. The Middle-
Platonic conception (following Aristotle) would identify a N\8"DP@H or N48`J4:@H as one ruled by ¦B42L:\" (sc. J` ¦B42L:0J46Î<), while someone ruled by 2L:`H (sc. JÎ 2L:@,4*XH) would in fact 
be irascible. When Ps.-Timaeus considers training of the soul (TL 82), in particular the obedience 
of the non-rational part to reason (JÎ :¥< –8@(@< Jè 8@(4F:è B,\2,F2"4), the ideal for 2L:`H, 
which constitutes the non-rational part along with ¦B42L:\", is that it be "tame" (Jä *z•8`(T 2L:Î< :¥< BD@< ,É:,<)—in other words, Ps.-Timaeus envisions 2L:`H primarily as an irascible 
element. Plutarch, however, sometimes does maintain the strictly Platonic role for JÎ 2L:@,4*XH 
as the motivating force for reckless ambition (see Tim Duff, Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and 
Vice [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999], 83-89). 
 39 Cf. Ps.-Metop.117.9-10:  :¥< ì< *4V<@4" •BÎ Jä 8@(46ä :XD,`H ¦<J4 JH RLPH,  *¥ ÐD,>4H •BÎ Jä •8`(T (also Ps.-Theag. 193.13-14:  *¥ ÐD,>4H Jä •8`(T); Didask. 29.2 [182.29-
35] (note the association of "Ê ÏDX>,4H with non-rational over against rational): FTND@Fb<0 = *b<":\H J\H ¦FJ4 6"2z¼< J,J"(:X<TH 6"Â ,ÛB,42äH §P@LF4< "Ê ÏDX>,4H BDÎH JÎ NbF,4 *,FB@J46`<, J@LJXFJ4 JÎ 8@(4FJ46`<; Plutarch, Virt. mor. 450 E-F: JÎ< 8@(4F:Î< º(,ÃF2"4 6"Â –DP,4< J@Ø •8`(@L, where J@Ø •8`(@L includes ÏDX>,4H. 
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with reason's management of non-rational forces in the soul, and which must 
systematically conceptualize the nature and function of those non-rational forces 
in need of management, takes full advantage of –8@(@< :XD@H as a heuristic 
device, making it the locus not only of appetite (ÐD,>4H) but also of impulse 
(ÒD:Z) and emotion (BV2@H).  
Reason over against Impulse (ÒD:Z) 
 "Appetite" (ÐD,>4H), generally speaking, bears a close relation to "impulse" 
(ÒD:Z), so Middle-Platonic moral psychology, which placed ÐD,>4H in the soul's 
non-rational part, naturally placed ÒD:Z there as well.40 The term ÒD:Z denotes 
above all directed movement within the soul.41 Thus ÐD,>4H, as a type of impulse, 
denotes directed movement toward something, and ¦B42L:\", more specifically, 
denotes movement toward pleasure, a pursuit—other types of impulses denote 
                                            
 40 On the topic of impulse (ÒD:Z), see Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (cf. Tad 
Brennan, "Stoic Moral Psychology," in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics [ed. Brad 
Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 265-69). Inwood considers primarily the 
Stoic view (esp. 42-101 [="The Psychology of Action"]), but also the less technical views of Plato 
and Aristotle (see 242-49 [="Hormê in Plato, Aristotle, and the Magna Moralia"]). For Plato, 
neither ÒD:Z nor ÐD,>4H are technical terms (the latter does not appear in his writings), so their 
precise relation cannot be determined. For Aristotle, the terms were more or less 
interchangeable, which allowed for their conflation among later philosophers, as Inwood notes: 
"For although one was the central theoretical term for the Stoa [ÒD:Z] and the other for Aristotle 
[ÐD,>4H], they could be blended together by those who were not interested in or did not 
understand the difference between the two psychological theories. This process continued to the 
point where . . . the desiderative part of the soul could be called to hormêtikon rather than to 
orektikon" (245). For the Stoics, ÐD,>4H was a type of impulse: namely, a rational impulse toward 
the apparent good (see Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 235-37; cf. 114-15, 227-28).  
 41 According to the generic Stoic definition, an impulse is simply "a motion of the soul 
toward something," as in ESE 9: 8X(@LF4< . . . ÒD:¬< ,É<"4 N@D< RLP−H ¦B\ J4 6"J JÎ (X<@H 
(Cf. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 32: "In most of our sources impulse is explicitly defined as 
a kind of change, movement or activity of the soul"). Stoics considered this definition broad 
enough to describe impulse in both rational and non-rational animals (JZ< J, ¦< J@ÃH 8@(46@ÃH . . . 6"Â J¬< ¦< J@ÃH •8`(@4H), although they believed that human beings, as rational animals, 
experience only rational impulse (8@(46¬ ÒD:Z). 
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other types of directed movement.42 The issue dividing Stoics and Middle 
Platonists was not how to describe the phenomenon of impulse, since both could 
acknowledge the experience of directed movement within the soul. They 
disagreed over where in the soul (in a theoretical sense) impulse occurred and 
what role reason played in the generation of impulse. Arius Didymus notes that 
"Platonic philosophers" (@Ê 6"J A8VJT<" N48@F@N@Ø<J,H) associated ÒD:Z with 
the non-rational part of the soul (–8@(@< :XD@H J−H RLP−H) over against the 
rational part (Jè 8@(46è).43 This same association appears in other writings with 
“Eudoran” affinities (Ps.-Timaeus, Ps.-Metopus, Plutarch) and arguably in the 
extant fragments of Eudorus himself.44 By locating impulse in the non-rational 
                                            
 42 Pleasure (º*@<Z), for example, as an impulse denotes directed movement upward—an 
"elevation" (§B"DF4H) of the soul (ESE 10b; DL 7.114). 
 43 Eclog. 38.10-14 (citing various equivalent definitions of ²246Z): ÒD:¬ RLP−H BD"6J46Z . 
. . ´ [=] B@4`J0H •8`(@L :@D\@L RLP−H ´ [=] RLP−H J@Ø •8`(@L :XD@LH B@4`J0H 6"2zßB@J"6J46Î< 8`(@< *L<":X<0 Jè 8@(46è ¦B"6@8@L2,Ã<. In Eclog. 117.11-12, Arius notes the explicit 
identification of –8@(@< :XD@H with ÒD:0J46`< by Peripatetic philosophers: J−H (D RLP−H JÎ :¥< ,É<"4 8@(46`<, JÎ *z–8@(@<q 8@(46Î< :¥< JÎ 6D4J46`<, –8@(@< *¥ JÎ ÒD:0J46`< (NB Vander 
Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation," 294, n. 29: "Arius' description of the –8@(@< as ÒD:0J46`< 
contravenes Stoic doctrine and appears to represent a Peripatetic adaptation of the Stoic theory 
of ÒD:Z"). Middle Platonists surely made the same identification, given their readiness to adopt 
Peripatetic models in moral psychology (e.g., tripartition as bipartition). But even without an 
explicit equation of –8@(@< :XD@H with ÒD:0J46`< in Middle-Platonic sources, the association of –8@(@< :XD@H with ÒD:Z unmistakably appears.  
44 See esp. Mauro Bonazzi, "Eudorus’ Psychology and Stoic Ethics," in Platonic Stoicism 
– Stoic Platonism: The Dialogue between Platonism and Stoicism in Antiquity (ed. Mauro Bonazzi 
and Christoph Helmig; AMP 39; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007), 109-32. On the basis of 
a distinction between 2,TD\" and ÒD:Z in Eclog. 42.13-23 [=Mazz. 1.4-10], Bonazzi convincingly 
argues for Eudorus’ acknowledgement of non-rational impulse in the context of a Platonic 
bipartition between rational and non-rational parts of the soul. The association between ÒD:Z and –8@(@< :XD@H appears explicitly in Ps.-Metop.117.12-14: Jä< :,DXT< JH RLPH *b@ J BDJ", JÎ :¥< 8@(4FJ46Î< JÎ *z–8@(@<q 6"Â 8@(4FJ46Î< :X<, ø 6D\<@:,H 6"Â 2,TDX@:,Hq –8@(@< *X, ø ÒD:ä:,H 6"Â ÏD,(`:,2" (cf. ÒD:Z and ÐD,>4H) (cited also by Bonazzi, "Eudorus’ Psychology," 
125). Ps.-Timaeus has the association, but not as clearly: e.g., TL 71, where the soul's hormetic 
faculty (ÒD:"J46H) is listed separately from its rational faculty (8@(46H), indicating its non-
rational function. See also Plutarch, Virt. mor. 450 E-F: JÎ< 8@(4F:Î< º(,ÃF2"4 6"Â –DP,4< J@Ø 
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part of the soul, which stands over against reason, Middle Platonists affirmed the 
existence of non-rational impulses in adult human beings. For them, impulses 
capable of motivating human action could arise, subsist, and desist wholly apart 
from reason, without reason's assent or authorization.45 Such impulses are thus 
capable of genuinely opposing, or even usurping, reason. In sharp contrast, the 
Stoics flatly denied the possibility of non-rational impulse in adult human 
beings.46 For them, impulse (ÒD:Z) always involves rational assent 
(FL(6"JV2,F4H) and thus always denotes an activity of the mind (º(,:@<46`<).47 
                                                                                                                                  •8`(@L, identifying "Ê ÒD:"Â (BDÎH J FT:"J46 64<@b:,<"4) with J@Ø •8`(@L (cf. Bonazzi, 
"Eudorus’ Psychology," 125-26). 
45 Just as non-rational animals, who have no capacity for reason, nevertheless operate 
according to impulse. For an explanation of the role of impulse in animal behavior, see Inwood, 
Ethics and Human Action, 66-91, esp. 72-82. 
46 See, for example, Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 224-42 [=Appendix 2: "The Kinds 
of Impulse"], esp. 225. Commenting on Arius Didymus’ detailed summary of the Stoic 
classification of impulse (see Eclog. 86.17 – 88.7), Inwood notes the Stoic attribution of non-
rational impulse to non-rational animals, while noting also that for rational animals (i.e., human 
beings) the concept of non-rational impulse simply does not apply (225). Cf. Julia Annas, 
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (HCS 8. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 106: "Our 
normal talk of 'irrational' impulses suggests that they are not rational at all; but for the Stoics 
ordinary language is just wrong here, for there can be no such thing as a totally nonrational 
impulse, at least not in undefective humans. We grasp the phenomenon, but it is not what we 
think it is, namely, reason versus something devoid of reason, but rather good reason versus bad, 
inadequate reason." 
 47 The relation between impulse and assent stands as part of the broader Stoic 
psychology of action (see Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 42-101). Following Inwood (Ethics 
and Human Action, 28), º(,:@<46`< is translated "mind" (also A. A. Long, "Stoic Psychology," in 
The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Psychology [ed. Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999], 560-84, esp. 572-83 [="Rationality and the faculties of the mind"]). 
Technically, º(,:@<46`< refers to the "governing" part of the human soul (RLPZ), which 
commands the operation of strictly instrumental non-rational parts such as the five senses 
("ÆF2ZF,4H), the faculty of speech, and the faculty of reproduction—thus in Stoic theory, the soul 
has eight parts (see Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 27-41; cf. Long, "Stoic Psychology," esp. 
560-72). The mind itself has four powers—"impression" (N"<J"F\"), "impulse" (ÒD:Z), "assent" 
(FL(6"JV2,F4H), and "reason" (8`(@H)—of which the first two have non-rational analogues in non-
rational animals (on the mind’s powers, see esp. Long, "Stoic Psychology," 572-83). The 
presence of reason in Man, however, influences the operation of the entire mind, making all of its 
functions distinctly rational: "[O]ur sources are correct, but misleading, when they say that the 
mind or ‘governing part’ of the human psuchē has the four faculties, impression, assent, impulse, 
reason. The Stoics’ model of the mind would be better rendered by saying that there are three 
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Stoics, in other words, considered impulse a rational function, precluding on 
theoretical grounds the idea of impulse opposing, much less usurping, reason.48 
The Middle-Platonic discussion of impulse certainly owed much to the Stoics, 
insofar as the Stoics brought the topic into prominence by emphasizing the role 
of impulse in moral theory, but the difference in their respective understandings 
of the origin and nature of impulse could not be starker. Simply put, the Stoics 
conceived impulse as an exclusively rational function, while Middle Platonists 
conceived impulse as a non-rational function, appropriately located in the soul's 
non-rational part.49   
                                                                                                                                  
mental faculties—rational impression, rational impulse, and rational assent. Reason is not 
something over and above the other three. It is the mind in its entirety. Hence reason (logos), 
mind (nous), and thought (dianoia) are all terms that refer to the distinctive nature of a human 
being’s psuchē" (Long, "Stoic Psychology," 575). 
 48 For the Stoics, a moment of rational assent is always the direct cause of human 
behavior, whether or not the agent is consciously aware of that moment. The idea of an internal, 
non-rational force causing or determining behavior clearly and flatly contradicts the Stoic theory of 
human action. (Cf. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 139: "[A]t no time do we experience 
impulses or passions which are produced independently of our assenting reason or which conflict 
with and resist it.") This reflects the Stoic "monistic" psychology, which holds that the human 
psyche stands united under one arbiter—reason. Thus no psychic power other than reason (i.e., 
no non-rational power) can ultimately determine the course of human action, which always 
proceeds on the basis of an autonomous agent's rational decision. As Inwood explains (idem, 
33), Stoic monism did not preclude the existence of soul parts (:XD0), only the possibility of 
opposition among those parts.  
49 The acknowledgement of non-rational impulses (–8@(@4 ÒD:"\) in adult human beings 
serves in itself as a criterion for distinguishing Middle-Platonic from Stoic moral psychology, 
including the moral psychology of the Stoic Posidonius (ca. 130 – 50 B.C.). While Posidonius did 
acknowledge non-rational forces in the soul analogous to Platonic ¦B42L:\" and 2b:@H, he did 
not count these non-rational "affective movements" (B"2,J46"Â 64<ZF,4H [see PHP V 5.28]) as 
impulses (ÒD:"\)—although they could influence the character of (always rational) impulses (see 
John Cooper, "Posidonius on Emotions," in Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral 
Psychology and Ethical Theory [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999], 449-84, esp. 467-
68, 474-75; repr. from pages 71-111 in The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy [ed. J. Sihvola and 
T. Engberg-Pedersen; TSHP 46; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998]). In other words, Posidonius need not 
muddle the clear and radical difference between Middle Platonists (including Philo) and Stoics on 
the question of non-rational impulses in adult human beings—or, for that matter, on the question 
of BV20, which both groups analyzed ultimately as a type of impulse: for Middle Platonists a type 
of non-rational impulse, for Stoics a type of (ir)rational impulse.  
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Reason over against Emotion (BV2@H) 
 Along with ÐD,>4H and ÒD:Z, Middle Platonists placed also emotion 
(BV2@H) in the non-rational part of the soul: feelings of dejection, fear, elation, 
desire—can all arise, subsist, and desist apart from the rational faculty.50 Arius 
Didymus confirms that "Platonist philosophers" (Eclog. 38.14-15) considered the 
soul's non-rational part to be also its "emotional part" (B"20J46Î< :XD@H), thus 
indicating that emotions are essentially non-rational phenomena.51 Similarly, in 
TL 71 Ps.-Timaeus lists the soul's "emotional faculty" (B"20J46H [sc. *L<V:4@H]) 
as something other than its rational faculty (8@(46H [sc. *L<V:4@H]), indicating 
that emotions occur apart from reason. Along with the Stoics, Middle Platonists 
acknowledged four cardinal BV20: grief (8bB0), fear (N`$@H), pleasure (º*@<Z), 
and desire (¦B42L:\").52 But agreement between the two groups virtually ends 
                                            
 50 The term BV2@H bears various translations, and a comparison of Middle-Platonic over 
against Stoic ethical theory demands the subtle yet crucial distinction between "emotion" (BV2@H) 
and "passion" (BV2@H). Emotion (BV2@H) is a strictly amoral function of normal human life, while 
passion (BV2@H) is an immoral function of abnormal human life. These different connotations led 
to semantic confusion and charges of equivocation (see Plutarch, Virt. mor. 449 A-C). 
 51 Eclog. 38.5-7: }!8@(@< :XD@H J−H RLP−H ,Æ24F:X<@< ßB"6@b,4< Jè 8`(åq ´ BV2@H ´ B"20J46Î< :XD@H J−H RLP−H ,Æ24F:X<@< ßB"6@b,4< Jè 8@(46è. Cf. Plutarch, Virt. mor. 442 A: [» Jz•<2DfB@L RLP¬] ªJ,D@< :¥< §P,4 JÎ <@,DÎ< 6"Â 8@(4FJ46`<, . . . ªJ,D@< *¥ JÎ B"20J46Î< 6"Â –8@(@< (Virt. mor. represents in large part Plutarch's polemic against the Stoics, who refuse to 
acknowledge that passions are something other than reason, not—as they claim—aberrant 
manifestations of reason; see 441 C [the Stoic view], 443 B, 446 F – 447 C, 448 D); also Didask. 
5.2 [156.35-37]: JX:<@:,< J¬< RLP¬< ,ÇH J, JÎ 8@(46Î< 6"Â ,ÆH JÎ B"20J46`<, 6"Â "Þ BV84< JÎ B"20J46`< ,ÇH J, JÎ 2L:46Î< 6"Â JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`< (cf. 17.4 [173.11-15]). Lilla (Clement of 
Alexandria, 87) suggests that a general tenet of the Middle-Platonic doctrine of BV2@H is: "the 
tendency to consider it as produced by the irrational [i.e., non-rational] parts of the soul."  
 52 On the four cardinal passions, see Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 144-45. The four 
appear also in Middle Platonism, e.g. TL 72: •DP"Â *¥ 6"6\"H *@<"Â 6"Â 8ØB"4 ¦B42L:\"4 J, 6"Â N`$@4; Philo, Her. 269-70: JH Jä< J,JJVDT< B"2ä< *L<V:,4H . . . º*@<−H . . . ¦B42L:\" . . . 8bB0H . . . N`$@L (cf. Schmidt, Anthropologie, 88, n. 92). Baltes, Timaios Lokros, 199, suggests 
that the doctrine of four cardinal passions attested in TL 72 formed (for Middle Platonists) part of 
"ein neues ethisches Lehrgebäude." 
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with this taxonomy. In the first place, Stoics considered these four passions to be 
expressions of the mind, albeit aberrant expressions (i.e., "irrational" [–8@(@H]).53 
This follows from the Stoic conviction that (a) passions are a type of impulse and 
(b) every impulse derives from reason. By claiming that passions arise 
independently from the rational faculty, Middle Platonists reject Stoic theory 
unequivocally.54 In addition, Stoics considered these four BV20 to be always and 
inherently bad—thus passions and not just emotions. Middle Platonists, by 
contrast, considered the cardinal BV20 an amoral part of normal human 
existence: their non-rational energy provides essential motivation for human 
activity, including virtuous human activity, and they become problematic only 
when they overstep the dictates of reason.55 So Middle Platonists endorsed as 
                                            
 53 ESE 10: ,É<"4 *¥ BV20 BV<J" J@Ø º(,:@<46@Ø J−H RLP−H; cf. Plutarch, Virt. mor. 446 F 
– 447 A: §<4@4 *X N"F4< @ÛP ªJ,D@< ,É<"4 J@Ø 8`(@L JÎ BV2@H . . . 6"Â (D ¦B42L:\"< 6"Â ÏD(¬< 6"Â N`$@< 6"Â J J@4"ØJ" BV<J" *`>"H ,É<"4 6"Â 6D\F,4H B@<0DVH, @Û B,DÂ ª< J4 (4<@:X<"H J−H RLP−H :XD@H, •88zÓ8@L J@Ø º(,:@<46@Ø Õ@BH 6"Â ,Ç>,4H 6"Â FL(6"J"2XF,4H 6"Â ÒD:VH.   
54 In other words, they side with the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition over against the Stoic. 
For a discussion of the radical difference between the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of BV2@H (as 
non-rational) and the Stoic concept (as [ir]rational), see Frede, "Stoic Affections," esp. 94-100.   
 55 E.g., Ps.-Metop. 121.10-12: @Û6 •N,8¥< ì< *,Ã J BV2," JH RLPH, @ÜJ, (D éNX84:@< "ÛJ •N,8X<, •88 FL<"D:`F"F2"4 B@JÂ JÎ 8`(@< §P@< Jä *X@<J@H 6"Â Jä :,JD\T; 
Plutarch, Virt. mor. 443 C: @Û $@L8@:X<@L [J@Ø 8`(@L] JÎ BV2@H ¦>"4D,Ã< B"<JVB"F4< (@ÜJ, (D *L<"JÎ< @ÜJz–:,4<@<), •88zÓD@< J4< 6"Â JV>4< ¦B4J42X<J@H "ÛJè; 451 C: :XJ,FJ4< @Þ< 
[•<2DfBå] 6"Â J@Ø •8`(@L, 6"Â Fb:NLJ@< §P,4 J¬< J@Ø BV2@LH •DPZ<, @Û6 ¦B,4F`*4@< •88z•<"(6"\"< @ÞF"<, @Û*z•<"4D,JX"< B"<JVB"F4< •88 2,D"B,\"H 6"Â B"4*"(T(\"H *,@:X<0<; Didask. 32.4 [186.14-18]: Jä< *¥ B"2ä< J :X< ¦FJ4< –(D4", J *¥ »:,D"q 6"Â »:,D" :¥< ÓF" 6"J NbF4< ßBVDP,4 Jè •<2DfBå •<"(6"ÃV J, 6"Â @Æ6,Ã"q @àJTH *z§P,4 ªTH —< Fb::,JD" ßBVDP®, BD@F,82@bF0H *¥ "ÛJ@ÃH •:,JD\"H º:"DJ0:X<" ßBVD>,4. For Middle 
Platonists, passions are in fact an essential component of moral virtue (²246¬ •D,JZ): TL 73: JÎ BãH §P,< B@JÂ J BV2," •DPV J, 6"Â BXD"H •D,JH 6"Â 6"6\"H ¦FJ\q JÎ (D B8,@<V.,< ¦< J"bJ"4H ´ 6VDD@< "ÛJ< ,É:,< ,Þ ´ 6"6äH •:¥ *4"J\20J4 (on which see Baltes, Timaios Lokros, 
206: "[W]ie bei Platon . . . sind die Affekte an sich noch nicht schlecht, sie werden es erst durch 
Übermaß und Unkontrolliertheit"); Arius Didymus (Eclog. 38.6-7): [²246¬ •D,JZ =] BV2@H ´ B"20J46Î< :XD@H J−H RLP−H ,Æ24F:X<@< ßB"6@b,4< Jè 8@(46è; Ps.-Metop. : 119.8: J *¥ BV2," JH •D,JH à8"; 121.7: (\<,J"4 (D ¦6 Jä< B"2XT<  •D,JV; Plutarch, Virt. mor. 440 D: [on ²246¬ •D,JZ] Jè JÎ :¥< BV2@H à80< §P,4<. 
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an ethical norm the moderation of emotion.56 This emphasis on moderation 
stems directly from Middle-Platonic convictions about the soul: a non-rational 
component, the locus of emotion, simply exists as a matter of fact; and its 
existence calls for active management on the part of reason.57 
Summary 
According to Alexandrian Middle Platonism, the human soul consists of 
two essentially different parts: a rational part and a non-rational part. Although 
the non-rational part represents in theory a composite of Platonic 2L:`H and 
¦B42L:\", this representation involves dramatic modifications of Plato's views. 
Along with expanding the scope of acquisitive desire (¦B42L:\"), this 
representation of tripartition as bipartition facilitates a unitary conception of the 
soul's non-rational part as the locus of appetite (ÐD,>4H), impulse (ÒD:Z), and 
emotion (BV2@H)—which all are conceived as non-rational capacities in 
accordance with their non-rational origin. In sum, Middle Platonists understand 
"rational" over against "non-rational" to be the one overarching paradigm for 
                                            
 56 Ps.-Metop. 120.24: :,F`J"J" Jä< B"2XT< (cf. Ps.-Archit. 41.16: •F60JX@< ì< B@JJ< :,JD4@BV2,4"< Ç:,<); Plutarch, Virt. mor. 443 D: B"2ä< . . . :,F`J0J"H; 444 C: J@ØJz@Þ< J@Ø BD"6J46@Ø 8`(@L 6"J NbF4< §D(@< ¦FJ\, JÎ ¦>"4D,Ã< JH •:,JD\"H Jä< B"2ä< 6"Â B80::,8,\"H; 445 A: ,ÆH JÎ :XJD4@< . . . 6"24FJF" Jä< B"2ä< ª6"FJ@<; cf. TL 72: *@<"Â –:,JD@\. Cf. Claudio Moreschini, "Considerazioni sulla dottrina del pathos nel Medioplatonismo, 
SF 8-9 (1985-86), 23-33, 24: "il medioplatonismo . . . sostiene l'eccellenza della dottrina della 
metriopatheia." See also Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 92-103; John Dillon, "Metriopatheia and 
Apatheia: Some Reflections on a Controversy in Later Greek Ethics," in Essays in Ancient Greek 
Philosophy II (ed. John Anton and Anthony Preus; Albany: SUNY Press, 1983), 508-17; repr. in 
The Golden Chain: Studies in the Development of Platonism and Christianity; CS 333; Aldershot, 
Hampshire; Brookfield, Vt.: Variorum, 1990. 
 57 Cf. Dillon, "Metriopatheia and Apatheia," 515: "the controversy about metriopatheia and 
apatheia, which generated such heat in later Greek philosophy, is properly one between the 
concept of a bipartite or tripartite soul, in which the lower part [or] parts can never be eradicated—
at least while the soul is in the body—but must constantly be chastised, and that of a unitary 
one." 
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moral psychology, although that paradigm accommodates a number of different 
conceptual models:  
Table One: Variations of Bipartition in Middle Platonism 
 TRIPARTITION APPETITE (ÐD,>4H) IMPULSE (ÒD:Z) EMOTION (BV2@H) 
RATIONAL 
8@(46Î< :XD@H 
 
8@(46Î< :XD@H 
 
8@(46Î< :XD@H 
 
8@(46Î< :XD@H 
 
8@(46Î< :XD@H 
NON-RATIONAL 
–8@(@< :XD@H 
 
2b:@H / ¦B42L:\" 
 
ÏD,6J46Î< :XD@H 
 
ÒD:0J46Î< :XD@H 
 
B"20J46Î< :XD@H 
 
This variety naturally allows for variant conceptions of desire (¦B42L:\"), 
depending on the model in question. For Middle Platonists, the term ¦B42L:\" 
can denote either an enduring "part" of the soul or an intermittent function of 
some "part" (ÏD,6J46`<, ÒD:0J46`<, B"20J46`<). But in any case, ¦B42L:\" 
represents a non-rational force within the soul in need of reason's management.  
BIPARTITION IN PHILO’S WRITINGS 
Reason over against z+B42L:\" / 1L:`H 
 Philo consistently maintains the bipartite psychological model of his 
Middle-Platonic contemporaries:58  
                                            
58 Generally speaking, studies of Philo's work identify the bipartition of rational and non-
rational (often "irrational") as the model held most consistently: e.g., Billings, Platonism of Philo, 
52: "The one distinction which persists throughout is the one . . . between the rational and the 
irrational parts of the soul"; Dillon, Middle Platonists, 174-75: "[F]or Philo each of these divisions 
expresses some aspect of the truth, but the most basic truth remains the division into rational and 
irrational" (175); Runia, Philo and The Timaeus, 468: "Philo regarded the main thrust of Plato's 
psychology as tending towards a bipartition of the soul into a rational and an irrational part" [cf. 
304-05]); Schmidt, Anthropologie, 50: "Trotzdem Philon zwischen den verschiedenen 
Einteilungen . . . hin- und herschwankt . . ., dominiert doch entsprechend seiner dualisischen 
Grundhaltung die Zweiteilung der Seele." Cf. Hermann S. Schibli, "Xenocrates' Daemons and the 
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Since our soul is bipartite (RLP−H º:ä< *4:,D@ØH ßB"DP@bF0H), having 
one rational part (JÎ :¥< 8@(46`<) and one non-rational part (JÎ *¥ –8@(@<), there is a virtue associated with each part . . .. (Congr. 26)59 
 
Furthermore, Philo uses this bipartite model to accommodate Platonic tripartition, 
again in agreement with contemporary Middle Platonism: 
 [Esau] was wild and indocile, brimful of fierce temper and desire (2L:@Ø 
 (X:@<J" 6"Â ¦B42L:\"H60), who to sum him up armed the non-rational part 
                                                                                                                                  
Irrational Soul," CQ 43 (1993): 143-67, who on the bipartite schema 8@(46`<-–8@(@< notes: "This 
was the working model for Philo of Alexandria in the first century A.D., probably following 
Eudorus" (161). For a helpful collection of Philonic material on the soul, in outline form and 
arranged under rubrics relevant to moral psychology, see Gretchen Reydams-Schils, "Philo of 
Alexandria on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology: The Socratic Higher Ground," in Philo of 
Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy (ed. Francesca Alesse; SPhA 5; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 
169-95; repr. from AP 22 (2002): 125-47. In addition to assembling and collating data (175-87 
[="Philo's Psychology, Nuts and Bolts"]), Reydams-Schils considers "which psychological model 
Philo prefers in his analysis of rational behavior and the passions" (169-70) and so seeks to 
explain the data (see esp. 169-75, 187-95). She concludes that Philo—despite skepticism 
regarding the precise nature of the soul—consistently maintains an overarching "Socratic" notion 
of soul-body opposition able to accommodate psychological models of both Platonic and Stoic 
provenance, which Philo can them deploy in various forms according to exegetical need (esp. 
190: "A return to the Socratic position of a struggle between soul and body" etc.). Her thesis, 
however, does not address the question of whether or not Philo holds a consistent view of the 
soul itself, since in the end a "soul-body" dichotomy only affirms the existence of a soul over 
against the body, which both Platonists and Stoics acknowledged. The bipartition espoused by 
Middle Platonists (rational over against non-rational) accommodates all of Reydams-Schils' data 
within one working model of the soul and so it provides what the soul-body dichotomy cannot: an 
overarching paradigm for moral psychology. The soul-body dichotomy more likely belongs not to 
Philo's moral psychology but to his moral rhetoric, in which the body (esp. the belly) serves as a 
foil for loftier pursuits of the soul (see Sandnes, Belly and Body, esp. 35-60 [="The belly in ancient 
moral philosophy"], 97-107 [="The belly-topos in Jewish-Hellenistic sources"], and 108-35 [="The 
belly in Philo's writings"]). On Philo's various formulations of the soul (along with a proposal of <@ØH-"ÇF20F4H as the one overarching model subsuming the rest), see Bouffartigue, "La structure 
de l'âme chez Philon," 59-75. See also Schmidt, Anthropologie, 49-67. 
 59 My translation. Also Leg. 2.2: ¦(ã B@88V ,Æ:4, RLP¬ Fä:", 6"Â RLP−H –8@(@< 8@(46`<; Her. 132: J¬< :¥< RLP¬< ,ÆH 8@(46Î< 6"Â –8@(@<; Her. 167: "Ê FJ−8"4 Jä< (,<46ä< *X6" <`:T< . . . *b@ ,ÆFÂ< ÆFVD42:@4 J@ÃH J−H RLP−H :XD,F4, 8@(46è 6"Â •8`(å; Spec. 1.66: @Û 6DV:"J" ¦6 8@(46−H 6"Â •8`(@L NbF,TH, @Ë"H JH º:,JXD"H ,É<"4 FL:$X$06,<; Spec. 1.201: *L@Ã< *zÐ<JT< ¦> ô< º º:,JXD" RLP¬ FL<XFJ0, 8@(46@Ø J, 6"Â •8`(@L; Spec. 1.333: J¬< Ó80< RLP¬< ¦6 8@(46@Ø 6"Â •8`(@L :XD@LH FL<,FäF"<; Conf. 111: ©6VFJ"H Jä< ¦< RLP± *L<V:,T< BD@F680DfF"<J,H JH :¥< 8@(46±, JH *¥ •8`(å :,D\*4. 
 60 While Philo does use the term ¦B42L:0J46`< to refer to the desiderative element of the 
tripartite soul in Leg. 1.70-72 and Leg. 3.115, he elsewhere uses the term ¦B42L:\" (cf. 2L:`H for 2L:@,4*XH), as Ioannes Leisegang notes (Indices ad Philonis Alexandrini Opera [= vol. 7 of 
PCW], s.v. at no. 1, "tertia pars animae"): Conf. 21; Spec. 4.92; Spec. 1.146-50, cf. 206 ff.; Virt. 
13; Migr. 67; Her. 64; Spec. 4.10. 
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 of the soul to war against the rational part (JÎ J−H RLP−H –8@(@< :XD@H 
 ¦B4J,J,P46`J" Jè 8@(46è). (Praem. 59)61 
 
Reflecting the full range of variant models endorsed by Middle Platonists, Philo 
also locates appetite (ÐD,>4H), impulse (ÒD:Z), and emotion (BV2@H) within the 
non-rational part of the soul. 
Reason over against Appetite (ÐD,>4H) 
 In agreement with his Middle-Platonic contemporaries, Philo locates 
ÐD,>4H in the non-rational part of the soul: 
 Our soul is tripartite (JD4:,D−): one part is rational (:XD@H :¥< «< 
 8@(4FJ46`<), a second is assertive (*,bJ,D@< *¥ 2L:46`<), and a third is 
 desiderative (JD\J@< *¥ ¦B42L:0J46`<). . . . To the desiderative part 
 [philosophers have assigned] the area around the abdomen and belly, 
 since that is the dwelling place of desire (¦<J"Ø2" (D 6"J@46,Ã 
 ¦B42L:\"), non-rational appetite (ÐD,>4H –8@(@H). (Leg. 3.115)62 
 
Philo indicates in Leg. 3.116 that he views this tripartite Platonic model in Middle-
Platonic terms, as a bipartite dichotomy: Ò 8`(@H over against Ò 2L:`H and º 
¦B42L:\", with the latter pair identified as :XD0 J@Ø •8`(@L. If Philo places 
¦B42L:\" in the soul's non-rational part, then his equation of ¦B42L:\" with 
ÐD,>4H –8@(@H clearly places ÐD,>4H there as well. So Philo, in good Middle-
Platonic fashion, sees ÐD,>4H operating apart from reason as a non-rational force 
within the soul in a distinct, non-rational part. This flatly contradicts the Stoics, 
                                            
 61 Substituting "desire" for Colson's "lust"; "non-rational" for "unreasoning." Cf. Migr. 66: Ò 2L:ÎH 6"Â º ¦B42L:\" = JÎ J−H RLP−H –8@(@<; Leg 3.116: Ò 2L:ÎH 6"Â º ¦B42L:\" = :XD0 J@Ø •8`(@L; Her. 64: J@Ø ©JXD@L RLP−H J:Z:"J@H, ÓB,D –8@(@< ßBVDP@< "Ë:"J4 BXNLDJ"4, 2L:@×H .X@<J"H 6"Â B,BLDT:X<"H ¦B42L:\"H •<"N8X(@<; cf. QG 4.216.  
 62 My translation. Cf. Post. 26: ¦B42L:\" *¥ •8`(@LH ¦:B@4@ØF" ÏDX>,4H. 
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who themselves defined ¦B42L:\" as ÐD,>4H –8@(@H but unequivocally meant 
"irrational appetite,” a malfunction of the rational faculty.63  
 Philo's identification of ¦B42L:\" as ÐD,>4H –8@(@H derives ultimately from 
Aristotle, and Philo's overall use of the term ÐD,>4H further reflects the Aristotelian 
modifications of Platonic theory inherent in Middle-Platonic bipartition. Plato had 
understood pleasure (º*@<Z) to be the ultimate aim of ¦B42L:\", and Aristotle 
added technical precision to this idea by defining ¦B42L:\" as an ÐD,>4H J@Ø 
º*X@H, or appetite for the pleasant.64 Philo likewise associates ¦B42L:\" with 
ÏDX>,4H . . . º*@<ä< (Leg. 3.138).65 He can speak of the typical varieties of 
                                            
 63 E.g., DL 7.113: º *z¦B42L:\" ¦FJÂ< –8@(@H ÐD,>4H [=SVF III 96, 22]. Galen 
understands both the ambiguity of –8@(@H and the clear intention of Chrysippus to mean 
"irrational" in his definition of ¦B42L:\": "[I]n his definition of desire (JÎ< J−H ¦B42L:\"H ÓD@<), 
which he calls irrational appetite (ÐD,>4H –8@(@<), he touches in a way, verbally at least, on the 
non-rational power in the soul; but here too he departs from it in his explanation, since even the 
appetite (º ÐD,>4H) that he includes in the definition belongs to the rational power (J−H 8@(46−H ¦FJ4 *L<V:,TH). Thus he defines appetite ("ÛJZ<) as 'rational impulse' (ÒD:¬< 8@(46Z<) . . ." 
(PHP IV 4.2-3; trans. De Lacey, slightly modified). Schmidt, Anthropologie, 89, citing Leg. 3.115 
(see 162, n. 126), recognizes that the definition of ¦B42L:\" as ÐD,>4H –8@(@H is "aus der Stoa 
wörtlich übernommene," but also that the words by themselves mean very little ("inhaltlich recht 
leere"). The meaning must be supplied, either through explicit commentary or through clear 
contextual cues, such as Philo provides via the framework of Platonic tripartition, in which ¦B42L:\" explicitly resides outside of the reasoning faculty and is thus non-rational.  
 64 E.g., De an. 414 b 5-6; Eth. nic. 1119 b 6-8. 
 65 "We have already mentioned that pleasure goes not only on its breast (¦BÂ Jè FJZ2,4) 
but also on its belly (J± 6@48\‘), and pointed out that the stomach (("FJXD") is a place most 
appropriate to pleasure, for we may almost describe it as a reservoir of all the pleasures (FP,*Î< (D •((,Ã@< Jä< º*@<ä< B"Fä< "àJ0 ¦FJ\). For when the belly has been filled, cravings after 
the other pleasures also become vehement (ÏDX>,4H 6"Â Jä< –88T< º*@<ä< (\<@<J"4 Fb<J@<@4), 
but when it has been emptied, theses are quieted and become more still (²D,:"Ã"4 6"Â FJ"20D`J,D"4)" (NB 6@48\" in Philo's allegory stands for ¦B42L:\", i.e., JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<). Cf. 
Post. 71, where Philo similarly implies that desire (N8,(@bF0H J−H ¦B42L:\"H) consists of an 
appetite (J@×H Jä< ÏDX>,T< ¦PV8"FX J, 6"Â §8LF, J`<@LH) for pleasure (º*@<ä< •B,P@:X<@LH); 
also Abr. 96: JH :¥< ¦Nzº*@<¬< •(@bF"H ÏDX>,4H (cf. Praem. 71: ¦B42L:ZF® J4<ÎH º*X@H).  
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Platonic ¦B42L:\" (for food, drink, sex) in terms of ÐD,>4H, as did Aristotle.66 But 
more importantly, his concept of the non-rational appetite for pleasure expands to 
include, as it did for Aristotle, objects that Plato had associated with the soul's 
assertive function, not its appetitive function—objects like victory, honor, and 
fame.67 So for Philo, as for other Middle Platonists, ¦B42L:\" encompassed the 
objects of both of Plato's inferior soul parts (JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<, JÎ 2L:@,4*XH) in its 
pursuit of pleasure.68 This "expansion" of the role of ¦B42L:\" in turn casts 2L:`H 
more exclusively as the non-rational agent of anger.69 Philo does not often use 
the term ÐD,>4H, but his use does reflect standard trends within Middle-Platonic 
moral psychology.70   
 
                                            
 66 Det. 113: J"ÃH :,J ("FJXD" PDf:,<@H º*@<"ÃH ¦B"88Z8@4H 6"Â §J4 J"ÃH BDÎH FL<@LF\"< ÏDX>,F4< •6:V.T<; Gig. 35 :¬ BDÎH BV<J" @Þ< J J± F"D6Â N\8" "Ê ÏDX>,4H •<0D,2\F2TF"<; Ebr. 214: Ÿ JH ÏDX>,4H •<"DD0(<b<J" [F4J\T<, ÐR@L, B@Jä<]; Ebr. 222: º –B80FJ@H ¦< "ÛJ@ÃH ÐD,>4H among J@×H @Æ<@N8L(\"H 6"Â 8"4:"D(\"H 6"Â Jä< "ÆFP\FJT< º*@<ä< »JJ@LH; Decal. 123: JH ÏDX>,4H (of the adulterer); Virt. 136: J−H ßB,DNL@ØH ("FJD4:"D(\"H ÏDX>,4H. 
 67 Philo attests this view explicitly only in Post. 116, but the passage is telling. Philo has in 
mind people whose appetites are engaged (J"ÃH •@D\FJ@4H "ßJä< ÏDX>,F4<)—appetites involving 
not only "bodily pleasures" (FT:"J46H º*@<VH) but also objects typically associated with Plato's 2L:@,4*XH, such as fame (N48@*`>@LH). Cf. Post. 117: ,Û:@DN\"H (L<"6ÎH ,Ë<,6", ´ PD0:VJT<, ´ *`>0H, ´ J4:−H, ´ •DP−H, ´ 6JZF,TH, ´ FL<`8TH ÓF" Ff:"J@H 6"Â Jä< ¦6J`H ¦FJ4 B8,@<,6JZ:"J"; Opif. 79: "Ê *`>0H ´ PD0:VJT< ´ •DP−H ¦B42L:\"4; Ios. 70: •DP−H ¦B42L:\".  
 68 E.g., Leg. 2.107: J (@Ø< B@40J46 [º*@<−H] . . . PDLFÎH, –D(LD@H, *`>", J4:"Â, •DP"Â, "Ê â8"4 Jä< "ÆF20Jä<. Schmidt, Anthropologie, recognized this tendency, without noting the 
historical developments in moral psychology that account for it: "Als Gegenstand des Begehrens 
werden fast durchweg die Strebungen, die Platon von dem zweiten und dritten Sellenteil aussagt, 
zusammengefaßt" (92-93). 
 69 Leg. 3.130: J@Ø 2L:@Ø . . . J@Ø B@8,:46@Ø :XD@LH; Leg. 3.131: §D4H *¥ :ZJ0D ¦FJÂ 2L:@Ø . . . J−H @Þ< ¦D4FJ46−H 6"Â N48@<,\6@L RLP−H B80::,8¥H (X<<0:" 2L:`<; Migr. 67: JÎ< B@8,:46Î< 2L:`<; Migr. 210: JÎ 2L:@Ø 6"Â ÏD(−H BV2@H. Cf. Méasson, Char ailé, 158-60 [="Le 
«thumos» chez Platon et chez Philon"]. 
 70 Compare the instances of ÐD,>4H (15) and ¦B42L:\" (218) (see Philo Index, s.v.). 
Because the two terms are virtually equivalent (¦B42L:\" = [–8@(@H] ÐD,>4H), Philo's preference 
for ¦B42L:\" over ÐD,>4H may come from a conviction that ÐD,>4H in most cases amounts to 
needless technical jargon. 
65 
 
  
Reason over against Impulse (ÒD:Z) 
 Siding with his Middle-Platonic contemporaries against the Stoics, Philo 
believes that the soul's non-rational part can generate non-rational impulses 
(ÒD:"\), whose independent origin allows them genuinely to oppose, or even 
usurp, reason.71 Philo's acceptance of non-rational impulse as a factor in human 
moral psychology derives from broader convictions about the relation between 
animal and human souls. Following standard formulations of the so-called scala 
naturae, which ranks various forms of existence according to natural endowment, 
Philo recognizes impulse (ÒD:Z) as a capacity possessed by non-rational 
animals.72 Because animals are non-rational (–8@(@H), their impulses are 
likewise non-rational (–8@(@H), generated by a reflexive mechanism every time 
an appropriate stimulus appears, without the authorization or assent of reason.73 
Occupying a higher rank on the scale, human beings have not only the capacity 
for impulse (ÒD:Z), but also the endowment of reason (8`(@H), which 
distinguishes them as a more advanced type of soul. But in Stoic theory, reason 
is not just one additional endowment among others. In other words, a human 
soul in no way amounts to simply the capacities of an animal soul, as they 
                                            
 71 Philo acknowledges also rational impulses in human beings (e.g., Praem. 104: JH ÒD:H *4"<@\"H). But the issue is not whether mind can generate impulses or not (it can), but 
whether or not there are also non-rational parts of the soul that can generate impulses. On ÒD:Z 
in Philo's writings, including rational ÒD:Z, see Schmidt, Anthropologie, 86-87. 
 72 E.g., Leg. 2.23: RLP¬ *¥ ¦FJ4 NbF4H BD@F,480NLÃ" N"<J"F\"< 6"Â ÒD:Z<q "àJ0 6@4<¬ 6"Â Jä< •8`(T< ¦FJ\< (cf. Leg. 1.30; Deus 41). On the scala naturae, see Inwood, Ethics and 
Human Action, 18-27 [="The Place of Man in Nature"].  
 73 For a discussion of how impulse works in non-rational animals, see Inwood, Ethics and 
Human Action, 66-91 [="Human and Animal Action"]. 
66 
 
  
function in animals (i.e., non-rationally), with reason added on as a distinct new 
element.74 Reason transforms the very nature of the human soul, making its 
capacities thoroughly rational. So human beings, for the Stoics, experience only 
rational impulses. In Philo's view, by contrast, the capacities of the animal soul, 
as they function in animals (i.e., non-rationally), remain intact within the human 
soul, coexisting with reason in what amounts to an animal soul superintended by 
reason: 
Each one of us (ª6"FJ@< º:ä<) . . . is two in number (•D42:è *b@ ,É<"4), 
an animal (.è`<), and a man (–<2DTB@<). To each of these has been 
allotted an inner power akin to the qualities of their respective life-
principles (FL((,<¬H *b<":4H Jä< 6"J RLPZ<), to one the power of 
vitality (º .TJ46Z), in virtue of which we are alive, to the other the power of 
reasoning (º 8@(46Z), in virtue of which we are reasoning beings. Of the 
power of vitality the non-rational creatures (J –8@(") partake with us . . .. 
(Det. 82)75 
 
This Middle-Platonic understanding of the scala naturae gives Plato's basic 
image of the "beast within" a more sophisticated theoretical basis—one that has 
profound implications for Philo's moral psychology. In particular, Philo considers 
the same mechanism of non-rational impulse found in animals to operate also in 
                                            
 74 See Long, "Stoic Psychology," esp. 574-75. 
 75 Substituting "each" for Colson's "either"; "non-rational" for Colson's "irrational." For 
Philo, º .TJ46Z *b<":4H (the life power of the .è@<) includes ÒD:Z: e.g., Leg. 1.30: JÎ (D .è@< J@Ø :¬ .æ@L *LFÂ BD@ÜP,4, N"<J"F\‘ 6"Â ÒD:± (cf. Leg. 2.23; Deus 41). Furthermore, Philo 
states that º .TJ46Z *b<":4H, including ÒD:Z, retains its distinct nature within the human soul, 
functioning for human beings as it does for non-rational animals (cf. Spec. 3.99: JÎ J−H RLP−H N"L8`J,D@< ,É*@H . . . ¦< Jè Ff:"J4, JÎ –8@(@<, @â 6"Â J 20D\" :,JXFP06,<; Sacr. 47: JH *¥ 6"2z©JXD"< ¦6*@P¬< •8`(@LH [*L<V:,4H] . . ., ÓF"4 :¬ 8@(46"\, ô< 6"Â J –8@(" .è" 6@4<T<,Ã). 
Cf. Wolfson, Philo, 1:385-89 [="Animals and the Irrational Soul of Man"]. 
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human beings. Just like non-rational animals, human beings experience non-
rational impulses (–8@(@4 ÒD:"\).76 
 In his description of Moses, Philo presents an idealized portrait of reason's 
management of non-rational impulse(s): 
 He did not . . . allow the lusts of adolescence (JH :,D4"64f*,4H
 ¦B42L:\"H) to go unbridled, . . .. But he kept a tight hold on them with the 
 reins, as it were, of temperance and self-control, and forcibly pulled them 
 back from their forward course (J¬< ,ÆH JÎ BD`FT N@D< •<,P"\J4., $\‘). 
 And each of the other emotions (Jä< –88T< :X<J@4 B"2ä< ª6"FJ@<), 
 which rage so furiously if left to themselves, he tamed and assuaged and 
 reduced to mildness; . . . and in general he watched the first directions and 
 impulses of the soul (JH BDfJ"H J−H RLP−H ¦B4$@8VH J, 6"Â ÒD:VH) as 
                                            
76 In QG 1.55 (Gk. Petit), Philo acknowledges the reflexive generation of impulse (ÒD:Z) 
at the mere appearance of something (ÓJ"< BD@FBXF® J4<ÎH N"<J"F\"), i.e., without rational 
assent. In other words, he describes a mechanism of non-rational impulse in human beings. 
Commenting on the Armenian version of this passage, Margaret Graver correctly notes: "Here 
the 'impulse . . . of which the appearance is the cause' cannot be the usual Stoic ÒD:Z, since in 
adult humans ÒD:Z is always caused by assent, never by the presentation itself" ("Stoic AC?A!1+3!3," 207, n. 19). She then suggests, however, that Philo, "using the term ÒD:Z 
loosely," has in mind the Stoic technical term BD@BV2,4". But Philo more likely speaks with 
precision: he refers in this case to a non-rational ÒD:Z (neither the rational ÒD:Z of the Stoics, nor 
a BD@BV2,4"). The suggestion that BD@BV2,4"4 played a meaningful role in Philo's theory of the 
passions presumes that rational assent (FL(6"JV2,F4H) played a meaningful role as well: "Philo . 
. . assumes that BD@BV2,4"4 can be called upon to explain away apparent exceptions to the 
posited incompatibility of virtue and emotion, taking advantage of a theoretical time-lag between 
impression and assent" (ibid., 200-01); "Philo employs [the appeal to the BD@BV2,4"4] only where 
there is some textual warrant for positing a time-lag between impression and assent" (205-06; cf. 
208: "the gap between impression and assent"). Philo, however, in keeping with his Middle-
Platonic affinities, nowhere brings FL(6"JV2,F4H into his understanding of BV2@H (see Pohlenz, 
Philon, 456, n. 1). He would have had precedent for his view of non-rational impulse in the 
Academic tradition, since Arcesilaus (ca. 316-240 B.C.), in dispute with the Stoics and using Stoic 
terminology, claimed that in human beings impulses reflexively occur in response to the 
appropriate sensory impression. See e.g. LS 53S [=Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1057 A (=SVF III 42, 22-
27)]: @Æ6,\"H N"<J"F\"H (,<@:X<0H ,Û2×H ÒD:< :¬ ,Ç>"<J"H :0*¥ FL(6"J"2,:X<@LH; cf. LS 
69A and commentary: "In effect, Arcesilaus applies to human action the Stoics' account of non-
rational animal behaviour" (LS 1:456) (see also Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 86-88). For 
the term –8@(@4 ÒD:"\, see Leg. 3.185: –8@(@H ÒD:Z; Ebr. 98: ¦< º:Ã< "Ê –8@(@4 ÒD:"\; Ebr. 
111: •8`(@4H ÒD:"ÃH; cf. Sacr. 80: J¬< J@Ø •8`(@L BV2@LH ÒD:Z<. Elsewhere, Philo uses the term ÒD:Z when he means ¦B42L:\" (–8@(@H ÐD,>4H: non-rational appetite), referring to the basic 
desires for food, drink, and sex (esp. Spec. 1.101: J"ÃH BDÎH FL<@LF\"< ÒD:"ÃH; Spec. 1.193: ¦B4FJ@:\.@<J"H JH ¦Nzº*@<¬< ÒD:VH [= ¦B42L:\"H]; cf. Det. 5: JH RLP−H •8`(@LH N@DVH; Agr. 
41: J−H •<2DfBT< BV<JT< •8`(@L N@DH; Spec. 3.129: •8`(å N@D”). These are clearly non-
rational impulses (–8@(@4 ÒD:"\), the kind common to both human beings and animals. 
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 one would a restive horse (ñH •N0<4"FJ¬< ËBB@<), in fear lest they should 
 run away with the reason which ought to rein them in (J@Ø º<4@P,Ã< 
 ÏN,\8@<J@H 8@(4F:@Ø), and thus cause universal chaos. For it is these 
 impulses ("âJ"4) which cause both good and bad (,ÆF4< "Ê •("2ä< "ÇJ4"4 
 6"Â 6"6ä<)—good when they obey the guidance of reason (ÓJ"< º(,:`<4 
 8`(å B,42"DPäF4), bad when they turn from their regular course into 
 anarchy (•<"DP\"<). (Mos. 1.25-26; emphasis added)  
 
The characterization here of reason's relation to impulse illustrates the Middle-
Platonic perspective evident throughout Philo's writings.77 The "primary impulses" 
(BDäJ"4 ÒD:"\) clearly arise apart from reason, since reason must act upon 
them, actively managing them as a rational human being would manage a non-
rational animal (•N0<4"FJ¬< ËBB@<).78 Although quite dangerous when left to 
themselves, these impulses are not inherently bad. Their moral import lies 
entirely in their relation to reason—i.e., whether or not they obey its commanding 
authority (º(,:`<4 8`(å B,42"DPäF4).  
 Philo does not name in this passage the source of the impulses, but 
clearly desire (¦B42L:\") and the "other emotions" (BV20) derive from the same 
source. This grouping of ÒD:Z, ¦B42L:\", and BV2@H over against reason reflects 
the Middle-Platonic dichotomy between "rational part" (8@(46Î< :XD@H) and "non-
rational part" (–8@(@< :XD@H) evident among Philo's contemporaries. In particular, 
                                            
 77 Along with JH BDfJ"H . . . ÒD:VH, the phrase J¬< ,ÆH JÎ BD`FT N@DV< denotes 
impulse as well (cf. Deus 149: J¬< ,ÆH JÎ BD`FT . . . ÒD:Z<). On the synonymy of ÒD:Z and N@DV, 
note the generic Stoic definition of impulse: 8X(@LF4< . . . ÒD:¬< ,É<"4 N@D< RLP−H ¦B\ J4 6"J JÎ (X<@H (ESE 9). On "primary impulse," see Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 184-94, 218-23. 
 78 Cf. Spec. 2.142: ¦< 8@(4F:è JH BDfJ"H º<4@Pä:,< ÒD:H :¬ ¦B4JDXB@<J,H "ÛJ"ÃH •N0<4V.,4< 6"Â •<"F64DJ< JD`B@< 2D,::VJT< •(,8VDP0< @Û6 ¦P`<JT<; Spec. 3.79: @Ì J"ÃH BDfJ"4H ,Û2×H ÒD:"ÃH ¦<*4*`<J,H ÒB@Ã"\ B,D —< @ÞF"4 JL(PV<TF4< ŸH º<4@P,Ã< *X@< •P"84<fJ@LH ¦äF4<. 
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the placement of emotion within the soul's non-rational part bears special 
significance for Philo's moral theory. 
Reason over against Emotion (BV2@H) 
 Philo agrees with his Middle-Platonic contemporaries, against the Stoics, 
when he locates emotion (BV2@H) outside of the rational faculty within the non-
rational part of the soul.79 Most clearly in Leg. 3.114-16, Philo identifies the two 
non-rational "parts" of the Platonic soul (2L:`H and ¦B42L:\") as the locus of 
emotion (BV2@H):80 
 If, therefore, O mind, thou art ever inquiring what quarter pleasure (º*@<Z) 
 has for her portion, do not consider the place occupied by the head, where 
 the reasoning faculty resides (ÓB@L JÎ 8@(4FJ46`<), for thou wilt assuredly 
 not find it there (@Û (D :¬ ,ßDZF,4H), since reason is at war with emotion 
 (:VP,J"4 Ò 8`(@H Jè BV2,4), and cannot remain in the same place with it 
 (¦< J"ÛJè :X<,4< @Û *b<"J"4) . . .. But look for it in the breast and belly, 
 where high spirit (Ò 2L:`H) and desire (º ¦B42L:\") are, portions of the 
 non-rational (:XD0 J@Ø •8`(@L) . . .. (Leg. 3.116)81  
 
Stoics, by contrast, invariably located the BV20 within the mind, identifying them 
as "judgments" (6D\F,4H) and thus rational phenomena.82 Philo explicitly rejects 
this view:  
                                            
 79 E.g., QG 2.59 (Gk. Petit): B,DÂ FVD6" *¥ º "ÇF20F4H 6"Â JÎ BV2@H, @ÛP Ò <@ØH 6"Â Ò 8@(4F:`H (cf. Pohlenz, Philon, 458); Migr. 25-26, which pits Ò <@ØH against non-rational emotion 
(BV2@LH •8`(@L). Cf. Schmidt, Anthropologie, 88: "Er weist . . . die Affekte dem unvernünftigen 
Seelenteile zu und lehnt ausdrücklich ihren Platz im Kopf, d.h. am Sitz des vernünftigen 
Seelenteils, ab, während sie nach stoischer Anschauung sich gerade im Hegemonikon vollziehen 
sollen." 
 80 I.e., B"20J46Î< :XD@H. Cf. Agr. 78: 2L:@Ø (D 6"Â ¦B42L:\"H 6"Â . . . BV<JT< B"2ä<. 
 81 Emphasis added; substituting "emotion" for Colson's "passion" and "non-rational" for 
"irrational." Cf. Leg. 3.114: J :XD0 JÎ BV2@H, JV J, FJXD<" 6"Â J¬< ("FJXD".  
 82 DL 7.111: "They hold the emotions to be judgments (*@6,Ã *z"ÛJ@ÃH J BV20 6D\F,4H ,É<"4), as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions (A,DÂ B"2ä<)" (trans. R. D. 
Hicks).  
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The non-rational part of the soul consists of sense-perception and its 
offspring the emotions, which are also non-rational—especially if they are 
not our "judgments" (6D\F,4H). (Leg. 2.6)83 
 
As part of the non-rational equipment of the soul, emotions are simply an 
endowment of human nature.84 In this respect, emotions are like a natural faculty 
(*b<":4H), comparable to other faculties like sense-perception.85 Philo 
acknowledges the natural occurrence of non-rational BV20 most clearly in Congr. 
                                            
83 JÎ *¥ –8@(@< "ÇF20F\H ¦FJ4 6"Â J J"bJ0H §6(@<" BV20, 6"Â :V84FJ" ,Æ :¬ 6D\F,4H ,ÆFÂ< º:XJ,D"4. The translation (my own) clearly offers an interpretation of the Greek, but the 
obscurity of the construction calls for it. Despite Philo’s wording, his meaning is clear, given the 
broader context of the passage (Leg. 2.1-8). In the course of his allegorical exegesis of Gen 2:8, 
Philo establishes the following points: the soul is divided into rational (8@(46`<) and non-rational 
(–8@(@<) parts (Leg. 2.2); to assist the mind (<@ØH [rational part]), God separately fashioned 
sense-perception ("ÇF20F4H) and passions (BV20) as "helpers" (Leg. 2.5); the "ruling part" of the 
soul (JÎ º(,:@<46`< [<@ØH, rational part]) holds preeminence over the non-rational part (JÎ –8@(@<), which consists of the "helpers" sense-perception and passion, which together represent 
a distinct, inferior order of creation (Leg. 2.6); mind, sense-perception, and the passions are 
distinct "parts" (:XD0) of one soul (RLPZ) (Leg. 2.8). Philo clearly affirms Middle-Platonic 
bipartition in this passage: 8@(46Î< :XD@H over against –8@(@< :XD@H. He clearly assigns the BV20 to the soul’s non-rational part, identifying them as something other than reason and 
therefore not functions of reason. There cannot be any real question in Philo’s mind as to whether 
or not the passions are judgments, because he repeatedly and unmistakably claims that they are 
not, insofar as he identifies them as something distinctly other than the rational faculty. By using 
the term 6D\F,4H in connection with BV20, Philo undoubtedly alludes to the Stoic doctrine, which 
he cites only to reject. Commentators who understand Leg. 2.6 in this way include Bréhier, Idées 
philosophiques et religieuses, 263; Le Boulluec, "Philon sur le plaisir," 137; Pohlenz, Philon, 458-
59; Schmidt, Anthropologie, 88. Alcinous, in his Middle-Platonic treatment of the passions, 
similarly cites and rejects the Stoic view that passions are judgments (6D\F,4H) (Didask. 32.1 
[185.24-42]). Lilla not only understands Philo to reject the idea of passions as judgments in Leg. 
2.6 (Clement of Alexandria, 92) but also more generally identifies the "refusal to regard [BV2@H] 
as a wrong judgement of reason" as one of three principal tenets in the Middle-Platonic doctrine 
of BV2@H (idem, 87). Cf. Alain Le Boulluec, "La place des concepts philosophiques dans la 
réflexion de Philon sur le plaisir," in Pages in Philon d’Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie 
(ed. Carlos Lévy; Turnhout: Brepolis, 1998), 129-152, 131: "Une altération sensible consiste à 
dissocier «passion» . . . et capacité intellectuelle." 
84 And, for that matter, an endowment of animal nature. Just as human beings have 
within them a mechanism of non-rational impulse analogous to the mechanism within non-rational 
animals, they also have within them a mechanism of emotion (which consists of non-rational 
impulses) analogous to the emotional mechanism of non-rational animals. For a consideration of 
the nature of animal emotion, see Juha Sihvola, "Emotional Animals: Do Aristotelian Emotions 
Require Beliefs?," in Psychology and Ethics (ed. Lloyd P. Gerson; vol. 3 of Aristotle: Critical 
Assessments; London: Routledge, 1999), 50-82. 
 85 See esp. Abr. 236-37: JH ¦< º:Ã< Jä< J,JJVDT< B"2ä< *L<V:,4H, º*@<−H, ¦B42L:\"H, N`$@L, 8bB0H. Cf. Leg. 3.250; Sobr. 49. 
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81, where he notes that before the onset of mature rational calculation 
(8@(4F:`H) children have only their emotions (BV20) to guide them.86  
 Because they are not intrinsically immoral, these emotions can provide 
non-rational motivation for perfectly natural, ethically appropriate behavior.87 
Philo accordingly asserts that God created the emotions as "helpers" ($@02@\) for 
the human race:  
 Moreover, there are, as I have said, helpers of another kind (§FJ4 J@\<L< 
 ªJ,D@< ,É*@H $@02ä<), namely the emotions (J BV20). For pleasure 
 (º*@<Z) and desire (¦B42L:\") contribute to the permanence of our kind: 
 pain (8bB0) and fear (N`$@H) are like bites or stings warning the soul to 
 treat nothing carelessly: anger (ÏD(Z) is a weapon of defense, which has 
 conferred great boons on many: and so with the other emotions (6"Â 
 J˜88" J"bJ®). (Leg. 2.8)88 
 
The emotion of ¦B42L:\", for example, can be especially useful, and in fact 
necessary, as a non-rational motivator for the procurement of food and drink, 
                                            
 86 See esp. Congr. 81-82, on which Le Boulluec ("Philon sur le plaisir," 131) notes: 
"Prises en elles-mêmes, les quatre «passions» principales, chagrin, peur, désir, plaisir, semblent 
selon Philon moralement neutres."  
87 Cf. Williamson, Philo, 203-04.  
 88 Substituting "emotion" for Colson's "passion." Philo's allegorical exegesis of Gen 2:19 
(see Leg. 2.9) equates the BV20 with the "beasts" (J 20D\") God created then presented to 
Adam as "helpers." Because he considers the emotions morally dangerous, Philo qualifies this 
identification (see Leg. 2.10-11), but he never denies it outright. In Plant. 43, he similarly equates 20D\" with BV20, acknowledging their ferocity but nevertheless admitting that they are a 
necessary component of life in the body (NB ¦> •<V(60H; cf. Praem. 88). On Philo's allegorical 
equation of beasts with emotions, see Carl Siegfried, Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten 
Testaments (Jena: Hermann Dufft, 1875), 182-84, esp. 182: "Die Thiere, insofern sie vernunftlose 
Wesen sind, werden Symbole der Leidenschaften, welche ebenfalls das –8@(@< im Menschen 
darstellen" (emphasis added). A similar Middle-Platonic understanding of the emotions appears in 
Didask. 32.4 [186.14-29], where Alcinous discusses "wild" and "tame" emotions: Jä< *¥ B"2ä< J :X< ¦FJ4< –(D4", J *¥ »:,D" [186.14-15]. "Tame" emotions are ÓF" 6"J NbF4< ßBVDP,4 Jè •<2DfBå •<"(6"ÃV J, 6"Â @Æ6,Ã" [186.16-17]. These emotions only become problematic when 
they exhibit a lack of moderation (•:,JD\"H) [186.18]. 
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both of which are obviously necessary for survival.89 So, for example, in the case 
of desire for food, virtue requires not the eradication of ¦B42L:\" but its proper 
management by reason. In general, Philo promotes the value of restraint by 
endorsing the moderation of emotion (:,JD4@BV2,4") as an ethical norm, 
although he admits the theoretical possibility of a perfect sage becoming free 
from the influence of emotion (•BV2,4").90 
Reason over against Sense-Perception ("ÇF20F4H) 
 Philo holds yet another conception of the soul's bipartition between 
rational and non-rational—one closely related to the reason-emotion dichotomy—
                                            
 89 Plato, Resp. 558 D–E: "[D]esires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly 
called necessary (•<"(6"Ã"), and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us 
(éN,8@ØF4< º:H), may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction (J± NbF,4 •<V(60)." Cf. Philo, Leg. 1.86 (substituting "desire" for Colson's "lust"): "Mark you not that even 
the most self-controlled of men (@ÛP ÒD”H ÓJ4 6"Â @Ê ¦(6D"JXFJ"J@4) under compulsion of the 
mortal element in them (•<V(6® J@Ø 2<0J@Ø) resort to food and drink (B"D"(\<@<J"4 ¦BÂ F4J\" 6"Â B@JV), out of which the pleasures of the appetite develop (¦> ô< "Ê ("FJDÎH º*@<"Â FL<,FJF4<)? So we must be content to face and fight desire as a principle (•("B0JÎ< @Þ< ¦FJ4< •<J4$−<"4 6"Â :"PXF"F2"4 Jè (X<,4 J−H ¦B42L:\"H)" (cf. Leg. 3.147, 151, 157; Gig. 34; Ebr. 131, 
214; Mos. 1.28; Contemp. 37). 
 90 Philo in fact endorses both :,JD4@BV2,4" and •BV2,4", as the respective goals for 
intermediate and advanced stages of ethical development (see esp. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 
92-106; also Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian 
Temptation: The Gifford Lectures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 385-86; Spanneut, 
"Apatheia," 4701-04; Williamson, Philo, 205-07; Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," 400-05). But 
since •BV2,4" presumes a sort of moral perfection, :,JD4@BV2,4" becomes, practically 
speaking, the ethical ideal (e.g., Virt. 195: B"Dz¦:@Â [,Û(X<,4"] :¥< (D "Æ*ãH 6"Â •8Z2,4" :,JD4@BV2,4V J, 6"Â •JLN\" 6"Â •6"6\" J\:4"; cf. Gemünden, "Culture des passions," 339-42; 
Williamson, Philo, 206). Philo's concept of •BV2,4" differs from the Stoic concept of •BV2,4", in 
accordance with his rejection of Stoic monistic psychology. Whereas the Stoics envision a mind 
that avoids false assessments of value and thus avoids passions, Philo envisions a mind so 
divorced from the sensible world, and so immersed in the intelligible world, that it operates free 
from the influence of emotions (e.g., Congr. 106: JÎ RLP46Î< AVFP" = º <•BÎ> B"<JÎH BV2@LH 6"Â B"<JÎH "ÆF20J@Ø *4V$"F4H to Ô *¬ <@0J`< ¦FJ4 6"Â 2,Ã@<; cf. Fug. 91; Leg. 1.103; Gig. 33; 
Ebr. 99-103). Plutarch endorses a similar Middle-Platonic notion of •BV2,4", while at the same 
time endorsing :,JD4@BV2,4", as Christopher Gill notes in his comment on Virt. mor. 444 C-D: 
"[T]here are two ideals: apatheia for the mind as the vehicle of abstract thought and knowledge 
and metriopatheia for the body-based emotions as regulated by practical reason" (The Structured 
Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 238). 
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which despite a relative lack of attestation among his contemporaries still bears 
Middle-Platonic affinities: a bipartition of mind (<@ØH) over against sense-
perception ("ÇF20F4H).91 Xenocrates (396 – 314 B.C.), third scholarch of Plato's 
Academy, used the Timaeus to endorse a bipartition of the soul into 8@(46`< and 
"ÆF20J46`<, indicating a dichotomy between parts of the soul geared respectively 
to the intelligible (<@0J`H) and sensible ("ÆF20J`H) realms.92 In this view, sense-
perception, a non-rational component of the soul, stems from embodiment and 
entails the emotions—so "ÇF20F4H (like BV2@H) often opposes <@ØH (and 
intelligible realities) through its attachment to the sensible realm.93 Philo affirms 
the non-rationality of "ÇF20F4H,94 its close association with the emotions,95 its link 
                                            
91 On Philo's dichotomy between mind and sense-perception in the context of Middle 
Platonism, see esp. Bouffartigue, "Structure de l'âme chez Philon," esp. 62-73; also Runia, Philo 
and the Timaeus, 262-66; Thomas H. Tobin, The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of 
Interpretation (CBQMS 14; Washington: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983), 148-49; 
cf. Gérard-Henry Baudry, "Le péché original chez Philon d'Alexandrie," MScRel 50 (1993): 99-
115; Petra von Gemünden, "La femme passionnelle et l’homme rationnel? Un chapitre de 
psychologie historique," Biblica 78 (1997): 457-80, 468-70. 
92 See Schibli, "Xenocrates' Daemons," esp. 149-53. For Xenocrates, "JÎ "ÆF20J46`< 
points to that part of the soul which links the psyche to the material, sensate world (the "ÆF20J¬ @ÛF\"); as such it merely serves as the conduit for sensations and operates without reason. The 
dichotomy of JÎ "ÆF20J46`<—JÎ 8@(46`< not only implies that the sensitive element lacks what 
its counterpart possesses, but it conceivably also points to the antithetical dimension of the two 
divisions, in so far as the sensible part may give rise to affections and passions that militate 
against reason, and that reason in turn must conquer" (153). 
93 See esp. Tim. 42 A-B (cf. Didask. 16.2 [172.2-19]). On "ÇF20F4H and embodiment, see 
Congr. 21, where Philo calls "ÇF20F4H "JÎ FT:"J@,4*XFJ,D@< RLP−H :XD@H." 
94 E.g., Leg. 3.50: "ÇF20F4H . . . –8@(@H @ÞF"; Spec. 2.89: "ÇF20F4H . . . º 6@4<¬ 6"Â Jä< •8`(T< .æT< (cf. Leg. 1.24; Migr. 213; Spec. 1.33; Spec. 4.123). 
95 E.g., Leg. 2.6: JÎ *¥ –8@(@< "ÇF20F\H ¦FJ4 6"Â J J"bJ0H §6(@<" BV20; Leg. 2 50: J¬< B"2ä< "ÆJ\"< "ÇF20F4<; Abr. 238: ¦> ô< (D —< Ç*T:,< ´ •6@bFT:,< ´ ÏFND"<2ä:,< ´ (,LFf:,2" ´ Rf:,2", 8ØB"4 6"Â º*@<"Â 6"Â N`$@4 6"Â ¦B42L:\"4 FL<\FJ"<J"4, :0*,<ÎH Jä< B"2ä< 6"2z"ßJÎ F2X<@<J@H, ,Æ :¬ ¦P@D0(,ÃJ@ J"ÃH *4 Jä< "ÆF2ZF,T< B"D"F6,L"ÃH. 
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to the sensible over against intelligible realm,96 and particularly its capacity to 
oppose <@ØH: 
Now the younglings (2D,::VJT<) that are reared among the herd are 
tame and docile, because they are guided by the care of the herdsman 
who rules them (ßBÎ ¦B4FJVJ@L . . . $@L6`8@L). For those that roam at 
large and in liberty become wild (¦>"(D4"\<,J"4) for want of one to tame 
them, but those who are led by goatherd, neat-herd, shepherd, and the 
like, the herdsman, that is, who tends whatever kind of animal it may be, 
must needs be tame and gentle (º:,D@ØJ"4). So then, the senses also as 
a kind (JÎ "ÆF2ZF,T< (X<@H) may be either wild or tame. They are wild 
(•J\2"F@<) when, throwing off the control of their herdsman the mind 
(•N0<4VF"< òFB,D $@L6`8@L J@Ø <@Ø), they are carried away in their 
unreason (•8`(TH) into the outer sphere of things perceptible by them 
(BDÎH JV . . . "ÆF20JV). They are tame (º:,D@<) when they respond 
submissively to reflection (8@(4F:è), the ruling element in our compound 
nature, and accept its guidance and control. (Sacr. 104-06) 97 
 
Here Philo casts "ÇF20F4H as a non-rational animal in need of a rational ruler 
(¦B4FJVJ0H), the mind (<@ØH). With the mind in charge, "ÇF20F4H functions like an 
obedient, tame creature.98 But "ÇF20F4H can become "wild," rejecting the 
                                            
96 For the distinction between realms, note esp. Her. 75: *b@ (D §@46, FLFJ−<"4, JÎ :¥< <@0J`<, JÎ *z"ÆF20J`<. "ÆF20Jä< :¥< @Þ< NbF,T< Ò 6`F:@H @âJ@H, •@DVJT< *zñH •802äH Ò <@0J`H (cf. Her. 209: J–88" ¦<"<J\" . . . "ÆF20J <@0JV). For "ÇF20F4H as link to sensible realm, 
see e.g. Migr. 191: 6—< ¦:B@*\.TF4< "Ê "ÆF2ZF,4H BDÎH J¬< •6D4$− 2X"< J@Ø <@0J@Ø, :X8,4 J@ÃH N48@2,V:@F4 6"2"4D,Ã< "ÛJä< J¬< ¦B\2,F4< . . . 6"Â ¦< ¦D0:\‘ 6"Â F6`Jå *4"JD\$,4< •>4@ØF4<, ñH :¬ BD`H J4<@H "ÆF20J@Ø JÎ RLP−H Ð::", ø <@0J $8XB,4< §*T6,< Ò 2,`H, ¦B4F64"F2±; Her. 
111: <è (D Ò 2,ÎH 6"J"8":$V<,4< JÎ< :¥< <@0JÎ< 6`F:@< *4z©"LJ@Ø, JÎ< *¥ ÒD"JÎ< *4z"ÆF2ZF,TH ¦N−6,<;  Somn. 1.44: ÓFJ4H —< FN"8± Jä< <@0Jä<, "ÛJ\6" BDÎH J "ÆF20J 6"J"Fb,J"4q *,bJ,D@H (D •,Â B8@ØH Ò BDÎH "ÇF20F4< J@ÃH :¬ *L<02,ÃF4 BDÎH JÎ< º(,:`<" <@Ø< ,ÛB8@−F"4. Cf. David Runia, "A Brief History of the Term Kosmos Noetos from Plato to 
Plotinus," in Traditions of Platonism: Essays in Honour of John Dillon (ed. John J. Cleary; 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 151-71. 
97 Cf. Alcinous' "tame" and "wild" emotions (Didask. 32.4 [186.14-18]). 
98 E.g., Det. 53: [J4:¬] J−H *¥ "ÆF2ZF,TH JÎ :¬ •N,2−<"4 Õb:® :4” NXD,F2"4 BDÎH J ¦6JÎH "ÆF20JV, ¦(P"84<T2−<"4 *¥ ßBÎ <@Ø 6L$,D<< 6"Â º<4@P,Ã< JH •8`(@LH ¦< º:Ã< *L<V:,4H ¦B4FJ":X<@L. 
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authority of reason and bringing destructive chaos to the soul.99 This sort of 
relation between <@ØH and "ÇF20F4H fits Philo's general characterization of 
Middle-Platonic bipartition: a rational element placed over a non-rational element, 
one capable of opposing or even usurping reason's hegemony. This emphasis on 
the <@ØH-"ÇF20F4H dichotomy allows Philo to press another model of the soul, an 
otherwise Stoic model, into Middle-Platonic service. 
Reason over against "Stoic" Non-Rational Soul 
For Stoics, the soul has eight parts: the rational mind (º(,:@<46`<), plus 
the five senses, the faculty of speech, and the faculty of reproduction.100 On the 
surface, this Stoic model resembles Philo's Middle-Platonic dichotomy of <@ØH-
"ÇF20F4H: not only does the Stoic soul divide into a rational and a non-rational 
component (º(,:@<46`< plus collective seven), but the senses account for five of 
the seven non-rational parts. So a loose description of both models as rational 
mind over non-rational sense-perception fits the data reasonably well. In terms of 
moral psychology, however, the two models are fundamentally incompatible. The 
non-rational parts of the Stoic soul operate only by order of the º(,:@<46`< in a 
strictly instrumental capacity.101 Under no circumstances would—or could—
                                            
99 E.g., Agr. 58: @Ê :¥< (D JD@NH J"ÃH "ÆF2ZF,F4 *4 J−H Jä< "ÆF20Jä< •N2@<\"H ,ÛJD,B4.`:,<@4, *@Ø8@4 (\<@<J"4 Jä< JD,N@:X<T< 6"2VB,D *,FB@\<"4H @Æ6XJ"4 N`D@< J,8@Ø<J,H 6"2z©6VFJ0< º:XD"< •<"(6"Ã@<, –DP@<J,H *¥ @Ê J@bJT< ¦B4FJ"J@Ø<J,H 6"Â J B,D4JJ J−H ,ÆH •B80FJ\"< ÒD:−H "ÛJä< ¦B4FJ@:\.@<J,H; Leg. 2.49: ª<,6" J−H "ÆF2ZF,TH Ò <@ØH, ÓJ"< "ÛJ± *@L8T2±, 6"J"8,\B,4 6"Â JÎ< B"JXD" Jä< Ó8T< 2,Î< 6"Â J¬< :0JXD" Jä< FL:BV<JT<, J¬< •D,J¬< 6"Â F@N\"< J@Ø 2,@Ø . . . Ë<" (X<T<J"4 :\" FD> 6"Â «< BV2@H @Ê *b@. 
100 See Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 27-41; Long, Stoic Psychology, esp. 560-72. 
101 Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 33. 
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"ÇF20F4H ever oppose, let alone usurp, the º(,:@<46`<.102 But Philo, who clearly 
knows and cites the Stoic eight-part model,103 nevertheless characterizes its non-
rational component as an antagonist of reason, able not only to oppose but even 
to supplant and enslave its rightful sovereign: 
[S]ix of [the faculties within us] wage ceaseless and continuous war on 
land and sea, namely the five senses ("Ì J, BX<J, "ÆF2ZF,4H) and speech 
(Ò BD@N@D46ÎH 8`(@H), the former in their craving for the objects of sense 
("Ê :¥< B`2å "ÆF20Jä<), deprivation of which is painful to them, speech 
because with unbridled mouth (•P"8\<å FJ`:"J4) it perpetually gives 
utterance where silence is due. But the seventh faculty is the dominant 
mind (º B,DÂ JÎ< º(,:`<" <@Ø<), which, after triumphing over the six and 
returning victorious through its superior strength (*L<"JTJXD‘ Õf:® 6"J"6D"JZF"H), welcomes solitude and rejoices in its own society. (Abr. 
28-30)104 
 
Philo's omission here of the faculty of reproduction, making a soul of seven parts 
instead of the canonical eight, illustrates his general practice of co-opting the 
Stoic model and forcing it into a Middle-Platonic mold.105 He has no real 
                                            
102 Because "ÇF20F4H clearly does function in this way for Philo, his understanding of "ÇF20F4H simply cannot be called Stoic (cf. Pohlenz, Philon, 456-57, esp. 456: "[F]ür ihn wächst 
die Aisthesis weit über die Rolle hinaus, die ihr nach der Stoa zukommen kann. Sie wird zu einem 
selbständigen seelischen Vermögen, das dem Nus wohl unentbehrlich für die Erkenntnis der 
Außenwelt ist und ihm damit gute Dienste tut, aber zugleich, da es auch die sinnlichen Triebe 
umfaßt, sein ständiger Widerpart wird und an die Stelle tritt, die in der griechischen Philosophie 
das Alogon einnimmt." 
103 E.g., Opif. 117: J−H º:,JXD"H RLP−H JÎ *\P" J@Ø º(,:@<46@Ø :XD@H ©BJ"P− FP\.,J"4, ,ÆH BX<J, "ÆF2ZF,4H 6"Â JÎ NT<0JZD4@< ÐD("<@< 6"Â ¦BÂ BF4 JÎ (`<4:@< (cf. Det. 168; Mut. 
111; Her. 232; Leg. 1.11). 
104 Emphasis added. Bouffartigue ("Structure de l'âme chez Philon," 61) also recognizes 
Philo's reference here to the Stoic model. 
105 Philo knows all seven of the Stoic non-rational parts, he simply chooses to omit one 
(cf. Det. 168: JÎ –8@(@< J−H RLP−H ,ÆH ©BJ *4"<X:,J"4 :@\D"H, ÓD"F4< •6@¬< ÐFND0F4< (,ØF4< N¬< 8`(@< (`<4:@<; also Mut. 111, Leg. 1.11; on antagonism between the reproductive faculty 
and reason, see Det. 100-103, esp. 102, 170-74, esp. 174). For another example of Philo's 
recasting of the Stoic model as Middle-Platonic bipartition, see Agr. 30-34. On Philo's use of the 
Stoic model, see also Carlos Lévy, ""Le concept de doxa des Stoïciens à Philon d’Alexandrie: 
essai d’étude diachronique" in Passions and Perceptions (ed. J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum; 
Cambridge, 1992), 250-84, esp. 275-84. 
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commitment to the Stoic doctrine, but he does insist on the Middle-Platonic 
bipartition of rational over against non-rational, with the patently non-Stoic 
assumption of antagonism between the two components. The Stoic formulation 
simply gives Philo more options when speaking of the soul's non-rational part: 
reason's non-rational antagonist can be "ÇF20F4H (as in the Middle-Platonic <@ØH-
"ÇF20F4H dichotomy), or the faculty of reproduction, or the faculty of speech. 
Philo does not endorse a Stoic understanding of the soul—he merely 
superimposes Middle-Platonic bipartition onto a Stoic formulation, always 
presuming a moral psychology incompatible with Stoic monism. 
Summary 
 Despite a variety of formulations, Philo ultimately endorses one basic 
model of the soul, setting rational over against non-rational in an often 
antagonistic bipartition: 
Table Two: Variations of Bipartition in Philo’s Writings 
 "PLATONIC" 
THREE PARTS 
APPETITE IMPULSE EMOTION SENSE-
PERCEPTION 
"STOIC" 
EIGHT PARTS 
 
RATIONAL106 
 
 8`(@H  8`(@H  8`(@H  8`(@H  8`(@H 
(<@ØH) 
 8`(@H 
(º(,:@<46`<)
 
NON-
RATIONAL 
 
 2b:@H ¦B42L:\" 
 ÐD,>4H   ÒD:Z  BV2@H  "ÇF20F4H 
 
 "ÇF20F4H (`<0 NT<Z 
 
                                            
106 On Philo's various designations for the soul's rational part, note especially Schmidt, 
Anthropologie, 49-50: "Für dieses oberste Vermögen, wodurch sich der Mensch von den Tieren 
unterscheidet, verwendet Philon nun außer Seele und Nus noch gleichbedeutend *4V<@4", 8@(4F:`H, 8`(@H und die formale Bezeichnung º(,:@<46`<, zwischen denen er . . . nur des Stiles 
wegen wechselt." Schmidt offers extensive evidence for the interchangeability of various terms on 
pages 139-42 [=n. 14]. 
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Philo's Middle-Platonic contemporaries offered him various ways of framing his 
discourse on ¦B42L:\". Undoubtedly, Plato's conviction that the soul contains an 
independent, enduring source of non-rational desire exerts a powerful influence: 
the term ¦B42L:\" stands often as a reference to either the Platonic faculty of 
desire (i.e., JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<) or the operation of that faculty (i.e., ¦B42L:\"4)—
either, to use Platonic imagery, the beast itself or the beast in action.107 Philo's 
Middle-Platonic moral psychology, however, allows for greater technical precision 
and more sophisticated, variant conceptions of the phenomenon of desire. Philo 
can, for example, identify ¦B42L:\" as an –8@(@H ÐD,>4H. In addition, he 
understands that ¦B42L:\" bears analysis as an impulse (ÒD:Z), which in turn 
allows him to speak of transient instances of desire in the more abstract technical 
language of impulse. Or Philo can speak of ¦B42L:\" as an emotion (BV2@H), 
although he sides with contemporary Middle Platonists by asserting that the 
emotion of desire, as a function of the non-rational, "emotional" part of the soul, 
is both natural and amoral. Philo's dichotomy of <@ØH-"ÇF20F4H offers him not 
only another model of bipartition, but also another way of envisioning desire: non-
rational "ÇF20F4H yearning for the attractions of the sensible world.108 Using this 
                                            
107 For Philo's Platonic identification of JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`< (¦B42L:\") as a beast, see esp. 
Spec. 1.148: •8`(@L 2DX::"J@H, ¦B42L:\"H; also Abr. 160: JÎ Fb:NLJ@< º:Ã< 2DX::" . . . J¬< ¦B42L:\"<; Leg. 1.69: J\(D4*4 *¥ Jè •J42"FTJVJå .æå J¬< ¦B42L:\"< [9TLF−H] ,Ç6"F,; 
Contempl. 74: JÎ 2D,::VJT< •B80FJ`J"J@< . . . J¬< ¦B42L:\"<; QE 1.19 (Gk. Petit): B@8L6,NV8å 2DX::"J4 Jä< ¦< º:Ã<. 
108 E.g., Her. 109: "ÇF20F4< *¥ •6`D,FJ@<, ¦:N@D@L:X<0< :¥< "Æ,Â Jä< "ÆF20Jä<, ßBÎ *¥ •6DVJ@D@H J−H ¦B42L:\"H :0*XB@J, ¦:B80F2−<"4 *L<":X<0<; Abr. 29: "Ì J, BX<J, "ÆF2ZF,4H 
. . . "Ê :¥< B`2å "ÆF20Jä<; Agr. 58: –DP@<J,H *¥ @Ê J@bJT< [Jä< "ÆF2ZF,T<] ¦B4FJ"J@Ø<J,H 6"Â J B,D4JJ J−H ,ÆH •B80FJ\"< ÒD:−H "ÛJä< ¦B4FJ@:\.@<J,H; Somn. 2.267: JÎ 6J0<ä*,H 2DX::", 
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same notion of non-rational "ÇF20F4H, but adding the two non-rational faculties of 
reproduction and speech, Philo used a reworked Stoic model for his Middle-
Platonic moral psychology, facilitating, for example, his discussion of the desire 
to speak and the desire to keep silent.109 All of these various conceptions of the 
soul and its faculties make it possible for Philo to understand and describe any 
given instance of desire in a variety of equivalent ways. But no instance of 
¦B42L:\", however described, necessarily represents for Philo an ethical 
problem or malfunction of the soul. When Philo wants to speak of desire as an 
aberration, he turns to other conceptual models.  
PROBLEMATIC MALFUNCTIONS OF DESIRE 
Passionate Desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\") 
 In Philo's view, the term ¦B42L:\" can refer also to "passionate desire," 
meaning non-rational desire that has overstepped the bounds of reason. For 
Middle Platonists, as for Plato, ¦B42L:\" as such was normal and morally 
unobjectionable—an inevitable, often useful, ingredient of human life. But 
certainly there were problematic manifestations of ¦B42L:\", so Plato's heirs 
needed a precise model for explaining the mechanics of problematic desire to 
match the elaborate moral psychology of the Stoics. For the Stoics, problematic 
movements of the soul belonged categorically under one rubric, "passion" 
                                                                                                                                  J¬< "ÇF20F4< (cf. Spec. 1.148: •8`(@L 2DX::"J@H, ¦B42L:\"H; Abr. 160: JÎ Fb:NLJ@< º:Ã< 2DX::" . . . J¬< ¦B42L:\"<). 
109 E.g., Spec. 4.90: ³*0 *¥ 6"Â ¦BÂ (8äJJ"< N2VF"F" :LD\" ¦<,TJXD4F,<q §<4@4 (D ¦B42L:@ØF4< ´ J 8,6JX" F4TB< ´ J ºFLP"FJX" 8X(,4<, 6"Â •<"N2,((@:X<@4H ªB,J"4 J4:TDÎH *\60 6"Â ¦P,:L2@ØF4 6"Â J@Û<"<J\@< (cf. Fug. 191; Det. 102). 
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(BV2@H): the passions (BV20), including ¦B42L:\", were always and inherently 
bad. But for Middle Platonists, the term BV2@H did not bear such an exclusively 
negative meaning. So despite the appeal—from the standpoint of systematic 
moral theory—of having one designated class of problematic phenomena, the 
label BV2@H by itself simply would not work (as it did for the Stoics) because of its 
moral ambiguity. The technical Stoic definition of BV2@H, however, was more 
promising, especially the designation of BV2@H as "excessive impulse" 
(B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z).110 Stoics and Middle Platonists, despite radically different 
views of the human soul, could agree that (1) the soul generates impulses 
(ÒD:"\); (2) some impulses are unobjectionable, some are problematic; and (3) 
human appetition, generally speaking, bears analysis as either an 
unobjectionable or a problematic impulse. Middle Platonists, then, could preserve 
the analytic value of the Stoic category BV2@H (despite the ambiguity of the term 
from a Platonic perspective) by focusing on the term ÒD:Z and endorsing—albeit 
reinterpreting—the Stoic idea that a BV2@H consists of a B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z. 
 What did the Stoics mean by "excessive impulse"? In accordance with 
Stoic psychology, the impulse had to be a rational impulse, a function of the 
mind, because the Stoics denied the existence of non-rational impulses in adult 
human beings. But in what sense is the impulse "excessive"?111 Ultimately, the 
excess lies in a faulty—but nevertheless reasoned—assessment of something's 
                                            
 110 E.g., DL 7.110: "ÛJÎ JÎ BV2@H 6"J -Z<T<" . . . ÒD:¬ B8,@<V.@LF" [=SVF III 99, 32-
33]; ESE 10: BV2@H *z,É<"4 N"F4< ÒD:¬< B8,@<V.@LF"< [=SVF III 92, 11]. 
 111 On this question, see Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 165-73. 
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value: an excessive, exorbitant appraisal.112 The notion is strictly qualitative: an 
excessive impulse differs in quality from a non-excessive impulse in the same 
way that strict alternatives like "correct" and "incorrect" differ from one another. In 
this qualitative model, the only way to eliminate an "excessive impulse" is to 
abandon an incorrect rational assessment and make a different (correct) rational 
assessment. Nothing in the Stoic sources suggests a quantitative notion of 
excess: the idea that an impulse, whose essential nature never changes, 
proceeds along an incremental scale of measurement until at some point it goes 
too far, becoming too powerful, too intense, too big. On the contrary, the term 
B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z denoted for the Stoics the quality of a rational impulse.  
 The earliest extant evidence for a Middle-Platonic definition of BV2@H using 
the Stoic terms B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z comes from Eudorus of Alexandria.113 
Unfortunately, no explanation survives from Eudorus of what he meant by that 
definition. If he simply meant what the Stoics meant, he would have endorsed the 
                                            
 112 Cf. Frede, "Stoic Affections," 107: Due to their faulty assessments of objects, moral 
agents "feel impelled towards them or away from them, with an intensity which stands in no 
comparison to their real value, and which hence is excessive." 
 113 Impulse was a principal topic in Eudorus' system of ethics: I"ØJz¦FJÂ J BDäJ" :XD0 J@Ø ²246@Ø 8`(@L 2,TD0J46`<, ÒD:0J46`<, BD"6J46`< (Mazz. 1.10 [=Eclog. 42.23]; cf. Bonazzi, 
"Eudorus’ Psychology"). He took an interest in both the taxonomy of impulse (,É*@H) and the 
relation between impulse and passions, in particular the notion of passion as an "excessive 
impulse": I@Ø *¥ B,DÂ J−H ÒD:−H 8`(@L Ò :X< ¦FJ4 B,DÂ J−H ,Æ*46−H ÒD:−H, Ò *¥ B,DÂ B"2ä<. }/J@4 (D B< BV2@H ÒD:¬ B8,@<V.@LF", ´ JV (, B8,ÃFJ" :,2zÒD:−H 6"Â [J] •DDTFJZ:"J" 
(Mazz. 1.23-24 [=Eclog. 44.3-6]). Ps.-Timaeus (TL 73-74) similarly attests a Middle-Platonic use 
of Stoic terminology (B8,@<V.,< . . . ÒD:VH) with reference to the passions (J BV2,"), which 
both Tobin (Timaios of Locri, 79, n. 35) and Baltes (Timaios Lokros, 206-07) identify as an 
allusion to the Stoic definition, BV2@H = ÒD:¬ B8,@<V.@LF". Plutarch uses the same Middle-
Platonic concept of BV2@H: J *¥ BV20 FN@*D`J0J,H ÒD:ä< (An. corp. 501 D [identified as an 
allusion to the Stoic definition also by Francesco Becchi, "Plutarco tra Platonismo e Aristotelismo: 
La Filosofia come A!3)+3!," in Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles: Actas del V Congreso 
Internacional de la I.P.S. : Madrid-Cuenca, 4-7 de mayo de 1999 (ed. Aurelio Peréz Jiménez et 
al.; Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1999), 25-43, 32] cf. Virt. mor. 444 B-C). 
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Stoic theory of impulse, which in turn implies an endorsement of Stoic monistic 
psychology. In that case, his association with Middle Platonism, which disagreed 
so sharply with the Stoics on the fundamentals of moral psychology, becomes 
difficult to explain. A more likely conjecture would have Eudorus revising the 
Stoic definition in accordance with the tenets of Middle-Platonic moral 
psychology.114 Given Middle Platonism's strong association of impulse with the 
non-rational part of the soul, the impulse in question would most certainly be a 
non-rational impulse (–8@(@H ÒD:Z).115 Since non-rational impulses (like 
emotions) are not problematic as such, but only become problematic when they 
overstep the bounds of reason, "excessive" would then denote a non-rational 
impulse whose measure exceeds proper limits and becomes "immoderate" in a 
quantitative sense. When the bounds of reason are transgressed—precisely at 
that moment—an otherwise benign impulse of emotion (say, fear or desire) 
becomes a passion, a morally problematic, injurious force within the soul. In 
other words, based on what is otherwise known of Middle-Platonic moral 
psychology, a Middle Platonist speaking of BV2@H as B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z would 
almost certainly have meant the excessive quantity of a non-rational impulse, not 
                                            
 114 Cf. Dillon, Middle Platonists, 122: "Eudorus' terminology is as fully Stoic as that of 
Antiochus [of Ascalon], although, like Antiochus, he would not have admitted that it was 
distinctively Stoic, but would claim it as the normal current language of philosophic discourse. 
We, from our perspective, attach too much importance to ferreting out Stoic, and even Epicurean, 
terms, in Platonic writers. By Eudorus' time, the technical language of philosophy was very largely 
uniform. Only the meanings given to certain terms by the various schools might differ" (emphasis 
added). For an example of Eudorus' revision of Stoic formulations in the area of physics, see 
Mauro Bonazzi, "Eudoro di Alessandria alle origini del platonismo imperiale," in L'eridità 
platonica: studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo (ed. Mauro Bonazzi and Vincenza 
Celluprica; Elenchos 45; Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005), 117-60, esp. 127-49. 
115 Cf. Bonazzi, “Eudorus’ Psychology.” 
83 
 
  
the aberrant quality of a rational impulse.116 Exactly this sort of Middle-Platonic 
reinvention of Stoic ideas appears in the writings of Philo.  
 In his most obvious citation of the Stoic definition, Philo adds one 
qualifying term, as if to clarify precisely what he means:   
On the one hand, every "passion" (BV2@H) is reprehensible (¦B\80BJ@<), 
since we are responsible (ßB"\J4@H) for every unmeasured "excessive 
impulse" (–:,JD@H 6"Â B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z). (Spec. 4.79)117 
 
Philo grants, along with the Stoics, that a passion is an "excessive impulse"—but 
by "excessive" he means "immoderate" (–:,JD@H), something quite different from 
what the Stoics had in mind. The term –:,JD@H denotes quantitative excess: 
going beyond the proper measure (:XJD@<) imposed by reason.118 As a natural 
                                            
116 John Dillon, Middle Platonists, 77, entertains this idea as a possibility but does not 
explore it further or mention it in connection with Eudorus. Speaking of Antiochus of Ascalon, he 
writes: "Antiochus, then, accepted the Stoic ideal of apatheia (freedom from passion) as opposed 
to the Academic-Peripatetic metriopatheia (moderation in the passions). It is not impossible, 
however, that Antiochus took the Stoic term and gave it a meaning consonant with Peripateticism. 
After all, he could argue, a passion is defined as an 'immoderate impulse' (hormê pleonazousa); if 
an impulse is under the control of moderation, it is not pleonazousa, and therefore not a passion 
'within the meaning of the Act'. There were, after all, in Stoic theory, so-called 'equable states' 
(eupatheiai) corresponding to all of the pathê (except Distress, of which there could be no 
reasonable form), and it would not have been beyond the wit of Antiochus to equate these with 
the Peripatetic 'means'. The difference, he might well say, is more verbal than real." Just such a 
connection between the Peripatetic notion of mean (:XF@<) and the term B8,@<V.,4< appears in 
Eth. nic. 1106 a 29-33: 8X(T *¥ J@Ø :¥< BDV(:"J@H :XF@< JÎ ÇF@< •BXP@< •Nz©6"JXD@L Jä< –6DT<, ÓB,D ¦FJÂ< «< 6"Â J"ÛJÎ< BF4<, BDÎH º:H *¥ Ô :ZJ, B8,@<V.,4 :ZJ, ¦88,\B,4 (cited by 
Francesco Becchi, "Platonismo medio ed etica Plutarchea," Prometheus 7 (1981): 125-45 [part 
one], 263-84 [part two], 275, in the context of Middle-Platonic theories of virtue). 
 117 My translation. Cf. Virt. mor. 444 B-C. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, cites Virt. 
mor. 450 E – 451 B & 444 C (304, n. 193) understanding Plutarch to mean that "excessiveness of 
impulse" is "a reference to the exceeding of some ideal and moderate degree of emotion in the 
soul" (170). 
 118 Cf. Agr. 70: F×< B8,\@<4 ÒD:± BXD"< ¦6NXD0J"4 J@Ø :XJD\@L. NB the task of reason in 
Spec. 4.79: :XJD" J"ÃH ÒD:"ÃH ÒD\.,4< (cf. Petit, QE No 24 [Fragments non identifiés]: I :XJD" B8,@<V.@<J" JÎ< ÓD@< ßB,D$"\<,4 ñH (\<,F2"4 J¬< :X< –:,JD@< ND`<0F4< B"<@LD(\"<, J¬< *¥ FTND@Fb<0< N,4*T8\"<, J¬< *¥ •<*D,\"< 2D"FbJ0J"); cf. Plutarch, Virt. mor. 444 B: J¬< *zÒD:¬< Jè BV2,4 B@4,Ã JÎ μ2@H, 8`(@L *,@:X<0< ÒD\.@<J@H, ÓBTH :,JD\" B"D± 6"Â :Z2zßB,D$V88® :ZJz¦(6"J"8,\B® JÎ< 6"4D`<. On the ethics of measure in Middle Platonism, 
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component of the human soul, non-rational impulse (ÒD:Z) poses no threat while 
it operates within the bounds of reason. If, however, an impulse exceeds those 
bounds (i.e., if the non-rational force usurps reason's control), it becomes morally 
problematic (a "passion"). For a Middle Platonist like Philo, the term –:,JD@H best 
captured what was actually going wrong with the impulse; but the Stoic technical 
term B8,@<V.,4< worked as a synonym, and this equivalence enabled a 
deliberate pressing of the Stoic definition of “passion” into Middle-Platonic 
service.119 
 This Middle-Platonic reinvention of Stoic technical terminology allowed 
Philo to speak with greater precision about problematic desire over against 
amoral desire. Desire itself—understood variously as the Platonic ¦B42L:0J46`<, 
–8@(@H ÐD,>4H, a type of ÒD:Z, a useful emotion (BV2@H), or some other 
expression of the non-rational soul (e.g., "ÇF20F4H)—was unobjectionable. But 
passionate desire—understood as an excessive (i.e., immoderate) desiderative 
impulse, and thus a "passion" by Stoic definition—was unquestionably a moral 
problem. In Her. 245, among the "deadly and irreconcilable enemies of the soul," 
Philo lists ÓF"4 –88"4 ¦6 B8,@<".@bF0H ÒD:−H ,Æf2"F4 Nb,F2"4 –8@(@4 
                                                                                                                                  
see Opsomer, "L'âme du monde et l' âme de l'homme," esp. 45-49 (cf. idem, "Plutarch's 
Platonism Revisited," in L'eridità platonica: studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo (ed. Mauro 
Bonazzi and Vincenza Celluprica; Elenchos 45; Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005), 163-200, esp. 180-83 
[="Moral psychology and ethics"]. 
119 Cf. Didask. 32.2 [186.6-7]: B8,@<V.,4 :X<J@4 ¦< Jè 8LB,ÃF2"4 6"Â ÏP8,ÃF2"4, on 
which Whittaker, Alcinoos, 148, n. 519: "Le terme stoïcien B8,@<V.T (cf. SVF I. 205 et III. 479, 
etc.) a été adopté tant par les Moyen-platoniciens (cf. Eudore d'Alexandrie ap. Stobée, Anth. II. 
44. 5 W.; Philon d'Alexandrie, De spec. leg. IV. 79; Plutarque, De virt. mor. 441 C; Timée de 
Locres 222. 14 M.) que par les Péripatéticiens (cf. Arius Didyme ap. Stobée, Anth. II. 38. 18-24 
W.)." 
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¦B42L:\"4, stating plainly that –8@(@4 ¦B42L:\"4 stem from "excessive impulse" 
(¦6 B8,@<".@bF0H ÒD:−H). He is obviously making use of the Stoic definition, but 
in Stoic theory an "excessive" desiderative impulse would simply be ¦B42L:\": 
the term "irrational desire" (–8@(@H ¦B42L:\"), from their perspective, makes no 
sense, because ¦B42L:\" is always irrational—there is no other type. For a 
Middle Platonist, however, the term ¦B42L:\" by itself denotes the non-rational 
desire inherent in the soul, whose presence and operation do not necessarily 
result in irrational behavior, provided that reason stays in control. Only when the 
impulse of non-rational desire oversteps the bounds of reason does desire 
become "irrational": a non-rational desire usurps reason and becomes a 
dangerous force, capable of motivating a rational being to act contrary to reason 
(i.e., irrationally). So for Philo, as Her. 245 illustrates, –8@(@H ¦B42L:\" 
designates "irrational desire"—in other words, problematic desire, which appears 
only when an otherwise natural desiderative impulse oversteps reason and 
becomes "immoderate" (B8,@<V.@LF" / –:,JD@H).120 In connection with the 
                                            
 120 Cf. Somn. 2.276: @Ê :¥< ¦BÂ FL<0(@D\"< º*@<−H 6"Â ¦B42L:\"H 6"Â BVF0H B8,@<".@bF0H ÒD:−H ¦JDVB@<J@, –8@(@< BV2@H ¦B4J,4P\.@<J,H º(,:`<4 8@(4F:è (NB the 
equivalence of ¦B42L:\", B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z, and –8@(@< BV2@H). Despite the apparently Stoic 
identification of ¦B42L:\" with B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z, Philo betrays his Middle-Platonic position by 
referring to this as an –8@(@< BV2@H. For the Stoics every BV2@H was irrational, so the term –8@(@< BV2@H would strike them as redundant. But for a Middle-Platonist, who believes that non-
rational ¦B42L:\" need not be "irrational," the term –8@(@< BV2@H makes perfect sense: an 
excessive desiderative impulse represents an otherwise useful emotion (BV2@H) that has become 
problematic and thus "irrational" (–8@(@<) This is precisely the idea underlying Philo's use of –8@(@H ¦B42L:\" in Her. 245. In other words, a non-rational force no longer under the control of 
reason, operating contrary to reason, is "irrational." Cf. ,Ü8@(@< BV2@H in Her 192, in reference to 
a non-rational emotion that is not irrational (opposed to reason) but "eurational" (obedient to 
reason). This is the Middle-Platonic version of Stoic ,ÛBV2,4" (see also Plutarch, Virt. mor. 448 
F: BV2@H . . . •6@8@L2@Ø< Jè 8`(å; 449 A: BV20 BD@FJ42X:,<" . . . Jè 8@(4F:è; 449 B: (\<,J"4 
86 
 
  
revised Stoic definition of passion (–:,JD@H 6"Â B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z), Philo cites 
the task of reason as :XJD" J"ÃH ÒD:"ÃH ÒD\.,4< (see Spec. 4.79). Reason must 
impose boundaries on non-rational desire as such (¦B42L:\"), lest it become 
passionate desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\").121 This Middle-Platonic revision of Stoic 
terminology underlies expressions such as :XJD" J"ÃH ¦B42L:\"4H B,D42,Ã<"4 
(Cherub. 33) and [¦B42L:\"H] :XJD@4H B,D4@D\.,4< (Spec. 4.217).122 Since 
¦B42L:\" bears analysis as an impulse, B8,@<V.@LF" (–:,JD@H) ¦B42L:\" simply 
represents a more specific instance of B8,@<V.@LF" (–:,JD@H) ÒD:Z, both of 
which are morally problematic. With the concept of "immoderation" (•:,JD\"), 
Philo was able to clearly distinguish passionate desire from amoral desire, using 
a reinvented Stoic definition of passion.123 
                                                                                                                                  (D ,ÛBV2,4" J@Ø 8@(4F:@Ø JÎ BV2@H @Û6 •<"4D@Ø<J@H •88 6@F:@Ø<J@H 6"Â JVJJ@<J@H ¦< J@ÃH FTND@<@ØF4<). Philo’s Middle-Platonic take on Stoic ,ÛBV2,4" explains his willingness to defy 
the Stoic doctrine of no rational counterpart to grief by naming *0(:`H in QG 2.57 as the "good 
emotion" corresponding to 8bB0 (see John Dillon and Abraham Terian, "Philo and the Stoic 
Doctrine of +KA!1+3!3: A Note on Quaes Gen 2.57," SPh 4 [1976-77]: 17-24). For Philo, *0(:`H would indicate the emotion of grief properly measured by reason. Rather than "a 
significant modification in basic Stoic doctrine" (ibid., 18), Philo offers a fundamental Middle-
Platonic revision of Stoic terminology (,ÛBV2,4") similar to the reworking of B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z 
(cf. Wolfson, Philo, 2:275-77). On QG 2.57, see also Graver, "Stoic AC?A!1+3!3," 213-16. 
 121 NB Plant. 105: •:XJDT< ¦B42L:4ä<; Legat. 162: J−H •:XJD@L . . . ¦B42L:\"H; Prov. 
2.70: J¬< •:,JD\"< Jä< ¦B42L:4ä<; Migr. 21: ¦B42L:4ä< . . . •:,JD\"4H. Cf. Leg. 2.77: •:,JD\" Jä< º*@<ä<; Leg. 3.111: º*@<−H •:XJD@L; Conf. 117: •:XJD@4H º*@<"ÃH (cf. TL 72: *@<"Â –:,JD@4). 
 122 Cf. Spec. 1.343: JÎ *z–:,JD@< :XJD@4H ¦B4FJ@:\.@LF". 
 123 And since ¦B42L:\" bears analysis as also a useful emotion (BV2@H), the Middle-
Platonic use of –:,JD@H terminology to analyze non-rational impulse applies also to the analysis 
of non-rational emotion, particularly in connection with the idea of "moderate" emotion 
(:,JD4@BV2,4"). In Virt. 195, Philo explicitly contrasts :,JD4@BV2,4" with º •:,JD\" Jä< B"2ä<, 
"immoderation of the emotions" (cf. Migr. 18: JVH . . . B"2ä< •:,JD\"H; Migr. 21: B"2ä< •:,JD\"4H; Mut. 143: B"2ä< •:,JD\"H; Spec. 3.209: JH •:,JD\"H Jä< B"2ä<). For Middle 
Platonists, the need to distinguish between emotion (BV2@H) and passion (BV2@H) posed an 
obvious terminological problem. So they often denoted passion by using terms that ascribed 
excess or lack of measure to emotion: •:,JD\" Jä< B"2ä< designates a "passionate emotion," 
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Tyrannical Desire (§DTH)  
 Along with passionate desire (B8,@<V.@LF" [–:,JD@H] ¦B42L:\"), Philo 
recognizes a second and even worse type of problematic desire, a "tyrannical 
desire" (§DTH), which does not simply overstep the bounds of reason, but instead 
takes control of the entire soul. Philo's characterization of tyrannical desire relies 
not on reinvented Stoic terminology but on the writings of Plato himself, who 
believed that §DTH can operate as a consuming, injurious, relentless desire for a 
single beloved object. He describes this type of desire in Books VIII – IX of the 
Republic through his portrait of the "tyrannical soul."124 Just as governments 
                                                                                                                                  
an amoral, potentially useful emotion (BV2@H) that exceeds rational bounds and become morally 
problematic, or "passionate" (cf. B8,@<V.@LF" [–:,JD@H] ÒD:Z). Plutarch describes this 
phenomenon in Virt. mor. 444 C, where he associates JH •:,JD\"H Jä< B"2ä< with an impulse 
(ÒD:Z) that goes too far (¦6NXD,J"4 . . . B@88Z . . . FN@*D`<; cf. ßB,D$V88@<J,H JÎ :XJD4@< [444 
B]). Evidence of the terminological problem faced by Middle Platonists appears in Didask. 30.5-6 
[184.20-36], where Alcinous uses the terms •:,JD4@B"2ZH and ßB,DB"2ZH to designate 
excessive (i.e., "passionate") emotion (cf. ¦< J@ÃH BV2,F4< •:,JD\" 30.5 [184.20-21]). (On •:,JD\" in Middle Platonism [including Virt. 195], see Whittaker, Alcinoos,  62, n. 504, who cites 
Resp. 486 D and Phileb. 52 C in connection with the term; cf. Dillon, Alcinous, 188-89.)  
 124 See esp. Resp. 572 C – 576 B (but note also 545 C: JLD"<<46¬< RLPZ<; 577 E: º JLD"<<@L:X<0 . . . RLPZ). On §DTH as a tyrant, see 573 B: JbD"<<@H Ò §DTH 8X(,J"4; 573 D: §DTH JbD"<<@H §<*@< @Æ6ä<; 574 E: JLD"<<,L2,ÂH *¥ ßBÎ §DTJ@H; 575 A: JLD"<<46äH ¦< "ÛJè Ò §DTH. 
This clearly negative image of §DTH from the Republic corresponds with a similar image in 
Phaedr. 237 D – 238 C, where Socrates defines §DTH as an ¦B42L:\" that usurps reason and 
becomes tyrant (238 B: JLD"<<,bF"F"; cf. 238 A: ¦B42L:\"H . . . •D>VF0H ¦< º:Ã<; 238 B: [sc. ¦B42L:\"H] *L<"FJ,L@bF0H . . . 6D"JZF"F" ¦B42L:\"). Plato's positive image of §DTH, by contrast, 
sees it as a means by which the soul of the philosopher ascends to the realm of true beauty and 
goodness (see Symp. 210 A – 212 C; Phaedr. 245 B – 257 B). Philo employs also this positive 
understanding of §DTH in his writings (e.g. Contempl. 11-12; Praem. 84: ßBz§DTJ@H @ÛD"<\@L; 
Gig. 44; cf. Didask. 1.2 [152.11-12]: BDÎH J¬< •8Z2,4"< §P,4< ¦DTJ46äH), on which see esp. 
Dieter Zeller, Charis bei Philon und Paulus (SBS 142; Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 
1990), 75-79 [="Der himmlische Eros"] (cf. Peder Borgen, "Heaven Ascent in Philo: An 
Examination of Selected Passages," in The Pseudepigrapha and Early Biblical Interpretation [ed. 
James Charlesworth and Craig Evans; JSPSup 14; SSEJC 2; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993], 246-
68, esp. 253-56; Holger Thesleff, "Notes on Eros in Middle Platonism," Arctos 28 [1994]: 115-28, 
esp. 119-20). Both views ascribe to §DTH a consuming motivational power capable of directing 
the course of one's life (cf. Post. 157). On Platonic §DTH in general, see Halperin, "Platonic Erôs"; 
idem, "Plato and the Metaphysics of Desire," PBACAP 5 (1989): 27-52. 
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degenerate stepwise from a best to a worst type, souls can degenerate from a 
best to a worst type, with tyranny representing the worst of both states and souls. 
The "tyrannical soul" suffers under the hegemony of an overgrown desire 
(¦B42L:\")—a preeminent, tyrannical desire (§DTH) that dominates not only other 
competing desires but also the collective operation of the entire soul.125 Without 
explicitly citing Plato's text, Philo nevertheless clearly demonstrates a familiarity 
with Plato's description of soul tyranny in the Republic.126 In particular, he 
incorporates Plato's notion of tyrannical desire (§DTH) into his moral psychology 
to describe the ultimate victory of non-rational desire (¦B42L:\") over reason 
(8`(@H).127 
 
                                            
 125 See Resp. 572 E: §DTJV J4<" . . . BD@FJVJ0< Jä< . . . ¦B42L:4ä<; 573 B: [§DTH] Ò BD@FJVJ0H J−H RLP−H; 573 D: §DTH JbD"<<@H §<*@< @Æ6ä< *4"6L$,D<‘ J J−H RLP−H B"<J"; 
573 E:  §DTJ@H, BVF"4H J"ÃH –88"4H [¦B42L:\"4H] ÓFB,D *@DLN`D@4H º(@L:X<@L; 575 A: Ò §DTH . . 
. "ÛJÎH ë< :`<"DP@H. }+DTH is a type of desire (Phaedr. 237 D: ¦B42L:\" J4H Ò §DTH), originating 
in the Platonic ¦B42L:0J46`<. Philo clearly associates §DTH with º ¦B42L:\" (i.e. the ¦B42L:0J46`<) in Conf. 21. Cf. the scholium on Didask. 34.3 [188.30-35] from the ninth-century 
codex Parisinus Graecus 1962 (see Whittaker, Alcinoos, 167), which correlates the various 
constitutions of Resp. IX with the corresponding parts of the Platonic soul: 6"J JÎ 8@(46`<: º •D4FJ@6D"J46Z; 6"J JÎ 2L:46`<: º J4:@6D"J46Z; 6"J JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<: º *0:@6D"J46Z, º Ï84("DP46Z, and º JLD"<<\H. 
 126 Esp. Agr. 45-46, where Philo speaks of "bad governments" (6"6@B@84J,4ä<), noting 
the danger of "mob rule" (ÏP8@6D"J\" [= *0:@6D"J\" of Resp. VIII]), and the even greater danger 
of an arising tyrant (JbD"<<@H), which in cities involves a man (B`8,T< :¥< –<2DTB@H), but in 
body and soul involves a savage mind (Ff:"J@H *¥ 6"Â RLP−H . . . 20D4T*XFJ"J@H <@ØH). See 
also Leg. 2.91: JLDV<<@L JD`B@<; Leg. 3.80: Ò . . . JbD"<<@H <@ØH; Conf. 164: JH Jä< JLDV<<T< JbP"H (cf. Colson, PLCL 4, 558); Prob. 45: òFB,D Jä< B`8,T< "Ê :¥< Ï84("DP@b:,<"4 6"Â JLD"<<@b:,<"4 *@L8,\"< ßB@:X<@LF4 . . . @àJTH 6"Â Jä< •<2DfBT<; Abr. 242: •<JÂ JLD"<<\*T< 6"Â *L<"FJ,4ä< ¦< J± RLP±. 
127 Cf. Emma Wasserman, The Death of the Soul in Romans 7 (WUNT 256; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 60-76 [="The Death of the Soul in Philo of Alexandria"]. Wasserman 
similarly notes the influence of Resp. VIII and IX on Philo’s Platonic notion of an inferior part of 
the soul utterly defeating reason, but she does not explore this connection in terms of §DTH 
(tyrannical desire). Instead, she suggests a link between Philo’s motif of "soul death" (e.g., Leg. 
1.105-107) and the "extreme immorality" (broadly conceived) represented by Plato’s image of 
tyranny in the Republic (see 67-76 [="Extreme Immorality in Platonic Discourse"], esp. 67-70). 
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}+DTH as Advanced Grade of Desire 
 Unlike useful desire, which dutifully submits to reason's command, 
passionate desire and tyrannical desire both counteract reason, but to different 
extents, and in different ways. Generally speaking, passionate desire and 
tyrannical desire correspond to the ethical categories of "lack of self-control" 
(•6D"F\") and "intemperance" (•6@8"F\"), which in turn represent two distinct 
dynamic relations between non-rational desire (¦B42L:\") and reason (8`(@H) 
within the soul.128 In the case of passionate desire, ¦B42L:\" impulsively 
counteracts the dictates of reason—overstepping the bounds of reason 
(becoming –-:,JD@H)—despite reason's attempt to enforce those dictates. In 
other words, desire forcibly asserts its inclination over against the inclination of 
reason in a contest of power.129 The moral agent simply does not have the 
requisite power (6DVJ@H) to control desire (i.e., •-6D"F\"), and thus acts under 
compulsion "against his or her will." In the case of tyrannical desire, however, the 
moral agent no longer experiences internal conflict, because desire has defeated 
reason entirely. Desire has become the undisputed ruler of the soul, a tyrant 
                                            
 128 In descending order of moral value, the four relations are "self-mastery" (FTND@Fb<0), 
in which reason enjoys uncontested dominion over compliant desire; "self-control" (¦(6DVJ,4"), in 
which reason asserts contested control over opposing desire; "lack of self-control" (•6D"F\"), in 
which desire asserts contested control over opposing reason; and "intemperance" (•6@8"F\"), in 
which desire enjoys uncontested dominion over compliant reason. The ethical theory underlying 
this scale of morality comes from Book VII of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (see Helen North, 
Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature [CSCP 35; Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1966], 203). For the scale from a Middle-Platonic perspective similar to Philo's, 
see Plutarch Virt. mor. 445 B – 446 C.  
 129 E.g., Abr. 135:  Ò *z§8,(P@H BDÎH @Û*¥< μ< ÐN,8@H, ßBÎ $4"4@JXD"H <46T:X<T< ¦B42L:\"H. 
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whose agenda determines the overall orientation and course of life.130 The moral 
agent, whose reason offers no opposition—no correction (6`8"F4H) of desire's 
errant ways (i.e., •-6@8"F\")—acts as the compliant slave of desire.131 In terms 
of moral psychology, what this means is that the invariable, sole aim of ¦B42L:\", 
which the Platonic tradition identifies as pleasure (º*@<Z), has become the 
invariable, sole aim of the moral agent, who thus becomes a "Lover of Pleasure" 
(N48Z*@<@H).132  
 Just as ¦B42L:\" can invariably seek pleasure through a variety of means 
(food, money, fame), tyrannical desire (§DTH) can invariably represent "love of 
pleasure" (N480*@<\") despite a variety of distinct means to pleasure. Philo 
speaks of the trouble caused by: 
                                            
130 Cf. Annas, "Humans and Beasts," on Resp. VIII – IX: "[T]he ‘tyrannical’ man is the 
only one to have lost all overall control, once a master desire has been implanted within him" 
(129). 
 131 Cf. Ios. 40: ¦> §DTJ@H •6@8VFJ@L; Spec. 3.65: •6@8"F\"H . . . ¼< §<4@4 . . . §DTJ" Ï<@:V.@LF4<. On the slavery imposed by (tyrannical) desire, see Her. 269: º *@L8,\" . . . ÓJ"< *¥ ¦B42L:\" 6D"JZF®, §DTH ¦((\<,J"4 Jä< •B`<JT<. In Leg. 2.90-91, Philo associates the absence 
of discipline (B"4*,\" [cf. 6`8"F4H]) with the eventual rise of tyranny in the soul. 
 132 Philo sees Ò N48Z*@<@H as a particular type (JD`B@H) of soul (Leg. 3.212: N48Z*@<@H JD`B@H; Sobr. 24: N48Z*@<@< . . . ¦< RLP± JD`B@<) equivalent to the tyrannical soul—in other 
words, a soul dominated by desire and possessed of •6@8"F\": e.g., Ios. 151-153: Ò N48Z*@<@H . 
. . J"ÃH •6"2X6J@4H ¦B42L:\"4H P"D4.`:,<@4 @ÍH —< BD@FJVJJTF4< ,Ç6@<J,H.; Leg. 3.37-38: JÎ< . . 
. JX8@H º(@b:,<@< JH º*@<VH . . . JÎ< N48Z*@<@<; Opif. 165-66: *,8,"F2,ÂH [8@(4F:ÎH J± º*@<±] ßBZ6@@H •<2zº(,:`<@H, *@Ø8@H •<JÂ *,FB`J@L; Spec. 3.23: º *z•6@8"F\" 6"Â N480*@<\"; Leg. 
2.90: ¦< (D º RLP¬ •B@DDR® J¬< B"4*,\"< (cf. •6@8"F\"), (X(@<, N48Z*@<@H. Cf. Ronocchia, 
"Anti-Epicurean Polemic," 93: "Philo never tires of attacking in his writings the 'pleasure-seeker' 
(º*@<46`H) or 'pleasure lover' (N48Z*@<@H) who has chosen pleasure as the only yardstick of 
judgment and has made it his supreme rule of life" (emphasis added). Philo's disdain for the N48Z*@<@H may indeed reflect a polemic against Epicurean philosophy, but he understands the 
moral psychology of hedonism along fundamentally Platonic lines. (On the Epicurean notion of 
pleasure as "the good," see LS 21A-X, esp. 21B, line 2 [from Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus]: J¬< º*@<¬< •DP¬< 6"Â JX8@H 8X(@:,< ,É<"4 J@Ø :"6"D\TH .−<q J"bJ0< (D •("2Î< BDäJ@< 6"Â FL((,<46Î< §(<T:,<; cf. John Cooper, "Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus," in Reason and 
Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory [Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999], 485-514.) 
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 [A] tyrannical desire for money (PD0:VJT< §DTH) or a woman (´ (L<"46`H) 
 or fame (´ *`>0H) or any other source of pleasure (´ J4<@H –88@L Jä< 
 º*@<¬< •B,D(".@:X<T<) . . .. (Decal. 151)133 
 
Plato's general theory of §DTH makes a distinction between the object and the 
aim of §DTH, which explains for tyrannical desire (§DTH) the relation between 
various means and the one ultimate end—pleasure (º*@<Z).134 For Plato, §DTH 
engages the rational mind, whose scope includes the convictions and aspirations 
of the moral agent, not just the impulsive activity of a non-rational element within 
the soul.135 }+DTH fundamentally involves a passionate pursuit of the Beautiful 
(JÎ 6"8`<), the object of §DTH, in an effort to secure the Good (JÎ •("2`<), the 
ultimate aim of §DTH.136 By properly evaluating reflections of the Beautiful 
manifested in a variety of sources in the sensible realm, the student of 
philosophy can ultimately ascend to the one source of those reflections in the 
intelligible realm, the Beautiful itself, in order to secure the Good itself, which 
                                            
 133 My translation. Cf. Ios. 70: J4:ä< §DTH; Leg 2.107: Ò $\@H Ò Jä< N"b8T< *,FB`.,J"4 ßNzº*@<−Hq J (@Ø< B@40J46 "ÛJ−H ,ßD\F6,J"4 *4 B"<@LD(\"H BVF0H, PDLFÎH –D(LD@H *`>" J4:"Â •DP"Â, "Ê â8"4 Jä< "ÆF20Jä<, 6"Â JXP<"4 "Ê $V<"LF@4 ÓF"4 –88"4 6"J"F6,L"FJ46"Â º*@<−H BV<L B@46\8"4. Plutarch speaks of Epicurus' §DTH for *`>" in Suav. viv. 1100 A-D; cf. the 
discussion of Caeser's 6"4<−H §DTJ" *`>0H and Ò J−H $"F48,\"H §DTH in Duff, Plutarch's Lives, 
86-87. 
 134 On this distinction, see Halperin, "Platonic Erôs, esp. 176-82. 
 135 Cf. J. M. E. Moravcsik, "Reason and Eros in the 'Ascent'-Passage of the Symposium," 
in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy (ed. J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas; Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1971), 283-302, 290: "Plato is using 'eros' in a wide sense, including any 
over-all desire or wish for what is taken to be good. The qualification 'over-all' is needed, for Plato 
is not talking about momentary impulses but about wishes, desires, aspirations that determine the 
ultimate goals of one's life. Thus eros is not blind passion; it is the wish or desire . . . for things 
deemed on account of their nature to be worthy of having their attainment become a man's 
ultimate goal." NB Symp. 205 D: @àJT J@\<L< 6"Â B,DÂ JÎ< §DTJ"q JÎ :¥< 6,NV8"\@< ¦FJ4 BF" º Jä< •("2ä< ¦B42L:\" 6"Â J@Ø ,Û*"4:@<,Ã<; 206 A: @Û*X< (, –88@ ¦FJÂ< @â ¦DäF4< –<2DTB@4 ´ J@Ø •("2@Ø . . . @Ê –<2DTB@4 J@Ø •("2@Ø ¦DäF4<. 
 136 Cf. Gerasimos Santas, "Plato's Theory of Eros in the Symposium," in Plato and Freud: 
Two Theories of Love (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 14-57, esp. 32-34 [="Generic Desire: 
Desire for the Good to be One's Own Forever"]. 
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results in happiness (,Û*"4:@<\"). But this philosophical use of §DTH presumes 
that the moral agent values as good what is truly good. In the case of tyrannical 
desire, the moral agent operates under the erroneous conviction that pleasure 
(º*@<Z) is good and thus worthy of pursuit.137 Enamored of a false good, the 
moral agent vehemently pursues objects that secure the "good"—pursues, in 
other words, objects capable of producing pleasure. The moral agent focuses 
only on what is "good" for non-rational desire, which has commandeered all 
faculties of the soul—including the rational faculty—to serve its pursuit of 
pleasure.138 Tyrannical desire (§DTH) thus represents the terminal stage of a 
disastrous process that begins with reason outmatched by ¦B42L:\" and ends 
with reason enslaved by ¦B42L:\".139  
 Philo emphasizes the distinct nature of §DTH as an advanced grade of 
desire by representing passionate desire (and thus •6D"F\") as a preliminary 
condition that engenders tyrannical desire (and thus •6@8"F\"): 
 When desire prevails within the soul (ÓJ"< *¥ ¦B42L:\" 6D"JZF®), a 
 tyrannical desire arises for things one does not have (§DTH ¦((\<,J"4 Jä< 
 •B`<JT<)—a tyrannical desire that racks the soul on unmet expectation as 
                                            
 137 Cf. Leg. 3.60-62. Pleasure appears to be good and thus has a deceptive charm that 
leads people to embrace it as good (see esp. Jessica Moss, "Pleasure and Illusion in Plato," 
Ph&PhenR 72 [2006]: 503-35). 
 138 Tyrannical desire has made pleasure "the good" (cf. Symp. 205 D). 
 139 Cf. Kahn, "Plato's Theory of Desire," 88: "If reason is able to rule in the soul, it will 
specify the life of virtue (the life of philosophy) as the good to be aimed at. If it does not succeed 
in doing so, that is because it has been so 'overpowered' by spirit or appetite that it mis-identifies 
the good. Since it is only the rational part that can form any conception of the good, even an 
erroneous conception, the domination of the other parts has the consequence of causing reason 
to make a mistake in its recognition of the ends to be pursued. That is what it means for reason to 
be enslaved" (original emphasis) (see also Cooper, "Human Motivation," 132, n. 18; Lorenz, 
Brute Within, 46: "the rule of the appetitive part consists in the fact that its central object of desire 
has become the person's central object of desire . . ."). 
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 if hanging it on a rope (6"Â J¬< RLP¬< òFB,D •Bz•(P`<0H ¦8B\*@H 
 •J,8@ØH ¦6DX:"F,). Always thirsty, yet never able to drink, such a soul 
 suffers the awful fate of Tantalus (*4R± :¥< (D •,\, B4,Ã< *¥ •*L<"J,Ã 
 J"<JV8,4@< J4:TD\"< ßB@:X<@LF"). (Her. 269)140 
 
In order for tyrannical desire to come into existence, ¦B42L:\" must first 
overpower reason (6D"J,Ã<), subjecting the soul to passionate desire—or, to put 
it differently, tyrannical desire is born only in souls predisposed to its genesis by 
passionate desire and the accompanying state of incontinence (•6D"F\"). 
Advancement to this terminal grade of desire invariably brings disaster. 
Negative Impact of }+DTH 
 Once established, tyrannical desire's hegemony ravages the soul by 
imposing the “fate of Tantalus” (Her. 269). For Tantalus, this meant the torturous 
circumstance of being always thirsty yet never able to take a drink.141 Framed as 
a more general predicament, this means suffering under an insatiable desire: 
always wanting something yet never able to get it.142 This experience of chronic 
insatiability (•B80FJ\") distinguishes tyrannical desire (§DTH) from all other 
types.143 In fact, only the abject defeat of reason (•6@8"F\") presupposed by 
tyrannical desire can explain the phenomenon of chronic insatiability. Unlike a 
physical receptacle such as the stomach, whose physical limits can be reached 
                                            
 140 My translation. For the same idea of passionate desire as a preliminary condition 
engendering §DTH, see Spec. 4.80-81. 
141 See Od. 11.582-92. 
 142 Cf. Resp. 578 A: RLP¬< –D" JLD"<<46¬< B,<4PD< 6"Â –B80FJ@< •<V(60 •,Â ,É<"4. 
See Halperin, "Metaphysics of Desire," esp. 36-43 [="Eros: Suffering Without Satisfaction"]. 
143 Gig. 31: –B80FJ@H . . . §DTH (cf. Leg. 3.39: –B80FJ@4 Jä< •D,J−H Ð<J,H ¦DfJT<). 
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to induce satiety, desire itself (¦B42L:\")—as a function of the soul—has no 
inherent limit. Philo explains: 
[T]he craving of the soul that is out of control is not restricted as the bodily 
organs are by their size (@Û (D •<"8@(,Ã J@ÃH FT:"J46@ÃH Ð(6@ÃH º J−H •6DVJ@D@H144 RLP−H ¦B42L:\"). These are vessels of a fixed capacity 
admitting nothing that exceeds it (–:,JD@< @Û*X<), but ejecting all that is 
superfluous. Desire is never filled up (º *¥ ¦B42L:\" B80D@ØJ"4 :¥< @Û*XB@J,), but continues always thirsty and in want of more (:X<,4 *¥ ¦<*,¬H 6"Â *4R"8X" •,\). (Leg. 3.149)145 
 
Once activated in the soul, desire impulsively extends toward its object, with 
nothing to limit it other than reason. In the virtuous soul, reason imposes limits, 
allowing desire to pursue its object only so far as that pursuit serves a rational 
end: to secure, for example, something necessary or useful. But in the soul under 
tyrannical desire (§DTH), reason never exercises its limiting capacity, so nothing 
counteracts this appetitive extension. The moral agent consumed with tyrannical 
desire continually holds the object of desire in mind, causing non-rational desire 
to pursue reflexively the pleasure afforded by that object, which in turn leads to 
the unending frustration of insatiable desire in a soul racked with longing. 
Although Philo alludes to this phenomenon in a variety of passages, he finds it 
signified explicitly under the allegorical figure of Tubal (LXX: 1@$X8), a 
                                            
144 What applies here to the –6D"J@H soul applies also to the •6`8@FJ@H soul. Desire itself 
is insatiable, whether the absence of restraining reason is temporary (•6D"F\") or chronic 
(•6@8"F\"). 
145Cf. Ebr. 206: 6—< JH J@Ø Ff:"J@H *,>":,<H •B@B80DT2äF4 BVF"H, §J4 6,<@×H JH ¦B42L:\"H Ð<J"H; Contempl. 55: JH :¥< ("FJXD"H –PD4 N"Db((T< B,B80DT:X<@4, 6,<@Â *¥ BDÎH JH ¦B42L:\"H (also Ebr. 6: •B80FJ\"H *¥ ["ÇJ4@<] º •D(8,TJVJ0 B"2ä< RLP−H ¦B42L:\").  
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descendant of Cain mentioned in Gen 4:22.146  Tubal represents for Philo the 
torturous extension of a soul consumed by a tyrannical desire (§DTH)147 for the 
pleasure (º*@<Z) of false "goods" (•("2V): 
 [T]he soul of someone vexed by the pleasures derived from either bodily 
 or external "goods" (J@Ø (D F,F@$0:X<@L B,DÂ JH ´ FT:"J46H º*@<H 
 ´ JH º*@<H [´] JH ¦6JÎH à8"H º RLPZ)148 gets hammered thin as if on 
 an anvil, driven by the long and cavernous extensions of its desires 
                                            
 146 On Philo's etymological interpretation, see Lester L. Grabbe, Etymology in Early 
Jewish Interpretation: The Hebrew Names in Philo (BJS 115; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988). On 
"1@$X8," see idem, 165-66 (cf. 29-33). Grabbe correctly notes that Philo, generally speaking, 
does not so much draw meaning as inject meaning: "Philo has a definite philosophical and 
theological system in mind. While certain modifications have been made to accommodate it to 
Judaism, this system is still evidently a representative of Middle Platonism. Philo is not in reality 
exegeting the biblical text, any more than the Stoic allegorists exegeted the text of Homer. He is 
only building an extensive bridgework between the Jewish sacred text and his philosophico-
theological system. Although Philo probably would not have thought consciously in such terms, 
his question is, ultimately, not what the text means but how can he funnel his philosophical 
system into it" (116). See also David Runia, "Etymology as an Allegorical Technique in Philo of 
Alexandria," SPhA 16 (2004): 101-21. 
 147 Although the term §DTH does not appear in Post. 116, Philo clearly has §DTH in mind: 
(1) the broader context of the passage (Post. 113: esp. ñH *4z•<"$"2:ä<) alludes to Plato's 
teaching on §DTH in the Symposium (211 C: esp. òFB,D ¦B"<"$"2:@ÃH; cf. Arnaldez, PAPM 6, 
110, n.3); (2) Philo links the term F,F@$0:X<@L, which Colson translates as "vehemently 
concerned," with §DTH elsewhere (Her. 70: §DTJ4 @ÛD"<\å F,F@$0:X<0H); (3) the terms @ÉFJD@< 
and Ë:,D@<, which appear in Post. 116, signal the involvement of §DTH (e.g., @ÆFJDVT and Ë:,D@H 
in Phaedr. 251 C-E). Philo describes a person whose state of mind is characterized by §DTH, 
although distinct instances of desire still bear description with terms like ¦B42L:\" and ÐD,>4H, 
which are both found in Post. 116. 
 148 Cohn emends the text as follows: J@Ø (D F,F@$0:X<@L B,DÂ JH ´ FT:"J46H º*@<H [´ JH º*@<H] ´ JH ¦6JÎH à8"H º RLPZ, suggesting that Philo means "either (1) bodily 
pleasures or (2) the materials of external things." But the phrase JH ´ FT:"J46H º*@<H (not ´ JH FT:"J46H º*@<H) suggests that Philo has in mind one type of pleasure over against 
another: JH ´ (1) FT:"J46H º*@<H ´ (2) JH º*@<H JH ¦6JÎH à8"H. The context of Philo's 
statement (Post. 112-15) clearly shows that he has in mind two classes of false "goods," those 
related to the body (e.g., health) and those related to the external world (e.g., wealth): "Sella" is a 
symbol (Fb:$@8@<) of the "goods" of the body and external "goods" (esp. §112: Jä< B,DÂ Fä:" 6"Â ¦6JÎH •("2ä<) and "Tubal" is the "son" of "Sella." In this context, JH FT:"J46H º*@<VH 
must refer to pleasures derived from (associated with) "goods" of the body, and JH º*@<H JH ¦6JÎH à8"H, although an awkward expression, must refer to pleasures derived from (associated 
with) external "goods," with JH ¦6JÎH à8"H serving as an adjective modifying º*@<VH, just as FT:"J46VH modifies º*@<VH. This emphasis on pleasure complements Philo's subsequent 
emphasis on desire (JH Jä< ¦B42L:4ä< :"6DH 6"Â *4T8L(\@LH ¦6JVF,4H), since he understands 
that ¦B42L:\" fundamentally involves a desire for pleasure. 
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 (6"2VB,D ¦Bz–6:@<@H FNLD08"J,ÃJ"4 6"J JH Jä< ¦B42L:4ä< :"6DH 
 6"Â *4T8L(\@LH ¦6JVF,4H ¦8"L<@:X<0). (Post. 116) 
 
Philo notes that such people have literally boundless appetites (J"ÃH •@D\FJ@4H 
"ßJä< ÏDX>,F4< [Post. 116]), meaning that their desire is insatiable.149  
 Tyrannical desire harms not only the individual, but also the community at 
large through the individual, whose obsessive pursuit of pleasure via false 
"goods" leads to lawless behavior and violent conflict. Plato associates tyrannical 
desire with lawlessness in the Republic, in his portrait of the tyrannical man: 
 Consumed by tyrannical desire (JLD"<<,L2,ÂH *¥ ßBÎ §DTJ@H), he 
 regularly becomes by day the sort of person he scarcely dreamed of 
 becoming at night. He will kill anyone, eat anything, do anything, because 
 the tyrannical desire inside of him (JLD"<<46äH ¦< "ÛJè Ò §DTH) lives in 
 absolute anarchy and lawlessness (¦< BVF® •<"DP\‘ 6"Â •<@:\‘). As the 
 undisputed ruler of the soul ("ÛJÎH ë< :`<"DP@H), tyrannical desire will 
 drive (–>,4) its host, its subject "city" (B`84<), to dare anything (¦BÂ BF"< 
 J`8:"<) . . .. (Resp. 574 E – 575 A)150 
 
Philo also links inner tyranny with lawless behavior, in a clear allusion to Plato's 
Republic: 
 Anarchy (•<"DP\") . . . is not our only danger. We have to dread also the 
 uprising of some aspirant to sovereign power, forcibly setting law at 
 naught (º 6"Â B"D"<`:@L 6"Â $4"\@L J4<ÎH ¦Nzº(,:@<\"< ¦B"<VFJ"F4H). 
 For a tyrant is a natural enemy (JbD"<<@H (D ¦6 NbF,TH ¦P2D`H). In cities 
 this enemy is man (B`8,T< :¥< –<2DTB@H); to body and soul and all the 
 interests of each of these (Ff:"J@H *¥ 6"Â RLP−H 6"Â Jä< 6"2z©6VJ,D@< 
 BD"(:VJT<), it is an utterly savage mind, that has turned our inner citadel 
 into a fortress from which to assail us (Ò J¬< •6D`B@84< ¦B4J,J,4P46ãH 
 ©6VFJå 20D4T*XFJ"J@H <@ØH). (Agr. 46)151 
                                            
 149 Cf. Conf. 117: F×< •:XJD@4H º*@<"ÃH •`D4FJ@H ¦B42L:\". 
 150 My translation. 
 151 On Ò J¬< •6D`B@84< ¦B4J,J,4P46ãH ©6VFJå 20D4T*XFJ"J@H <@ØH, see André Pelletier, 
"Les passions à l’assaut de l’âme d’après Philon," REG 78 (1965): 52-60, 56. Cf. Leg. 3.79-80: 
"[A] king ($"F48,bH) is a thing at enmity with a despot (JLDV<<å), the one being the author of 
laws, the other of lawlessness (•<@:\"H . . . ,ÆF0(0JZH). So mind, the despot (Ò . . . JbD"<<@H 
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People consumed by tyrannical desire will do anything to get what they want: 
nothing deters them, not even the law. For instance, Philo in Spec. 4.7 speaks of 
someone "crazed with a tyrannical desire for what belongs to others" (§DTJ4 Jä< 
•88@JD\T< ¦B4:"<,\H), who as a result "attempts to steal" (68XBJ,4< ¦B4P,4D±). 
As in Agr. 46, the tyrannical desire for possessions has "set law at naught." 
Tyrannical desire leads not only to individual acts of lawlessness, but also to 
violent conflict among entire groups of people. Philo states this most clearly in his 
exposition of the Tenth Commandment: 
[A]mong the passions, only passionate desire deserves the name “Master 
Vice,” whose one little offspring (§((@<@<) tyrannical desire (§DTH) has 
repeatedly filled the world with unspeakable disasters—which, too 
numerous for land, have spilled out into the sea. Everywhere the vast 
watery expanse has been filled with ships of war and all the terrible 
inventions of war. Charging out to sea, their violence runs its course then 
crashes back like a tide upon the shores of home. (Spec. 4.85)152 
 
This same idea appears in Philo's allegorical reading of Tubal, who represents 
the soul consumed by tyrannical desire (§DTH)153 and thus all "war makers" 
(*0:4@LD(@\ . . . B@8X:@L): 
 [A]nd that is why they are said to be workers in iron and bronze,154 and 
 these are the instruments with which wars are waged (*4zô< @Ê B`8,:@4). 
 For any who are looking into the matter would find, that the greatest 
 quarrels both of men individually and of states corporately, have arisen in 
 the past, and are going on now, and will take place in the future, either for 
                                                                                                                                  <@ØH), decrees for both soul and body harsh and hurtful decrees (¦B4JV(:"J" ¦B4JVJJ,4 J± J, RLP± 6"Â Jè Ff:"J4 $\"4" 6"Â $8"$,DV) working grievous woes (6"Â FN@*DH 8bB"H ¦D(".`:,<"), conduct, I mean, such as wickedness prompts (JH 6"J 6"6\"< 8X(T BDV>,4H), 
and free indulgence of the passions (JH Jä< B"2ä< •B@8"bF,4H)" (also Abr. 242). 
 152 My translation. Cf. Decal. 151-53. 
 153 On §DTH in Post. 116-17, see above, n. 142. 
 154 See Gen 4:22: P"86,×H P"86@Ø 6"Â F4*ZD@L. 
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 a woman’s beauty (´ ,Û:@DN\"H (L<"6ÎH ,Ë<,6"), or for money (´ 
 PD0:VJT<), or glory (*`>0H) or honor (J4:−H) or dominion (•DP−H), or 
 acquisition (6JZF,TH), or, in a word, to gain advantages pertaining to the 
 body and outward things (´ FL<`8TH ÓF" Ff:"J@H 6"Â Jä< ¦6J`H ¦FJ4 
 B8,@<,6JZ:"J"). (Post. 117)155 
 
Tyrannical desire (§DTH) thus poses a unique threat to both individual and 
society, representing the maximum ill effect of unrestrained ¦B42L:\". 
CONCLUSION 
 Philo holds a coherent, consistently Middle-Platonic theory of ¦B42L:\", 
involving a great variety of terms and concepts. Philo consistently locates 
¦B42L:\" in the non-rational part of the soul, but he uses different terms to 
describe that part. This makes ¦B42L:\" a fundamentally non-rational 
phenomenon, which operates according to a non-rational mechanism of stimulus 
(pleasurable object) and response (pursuit). Discrete instances of ¦B42L:\" may 
receive different labels (¦B42L:\", ÐD,>4H, ÒD:Z, BV2@H), but each describes the 
same phenomenon, only from a different conceptual perspective. Desire serves a 
variety of useful purposes for human beings—most notably the necessary desire 
for food and drink—and so forms an integral part of life. If not properly managed 
by reason, however, desire can become an injurious force. Passionate desire 
signals the partial victory of non-rational desire over reason, in which desire 
forcibly oversteps the bounds of reason, despite the moral agent's knowledge of 
what reason requires. Tyrannical desire (§DTH) signals the complete defeat of 
reason by non-rational desire, in which desire enslaves reason, compelling the 
                                            
 155 Cf. Conf. 45-50. 
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entire soul to pursue desire's single aim of pleasure. So the non-rational desire 
(¦B42L:\") found in every human soul poses a latent threat, and tyrannical desire 
(§DTH) represents the absolute realization of that threat. Instead of a useful 
source of non-rational motivation, desire becomes an awful tyrant, whose 
despotic rule harms both the individual and the surrounding community.  
 Clearly, effective management of the threat posed by non-rational desire 
requires preemptive intervention, an effort to contain the threat before it ever 
matures. Since the terminal state of intemperance (•6@8"F\") accompanying 
tyrannical desire always develops from a prior lack of self-control (•6D"F\"), 
preemptive therapeutic intervention must target the preliminary state and the 
passionate desire associated with it. If non-rational desire always remains within 
rational bounds, then passionate desire can never emerge, which in turn 
removes the precondition for tyrannical desire and so precludes its development. 
The moral quality necessary for keeping non-rational desire in check is self-
control (¦(6DVJ,4")—literally the power (6DVJ@H) to restrain desire when it tries to 
usurp the dictates of reason. So a complete system of practical ethics must 
include provisions for the development and exercise of self-control (¦(6DVJ,4").  
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CHAPTER THREE 
PHILO ON SELF-CONTROL (+'5C!I+3!) AND PRACTICE (!E5/G3G) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Philo considers non-rational desire (¦B42L:\") a necessary, even useful 
component of human life, but its innate and invariable tendency to pursue 
pleasure (º*@<Z) apart from rational calculation (8@(4F:`H) threatens human well 
being. The initial danger lies in the ability of ¦B42L:\" to oppose and overpower 
the dictates of reason, to compel moral agents to pursue pleasure against their 
better judgment in an instance of •6D"F\" ("lack of self-control"). When an 
otherwise benign emotion overpowers reason in this way, it becomes a malignant 
passion, and Middle Platonists conceptualized this transformation as an impulse 
(ÒD:Z) becoming "immoderate" (–:,JD@H) as it transgresses the limit or 
"measure" (:XJD@<) set by reason. Passionate desire unquestionably harms the 
soul, but the ultimate danger of ¦B42L:\" lies not so much in its ability to get the 
occasional upper hand as in its ability to usurp reason entirely, to rule the moral 
agent without opposition in a state of "•6@8"F\"" ("intemperance"). At this 
terminal stage, ¦B42L:\" becomes an all-consuming tyrannical desire (§DTH) and 
the moral agent becomes thoroughly corrupt. 
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Self-control (¦(6DVJ,4") involves the moral agent’s ability to assert the 
dictates of reason over against the demands of desire whenever the two conflict, 
and by preventing desire from ever getting the upper hand, ¦(6DVJ,4" eliminates 
the risk of tyrannical desire entirely. Recognizing its critical importance for the 
overall health of the soul, Philo speaks highly of ¦(6DVJ,4" and gives it a 
prominent role in his ethical theory.1 This chapter explains Philo’s concept of 
¦(6DVJ,4" in light of Middle-Platonic moral psychology, addressing in turn the 
fundamental questions of what ¦(6DVJ,4" is and how to acquire it.  
THE NATURE OF z+(6DVJ,4" 
 Philo has a coherent but multi-faceted concept of ¦(6DVJ,4", whose 
character emerges best by considering three of its aspects. First, ¦(6DVJ,4" 
simply involves a power dynamic, in which reason engages and overpowers a 
separate, unruly element of the soul. Second, ¦(6DVJ,4" involves the curtailing 
of excessive impulse, and so it figures prominently in a Middle-Platonic theory of 
passion, especially through the Platonic image of reason as charioteer. Finally, 
¦(6DVJ,4" involves a predominance of rational motivation, in which the urge to 
secure a rationally determined, ultimate benefit for the entire soul outweighs the 
urge to experience an immediate pleasure.  
 
                                            
1 E.g., Spec. 1.173: J¬< éN,84:TJVJ0< Jä< •D,Jä<, ¦(6DVJ,4"< (cf. Spec. 1.175); 
Contempl. 34: ¦(6DVJ,4"< *¥ òFB,D J4< 2,:X84@< BD@6"J"$"88`:,<@4 J−H RLP−H JH –88"H ¦B@46@*@:@ØF4< •D,JVH. A similar emphasis on ¦(6DVJ,4" appears in Xenophon's portrait of 
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z+(6DVJ,4" -- Victory of Rational over Non-Rational 
The Platonic tradition associates ¦(6DVJ,4" with the victory of reason, but 
it characterizes reason’s opponent in different ways. One broad formulation 
simply pits reason against the rest of the soul, understood more or less as a 
single inferior "part" whose inferiority stems from a lack of reasoning capacity. 
One narrow formulation pits reason against only desire (¦B42L:\"), based on a 
theoretical correlation of specific virtues with specific elements of the tripartite 
Platonic soul. Philo uses both of these formulations in his ethical discourse. 
The broad formulation appears in Plato’s Republic as a reflection on the 
division within the soul presumed by the term ¦(6DVJ,4" itself, which commonly 
denotes power (6DVJ@H) over oneself.2 Socrates notes the association of "self-
control" (¦(6DVJ,4") with the expression "6D,\JJT "ßJ@Ø," whose literal sense—
"stronger than himself"—creates confusion:  
Now the phrase "stronger than himself" (6D,\JJT "ßJ@Ø) is ridiculous, is it 
not? For anyone stronger than himself (Ò (D ©"LJ@Ø 6D,\JJT<) would 
also be weaker than himself (»JJT< . . . "ßJ@Ø), and anyone weaker (Ò 
                                                                                                                                  
Socrates in the Memorabilia (see Louis-André Dorion, "Akrasia et enkrateia dans les Mémorables 
de Xénophon," Dialogue 42 (2003): 645-72, esp. 646-50 [="La prééminence de l'enkrateia"]. 
2 See Resp. 430 D – 432 A. 6DVJ@H takes the genitive to indicate the domain of power: 
power over someone or something (see LSJ, s.v.). Walter Grundmann suggests that ¦(6DVJ,4" 
derives from "¦< 6DVJ,4 ê<," which implies a "status of power" ("¦(6DVJ,4"," TDNT 2:339-42, 
340)—i.e., a state of being in power, namely over oneself. As with 6DVJ@H, the term ¦(6DVJ,4" 
can also take the genitive, at least in earlier usage (e.g., Resp. 390 B: ¦(6DVJ,4"< ©"LJ@Ø). But 
the reflexive pronoun eventually became unnecessary (see A. A. Long, "Hellenistic Ethics and 
Philosophical Power," in Hellenistic History and Culture [ed. Peter Green; HCS 9; Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993], 138-56, esp.144. Philo never uses ¦(6DVJ,4" with the 
reflexive pronoun, despite his use of equivalent expressions elsewhere: Post. 42: ÔH :0*z"ßJ@Ø 6D"J,Ã< Ê6"<ÎH ë<; Agr. 37: @Û6XJ4 6D"J,Ã< ©"LJä< *b<"<J"4; and Ebr. 221: @Û6XJ4 6D"J,Ã< ©"LJä< *L<V:,<@4.  
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»JJT<) would be stronger (6D,\JJT<). For the same person (Ò "ÛJ`H) 
figures in all of these expressions. (Resp. 431 A)3 
 
Socrates, however, further explains what people really mean by such 
expressions, despite the obscurity: 
[T]he soul of man within him has a better part (JÎ :¥< $X8J4@<) and a 
worse part (JÎ *¥ P,ÃD@<), and the expression "being stronger than 
himself" (JÎ 6D,\JJT "ßJ@Ø) really means the control of the worse by the 
naturally better part (JÎ $X8J4@< NbF,4 J@Ø P,\D@<@H ¦(6D"JXH). (Resp. 
431 A) 
 
Here the "naturally better part" (JÎ $X8J4@< NbF,4) stands for reason, which ought 
to be in control (¦(6D"JXH). But Plato never clearly identifies the "worse part" (JÎ 
P,ÃD@<), here or elsewhere, because he never clearly formulates a bipartite 
model of the soul.4 Middle Platonists, however, ultimately preferred a bipartite 
model of the soul, envisioning simply a "rational part" over a "non-rational part," 
and they developed a broad conception of ¦(6DVJ,4" along these lines: 
Whenever the rational part of the soul overpowers the non-rational part (JÎ 8@(4FJ46Î< :XD@H JH RLPH ¦B46D"J± Jä •8`(T), self-control comes into 
existence ((\<,J"4 . . . ¦(6DVJ,4"). Whenever the non-rational part of the 
soul overpowers the rational part (JÎ –8@(@< :XD@H JH RLPH Jä 8@(4FJ46ä), lack of self-control comes into existence ([(\<,J"4] •6D"J\"). 
(Ps.-Metop.117.16-18)5 
                                            
3 On this passage, see also Plutarch, Virt. mor. 450 D-E. Cf. Leg. 626 E: "[T]he victory 
over self (JÎ <46”< "ÛJÎ< "ßJ`<) is of all victories the first and best while self-defeat (JÎ *¥ ºJJF2"4 "ÛJÎ< ßNz©"LJ@Ø) is of all defeats at once the worst and the most shameful. For these 
phrases signify that a war exists within each one of us (B@8X:@L ¦< ©6VFJ@4H º:ä< Ð<J@H BDÎH º:H "ÛJ@bH)." 
4 Despite evidence for the concept of bipartition (see Rees, "Bipartition"). 
5 My translation. Cf. Plutarch, Virt. mor. 442 A: "[The soul of man] has as one part the 
intelligent and rational (ªJ,D@< :¥< §P,4 JÎ <@,DÎ< 6"Â 8@(4FJ46`<), whose natural duty is to 
govern and rule the individual (ø 6D"J,Ã< J@Ø •<2DfB@L 6"J NbF4< 6"Â –DP,4< BD@F−6`< ¦FJ4<), and as another part the passionate and irrational (ªJ,D@< *¥ JÎ B"20J46Î< 6"Â –8@(@<), 
the variable and disorderly (B@8LB8"<¥H 6"Â –J"6J@<), which has need of a director (¦>,J"FJ@Ø 
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Although Philo never defines ¦(6DVJ,4" in this way, he presumes this sort of 
definition when, for example, he interprets biblical references to "shepherding" 
(B@4:,<46¬ JXP<0) along allegorical lines as an ethical discourse about reason’s 
management of the "herd" (•(X80) of non-rational powers within the soul (Agr. 
26-66).6 Consistent with Philo’s Middle-Platonic moral psychology, this line of 
interpretation envisions a basic power dynamic in the soul between a rational 
component fit to govern and a separate, non-rational component in need of 
governance.7 As long as the non-rational component tractably accepts 
governance, all is well. But when the two components conflict, moral well being 
hinges on the presence or absence of ¦(6DVJ,4". Its presence consists in the 
                                                                                                                                  *,`:,<@<)" (unless otherwise noted, all translations of Plutarch's writings are from the Loeb 
Classical Library); also Eclog. 38.5-6: }!8@(@< :XD@H J−H RLP−H ,Æ24F:X<@< ßB"6@b,4< Jè 8`(å.  
6 Moses uses the figures of "shepherd" (B@4:Z<) and "feeder of livestock" (6J0<@JD`N@H) 
respectively to speak of the rational faculty engaged in either good or bad management of its 
non-rational "herd" (•(X80) (esp. Agr. 29: N"Ø8@H :¥< (D ë< Ò •(,8VDP0H @âJ@H [8@(4F:`H] 6"8,ÃJ"4 6J0<@JD`N@H, •("2ÎH *¥ 6"Â FB@L*"Ã@H Ï<@:V.,J"4 B@4:Z<) (cf. Sacr. 104-06). 
Figurative representations of the soul as a combination of "Man" (rational) and "Beast" (non-
rational) suit the Platonic moral psychology particularly well. See Annas, Platonic Ethics, 117-36 
[="Humans and Beasts: Moral Theory and Moral Psychology"], esp. 134-36. Cf. Theo Heckel, Der 
innere Mensch: Die paulinische Verarbeitung eines platonischen Motivs (WUNT 53; Tübingen: 
J.C.B. Mohr, 1993). Heckel considers the Platonic image of the tripartite soul as "man" (JÎ 8@(4FJ46`<, the "inner man"), lion (JÎ 2L:@,4*XH), and many-headed beast (JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<) 
(Resp. 588 B-D), especially its use among authors postdating Plato (see his ch. 3, "Der Aufstieg 
der Metapher vom 'Inneren Menschen' und die neue Platonhermeneutik ab dem ersten Jh. v. 
Chr.," 31-88, esp. 42-76 [="Der 'Innere Mensch' bei Philon"]). 
7 Philo’s subdivision of the non-rational component into five senses, the organs or 
speech, and the organs of reproduction (Agr. 30) in no way undermines the fundamentally 
bipartite conception of the soul presumed in his shepherding allegory (see above, 72-77). In this 
case, the manifold nature of the non-rational part simply fits the characterization of reason as 
manager of a non-rational "herd." On Philo’s conviction that the "better" (rational) part ought to 
govern the "worse" (non-rational) part, note for example Leg. 1.72: *\6"4@< (D JÎ :¥< 6D,ÃJJ@< –DP,4< •,Â 6"Â B"<J"P@Ø, JÎ *¥ P,ÃD@< –DP,F2"4q 6D,\JJ@< :¥< *¬ JÎ 8@(46`<, P,ÃD@< *¥ JÎ ¦B42L:0J46Î< 6"Â JÎ 2L:46`< [= JÎ –8@(@<] (cf. Leg. 3.222; Fug. 24; Praem. 59; QG 4.218). In 
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ability of the rational to overpower the non-rational, and Philo attributes precisely 
this ability to "shepherds," who use their rational powers to rule (6D"J,Ã<) over 
the non-rational forces within.8 The absence of ¦(6DVJ,4" (•6D"F\") similarly 
involves a question of power, but in this case non-rational forces overpower the 
rational. Philo can use the shepherding allegory to depict this disastrous 
situation: 
[T]he stream of these evils becomes most grievous when the non-rational 
forces of the soul attack and overpower the forces of reason (¦B,4*< "Ê –8@(@4 *L<V:,4H J−H RLP−H ¦B42X:,<"4 J"ÃH J@Ø 8@(4F:@Ø 6D"JZFTF4<). 
While the herd obeys its herdsman ($@L6`84" $@L6`8@4H . . . B,42"DP,Ã), 
or the flocks of sheep or goats obey the shepherd or goatherd (´ B@4:XF4 B@\:<4" ´ "ÆB`8@4H "ÆB`84"), all goes well with them; but, when the 
controlling herdsmen (•(,8VDP"4) prove weaker than their charges 
(•F2,<XFJ,D@4 Jä< 2D,::VJT<), everything goes awry. (Somn. 2.151-52) 
 
Although Philo sees reason engaged in a struggle against certain "powers of the 
soul" (*L<V:,4H J−H RLP−H), he disregards the specific identity of those powers 
and notes only a common property, their lack of reason (–8@(@4). Here he 
construes ¦(6DVJ,4" in the broadest possible terms: a variety of distinct 
opponents may contend with reason (desire, anger, fear, etc.), but they 
necessarily offer only one type of opposition, non-rational opposition. The value 
of such a broad formulation lies in its ability to construe the forcible control of any 
non-rational movement as an instance of ¦(6DVJ,4". 
                                                                                                                                  
Opif. 83-86, Philo expresses a similar conviction: human beings (rational) ought to govern 
animals (non-rational).  
8 E.g., Agr. 63: *b<"<J"4 6D"J,Ã< Jä< •8`(T< [*L<V:,T<] . . . PDf:,<@4 J"ÃH 8@(46"ÃH 
[*L<V:,F4] (cf. Agr. 40; Sacr. 49). 
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The narrow formulation of ¦(6DVJ,4" ultimately derives from a 
development within Platonic tradition regarding the nature of FTND@Fb<0, "self-
mastery." Plato himself had conceived of FTND@Fb<0 in terms of "order" (6`F:@H) 
or "concord" (>L:NT<\") among all parts of the soul as to which part should rule 
(ÒB`J,D@< *,Ã –DP,4<).9 But Middle Platonists, dogmatically assigning a single 
cardinal virtue to each of the soul’s parts, narrowed the scope of FTND@Fb<0 
from an agreement involving the entire soul to simply a governance of JÎ 
¦B42L:0J46`<, the seat of ¦B42L:\".10 Philo reflects this trend: 
We must understand, then, that our soul has three parts (¦FJÂ< º:ä< JD4:,D¬H º RLPZ): the rational (JÎ :¥< 8@(46`<), the assertive (JÎ *¥ 2L:46`<), and the desirous (JÎ *¥ ¦B42L:0J46`<). . . . and that to each of 
the parts an appropriate virtue has been attached (•D,J¬< *¥ ©6VFJå Jä< :,Dä< @Æ6,\"< BD@F0D:`F2"4): prudence to the rational part (Jè :¥< 8@(46è ND`<0F4<) . . . . courage to the assertive part (Jè *¥ 2L:46è •<*D,\"<); and self-mastery to the desirous part (Jè *¥ ¦B42L:0J46è FTND@Fb<0<). For it is by self-mastery that we heal and cure our desires 
(FTND@Fb<® (D JH ¦B42L:\"H •6@b:,2" 6"Â Æf:,2"). (Leg. 1.70)11 
 
                                            
9 See Resp. 430 E and 432 A. On FTND@Fb<0 in Plato’s writings, see North, Sophrosyne, 
150-96. 
10 Cf. North, Sophrosyne, 173: "[S]ophrosyne must be practiced by all three parts of the 
soul; it is never, for Plato, as for many later Platonists, solely the virtue of the appetitive part" (cf. 
Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 78, n. 2). On the doctrine of virtues for each part in Middle 
Platonism, see Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 72-84, esp.80-83. In addition to the passages Lilla 
cites, note also Ps.-Metop.118.9-13: Jä :¥< (D 8@4FJ46ä :XD,@H JH RLPH •D,J  ND`<"F4H . 
. . Jä *¥ 2L:@,4*X@H •<*D,\" . . . Jä *z¦B42L:"J46ä  FTND@Fb<" . . . Ó8"H *¥ JH RLPH  *46"4@Fb<"; cf. Didask. 29.1 [182.22]: JÎ ¦B42L:0J46Î< J−H FTND@Fb<0H. On Philo’s 
understanding of the cardinal virutes, see Carl Joachim Classen, "Der platonisch-stoische Kanon 
der Kardinaltugenden bei Philo, Clemens Alexandrinus und Origenes," in Kerygma und Logos: 
Beiträge zu den geistesgeschichtlichen Beziehungen zwischen Antike und Christentum (ed. Adolf 
Ritter; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 68-88, esp. 70-75; Wofson, Philo, 2:218-35; 
and in general, Pierre Daubercies, "La vertu chez Philon d’Alexandrie," RTL 26 (1995): 185-210. 
11 My translation.  
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As the "appropriate virtue" for the ¦B42L:0J46`<, FTND@Fb<0 accordingly 
manages the non-rational desires (JH ¦B42L:\"H) generated in that part of the 
soul—and it manages them well. Philo associates FTND@Fb<0 with the "healing" 
and "curing" of desire, suggesting a state of moral wellness in which desire 
operates only as it should. In other words, FTND@Fb<0 represents the ideal sort 
of management, in which ¦B42L:\" plays the obedient servant of reason, acting 
only with reason’s authorization and never opposing its dictates. Plutarch 
characterizes the man of self-mastery along similar lines: 
And you would say, as you looked at the man, "Then, indeed ceased the 
gale; a windless calm arose; some god had laid the waves to rest" [Od. 
12.168], since by reason the violent, raging, and furious movements of the 
desires (64<Z:"J" Jä< ¦B42L:4ä<) had been quenched and those 
movements which Nature absolutely requires (ô< *zº NbF4H •<"(6"\TH *,ÃJ"4) had been made sympathetic (Ò:@B"2−), submissive (ßBZ6@"), 
friendly (N\8"), and, when the man chose a course of action, willing to co-
operate (FL<,D(V), so that they did not outstrip the dictates of reason (:¬ BD@,62,Ã< J@Ø 8@(4F:@Ø), nor fall short of them (ßB,<*4*`<"4), nor 
misbehave (•J"6J,Ã<), nor disobey (•B,42,Ã<), but so that every impulse 
was easily led (BF"< ÒD:¬< ,ÛV(T(@< @ÞF"<). (Virt. mor. 446 D-E)12 
 
Plutarch situates this concept of self-mastery at the top of a four-point scale 
depicting four possible relations between reason and desire: reason rules desire 
without conflict (FTND@Fb<0), reason rules desire with conflict (¦(6DVJ,4"), 
desire rules reason with conflict (•6D"F\"), and desire rules reason without 
                                            
12 Cf. TL 82: ÓD@H FTND@Fb<"H ,ÛB,\2,4". 
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conflict (•6@8"F\").13 Despite occasional lapses in technical precision, Philo 
demonstrates a fundamental acceptance of this same scale in his ethical theory. 
For example, he identifies moral "opposites" according to the terms of the scale, 
correlating the terms denoting absence of conflict (FTND@Fb<0 and •6@8"F\") 
and the terms denoting its presence (¦(6DVJ,4" and •6D"F\").14 Furthermore, 
Philo’s ethical theory presumes and depicts, in a variety of ways, the four types 
of relation between reason and desire outlined by the scale, so he affirms its 
distinctions by implication if not always by name.15 Philo’s general acceptance of 
such a well-developed scheme, especially its distinction between self-mastery 
and self-control, helps to clarify his concept of ¦(6DVJ,4". 
 Like FTND@Fb<0, which in Middle-Platonic theory deals specifically with 
the ¦B42L:0J46`<, ¦(6DVJ,4" deals specifically with ¦B42L:\", but in a different 
way. In Spec. 1.149, Philo calls ¦(6DVJ,4" desire’s "antagonist" (•J\B"8@< 
¦B42L:\"H), and this image captures the essential difference between ¦(6DVJ,4" 
and FTND@Fb<0. In the case of "self-mastery," reason placidly manages an ever 
docile desiderative faculty. But in the case of "self-control," reason struggles 
against desire in an active contest of power: reason does manage to assert its 
                                            
13 Plutarch gives a detailed overview of this scale in Virt. mor. 445 B – 446 E. The ethical 
theory underlying the scale comes from Book VII of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (see North, 
Sophrosyne, 203).  
14 For FTND@Fb<0 opposed to •6@8"F\", see for example Opif. 73: J•<"<J\" . . . FTND@Fb<0< 6"Â •6@8"F\"<; Her. 209: ¦<"<J\" . . . FTND@Fb<0, •6@8"F\"; for ¦(6DVJ,4" 
opposed to •6D"F\", see for example Abr. 103: BDÎH ¦6DVJ,4"< Ò •6D"JZH; Mos. 1.161: •6DVJ@D,H :,J"$V88@LF4 BDÎH ¦(6DVJ,4"<; Virt. 180: ¦> •6D"J,\"H ,ÆH ¦(6DVJ,4"<. 
15 See above, 87-93. 
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directives, but only against—and over—desire’s positive opposition to those 
directives. Plutarch characterizes the man of self-control along these lines: 
[T]he self-controlled man (Ò *z¦(6D"JZH), while he does indeed direct his 
desire by the strength and mastery of reason (–(,4 :¥< ¦DDT:X<å Jè 8@(4F:è 6"Â 6D"J@Ø<J4 J¬< ¦B42L:\"<), yet does so not without pain, nor 
by persuasion (@Û*¥ B,42@:X<0<), but as it plunges sideways and resists 
(B8"(\"< 6"Â •<J4J,\<@LF"<), as though with blow and curb (ßBÎ B80(−H 6"Â P"84<@Ø), he forcibly subdues it and holds it in (6"J"$4".`:,<@H 6"Â •<"6D@bT<), being the while himself full of internal struggle and turmoil 
(•(ä<@H ë< ¦< ©"LJè 6"Â 2@Db$@L :,FJ`H). (Virt. mor. 445 B-C)  
 
Because self-control involves an active conflict between reason and desire, 
Plutarch uses terms of strength, force, and violent opposition to characterize it. 
Philo demonstrates a similar view of self-control and uses similar language in his 
own characterizations, although he never states his theoretical positions quite as 
clearly as Plutarch.16  He does, however, encapsulate his understanding of 
¦(6DVJ,4" in an interpretive reflection on the creature known as the "snake-
fighter" (ÏN4@:VP0H): 
For the snake-fighter is, I think, nothing but a symbolic representation of 
self-control (FL:$@846äH ¦(6DVJ,4" ,É<"4), waging a fight that never ends 
and a truceless war against intemperance and pleasure (:VP0< •6"2"\D,J@< 6"Â B`8,:@< –FB@<*@< ¦6NXD@LF" BDÎH •6D"F\"< 6"Â º*@<Z<). (Opif. 164) 
 
The notions of "never ending fight" (:VP0< •6"2"\D,J@<) and "truceless war" 
(B`8,:@< –FB@<*@<) obviously convey the element of conflict characteristic of 
¦(6DVJ,4". And despite Philo’s naming here of •6D"F\" and º*@<Z as the 
                                            
16 Cf. Leg. 1.86 (NB @Ê ¦(6D"JXFJ"J@4): •("B0JÎ< @Þ< ¦FJ4< •<J4$−<"4 6"Â :"PXF"F2"4 Jè (X<,4 J−H ¦B42L:\"H. 
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opponents of ¦(6DVJ,4", he in no way contradicts the notion of a fundamental 
opposition between ¦(6DVJ,4" and  ¦B42L:\". By pitting ¦(6DVJ,4" against 
•6D"F\", Philo simply notes that self-control subverts the victory of desire over 
reason (•6D"F\") by enforcing the victory of reason over desire (¦(6DVJ,4").By 
pitting ¦(6DVJ,4" against º*@<Z, Philo simply recognizes pleasure as the 
constant and necessary counterpart of desire. Since Platonic ¦B42L:\" invariably 
seeks º*@<Z as its object, pleasure and desire ultimately represent twin aspects 
of the same phenomenon, and for that reason ¦(6DVJ,4" interchangeably 
represents the antagonist of either one.17 But in either case ¦(6DVJ,4" involves 
active management of one part of the soul, the ¦B42L:0J46`<. 
 Whether formulated broadly as the dominance of rational over non-rational 
forces or narrowly as the dominance of reason over desire, ¦(6DVJ,4" always 
involves a decisive contest of power. Since only reason can successfully direct 
the soul on a virtuous course of life, moral well being demands an ability to 
overcome any opposition to reason, no matter the source. Conceiving ¦(6DVJ,4" 
along these lines, as simply a power dynamic, rightly identifies self-control with 
the victory of reason, but it does nothing to define that victory. A more precise 
                                            
17 In Philo’s discussion of FTND@Fb<0 in Leg. 1, he links self-mastery with the ¦B42L:0J46`< alone (§§70-71) yet—in line with the Platonic view of ¦B42L:\"—presumes its 
dealing with both desire and pleasure (§86: •*L<"J,Ã 6L68fF"F2"4 J¬< ¦B42L:\"< 6"Â º*@<Z<). 
Since it deals with the same part of the soul, ¦(6DVJ,4" deals also with both desire and pleasure: 
either the forcible subjugation of ¦B42L:\" or the forcible abstention from º*@<Z (cf. Ps.-Metop. 
117.21-22:  *¥ ¦(6DVJ,4" ¦< Jè •<JXP,< *@<”). 
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concept of ¦(6DVJ,4" emerges through Philo’s use of what he and other Middle 
Platonists took as a model of self-control in action: the two-horse chariot. 
z+(6DVJ,4" -- Curtailing Excessive Impulse 
While he owes the analogy between soul and chariot to Plato’s Phaedrus 
(esp. 246 A-B; 253 D – 256 D), Philo’s particular use of the chariot figure to 
depict ¦(6DVJ,4" reflects a decidedly Middle-Platonic moral psychology and a 
set of didactic aims different from Plato’s.18 In the Phaedrus, the chariot figure 
helps to narrate a myth of the soul’s journey to transcendent reality, not to 
expound moral theory.19 The struggle between charioteer and horse obviously 
symbolizes conflict within the soul, but Plato examines this conflict strictly in 
terms of the myth, not as a separate ethical concern.20 In Philo’s writings, by 
contrast, the chariot figure serves as a working model for moral psychology, 
stripped of any explicit connection with the Phaedrus myth and framed according 
                                            
18 On Philo's use of the Phaedrus image, see esp. Méasson, Char ailé, 141-76; also 
Billings, Platonism of Philo, 88-92. On the broader use of the Phaedrus image in Middle 
Platonism, see Vander Waerdt, "Moral Psychology," 390 (cf. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 92-103, 
esp. 97). Within Middle Platonism, Philo’s use takes precedence, as Méasson notes: "l’œuvre de 
Philon est sans doute le plus ancien témoignage subsistant de l’utilisation de cette image destiné 
à devenir un des themes familiers du moyen platonisme" (176). On the chariot as a model of ¦(6DVJ,4", see esp. Plutarch’s explicit statement to that effect in Virt. mor. 445 B-D. On the 
Phaedrus image in Plutarch, see François Fuhrmann, Les images de Plutarque (Paris: C. 
Klincksieck, 1964), 141, n. 2; cf. Opsomer, "L'âme du monde," 46-47; Rhiannon Ash, "Severed 
Heads: Individual Portraits and Irrational Forces in Plutarch's Galba and Otho," in Plutarch and 
his Intellectual World: Essays on Plutarch (ed. Judith Mossman; London: Duckworth, 1997), 189-
214, 192-96. 
19 See Anne Lebeck, "The Central Myth of Plato's Phaedrus," GRBS 13 (1972): 267-90 
20 See Jacqueline de Romilly, "Les conflits de l'âme dans le Phèdre de Platon" WS 16 
(1982): 100-13, esp. 112, where she concludes concerning the conflict depicted through the 
chariot figure: "Il s’agit, en commandant mieux à l’attelage de notre âme, de pouvoir monter 
jusqu’au lieu supracéleste, et, pour finir, d’échapper au cycle des incarnations. Ou bien il s’agit, 
dans le cas contraire, de s’empêtrer dans la matière et les souffrances infinies au’entraîne cette 
déchéance." 
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to Middle-Platonic conceptions of the soul. Gone, for example, are the wings of 
the chariot-soul so indispensable to the mythical narrative.21 And just as Middle-
Platonic bipartition recast 2L:`H as more of an opponent of reason than an ally, 
Philo pits both horses against the driver, replacing the Phaedrus notion of a "bad" 
horse (¦B42L:\") yoked to an obedient "good" horse (2L:`H).22 In further 
agreement with Middle-Platonic moral psychology, which offered variant 
conceptions of the soul’s non-rational part (–8@(@< :XD@H) over against its 
rational part (8@(46Î< :XD@H), Philo offers variant conceptions of what exactly the 
soul's driver, reason, must manage. Reflecting Middle Platonism's configuration 
of tripartition as bipartition, Philo can speak of either two horses, 2L:`H and 
¦B42L:\", or a single horse, representing simply the non-rational part of the 
soul.23 Elsewhere, he identifies the team of horses more broadly as emotion(s).24 
He can also envision the team as sense-perception ("ÇF20F4H).25 But no matter 
what team Philo envisions, he always casts the soul’s rational element as the 
                                            
21 E.g., Phaedr. 246 A: ¦@46XJT >L:NbJå *L<V:,4 ßB@BJXD@L .,b(@LH J, 6"Â º<4`P@L; 
246 E: JÎ J−H RLP−H BJXDT:". 
22 See Méasson, Char ailé, 148-49 [="De l’attelage de Platon à celui de Philon"]; 158-60 
[="Le «thumos» chez Platon et chez Philon"]. 
23 Horses 2L:`H and ¦B42L:\": e.g., Agr. 72-73; Migr. 67 (cf. Leg. 1.72); single horse: 
e.g., Leg. 2.99, cited in Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 142, n. 63. On the single horse 
variation (142), Inwood writes: "In Plato the two horses represent the two distinct irrational 
elements in the soul. When a dualistic contrast of reason and the irrational part of the soul in its 
undifferentiated formulation was preferred, an analogy with only one horse was substituted." 
24 E.g., Leg. 193: ÏPZ:"J4 B"2ä<. 
25 E.g., Leg. 3.222-24: e.g., <@ØH *¥ 6D,ÃJJ@< "ÆF2ZF,TH. òFB,D @Þ< –DP@<J@H :¥< º<4`P@L 6"Â J"ÃH º<\"4H J .è" –(@<J@H Á $@b8,J"4 –(,J"4 JÎ D:". See Méasson, Char ailé, 
160-63. 
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charioteer charged with controlling the team.26 In this way, his chariot figure 
always serves as a model of ¦(6DVJ,4" in action—as a model of reason 
managing or "driving" the non-rational elements of the soul—and in this respect it 
perfectly suits the Platonic tradition’s broad formulation of ¦(6DVJ,4" as a power 
dynamic of rational versus non-rational. But since it can also depict reason 
managing the discrete movement of those elements—managing, in other words, 
discrete instances of non-rational impulse (ÒD:Z)—the figure accommodates a 
more precise concept of ¦(6DVJ,4" tailored to a Middle-Platonic view of 
"passion."  
Philo’s use of the concept of impulse (ÒD:Z) to develop his chariot figure 
into a more elaborate model of ¦(6DVJ,4" presumes a suitable basis in the 
actual dynamic between horses and drivers:27 
Drivers (º<\@P@4) . . . lead [their team] just as they please by keeping hold 
of the reins (Jä< º<4ä<). Sometimes they give rein for a brisk trot 
(¦N4X<J,H BDÎH Ï>×< *D`:@<), other times they pull back violently 
                                            
26 In Agr. 93, Philo characterizes the "art of driving" (JXP<0< J¬< º<4@P46Z<) as an ability 6D"J,Ã< ËBBT< (cf. Virt. 13: ß(,\" *¥ RLP−H ,Û6D"F\" *L<V:,f< ¦FJ4 J−H J, 6"J JÎ< 2L:Î< 6"Â J¬< ¦B42L:\"< 6"Â JÎ< 8`(@<, ¦B46D"J@bF0H J−H 8@(46−H 6"Â òFB,D •N0<4"FJH ËBB@LH º<4@P@bF0H ©6"JXD"H). Conversely, Philo assumes the capacity of the team to overpower the 
driver (cf. •6D"F\") and bring everything to ruin (see esp. Leg. 3.223: òFB,D @Þ< –DP@<J@H :¥< º<4`P@L J"ÃH º<\"4H J .è" –(@<J@H Á $@b8,J"4 –(,J"4 JÎ D:", •N0<4"FV<JT< *¥ ¦6,\<T< 6"Â 6D"J0FV<JT<, Ó J, º<\@P@H 6"J,FbD0 B@88V64H JV J, .è" §FJ4< ÓJ, J± Õb:® J−H N@DH ,ÆH $`2D@< 6"J0<P20 B80::,8äH J, BV<J" NXD,J"4). 
27 Philo himself had seen chariots in action: "Thus in chariot races (¦< ÊBB@*D@:\"4H) . . . I 
have seen (,É*`<) people giving way to thoughtlessness who, instead of sitting in their places as 
they should as orderly spectators, stood in the middle of the course and pushed over by the rush 
of the chariots were crushed under the feet and wheels, a proper reward for their folly" (Prov. 58). 
Philo's knowledge of chariots included familiarity with obscure technical terminology, on which 
see H. A. Harris, "The Foot-Rests in Hippolytus' Chariot," CR 18 (1968): 259-60. On Philo's 
extensive familiarity with a variety of competitive sports, see esp. H. A. Harris, Greek Athletics 
and the Jews (TSP 3; Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1976), 51-95. 
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(•<"P"4J\.@<J,H), if an excessive surge gets the team running (,Æ N@D” J@Ø *X@<J@H B8,\@<4 2X@4). (Opif. 88)28  
 
Here Philo reviews the fundamentals of managing an unruly team. Of course, the 
problem lies not in the team’s movement per se, but in its movement beyond 
what the driver sanctions, in its "excessive surge." Philo uses the term N@DV—a 
synonym of ÒD:Z—to describe this surge and qualifies it with the expression 
B8,\T< J@Ø *X@<J@H, "greater than the need," meaning greater than the 
movement needed to accomplish the driver’s purpose. Philo elsewhere denotes 
this type of unruly, excessive movement using a number of specialized terms, 
most commonly •N0<4V.,4<, "to throw off the reins."29 To counter this unruliness, 
drivers must reassert their control, whether by "pulling back violently" 
(•<"P"4J\.,4<), as Philo indicates here, or by some other technique, such as 
"curbing" (¦B4FJ@:\.,4<), as Philo indicates elsewhere.30 In any case, Philo 
envisions controlling a team of horses as a matter of curtailing their excessive 
movements, which bear description in terms of impulse. Philo’s characterization 
of chariot driving applies also to the mounted horseman: 
When the horse goes forward in obedience to the reins (,Û0<\TH), the 
horseman gives a few pats as if to praise the horse, but when the horse 
gets carried away beyond proper measure by excessive impulse (ÓJ"< *¥ F×< B8,\@<4 ÒD:± BXD"< ¦6NXD0J"4 J@Ø :,JD\@L), the horseman pulls 
                                            
28 My translation. 
29 •N0<4V.,4< and its variants appear over fifty times in Philo’s writings. Méasson (Char 
ailé, 146) considers it part of a larger vocabulary "inspiré du Phèdre."  
30 •<"P"4J\.,4<: lit. to throw back the mane (P"\J0), i.e., to cause to rear up. In other 
words, the driver pulls back with such violence that the team rears up. ¦B4FJ@:V.,4<: to curb with 
the bit (cf. FJ`:"). 
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back violently with force (:,J $\"H ,ÛJ`<TH •<"P"4J\.,4) to slow the 
horse down. (Agr. 70)31  
 
Here again Philo equates control with the curtailing of excessive impulse 
(B8,\@<4 ÒD:±), which involves movement beyond the limit or measure (BXD"< . . 
. J@Ø :,JD\@L) set by the horseman’s purpose. He also highlights a key element 
of managing any unruly non-rational power, horse or not: the use of brute force 
(:,J $\"H). By the application of force, a horseman bends the steed to his will, 
not to eliminate its movement, but simply to control it. Technically, neither of 
these passages describes the soul, but they clearly allude to the Middle-Platonic 
definition of "passion" Philo formulates in Spec. 4.79: 
 –:,JD@H 6"Â B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z (Spec. 4.79) 
 N@D J@Ø *X@<J@H B8,\T< (Opif. 88) 
 B8,\@<4 ÒD:± BXD"< . . . J@Ø :,JD\@L (Agr. 70) 
 
In other words, Philo sees in the management of horses an effective means of 
representing the management of non-rational impulse, specifically the 
"excessive" impulse Middle Platonists counted as "passion." Capitalizing on this 
analogy, Philo applies the language of horsemanship directly to the realm of 
moral psychology to characterize ¦(6DVJ,4" as the curtailing of excessive 
impulse. 
   Since Middle Platonists defined passion in terms of non-rational impulse, 
Philo can depict the management of passion strictly in terms of non-rational 
impulse, without ever naming a specific type of passion (desire, fear, grief, etc.): 
                                            
31 My translation.  
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For ["horsemen"] are able, by applying a bridle to the soul's non-rational 
faculties (P"84<Î< J"ÃH •8`(@4H *L<V:,F4< ¦:$"8`<J,H), to curb the surge 
of their excessive impulse ("ÛJä< ¦B4FJ@:\.,4< J−H B8,@<".@bF0H J¬< N@D< ÒD:−H). (Agr. 94)32 
 
As Philo suggests here, the soul has a variety of non-rational faculties (–8@(@4 
*L<V:,4H), whose existence in itself poses no problem. But since these faculties 
can usurp reason’s authority and become "passionate," the moral agent must be 
able to exercise ¦(6DVJ,4", which Philo depicts here as "applying a bridle" 
(P"84<`< . . . ¦:$"8`<J,H). In particular, the moral agent must be able to curb the 
surge of excessive non-rational impulses, whatever their source. Desire 
(¦B42L:\"), for example, represents a perfectly natural faculty of the soul. But 
when the impulses of desire become excessive, ¦B42L:\" the benign emotion 
becomes ¦B42L:\" the malignant passion. Controlling ¦B42L:\" (exercising 
¦(6DVJ,4") specifically involves the curtailment of this excess: 
But there are others, boastful persons, of the sort that is puffed up by 
arrogance, who in their craving for high position determine to have nothing 
to do in any way with the frugal, the truly profitable mode of living. Indeed, 
if any rebuke them in order to rein in the unruliness of their desires (ª<,6" J@Ø JÎ< •N0<4"F:Î< Jä< ¦B42:4ä< •<"P"4J\F"4), they regard the 
admonition as an insult. (Spec. 2.18)33 
 
The rebuke here stands against passionate desire, since it involves "pulling back 
violently" (•<"P"4J\F"4) not on desire per se but on the "unruliness" of desire 
                                            
32 My translation. Cf. Leg 3.118: º . . . ÒD:¬ BV2@LH; Agr. 58: J B,D4JJ J−H ,ÆH •B80FJ\"< ÒD:−H "ÛJä< ¦B4FJ@:\.@<J,H; Spec. 1.193: ¦B4FJ@:\.@<J"H JH ¦Nzº*@<¬< ÒD:VH. 
33 Cf. Spec. 2.135: P"84<`< . . . ¦:$"8,Ã< J"ÃH ¦B42L:\"4H ßB¥D J@Ø :¬ •<"F64DJ< ¦BÂ B8X@<; Virt. 113: @Û6 ,Ç"F,< •PV84<@< NXD,F2"4 J¬< ¦B42L:\"< •B"LP,<\.@LF"<, ¦FJ,\8"J@ JÎ FN@*D`< . . . P"8VF"H.  
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(JÎ< •N0<4"F:`<), which represents the movement in excess of the "frugal mode 
of living" reason would otherwise allow. And the dynamic envisioned here relative 
to ¦B42L:\" applies in theory to any emotion. In Leg. 3.118-37, for example, 
Philo uses the chariot figure to represent the work of Aaron, who stands as the 
allegorical exemplar of the moderation of emotion (:,JD4@BV2,4").34 While cues 
in the biblical text prompt Philo to highlight 2L:`H in his allegorical consideration 
of :,JD4@BV2,4", he clearly has all emotions in view.35 In general, he portrays 
the moderating effect of ¦(6DVJ,4" as bringing reason (8`(@H) to bear on the 
emotions (BV20), "so that [reason] like a charioteer may curb their surge to 
excess (Ë<z@âJ@H º<4`P@L JD`B@< ¦B4FJ@:\.® J¬< ¦BÂ B8X@< "ÛJä< N@DV<)" 
(Leg. 3.134). In other words, reason seeks not to eliminate emotions but simply 
to curb their excessive impulse. With reason in command, emotion never 
oversteps the limits of moderate expression—never becomes, in other words, a 
                                            
34 Leg 3.131: z!"Dã< :,JD4@BV2,4"< . . . •F6,Ã, ¦6J,:,Ã< (D §J4 JÎ FJ−2@H 6"Â JÎ< 2L:Î< •*L<"J,Ãq NXD,4 *z¦Bz"ÛJÎ< JÎ< º<\@P@< . . . 8`(@<. Philo contrasts the :,JD4@BV2,4" of 
Aaron, a lower ethical stage, with the •BV2,4" of Moses, a higher ethical stage (Leg. 3.128-29). 
For this distinction between :,JD4@BV2,4" and •BV2,4" in Middle Platonism, see Lilla, Clement 
of Alexandria, 92-106 (cf. John Dillon, "Plotinus, Philo and Origen on the Grades of Virtue," in 
Platonismus und Christentum: Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie [ed. Horst-Dieter Blume and 
Friedhelm Mann; JACE 10; Münster: Aschendorff, 1983], 92-105, esp. 102-03). 
35 On reason as the "charioteer" of 2L:`H, see, for example, Leg. 3.123: ¦BÂ J@Ø 2L:@Ø, Ë<z@âJ@H º<4@P−J"4 8`(å; Leg. 3.127: º<4@P2ZF,J"4 Ò 2L:ÎH ßB` J, 8`(@L. Philo, however, sets 
this long discourse on "Aaronic" moderation in the broader context of a Middle-Platonic bipartite 
opposition between reason (8`(@H) and emotion (BV2@H). At the outset (Leg. 3.115), he seems to 
endorse Platonic tripartition, but he immediately reveals his Middle-Platonic affinities in Leg. 
3.116 by making bipartition the overarching frame: the soul consists of reason opposed to 
emotion (:VP,J"4 Ò 8`(@H Jè BV2,4), for instance pleasure (6D"J@Ø<J@H . . . 8`(@L ND@Ø*@H º º*@<Z, <46fF0H . . . º*@<−H NL(H Ò 8`(@H), or of reason opposed to 2L:`H and ¦B42L:\", 
elements of the non-rational part (Ò 2L:ÎH 6"Â º ¦B42L:\", :XD0 J@Ø •8`(@L), abode of the 
emotions (J BV20). In Philo's Middle-Platonic tripartition as bipartition, 2L:`H and ¦B42L:\" 
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"passion": a disruptive force that overpowers reason and leads the soul to 
destruction, like a runaway horse pulling a hapless chariot to ruin. Here again 
Philo conceives ¦(6DVJ,4" as the curtailing of excessive non-rational impulse, 
and he formulates this concept in light of a Middle-Platonic definition of "passion."  
While this notion of curtailing excess certainly lends precision to Philo’s concept 
of ¦(6DVJ,4", his most practical concept of what it means for a rational part to 
rule over non-rational parts within the soul—especially for reason to rule over 
desire (¦B42L:\")—involves the different and often conflicting sources of human 
motivation.  
z+(6DVJ,4" -- Predominance of Rational Motivation 
 
Reason and desire represent two distinct sources of motivation in the 
human soul, each with its own characteristic aim.36 Desire (¦B42L:\") represents 
a source of motivation whose invariable aim is pleasure (º*@<Z). Given a sensory 
impression of something pleasurable, desire always responds by motivating the 
moral agent to pursue pleasure. Reason (8`(@H), by contrast, represents a 
source of motivation whose invariable aim is the good (•("2`H). Given a set of 
circumstances, reason—unless captive to another component of the soul—
always responds by motivating the moral agent to do what rational calculation 
                                                                                                                                  
represent emotions (BV20) stemming from the soul's non-rational part, but they are only two of 
many (cf., Agr. 78: 2L:@Ø (D 6"Â ¦B42L:\"H 6"Â FL<`8TH BV<JT< B"2ä<). 
36 For analysis of the Platonic theory in terms of motivation, see for example Lohrenz, 
Brute Within, 35: "the embodied human soul is a composite object, composed of a number of 
parts which (strictly and accurately speaking) are the subjects or bearers of different kinds of 
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(8@(4F:`H) deems best in those circumstances. These two sources of motivation 
do not necessarily oppose one another, but they obviously can. Desire 
overcomes reason (•6D"F\") whenever the moral agent acts for the sake of 
pleasure despite reason's contrary motivation to act for the sake of rational 
benefit.37 Conversely, reason overcomes desire (¦(6DVJ,4") whenever the moral 
agent acts for the sake of rational benefit despite desire's contrary motivation to 
act for the sake of pleasure.38 Conceived in terms of conflicting motivations, 
¦(6DVJ,4" imposes onto desire the "measure" of rational benefit: desire may 
pursue its aim of pleasure, as long as that pursuit serves a rational end and 
bears rational justification.39 The pursuit of pleasure beyond reasonable 
measure—the pursuit of pleasure for pleasure's sake—represents the triumph of 
desire (as a source of motivation) over reason (as a source of motivation), and 
desire at that moment, as its characteristic motivation predominates, becomes 
"excessive" and so "passionate." While this dynamic applies in theory to any 
desire, the most basic of desires, the desire for food, illustrates it well.40 
                                                                                                                                  
motivating conditions" (emphasis added; cf. passages in the General Index under "Motivating 
condition" [218]); see also Cooper, "Human Motivation." 
37 E.g., Det. 95: J¬< º*@<¬< •B@*,P`:,2" ¦(6DVJ,4"< BXD"< ÓDT< ¦8"b<@<J,H. 
38 E.g., Agr. 48: PD¬ . . . –DP,4< JÎ< º:XJ,D@< <@Ø< . . . JÎ FL:NXD@< BDÎ J@Ø º*X@H . . . "ÊD@b:,<@<.  
39 E.g., QG 2.68 (Petit): B\<,4 *4z¦(6DVJ,4"< *4z¼< ¦:XJD,4 J¬< PD−F4<. 
40 For an illustration of this basic dynamic relative to sexual desire, see Kathy L. Gaca, 
"Philo's Principles of Sexual Conduct and Their Influence on Christian Platonist Sexual 
Principles," SPhA 8 (1996): 21-39, esp. 22-27, where Gaca outlines Philo’s (Pythagorean) 
"procreationist principle." Although Gaca does not analyze it in terms of moral psychology, the 
procreationist principle nevertheless envisions ¦(6DVJ,4" as the predominance of rational 
motivation by endorsing sex for the sake of reproduction (reason as source of motivation) and 
rejecting sex for the sake of pleasure (desire as source of motivation). Niehoff (Philo on Jewish 
Identity, 99-102) examines the same principle of limiting sex to reproduction but downplays the 
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With regard to food, desire invariably seeks only the pleasure of eating, 
while reason seeks the moral agent’s overall well being.41 Desire always urges 
indulgence, due to its reflexive, non-rational mode of operation—in other words, 
given an opportunity to eat pleasurably, desire always says "yes." Reason, by 
contrast, taking all factors into account, can accordingly urge either for or against 
indulgence on an ad hoc basis. While reason could not in principle categorically 
endorse a certain type of indulgence, human beings must eat to live, so—barring 
exceptional circumstances—reason always approves eating for nourishment as 
the unavoidable indulgence of a "necessary" desire, an indulgence perfectly 
consistent with the demands of ¦(6DVJ,4": 
Mark you not that even the most self-controlled of men (@Ê ¦(6D"JXFJ"J@4) 
under compulsion of the mortal element in them (•<V(6® J@Ø 2<0J@Ø) 
resort to food and drink (B"D"(\<@<J"4 ¦BÂ F4J\" 6"Â B@JV), out of which 
the pleasures of the appetite develop (¦> ô< "Ê ("FJDÎH º*@<"Â FL<,FJF4<)? (Leg. 1.86)42 
                                                                                                                                  
Pythagorean associations, instead framing the issue in terms of Philo's ideal of Jewish ¦(6DVJ,4". 
41 Much of Philo's discourse on ethical eating reflects elements of the diatribe tradition, 
especially the works of Musonius Rufus (see Paul Wendland, "Philo und die kynisch-stoische 
Diatribe," in Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Religion [Berlin: Georg 
Reimer, 1895], 1-75, esp. 8-15; cf. Bréhier, Idées philosophiques et religieuses, 261-62; Niehoff, 
Philo on Jewish Identity, 105). Musonius, for example, endorses the standard of need over 
pleasure: e.g., Troph.B 116.9-11: ("FJD4:"D(\" J\ —< ,Ç0 –88@ ´ •6D"F\" B,DÂ JD@NZ<, *4z¼< –<2DTB@4 JÎ º*× JÎ ¦< F\Jå J@Ø éN,8\:@L BD@J4:äF4<; 118.6-7: •F6ä< 6"Â ¦2\.T< "ßJÎ< "ÊD,ÃF2"4 FÃJ@< @ÛP Ë<" »*0J"4 •88zË<" JDXN0J"4. Such similarities, however, do not signal the 
acceptance of Cynic-Stoic philosophical commitments on Philo's part but simply the use of a 
widespread ethical topos (cf. A. C. van Geytenbeek, Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe [trans. 
B. L. Hijmans; rev. ed.; WTS 8; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1963], 106: "Like nearly all moralists who 
treat the problem of food, Musonius rejects pleasure as the aim"). Although he sometimes frames 
ethical discourse in ways comparable to Musonius, Philo presupposes a moral psychology quite 
different from Musonius or any other Stoic.    
42 Cf. Leg. 3.147: J@ÃH (D •<"(6"\@4H F4J\@4H 6"Â B@J@ÃH º NbF4H $4V.,J"4 PD−F2"4; 
Ebr. 131: F4J\T< 6"Â B@Jä< 6"Â àB<@L 6"Â BV<JT< ÓF" •<"(6"Ã" J± NbF,4. For Plato’s 
understanding of "necessary desires," see Resp. 558 C – 559 D. 
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So a moral agent who genuinely needs to eat can satisfy both reason and desire 
with a good meal: rational calculation (8@(4F:`H) motivates the eating as a 
logical means of sustaining life and health, while desire (¦B42L:\") motivates the 
eating as a pleasurable experience. Of course, rational calculation (8@(4F:`H) 
may compel the same hungry moral agent to reject a meal despite desire's 
pressing motivation to eat for the sake of pleasure—if, for instance, the meal is 
poisoned or belongs to someone else. But the conflict between reason and 
desire in matters of food more commonly involves the question of eating in 
excess of rational necessity. Having eaten enough to survive in good health, and 
so having no real need to eat, how does the moral agent handle further 
opportunities to eat? At this point, Philo’s moral theory can explain indulgence 
and abstinence in term of •6D"F\" and ¦(6DVJ,4", understanding each as the 
victory of a certain type of motivation. To eat represents a victory of desire over 
reason (•6D"F\"), since the moral agent eats strictly for the sake of pleasure: the 
motivation for pleasure has in effect overpowered the motivation for rational 
benefit, which urges abstinence as the reasonable course. Philo understands 
•6D"F\" along these lines in Mos. 1.160-61, where he attributes a lack of 
¦(6DVJ,4" to those who incite desires, including the desires of the stomach (JH 
("FJDÎH ¦B42L:\"H), beyond necessities (§>T Jä< •<"(6"\T<)—by eating more 
than they need, they eat for pleasure and reflect the predominance of ¦B42L:\" 
122 
 
 
 
as a motivating disposition.43 Conversely, not to eat represents a victory of 
reason over desire (¦(6DVJ,4"), since the moral agent controls the desire for 
food by keeping it within the bounds of rational necessity. Philo equates 
¦(6DVJ,4" with eating (and drinking) according to need, since it involves reason 
motivating the moral agent to indulge desire only to the point of need and no 
further. Commenting on Exodus 23:25b44 Philo writes:  
In this passage, he symbolically indicates nourishment and health (JD@N¬< 6"Â ß(\,4"< "Æ<\JJ,J"4): nourishment through the mention of food and 
water, and health through the expression "turn away weakness" (*4 J@Ø :"8"6\"< •BFJDXN,4<). Second, he represents self-control (¦(6DVJ,4"< ,ÆF0(,ÃJ"4) by talking about the consumption of necessities only (J¬< Jä< •<"(6"\T< :,J@LF\"< :@<`<). (QE 2.18)45 
 
Philo’s identification here of ¦(6DVJ,4" with the indulgence of necessary desire 
enhances the notion of curtailing excess from the chariot figure by further 
characterizing "excessive" as "unnecessary." Conceived in these terms, 
                                            
43 In this passage, Philo contrasts •6D"F\" and ¦(6DVJ,4" (NB §161: @Ê . . . •6DVJ@D,H :,J"$V88@LF4 BDÎH ¦(6DVJ,4"<), associating the former not only with desire §>T Jä< •<"(6"\T<, but also with the enjoyment of pleasure (6"20*LB"2,Ã< [cf. º*bH]); cf. Det. 95: J¬< º*@<¬< •B@*,P`:,2" ¦(6DVJ,4"< BXD"< ÓDT< ¦8"b<@<J,H; Opif. 158: Ò N48Z*@<@H . . . ¦6JD"P084.@bF0H 6"Â ßB@F6,84.@bF0H J−H •6D"F\"H; Somn. 2.48: BDÎH •B`8"LF4< º*@<−H :88@< ´ BDÎH :,J@LF\"< JD@N−H. In Det. 113, Philo associates •6D"F\" with those whose 
desires continue despite a full stomach. With no rational motivation for eating, only a desire for 
pleasure can explain their behavior (cf. Leg. 2.16: B`J,D@< ª<,6" J@Ø •<"(6"\@L :`<@< . . . ´ 6"Â ª<,6" J@Ø •:XJD@L 6"Â B,D4JJ@Ø).  
44 LXX: ,Û8@(ZFT JÎ< –DJ@< F@L 6"Â JÎ à*TD F@L 6"Â •B@FJDXRT :"8"6\"< •Nzß:ä<. 
As Marcus notes (PLCL suppl. 2, 56, n. c), "Philo agrees with Heb. against LXX in omitting ‘and 
wine’ after ‘bread.’" (cf. Petit, 254, n. b).  
45 My translation of Petit’s text of the Greek fragment (Petit, 254). The passage continues 
from the Armenian, "for bread is a plain food without anything extra, and flowing water is (a 
similarly plain) drink, and upon these (depends) health" (trans. Marcus; PLSL suppl. 2, 56). In 
Leg. 3.154, Philo likewise associates the restraint of desire (FL<,FJV82"4 JH ¦B42L:\"H) with 
only necessary indulgence(s) (:`<@4H PD0F`:,2" J@ÃH •<"(6"\@4H, Jä< *¥ B,D4JJä< •N,>`:,2") 
(cf. Mos. 1.28: ("FJD\ J, (D §>T Jä< •<"(6"\T< *"F:ä<, @áH º NbF4H §J">,<, @Û*¥< B8X@< ¦P@DZ(,4). 
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¦(6DVJ,4" works to counteract passionate desire (B8,@<V.@LF" [–:,JD@H] 
¦B42L:\") by consistently enforcing the "measure" urged by reason (necessity) 
over against desire’s persistent urge toward pleasure. In other words, ¦(6DVJ,4" 
eliminates excessive, unnecessary desire and the unnecessary pleasure it 
entails. Philo symbolically interprets the rite of circumcision along these lines: 
They say that circumcision of the skin is a symbol, as if (to show that) it is 
proper to cut off superfluous and excessive desires (JH B,D4JJH 6"Â B8,@<".@bF"H ¦B42L:\"H) by exercising self-control (¦(6DVJ,4"<) . . .. For 
just as the skin of the foreskin is superfluous in procreation . . . so the 
excess of desire is superfluous . . .. It is superfluous because it is not 
necessary . . .. (QG 3.48)  
 
So the moral agent possessed of ¦(6DVJ,4" moderates ¦B42L:\" and avoids 
passion by indulging according to need, curtailing the excess of unnecessary 
indulgence by ensuring the predominance of a motivation to secure rational 
benefit (necessity) over a motivation to secure pleasure. 
Summary 
 Although Philo never offers a direct, extended explanation of ¦(6DVJ,4", 
he nevertheless reveals through incidental remarks a substantive concept of 
¦(6DVJ,4" framed along three distinct but complementary lines. First, ¦(6DVJ,4" 
involves a power dynamic of rational over non-rational forces, understood either 
broadly as 8`(@H defeating any challenge from elsewhere in the soul, or narrowly 
as 8`(@H defeating ¦B42L:\". Second, ¦(6DVJ,4" involves the curtailing of 
excessive impulse. Finally, ¦(6DVJ,4" involves the predominance of rational 
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motivation over against a non-rational urge toward pleasure. But how, in Philo’s 
view, does the moral agent acquire ¦(6DVJ,4"? 
THE ACQUISITION OF z+(6DVJ,4" 
  
Because ¦(6DVJ,4" involves the control of non-rational forces, the means 
of acquiring it have a correspondingly non-rational character, insofar as they do 
not involve the formulation or deployment of rational argument. Without a 
capacity for reason, ¦B42L:\" simply cannot accept or reject a moral agent’s 
reasoned guidance. Instead, the moral agent must manage ¦B42L:\" through the 
application of force—just as the charioteer does not reason with an unruly team 
(he cannot), but simply acts to bring it into submission. In other words, ¦(6DVJ,4" 
comes from doing, not thinking: the moral agent becomes good at controlling 
¦B42L:\" only by exerting or practicing control, not by theoretical reflection.46 
Philo’s philosophical contemporaries considered the importance of practice in 
moral development under the conceptual rubric of –F60F4H.47 Although the term 
                                            
46 Philo clearly distinguishes between theoretical and practical virtue: e.g., Leg. 1.57: º *¥ •D,J¬ 6"Â 2,TD0J46Z ¦FJ4 6"Â BD"6J46Z; Congr. 46: º (D –<,L BDV>,TH 2,TD\" R48¬ BDÎH @Û*¥< ÐN,8@H J@ÃH ¦B4FJZ:@F4<.  
47 As noted earlier (16, n. 45), the term –F60F4H in Philo’s usage has little to do with 
modern terms such as "ascetic" or "asceticism," whose connotations derive mostly from Christian 
monasticism. The Greek term has no intrinsic association with religious practice (see Dressler, 
Use of z!F6XT). For use the term in Middle Platonism, see, for example, Didask. 24.4 [177.14-
15]: J@Ø :¥< [8@(4FJ46@Ø] *4 *4*"F6"8\"H, J@Ø *¥ [B"20J46@Ø] *4 J−H J@Ø §2@LH •F6ZF,TH;(cf. 
30.3 [184.1-2]: ¦> §2@LH ¦((4<`:,<"4 6"Â •F6ZF,TH); Plutarch, Garr. 510 C: Jä< (D B"2ä< 6D\F,4 6"Â •F6ZF,4 B,D4(4<`:,2"; Eclog. 37.18 – 38.1: z/246Z ¦FJ4 *b<":4H RLP−H, *4z½H •F602,\F0H 6"8äH º BD"6J46¬ 6"J"F6,LV.,J"4 •D,JZ. For the concept in contemporary 
Stoicism, see, for example, Musonius Rufus, "On Training" (AXD4 •F6ZF,TH) (see also Richard 
Valantasis, "Musonius Rufus and Roman Ascetical Theory," GRBS 40 [1999]: 207-31; cf. B. L. 
Hijmans,}!G5/G3G: Notes on Epictetus’ Educational System [WTS 2; Assen: Von Gorcum, 
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appears nowhere in the Pentateuch, Philo has much to say about –F60F4H, 
because he believes that Moses considered the topic allegorically under the 
figure of Jacob. 
z+(6DVJ,4" through }!F60F4H 
Philo’s view of Jacob fits into a broader interpretive scheme involving the 
three patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who each represent a different way 
of acquiring virtue: through instruction (:V20F4H), nature (NbF4H), and practice 
(–F60F4H) respectively: 
For the holy word seems to be searching into the types of souls (JD`B@LH RLP−H), all of them of high worth, one which pursues the good through 
teaching (¦6 *4*"F6"8\"H), one through nature (¦6 NbF,TH) and one 
through practice (¦6 •F6ZF,TH). The first called Abraham, the second 
Isaac and the third Jacob, are symbols of virtue (Fb:$@8["] . . . •D,J−H) 
acquired respectively by teaching (*4*"F6"846−H), nature (NLF46−H) and 
practice (•F60J46−H). (Abr. 52)48 
 
 Although Philo ostensibly discovers this threefold scheme through allegorical 
exegesis of the Pentateuch, the notion of virtue accruing by nature, instruction, 
and practice comes from Greek philosophy, appearing in systematic formulation 
at least as early as Aristotle and gaining later acceptance among Philo’s 
philosophical contemporaries, including his fellow Middle Platonists.49 Philo’s 
                                                                                                                                  
1959]). For the concept in Cynic philosophy, see Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, L’ascèse cynique: un 
commentaire de Diogène Laërce VI 70-71 (2d ed.; Paris: J. Vrin, 2001). 
48 Cf. Mut. 12; Ios. 1; Mos. 1.76. 
49 Diogenes Laertius (5.18), attributes the formulation to Aristotle: "Three things he 
declared to be indispensable for education: natural endowment (NbF,TH), study (:"2ZF,TH), and 
constant practice (•F6ZF,TH)" (trans. R. D. Hicks). Noting the tripartite method in Didask. 28.4 
[182.3-6], Dillon writes (also citing Abr. 52-54) that "it is thus likely to be the basic Middle-Platonic 
doctrine" (xxiii) (cf. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 66-68). For the doctrine among contemporary 
Stoics, see Geytenbeek, Musonius Rufus, 28-29. 
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reason for choosing Jacob as the model of practice (–F60F4H) derives mainly 
from the patriarch’s wrestling match at the ford of the Jabbok (Gen 32:22-32).50 
Since wrestling plays a definitive role in the life of Jacob, Philo makes it an 
essential attribute of the type of soul Moses represents through the story of 
Jacob. Wrestlers are athletes, and in the athletic discourse of antiquity "–F60F4H" 
refers to the practice (i.e., exercise, training) that every athlete—wrestler or not—
must undergo to achieve excellence. And the discourse of –F60F4H belongs to an 
even larger stock of athletic imagery and terminology deployed in connection with 
the Jacob soul: an "agon motif" that suits Philo’s allegorical method well because 
it operates on two levels.51 Literally, the agon motif speaks of an athlete’s 
                                            
50 Gen 32:25: ¦BV8"4,< –<2DTB@H :,Jz[3"6T$] ªTH BDT\; Gen 32:26: ¦< Jè B"8"\,4< "ÛJÎ< :,Jz"ÛJ@Ø. For Philo, the etymological tale of Jacob’s "heel grabbing" (Gen 25:26: esp. º P,ÂD "Û@Ø ¦B,480::X<0 J−H BJXD<0H /F"L) illustrates his skill as a wrestler, who grabs the heel 
to trip up and overthrow an opponent (e.g., Leg. 3.190; cf. Leg. 3.18, 93; Sacr. 42). On Philo's 
portrait of Jacob in terms of ancient wrestling, see Harris, Greek Athletics, 68-71. On Philo’s 
understanding of Jacob more broadly, see Petra von Gemünden, "La figure de Jacob à l’époque 
hellénistico-romaine: l'example de Philon d'Alexandrie," in Jacob: commentaire à plusieurs voix 
de Gen 25-36 : mélanges offerts à Albert de Pury (ed. Jean-Daniel Macchi and Thomas Römer; 
MdB 44;  Genève: Labor et Fides, 2001), 358-70; C. T. R. Hayward, "Philo, the Septuagint of 
Genesis 32:24-32 and the Name ‘Israel’: Fighting the Passions, Inspiration and the Vision of 
God," JJS 51 (2000): 209-226; Michael Poliakoff, "Jacob, Job, and Other Wrestlers: Reception of 
Greek Athletics by Jews and Christians in Antiquity," JSH 11 (1984): 48-65, esp. 63-65; Mark 
Sheridan, "Jacob and Israel: a Contribution to the History of an Interpretation," in Mysterium 
Christi: Symbolgegenwart und theologische Bedeutung (ed. M. Löhrer and Elmar Salmann; SA 
116; Rome: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 1995), 219-42.  
51 On the agon motif in Philo, see esp. Martin Brändl, Der Agon bei Paulus: Herkunft und 
Profil paulinischer Agonmetaphorik (WUNT 222; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 85-115 [="Die 
Agon-Metaphorik bei Philo von Alexandrien"]. On Philo’s knowledge of agon terminology, Brändl 
notes: "Dabei handelt es sich nicht nur um das gängige agonistische Wortfeld, sondern auch um 
detaillierte Einzelheiten und zahlreiche termini technici" (87). As examples of "das gängige 
agonistische Wortfeld," Brändl lists: "•(T<\.,F2"4, •28,Ã<, •8,\N,4<, •F6,Ã<, $D"$,b,4<, (L:<V.,4<, 60DbFF,4<, 6@<4@ØF2"4, B"<6D"J4V.,F2"4, B"8"\,4<, B,<J",J0D\H, B`<@H, BL6J,b,4<, FJ"*4,b,4<, FJ,N"<@Ø<, JDXP,4< mit ihren Derivaten und Komposita" (87, n. 39). On 
Philo’s agon motif, see also Uta Poplutz, Athlet des Evangeliums: Eine motivgeschichtliche 
Studie zur Wettkampfmetaphorik bei Paulus (HBS 43; Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2004), 174-
201 [="Die Agonmetaphorik im hellenistischen Judentum: Philo von Alexandrien"]; Victor C. 
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struggle to train in pursuit of tangible prizes. But figuratively, the motif speaks of 
the soul’s struggle to train in pursuit of intangible—yet more valuable—prizes, 
especially virtue. While –F60F4H can in theory yield a number of virtues, Philo 
sees it primarily as a means of acquiring ¦(6DVJ,4".52 He thematically highlights 
¦(6DVJ,4" as a prominent goal of the Jacob soul by characterizing its struggle as 
a contest with non-rational forces—a wrestling match against emotion (BV2@H).53 
 While the patriarch Jacob played the athlete by literally wrestling with a 
physical opponent, the Jacob soul—the soul possessed of Jacob’s athletic 
qualities—takes its practice (–F60F4H) by figuratively wrestling with an intangible 
                                                                                                                                  
Pfitzner, Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature (NovTSup 
16; Leiden: Brill, 1967), 38-48 [="Hellenistic Judaism and the Agon Tradition: Philo"]. 
52 When Philo lists the elements of –F60F4H, he mentions only the virtue of ¦(6DVJ,4": 
Leg. 3.18: :XD0 J−H •F6ZF,TH = •<"(<fF,4H, :,8XJ"4, 2,D"B,Ã"4, Jä< 6"8ä< :<−:"4, ¦(6DVJ,4", Jä< 6206`<JT< ¦<XD(,4"4; Her. 253: BV<J" (D J J−H •F6ZF,TH = º .ZJ0F4H, º F6XR4H, º •<V(<TF4H, º •6D`"F4H, º BD@F@PZ, º ¦(6DVJ,4", º ¦>"*4"ND0F4H Jä< •*4"N`DT<.  
53 Cf. Völker, Fortschritt und Vollendung, 126-37 [="Der kamf gegen die BV20"], esp. 129-
30: "Daneben fordert Philo eine willensmäßige Anspannung, um die BV20 zu überwinden, ein 
systematsiches Sich-Üben in der ¦(6DVJ,4"." Although a prominent goal, ¦(6DVJ,4" clearly does 
not represent for Philo the ultimate goal of the Jacob soul. Philo translates "Israel" as "seeing 
God" (Conf. 51: z3FD"¬8 (D ÒDä< 2,Î< ©D:0<,b,J"4; cf. Ebr. 82: ÓD"F4< (D 2,@Ø :0<b,4 J@Ü<@:"; on the etymology see Grabbe, Etymology, 172-73), so the Jacob soul must become 
"Israel" and obtain a vision of God to achieve its final end. This ultimate emphasis on seeing 
God—representing detachment from the sensible world in favor of the intelligible—gives Philo’s 
understanding of Jacob, and thus his concept of –F60F4H, an overarching Platonic framework 
(see esp. Praem. 36-40; cf. Migr. 214; Somn. 1.46; on the Platonic nature of such a vision, see 
David Bradshaw, "The Vision of God in Philo of Alexandria," ACPQ 72 [1998]: 483-500; Frederick 
E. Brenk, "Darkly Beyond the Glass: Middle Platonism and the Vision of the Soul," in Platonism in 
Late Antiquity [ed. Stephen Gersh and Charles Kannengiesser; CJA 8; Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1992], 39-60; cf. Irl Goldwin Whitchurch, The Philosophical 
Bases of Asceticism in the Platonic Writings and in Pre-Platonic Tradition [CSP 14; New York: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1923]; Sarah J.K. Pearce, The Land of the Body: Studies in Philo's 
Representation of Egypt [WUNT 208; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007], 30-33 [="Migration and 
Allegory"]). So despite his identification of Cynic elements in Philo’s concept of –F60F4H, Émile 
Bréhier's suggestion that it derives entirely from Cynicism must be rejected (Idées philosophiques 
et religieuses, 261: "L'on ne saurait réduire toute la morale philonienne au cynisme . . . nous 
allons essayer de montrer que tout son ascétisme en provient" [emphasis added]; see 261-71 
[="Le cynisme et l'ascétisme"]). 
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yet dangerously real opponent, the emotions (BV20).54 Philo’s vision of the moral 
agent grappling with, and so struggling against, the emotions reflects above all 
the division of soul presumed in Middle-Platonic moral psychology, where BV2@H 
has an independent existence over against the rational faculty. The Jacob soul, 
in other words, contends with distinct, non-rational BV20—but how and to what 
end? Philo clearly depicts the Jacob soul engaged in a contest of power whose 
outcome rests solely on the relative strength of opponents: the moral agent, 
exemplified by reason (8`(@H), either is or is not stronger than emotion, and so 
either will or will not succeed in forcibly controlling it.55 And the Jacob soul clearly 
does, in Philo’s view, wrestle for control of the emotions, not their elimination or 
absolute suppression. Specifically, the Jacob soul seeks to moderate emotion 
and keep it from overstepping the limits or bounds set by reason in a given 
circumstance.56 In Philo’s view, the historical patriarch Abraham exhibits this type 
of soul, as he "wrestles" with the emotion of grief at the loss of Sarah and rightly 
aims for :,JD4@B"2,Ã< (Abr. 257): 
                                            
54 E.g., Leg. 3.93: Ò BJ,D<4FJ¬H Jä< B"2ä< 6"Â •F60J¬H •D,J−H z3"6f$; Sobr. 65: Ò J¬< BDÎH BV20 BV80< (,(L:<"F:X<@H z3"6f$ (cf. Leg. 3.190; Sacr. 17; QG 4.163). 
55 E.g., Leg. 3.18: Ò •F60J¬H @Þ<z3"6ã$ <@ØH, ÓJ, :¥< ÒD” J"B,4<Î< JÎ BV2@H, B,D4:X<,4 8@(4.`:,<@H "ÛJÎ <46ZF,4< 6"J 6DVJ@H; Mut. 85: Ò *z•F60J¬H 6"Â JÎ ©6@bF4@< §PT< "ÛJÎ :`<@<  6"Â J@ØJ@ (L:<V.T< 6"Â FL(6D@Jä<, Ë<" JÎ @Æ6,Ã@< BV2@H Jè (,<0Jè 6"J"$V8®. 
56 In general, Philo suggests a necessary correlation between :,JD4@BV2,4" and –F60F4H as characteristics of a moral agent occupying a lower stage of ethical development (i.e., 
making progress [BD@6`BJT<] toward perfection): e.g., Leg. 3.132: Ó (, BD@6`BJT< *,bJ,D@H ë< z!"Dã< :,JD4@BV2,4"< . . . •F6,Ã; Det. 65: º :¥< @Þ< –F60F4H :XF@<, @Û JX8,4@<; Post. 78: J@ÃH :¥< (D •F60J"ÃH BD@6`BJ@LF4 6"Â $,8J4@L:X<@4H. z+(6DVJ,4" fits into this nexus, insofar as it 
always involves conflict and thus always denotes a measure of imperfection on the part of the 
moral agent, who has failed at some level to settle the issue of who—or what—shall rule the soul. 
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[W]hen grief was making itself ready to wrestle with his soul (J−H 8bB0H ¦B"B@*L@:X<0H ³*0 6"Â 6"J J−H RLP−H 6@<4@:X<0H), he grappled with it, 
as in the arena, and prevailed (òFB,D •280J¬H ¦B,6DVJ0F,). He gave 
strength and high courage to the natural antagonist of emotion, reason 
(JÎ< •<J\B"8@< NbF,4 Jä< B"2ä< 8@(4F:`<), which he had taken as his 
counselor throughout his life and now particularly was determined to obey. 
(Abr. 256)57 
 
Philo’s conception of what the ascetic soul achieves in grappling with the 
emotions mirrors the Middle-Platonic theory of "passion" sketched elsewhere in 
his writings. Benign emotions become malignant "passions" by becoming 
"immoderate" (–:,JD@H), so the Jacob soul targets any expression of emotion in 
excess of the measure (:XJD@<) set by reason, "wrestling" it down into a more 
appropriate form. 58  Allegorically interpreting the "numbing of the broad part" 
(B8VJ@LH <VD60)59 as a "prize" ($D"$,Ã@<) awarded to Jacob the "practiser" (Ò 
•F60JZH) after his wrestling match, Philo writes: 
[N]othing is so profitable (Fb:N@D@<) as that the laxity and free play of the 
impulses (JÎ 6,P"8"F:X<@< 6"Â •<,4:X<@< Jä< ÒD:ä<) should be 
hampered and numbed (•<"6@B−<"\ J, 6"Â <"D6−F"4) with their vitalizing 
forces paralyzed so that the inordinate strength of the emotions may be 
exhausted (Ë<zº Jä< B"2ä< –:,JD@H ÆFP×H ¦>"F2,<ZF"F") and thus 
provide a breadth in which the better part of the soul may expand (B8VJ@H ¦:B"DVFP® RLP−H Jè $,8J\@<4 :XD,4). (Praem. 48)60 
 
                                            
57 Substituting "grief" for Colson’s "sorrow," and "emotion" for "passion." 
58 Note also in Abr. 257 Philo’s characterization of :,JD4@B"2,Ã< as :ZJ, B8X@< J@Ø :,JD\@L FN"*’.,4<. 
59 Gen 32:26: ¦<VD60F,< JÎ B8VJ@H J@Ø :0D@Ø 3"6T$ ¦< Jè B"8"\,4< "ÛJÎ< :,Jz"ÛJ@Ø. 
60 Substituting "impulses" for Colson’s "appetites"; "emotions" for "passions"; "paralyzed" 
for "paralysed." On 6,P"8"F:X<@<, see Philo’s interpretation of "girding the loins" (ÏFNØH B,D4,.äF2"4) which likewise speaks of moderating emotion (e.g., Leg. 3.153-54: •<,.äF2"4 (D $@b8,J"4 º:H J BV20, •88 :¬ •<,4:X<" 6"Â 6,P"8"F:X<" N@D,Ã<; cf. Leg.  2:28: ¦BÂ J@Ø BV2@LH, Ô •<,.äF2"4 PD¬ 6"Â :¬ ¦< 6,P"8VF2"4 6"Â •<,ÃF2"4). 
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Since curtailing excess stands in Philo’s mind as one aspect of ¦(6DVJ,4", he 
characterizes here the laborious wrestling of the Jacob soul as the practice 
(–F60F4H) of ¦(6DVJ,4".61 Speaking allegorically of "Jacob," Philo elsewhere 
notes: 
[The Man of Practice (Ò •F60JZH)] . . . wrestles with the emotions (BDÎH J BV20 B"8"\T<) and . . . goes into training to gain self-control (BDÎH ¦(6DVJ,4"< •8,4N`:,<@H) . . .. (Congr. 31)62 
 
Insofar as he identifies the emotions generically as the wrestling opponent of the 
Jacob soul, Philo brings a broad formulation of ¦(6DVJ,4" ("rational" over "non-
rational") to his consideration of –F60F4H. But the emotions obviously include 
¦B42L:\", and the narrow formulation of ¦(6DVJ,4" singles it out as the principal 
antagonist of reason. When Philo considers the specific types of practice needed 
to acquire ¦(6DVJ,4", he tends to have this narrow formulation—with its 
emphasis on ¦B42L:\"—in mind. 
z+(6DVJ,4" through Ascetic Precepts 
 
 Based on his understanding of what Jacob represents, Philo sees the 
acquisition of ¦(6DVJ,4" as a matter of practice (–F60F4H): strenuous, active 
engagement with an opponent (¦B42L:\"), in a contest of power that builds 
strength and skill. But exactly what sort of practice endows the moral agent with 
¦(6DVJ,4"? What sorts of exercises make for good training? In general, Philo 
                                            
 61 Cf. Praem. 100: ¦(6DVJ,4"< •F6ZF"<J,H; Hypoth. 7.11: BDÎH •F6ZF,TH . . . ¦(6D"J,\"H; Hypoth. 11.14: •F6,Ã< ¦(6DVJ,4"<. 
62 Substituting "emotions" for Colson’s "passions." 
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believes that the Law of Moses promotes virtue among its adherents.63 But he 
also believes that Moses designed specific laws to promote specific virtues, 
including ¦(6DVJ,4".64 In other words, Moses had a clear grasp of the activities 
of soul capable of effecting ¦(6DVJ,4", and—like a good trainer—he prescribed 
those activities through specific laws.65 Apart from any religious significance, 
such precepts have great philosophical significance, because their formulation 
reflects principles of moral psychology and –F60F4H derived from Philo’s 
philosophical milieu.66 To coin a term, they are "ascetic precepts," and they 
                                            
63 Esp. Spec. 4.179: <`:@4H ¦>"4DXJ@4H PDT:X<åq F,:<@Â *z,ÆFÂ< ¦> •<V(60H, J, BDÎH J¬< –6D"< •D,J¬< •8,\N@<J,H; cf. Mos. 2.10-11. See Wolfson, Philo, 2:200-225 
[="Commandments and Virtues"] (cf. John W. Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria 
on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law [AMMTC; SPhAMA 2; Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 
2003], 95-99 [="The Law of Moses"]; André Myre, "La loi de la nature et la loi mosaïque selon 
Philon d’Alexandrie," ScEs 28 (1976): 163-81, esp. 167-71 [="La loi mosaïque et la loi morale"]; 
Michael Satlow, "Philo on Human Perfection," JTS 59 [2008]: 500-519, 517-18; ). For a 
consideration of the role of Torah in ethical training in ancient rabbinic Judaism, see Jonathan 
Wyn Schofer, The Making of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2005), esp. 84-115 [="The Heart and Its Formation"]. 
64 E.g., Spec. 2.163: ßN0(ZF,F4 <`:T< 2,\T<, @Ì JVH J, ("FJDÎH º*@<H 6"Â ßB@("FJD\@LH §FJ,48"< . . . 6"Â JH J−H RLP−H •6D\J@LH 6"Â B8,@<".@bF"H ÒD:H •<X6@R"< 6"Â •<,P"\J4F"<. On the valorization of ¦(6DVJ,4" among Philo’s contemporaries as a context for his 
own emphasis on ¦(6DVJ,4" in regard to the Tenth Commandment (and dietary laws), see 
Stowers, Romans, 46-56; also Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity, 75-110 [= "Jewish Values: 
Religion and Self-Restraint"]; cf. Long, "Ethics and Power." 
65 In Philo’s view, Moses could formulate helpful exercises in ¦(6DVJ,4" because he 
himself had mastered desire: "When [Moses] was now passing beyond the term of boyhood, his 
good sense became more active. He did not, as some, allow the lusts of adolescence to go 
unbridled (@ÛP ñH §<4@4 JH :,D"64f*,4H ¦B42L:\"H •P"84<fJ@LH ¦ä<), though the abundant 
resources which palaces provide supply numberless incentives to foster their flame. But he kept a 
tight hold on them with the reins, as it were, of temperance and self-control (FTND@Fb<® 6"Â 6"DJ,D\‘ òFB,D J4FÂ< º<\"4H ¦<*0FV:,<@H "ÛJVH), and forcibly pulled them back from their 
forward course (J¬< ,ÆH JÎ BD`FT N@D< •<,P"\J4., $\‘). (Mos. 2.25-26). On Philo's view of 
Moses, see Hywel Clifford, "Moses as Philosopher-Sage in Philo," in Moses in Biblical and Extra-
Biblical Traditions (ed. Axel Graupner and Michael Wolter; BZAW 372; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007), 
151-67;  
66 These Mosaic philosophical exercises fit the definition of "sittliches Exerzitium" (also 
"sittliche Übung"), the term Paul Rabbow offers to describe a type of methodical practice popular 
among philosophers of the early Roman Era: "a particular exertion, a calculated act of self-
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signal Philo’s attempt to understand Mosaic legislation in light of contemporary 
Middle-Platonic ethical concerns.67 Although Philo casts a number of laws as 
exercises in ¦(6DVJ,4" (ascetic precepts), he never couples an individual law 
with a complete explanation of how it works. But considering his remarks on 
several such laws provides enough material to create an adequate concept of the 
ascetic precept. 
 In the law regarding a year of Sabbath rest for the land (Lev 25:2-7; Exod 
23:10-11), the law regarding fasting on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:29-31; 
                                                                                                                                  
influence, carried out with the express purpose of achieving a specific ethical effect; it always 
transcends itself, insofar is it is either repeated or forms part of a larger network of acts designed 
for the same purpose" (my translation of Paul Rabbow, Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in 
der Antike [München: Kösel, 1954], 18).  
67 In general, research into Philo’s theory of –F60F4H has overlooked the place of Mosaic 
legislation within that theory. Studies of Philo that deal directly with –F60F4H but do not consider 
the ascetic function of precepts include Bréhier, Idées philosophiques et religieuses, 261-71 [="Le 
cynisme et l'ascétisme"] ; Völker, Fortschritt und Vollendung, 198-239 [="Die –F60F4H als Weg 
zur Vollkommenheit"]; and Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," esp. 405-14 [="Asceticism"]. 
Similarly, David Charles Aune, "Mastery of the Passions," while he intends in part to "illustrate 
Philo's . . . ascetic program" (128), does not consider the role of precepts. Siegfried, Philo, does 
speak of "das mosaische Gesetz als das zweckmässigste Anleitungsmittel für . . . sittlichen 
Uebungen" (257) in the context of Philo’s theory of –F60F4H (Uebung), but he does not explore 
the precept-–F60F4H connection in depth (cf. 21 [on 4 Macc]: "durch die Uebung des Gesetzes . . 
. diese vier Tugenden Entstehen"). In their study of Jacob as Philo's allegorical paradigm of –F60F4H, Hayward ("Philo and the Name ‘Israel’") and Sheridan ("Jacob and Israel") also overlook 
the role of precepts within that paradigm. Steven Fraade notes the role of precepts in his 
"Ascetical Aspects of Ancient Judaism" (in Jewish Spirituality [ed. Arthur Green; New York: 
Crossroad, 1986], 253-88, 265: "Such strength is only gradually achieved with the help of the 
commandments of the Torah, which are often interpreted by Philo as exercises intended to 
strengthen the soul by repeatedly accustoming it to abstinence from and moderation of desires 
for food, drink, sex, etc." But Fraade does not explore the precept-–F60F4H connection in depth, 
or from the standpoint of moral psychology. There are also important treatments of –F60F4H per 
se that mention Philo yet fail to consider ascetic precepts (e.g., Bernhard Lohse, Askese und 
Mönchtum in der Antike und in der alten Kirche [RKAM; ed. Carsten Colpe and Heinrich Dörrie; 
Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1969], 102-10). Pierre Hadot, "Spiritual Exercises," provides 
an excellent survey of therapeutic exercises in Greco-Roman philosophy, including Philo. He 
cites Philo's general lists of what constitutes –F60F4H (Her. 253, Leg. 3.18) (84) but nowhere 
mentions Mosaic precepts, which are for Philo just the sort of therapeutic exercises Hadot seems 
to have in mind. 
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Num 29:7-11), and the law regarding marrying female prisoners of war (Deut 
21:10-13), Philo recognizes deliberate efforts on Moses’ part to promote 
¦(6DVJ,4" through –F60F4H.68 First of all, Moses understood that the dominance 
of 8`(@H over ¦B42L:\" can involve either the complete suppression of desire (no 
indulgence) or simply the constraint of desire within certain limits (moderate 
indulgence). In either case, the moral agent controls desire and effectively 
exercises a capacity for ¦(6DVJ,4". The law of Sabbath rest, for example, calls 
for a moderate indulgence of ¦B42L:\", because it prohibits farmers from working 
their land every seventh year. By enjoining the deliberate forgoing of potential 
gain (6XD*@H), this law trains its adherents not only to bear unexpected 
deprivation (§<*,4") but also to keep their desires within moderate bounds.69  In 
Philo’s view, the command targets B8,@<,>\", a form of excessive desire.70 
Speaking of those who do not observe the law of Sabbath rest, Philo writes: 
                                            
68 On the law of Sabbath rest, see esp. Spec. 2.86-109, Spec. 4.212-18, and Praem. 153-
56 (cf. Hypoth. 7.15-18). On fasting, see esp. Spec. 1.186-88 (cf. Spec. 1.192-93; Mos. 2.23-24) 
and Spec. 2.193-203 (esp. §195). On female prisoners of war, see Virt. 110-13. Philo himself 
seems to acknowledge the barbaric setting of a law treating women as spoils of war subject to 
nonconsensual marriage. He takes an apologetic tack, including this law in his discussion of 
Mosaic humanity (N48"<2DTB\") and highlighting the kindness it enjoins (NB Virt. 110: :¬ ñH "ÆP:"8fJå, N0F\<, ¦<"B,Db(®H JÎ BV2@H, •88zº:,DfJ,D@< @Æ6J4FV:,<@H J−H :,J"$@8−H ¦B46@bN4F@< J¬< FL:N@DV<, :,2"D:@FV:,<@H BV<J" BDÎH JÎ $X8J4@<; Virt. 114: ¦8,,Ã J¬< "ÆP:V8TJ@<). Unlike the laws of Sabbath rest and fasting, which had practical application in 
Philo’s day, the law regarding marrying female prisoners of war presumably had only a theoretical 
interest for Philo. 
69 On training for unexpected hardship, see Spec. 2.87-88, where Philo makes the 
ascetic function of this precept explicit: 6"8@ÃH ¦<"F6@b:,<@4 <@:\:@4H (§88). Philo’s explanation 
of how this precept works to moderate desire comes in Spec. 4.212-18, as part of an explication 
of the law against sowing two kinds of seed (Lev 19:19; Deut 22:9), to which Philo attributes the 
same ascetic function (see esp. Spec. 4.215-18).  
70 Cf. B8,@<X6J0H (= Ò B8X@< §PT<) (see LSJ s.v.). On B8,@<,>\" and excessive desire, 
see Spec. 4.5: J@ÃH @ÞF4< @Û6 •D6@b:,<@H B,D4JJ@JXDT< ÏDX(,J"4, B8,@<,>\"<, ¦B\$@L8@< 6"Â 
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They have burdened the fields by continually pursuing unjust gains based 
on greedy cravings (•,Â 6XD*0 :,J"*4f6@<J,H ¦6 B8,@<,>4ä< –*46"), 
adding to otherwise reasonable desires (J"ÃH ¦B42L:\"4H ¦B4FJV<J,H) 
unbridled and unjust impulses incapable of fulfillment (•P"8\<@LH 6"Â •*\6@LH ÒD:H ,ÆH JÎ •6`D,FJ@<). (Praem. 154)71 
 
Philo clarifies here the nature of B8,@<,>\"4 as excessive desires in terms of 
Middle-Platonic theory. The ¦B42L:\"4 he names represent the unobjectionable 
emotion desire, whose otherwise benign impulse becomes malignant with the 
addition (¦B4FJV<J,H) of excessive impulse. In other words, the •P"8\<@LH 6"Â 
•*\6@LH ÒD:VH correspond to the B8,@<V.@LF" (–:,JD@H) ÒD:Z of Middle-
Platonic theory, the quantitative excess constituting passion. To observe the law, 
farmers need not deny their reasonable desire for produce; they exercise 
¦(6DVJ,4" and curtail their desire within limits prescribed by Moses.72 Outright 
denial—at least for a time—figures in the laws of fasting on the Day of 
Atonement and marrying female prisoners of war. Here reason cedes nothing to 
¦B42L:\", compelling it to wait for a fixed interval of time deprived of the pleasure 
it seeks. The fast, for example, involves one day of "bridling impulses for 
                                                                                                                                  *LF\"J@< BV2@H, ¦B4J,4P\.T<; also Spec. 4.129: "Ê (D –("< B8,@<,>\"4 :XJD@< @Û6 §P@LF4 (cf. 
Spec. 1.270, Virt. 100). 
71 My translation. The phrase J"ÃH ¦B42L:\"4H ¦B4FJV<J,H •P"8\<@LH 6"Â •*\6@LH ÒD:H ,ÆH JÎ •6`D,FJ@< has caused some difficulty (e.g., PLCL 8, 411, n. d), but it makes sense in light 
of a Middle-Platonic concept of passion, without Cohn’s emendation of present (¦N4FJV<J,H) for 
the manuscript aorist (¦B4FJV<J,H). 
72 In Spec. 4.217, Philo compares violators of the law of Sabbath rest to those who BD@F"<"DD0(<×H JH •*\6@LH ¦B42L:\"H "ßJ@Ø, :XJD@4H "ÛJH :¬ B,D4@D\.T< (cf. Cher. 33: :XJD" J"ÃH ¦B42L:\"4H B,D42,Ã<"4).  
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pleasure" (Spec. 1.193: ¦B4FJ@:\.@<J"H JH ¦Nzº*@<¬< ÒD:VH).73 The marriage 
law involves thirty days of postponing consummation, reflecting Moses’ 
unwillingness to "let desire get swept away in unbridled disobedience" (Virt. 113: 
@Û6 ,Ç"F,< •PV84<@< NXD,F2"4 J¬< ¦B42L:\"< •B"LP,<\.@LF"<).74 In either 
case, Moses has designed an effective exercise in ¦(6DVJ,4", since obedience 
requires a stark denial of desire on reason’s part. Like the moderation enjoined 
by the law of Sabbath rest, the abstinence enjoined by these laws of fasting and 
marriage strengthen the capacity of 8`(@H to subjugate ¦B42L:\", which in turn 
promotes self-control in contexts beyond those contrived by Moses. 
 In fact, the ascetic value of these laws hinges on their not being ends in 
themselves, since training exercises necessarily serve as a means for cultivating 
broader proficiencies. In other words, Philo admires Moses’ ascetic precepts not 
so much for the successful instances of ¦(6DVJ,4" they enjoin as for the 
successful life of  ¦(6DVJ,4" they collectively promote. The moral capacities 
derived from observing particular commands transfer broadly to analogous 
situations Moses never addressed, so those trained by Mosaic legislation can 
operate apart from law as free moral agents possessed of ¦(6DVJ,4". Philo 
illustrates this principle of transference in Spec. 4.218, where he praises the law 
                                            
73 JH ¦Nzº*@<¬< ÒD:VH = ¦B42L:\"H, in accordance with Platonic theory. Philo contrasts 
this restraint with the incitements to desire characteristic of pagan holidays (e.g., Spec. 1.192: JH ("FJDÎH •6@DXFJ@LH ¦B42L:\"H ¦(,\D@LF"4; Spec. 2.193: *4zêJT< ¦(,\D,4 JH •6"2X6J@LH ¦B42L:\"H). 
74 Cf. Virt. 113: 8@(4F:ÎH (D B,*ZF,4 J¬< ¦B42L:\"< @Û*¥< ß$D4FJ46Î< ¦VF"H "ÛJ¬< ¦>,D(VF"F2"4, •88 J¬< :0<4"\"< BD@2,F:\"< ¦B4FP,Ã<.  
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of Sabbath rest for the land as one of two precepts—along with the law against 
planting two types of seed in a vineyard (Deut 22:9; cf. Lev 19:19)—designed to 
restrain "by extension" (:"6D`2,<) the madness of greedy cravings (B8,@<,>4ä< 
J¬< 8bFF"<) aimed at people (¦Bz•<2DfB@4H) rather than plants:75 
For he who as a commoner has learned to shun unjust gains (6XD*@H –*46@<) in the treatment of his plants will, if he becomes a king with 
greater matters in his charge (8"$`:,<@H :,4.`<T< BD"(:VJT<), follow 
his acquired habit (Jè §2,4) when he comes to deal with men and also 
women. He will not exact a double tribute nor wring the life out of his 
subjects with his imposts (*"F:@ÃH). For long familiar habit (JÎ Fb<JD@N@< §2@H) has the power to soften harsh temperaments and in a sense to tutor 
and mould them to better forms (BDÎH $,8J\@<"H JbB@LH). (Spec. 4.218) 
 
Through the repeated practice (–F60F4H) of Moses’ agricultural laws, the moral 
agent develops a "habit" (§2@H) of successfully dealing with desire.76 Since 
¦(6DVJ,4" per se stands as the ultimate goal, the original context of the precept 
has little significance, except that it stages a contest of power between 8`(@H and 
¦B42L:\" whose result is the moral habit of moderating desire. Once acquired 
                                            
75 For this use of :"6D`2,<, see also Spec. 4.104: :"6D`2,< •<,ÃD>"4 $@L8`:,<@H J¬< ¦BÂ J 8,P2X<J" ÒD:Z<.  For the language of restraint Philo uses in Spec. 4.218 to describe the 
function of these laws (•<,\D(@LF4 6"Â •<"6`BJ@LF4<), see also Decal. 173 (BX:BJ@< *¥ JÎ •<,ÃD(@< J¬< Jä< •*460:VJT< B0(Z<, ¦B42L:\"<) and Spec. 2.163 (JH J−H RLP−H •6D\J@LH 6"Â B8,@<".@bF"H ÒD:H •<X6@R"<), which also speak of the function of law. 
76 Aristotle clearly articulated a theory of the role played by §2@H in the acquisition of 
moral virtue (e.g., Eth. nic. 1103 a 17-18: º *z²246¬ ¦> §2@LH B,D4(\<,J"4; cf. Nancy Sherman, 
"The Habituation of Character," in Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays [ed. Nancy Sherman; CEC; 
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999], 231-60). In Middle-Platonic moral theory, the concepts 
of –F60F4H and §2@H bear a close relation, since both involve a process of training non-rational 
elements of the soul to obey reason. E.g., Didask. 24.4 [177.15]: *4 J−H J@Ø §2@LH •F6ZF,TH; 
Didask. 30.3 [184.1-2]: ¦> §2@LH ¦((4<`:,<"4 6"Â •F6ZF,TH; Didask. 28.4 [182.4-5] cites the 
threefold means to acquiring virtue familiar to Philo (e.g., Abr. 52), expanding –F60F4H to include §2,F\ J, 6"Â •(T(± 6"Â •F6ZF,4 J± 6"J <`:@<; Plutarch, Garr. 510 C-D: •F6ZF,4 . . . ¦2\.,J"4. 
The association appears in Plato as well: e.g., Resp. 518 D-E: Jè Ð<J4 (D @Û6 [•D,J"Â] ¦<@ØF"4 BD`J,D@< àFJ,D@< ¦:B@4,ÃF2"4 §2,F\ J, 6"Â •F6ZF,F4<.  
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through Moses’ ascetic precepts, this habit of moderation transfers to "greater 
matters" (:,4.`<T< BD"(:VJT<), such as the duties of a king. Instead of 
indulging an inordinate desire for revenue, a ruler trained by Moses’ regimen will 
exercise moderation and not exhaust the wealth of his subjects. The same 
principle of transference appears in Philo’s analysis of the fasting prescribed for 
the Day of Atonement, which he calls a day "devoted to ¦(6DVJ,4"" (Spec. 2.195: 
¦>"\D,J@< º:XD"< •<"2,ÂH "ÛJ± [¦(6DVJ,4"]): 
To one who has learnt to disregard food and drink which are absolutely 
necessary (F4J\T< (VD J4H 6"Â B@Jä< :"2ã< •8@(,Ã< Jä< @àJTH •<"(6"\T<), are there any among the superfluities of life (J\<@H . . . Jä< B,D4JJä<) which he can fail to despise, things which exist to promote not 
so much preservation and permanence of life (Ÿ (X(@<,< @Û *4":@<−H 6"Â FTJ0D\"H ª<,6") as pleasure with all its powers of mischief (:88@< ´ $8"$,DTJVJ0H º*@<−H)? (Spec. 2.195) 
 
Philo admires the lifestyle of ¦(6DVJ,4" this law promotes, not simply the 
temporary exercise of ¦(6DVJ,4" it requires. By practicing on a limited basis the 
more challenging denial of necessary desires, the moral agent masters the 
comparatively easy denial of superfluous desires. And this broader capacity for 
consistent denial of superfluous desires amounts to ¦(6DVJ,4", because it 
involves the enforcement of reason’s measure (necessity) over against desire’s 
tendency to pursue pleasure in excess of that measure. 
CONCLUSION 
 Philo has a multi-faceted but theoretically consistent understanding of 
¦(6DVJ,4". In essence, ¦(6DVJ,4" involves the rule of reason over antagonistic 
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non-rational forces within the soul, especially ¦B42L:\". In particular, ¦(6DVJ,4" 
involves the curtailing of excessive non-rational impulses through the 
enforcement of limits set by reason. Framed in terms of human motivation, this 
involves reason’s consistent enforcement of its goal, the greatest overall good for 
the soul, over against desire’s goal of pleasure. In any case, ¦(6DVJ,4" stands 
as the indispensable guard against passion, because it keeps the emotion 
¦B42L:\" from ever usurping reason’s authority and overtaking the soul. For this 
reason, Philo commends the acquisition of ¦(6DVJ,4", identifying –F60F4H as the 
principle means to that end. By repeatedly practicing reason’s dominance over 
desire, the moral agent develops a capacity for ¦(6DVJ,4". Moses understood 
this principle and so designed a number of ascetic precepts, which enjoin the 
subjugation of desire in a limited, artificial setting in order to cultivate a broader 
lifestyle of ¦(6DVJ,4" among those trained by his precepts. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PHILO’S EXPOSITION OF THE TENTH COMMANDMENT: 
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 
 
PHILO’S EXPOSITORY AGENDA 
In his exposition of the Tenth Commandment, Philo uses the conceptual 
nexus of ¦B42L:\", ¦(6DVJ,4", and –F60F4H as an overarching frame of 
reference for his work. Within that frame, his concept of desire figures most 
prominently, since a serious attempt to explain the prohibition @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H 
requires an equally serious concept of ¦B42L:\", serious enough to enable a 
precise statement of what exactly the Tenth Commandment prohibits. For Middle 
Platonists, the operation of ¦B42L:\" can represent either a perfectly natural, 
amoral emotion (BV2@H) or an immoral passion (BV2@H), depending on whether 
or not reason stays in control. Reading @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H as a categorical 
prohibition of the emotion desire—¦B42L:\" itself—makes no sense from a 
Middle-Platonic standpoint for two reasons: (1) the emotion itself involves nothing 
morally objectionable and (2) human existence requires, at minimum, the 
indulgence of necessary desires for food and drink. So on theoretical grounds 
alone, Philo must take @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H as a prohibition of passionate desire, 
which in fact he does in the course of his exposition, justifying the prohibition in 
light of dangers posed by passionate desire itself and its dangerous propensity to 
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burgeon into tyrannical desire (§DTH). But how does someone actually observe a 
prohibition of passionate desire? Here the concept of ¦(6DVJ,4" figures into 
Philo’s frame of reference as the solution to the problem addressed by the Tenth 
Commandment. Because Middle Platonists conceived passionate desire as 
"immoderate" desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\"), abstaining from the passion (thereby 
observing the prohibition) means keeping the emotion within the bounds of 
moderation, which in turn requires ¦(6DVJ,4". For this reason, Philo’s exposition 
programmatically commends ¦(6DVJ,4" as the means to observing the Tenth 
Commandment. But Philo also outlines the Mosaic program for acquiring 
¦(6DVJ,4", which brings –F60F4H into his frame of reference. In particular, he 
casts the Mosaic dietary laws as a set of ascetic precepts designed to inculcate 
¦(6DVJ,4" through –F60F4H. So Philo’s entire exposition can be summarized in 
terms of these three concepts: (1) the Tenth Commandment prohibits passionate 
¦B42L:\", (2) obeying the prohibition amounts to the exercise of ¦(6DVJ,4", and 
(3) the Mosaic dietary laws inculcate ¦(6DVJ,4" through –F60F4H.  
Recognizing ¦B42L:\", ¦(6DVJ,4", and –F60F4H as Philo’s ultimate frame 
of reference helps to explain the various interpretive moves he makes in 
connection with both the prohibition @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H and the dietary laws 
presumed to support its observance. Before composing an exposition of the 
Tenth Commandment, Philo understood these three concepts to stand in a 
certain theoretical relationship, conceived along Middle-Platonic rather than 
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biblical lines. So when he encounters a biblical prohibition of ¦B42L:\", he tries to 
make sense of it in light of the Middle-Platonic theory at his disposal, framing a 
philosophical notion of the type of desire proscribed, the reason for its 
proscription, and the means of observing the proscription. Similarly, once Philo 
identifies the dietary laws as the legal species of the genus @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, his 
interest lies not so much in the laws per se as in the Mosaic program of –F60F4H 
they represent. In other words, Philo operates according to a clear expository 
agenda: a deliberate effort to correlate the Tenth Commandment and its dietary 
laws with the best of contemporary philosophy (Middle Platonism) by carefully 
highlighting the principles of ¦B42L:\", ¦(6DVJ,4", and –F60F4H at work in their 
formulation. Philo implements this agenda in a variety of ways throughout his 
exposition, but two particular ways involve his prior knowledge of (1) traditional 
interpretations of the dietary laws, particularly laws concerning clean and unclean 
animals, and (2) contemporary genres of philosophical literature. Giving 
preliminary consideration to these topics clarifies their relevance to Philo's 
expository agenda. 
Traditional Interpretations of Clean and Unclean Animals 
In his extended interpretation of the Mosaic regulations concerning clean 
and unclean animals (Spec. 4.100-118), Philo demonstrates familiarity with a line 
of interpretation developed by an earlier generation of Hellenistic Jews in 
Alexandria—namely, the symbolic interpretation of clean and unclean animals 
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attributed to the High Priest Eleazar in the Letter of Aristeas.1 Essentially, Eleazar 
argues that Moses formulated his legislation on clean and unclean animals to 
promote justice (*46"4@Fb<0) among his followers.2 The designations "clean" and 
"unclean" have little to do with the properties of animal flesh for eating—instead 
they derive from physical and behavioral traits that symbolize certain ethical traits 
among human beings.3 Eleazar’s most extensive interpretation along these lines 
involves various species of birds (Let. Arist. 145-50). Unclean birds, for example, 
"are wild and carnivorous and with their strength oppress the rest and procure 
their food with injustice" (Let. Arist. 146). As Eleazar explains further: 
Through these creatures then, by calling them ‘unclean’ (•6V2"DJ"), 
[Moses] set up a symbol (B"DVF0:@<) that those for whom the legislation 
was drawn up must practice justice (*46"4@Fb<®) in spirit and oppress no 
one, trusting in their own strength, nor rob anyone of anything, but must 
guide their lives in accordance with justice (¦6 *46"\@L) . . .. (Let. Arist. 
147) 
 
                                            
1 See esp. Let. Arist. 144-69. On the question of Philo’s knowledge of the Letter of 
Aristeas, see Moses Hadas, Aristeas to Philocrates: Letter of Aristeas (New York: Harper, 1951; 
repr., Eugene, Oreg.: Wipf & Stock, 2007), 21-26. Hadas concludes: "The balance of probability 
seems to be rather on the side of Philo’s having read our Aristeas" (25-26). Cf. Rhodes, "Diet and 
Desire," 124, n. 10: "Whether or not Philo knew the Letter of Aristeas or simply inherited a similar 
exegetical tradition is difficult to determine with certainty. The situation is analogous to the famous 
crux of whether Philo derives his story of the origin of the LXX (Mos. 2.25-44) from Aristeas or an 
independent tradition. On balance, the wide circulation eventually attained by the Letter of 
Aristeas favors Philo’s knowledge of that document." Berthelot ("L’interprétation symbolique," 
253) suggests a shared tradition: "Bien que l'inspiration de Philon soit très proche de celle 
d'Aristée, il n'est pas sûr que Philon dépende à strictement parler de celui-ci; il semble plutôt que 
les deux auteurs aient puisé à une tradition commune." On Philo's relation to the Letter of 
Aristeas, see also Hecht, "Patterns of Exegesis," 112-14. 
2 E.g., Let. Arist. 144: *46"4@Fb<0H ª<,6,< . . . BV<J" •<"JXJ"6J"4; 148: *4 Jä< J@4@bJT< . . . Ò <@:@2XJ0H F0:,4@ØF2"4 J@ÃH FL<,J@ÃH ,É<"4 *46"\@LH; 169: B,DÂ $DTJä< @Þ< 6"Â Jä< •6"2VDJT< ©DB,Jä< 6"Â 6<T*V8T< 6"Â BH 8`(@H •<"J,\<,4 BDÎH *46"4@Fb<0<. 
3 On this sort of ethical interpretation, see Berthelot, "L’interprétation symbolique." 
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Moses’ prohibition functions as a symbolic discourse in which the command to 
abstain from a certain type of bird translates directly into a moral exhortation to 
abstain from violent oppression. This line of interpretation makes actual 
abstinence seem irrelevant, since eating an unclean bird would not in fact 
undermine Moses’ purpose, as long as the moral agent abstains from the type of 
behavior the bird represents.4 Similarly, the clean birds are all "gentle" (»:,D") 
herbivores, which never violently oppress another creature (Let. Arist. 147). By 
calling them "clean," Moses commends the disposition they represent, again with 
no real concern for the consumption (or not) of their flesh: 
By such examples, then, the lawgiver has commended to men of 
understanding a symbol (F0:,4@ØF2"4 J@ÃH FL<,J@ÃH) that they must be 
just (*46"\@LH) and achieve nothing by violence ($\‘), nor confiding in their 
own strength (ÆFPb4), must they oppress others (©JXD@LH 6"J"*L<"FJ,b,4<). (Let. Arist. 148)   
 
In sum, then, the exegetical method of Eleazar involves recognizing in the 
designations "clean" and "unclean" an animal behavioral trait analogous to a 
human ethical trait—and further recognizing Moses’ primary intention as the 
commendation or condemnation of ethical traits, not types of meat. As a result of 
this method—interpreting mainly the traits of "savage" and "carnivorous," "tame" 
and "herbivorous"—Eleazar identifies justice (*46"4@Fb<0) as Moses’ real ethical 
concern.  
                                            
 4 Eleazar downplays the literal significance of the dietary laws at the beginning of his 
interpretation (Let. Arist. 144): "Do not accept the exploded idea that it was out of regard for 
‘mice’ and the ‘weasel’ and other such creatures that Moses ordained these laws with such 
scrupulous care."  
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 Although he uses elements of this traditional interpretation, Philo 
fundamentally reworks these elements to suit his expository agenda, adapting 
Eleazar’s method and its results to his own particular frame of reference: 
¦B42L:\", ¦(6DVJ,4", and –F60F4H. Above all, Philo tries to show that Moses had 
in mind the promotion of ¦(6DVJ,4"—not *46"4@Fb<0—when he formulated laws 
concerning clean and unclean animals. As a result, Philo tends to emphasize the 
literal significance of Moses’ regulations in two important respects: (1) in drawing 
a connection between the actual eating (or not) of certain meats and the 
operation of ¦B42L:\" in the human soul, and (2) in casting the commands to eat 
or abstain as the substance of a practical regimen of –F60F4H, not the 
dispensable symbolic form of Moses’ ethical exhortations. And when Philo does 
use a symbolic mode of interpretation comparable to Eleazar’s, he uses it to 
demonstrate Moses’ ultimate concern for issues of ¦B42L:\", ¦(6DVJ,4", and 
–F60F4H. 
Contemporary Genres of Philosophical Literature 
Philo models his exposition of the Tenth Commandment on a type of 
philosophical literature whose attention to issues of BV2@H, ¦(6DVJ,4", and 
–F60F4H resonates with Philo’s exegetical agenda. Five examples of the genre 
appear among the Moralia of Philo’s Middle-Platonic near contemporary 
Plutarch—treatises Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp calls "praktische 
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Seelenheilungsschriften."5 Essentially, the Seelenheilungsschrift names one 
particular passion (BV2@H) as its topic and consists of two parts: a diagnosis 
(6D\F4H) of that passion and a prescription for treatment (–F60F4H).6 Plutarch 
explains the relation between the two parts: 
[W]e get well by the diagnosis and treatment of our passions (Jä< (D B"2ä< 6D\F,4 6"Â •F6ZF,4), but the diagnosis must come first (BD@JXD" *zº 6D\F4H); since no one can become habituated to shun or to eradicate 
from his soul what does not distress him (@Û*,ÂH (D ¦2\.,J"4 N,b(,4< 6"Â •B@JD\$,F2"4 J−H RLP−H Ô :¬ *LFP,D"\<,4), and we only grow 
distressed with our passions (J BV20) when we have perceived, by the 
exercise of reason, the injuries and shame which result from them (JH $8V$"H 6"Â JH "ÆFPb<"H JH •Bz"ÛJä<). (Garr. 510 C-D) 
 
In other words, a Seelenheilungsschrift tries to convince the reader of the horrible 
nature of a particular passion, in hopes of motivating the reader to embrace the 
practical exercises offered as a therapeutic treatment or cure for that passion. 
Philo most likely encountered the genre through acquaintance with the 
philosophical milieu of Plutarch’s teacher, Ammonius, a contemporary of Philo 
and native of Alexandria.7 In that case, the Seelenheilungsschrift most likely to 
represent the genre as Plutarch learned it, and thus as Philo knew it, would be 
the earliest of the five, De garrulitate or On Talkativeness.8  
                                            
5 See Ingenkamp, Schriften, 7, where he introduces the term and lists the five treatises: 
De curiositate, De cohibenda ira, De garrulitate, De vitioso pudore, and De se ipsum citra 
invidiam laudando. 
6 See Ingenkamp, Schriften, 74-124. Cf. Rabbow, Seelenfürung, 340: "Plutarchs System 
der Seelenheilung scheidet 6D\F4H und –F60F4H; die 6D\F4H gibt die Erkenntnis des Übels in 
seinem Wesen, seiner Schädlichkeit; die –F60F4H die praktische Übung gegen das Übel." 
 7 See above, 43, n. 12.  
 8 Ingenkamp identifies De garrulitate as the earliest of the five Seelenheilungsschriften, 
written sometime after A.D. 68 (Schriften, 116-18). And of the five, De garrulitate bears the least 
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 Although Plutarch makes talkativeness (•*@8,FP\") the explicit subject of 
his earliest Seelenheilungsschrift, he ultimately considers the issue of desire 
(¦B42L:\")—but desire considered under just one of its aspects, a desire for 
listeners: 
[B]ut even in that which they desire (B,DÂ "ÛJ¬< J¬< ¦B42L:\"<) especially 
they fail miserably. For in other diseases of the soul (<@FZ:"F4 J−H RLP−H), such as love of money (N48"D(LD\‘), love of glory (N48@*@>\‘), 
love of pleasure (N480*@<\‘), there is at least the possibility of attaining 
their desires (JL(PV<,4< ô< ¦N\,<J"4), but for babblers (J@ÃH *z•*@8XFP@4H) this is very difficult: they desire listeners (¦B42L:@Ø<J,H •6D@"Jä<) and cannot get them, since every one runs away headlong. 
(Garr. 502 E) 
 
Here Plutarch suggests that ¦B42L:\" as it relates to speech can manifest itself 
in a "diseased" way as talkativeness (•*@8,FP\"), even though the desire itself 
involves nothing objectionable.9 Thinking along Middle-Platonic lines, Plutarch 
understands the critical importance of reason’s position over against this type of 
desire, consistently framing his discussion of talkativeness as a matter of self-
control (¦(6DVJ,4") or its absence (•6D"F\").10 With reason in control, the moral 
                                                                                                                                  
evidence of Plutarch's personal development of the genre (Schriften, 118, 145). While this 
particular Middle-Platonic Seelenheilungsschrift postdates Philo, the unmistakable conformity of 
Philo’s exposition with the basic structure and function of De garrulitate indicates Plutarch’s use 
of a preexisting genre known also to Philo. On De garrulitate, see also William A. Beardslee, "De 
Garrulitate (Moralia 502B-515A)," in Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature (ed. 
Hans Dieter Betz; SCHNT 4; Leiden: Brill, 1978), 264-88. 
9 Garr. 504 E: "[S]peech, which is the most pleasant and human of social ties, is made 
inhuman and unsocial by those who use it badly and wantonly." Philo never explicitly links ¦B42L:\" with •*@8,FP\", but he does link the adjective "talkative" (•*@8XFP0H) with the "lover of 
pleasure" (Sacr. 32). He also speaks of desire "overtaking the tongue" (¦BÂ (8äJJ"< N2VF"F"), 
recognizing that some people ¦B42L:@ØF4< . . . J ºFLP"FJX" 8X(,4< (Spec. 4.90). 
10 E.g., ¦(6DVJ,4": 505 E, 506 A-B, 506 E (cf. 504 F; 511 D; 515 A); •6D"F\": 503 C, 503 
E, 506 F, 507 E, 508 B, 508 F (cf. 503 C: •P"8\<T< . . . FJ@:VJT<). Cf. Jacques Boulogne, 
"L'intempérence verbale: L'imaginaire de Plutarche dans la thérapie des maladies de l'âme," in 
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agent speaks in an appropriate manner. But if the moral agent’s desire for 
listeners becomes excessive and overcomes reason, a "passion" (BV2@H) results, 
and since the excessive desire here involves speech, the resulting passion 
accordingly manifests as an irrational, excessive type of speech, talkativeness.11 
Following the basic format of a Seelenheilungsschrift, Plutarch’s approach to the 
problem of talkativeness involves first a diagnosis (6D\F4H), then a treatment 
(–F60F4H). 
 Plutarch’s diagnosis of talkativeness includes both broad denouncements 
of the passion and specific examples of its ill effects.12 With chiastic flair, he 
characterizes •*@8,FP\" as worst among the passions: 
Now of the other passions and diseases some are dangerous 
(¦B46\<*L<"), some detestable (:4F0JV), some ridiculous (6"J"(X8"FJ"); 
but talkativeness has all these qualities at once (J± *z•*@8,FP\‘ BV<J" FL:$X$06,); for babblers are derided (P8,LV.@<J"4) for telling what 
everyone knows, they are hated (:4F@Ø<J"4) for bearing bad news, they 
run into danger (64<*L<,b@LF4) since they cannot refrain from revealing 
secrets. (Garr. 504 F)13 
 
Plutarch supports his rhetoric with anecdotal evidence of the trouble 
talkativeness brings, such as the destruction and ruin attending revealed 
                                                                                                                                  
Les passions antiques et médiévales (ed. Bernard Besnier et al.; Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France, 2003), 161-69. 
11 Plutarch understands "passion" in the Middle-Platonic sense of B8,@<V.@LF" 
(–:,JD@H) ÒD:Z (see above, 79-86). Cf. Garr. 514 C: JÎ 8V8@< . . . B8,@<V.@<. 
12 Philo, too, vilifies immoderate speech: e.g., Somn. 2.274-75. 
13 Substituting "passions" for Helmbold’s "affections" (B"2ä<), "diseases" for "maladies" 
(<@F0:VJT<), "talkativeness" for "garrulousness" (•*@8,FP\‘). 
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secrets.14 King Seleucus, for example, escaping a disastrous battle incognito, 
received food from a farmer whose •*@8,FP\" brought death (Garr. 508 D-F). 
The farmer recognized Seleucus and could not restrain himself (@Û 6"JXFP,<): 
[O]n taking leave, [he] said, "Farewell, King Seleucus." And Seleucus, 
stretching out his right hand to him and drawing him towards himself as 
though to kiss him, gave a sign to one of his companions to cut off the 
man’s head with a sword. (Garr. 508 E) 
 
Plutarch frames this as a deadly case of •6D"F\" (508 F), a lack of verbal self-
control characteristic of everyone possessed of talkativeness. By this and other 
examples, framed with disparaging rhetoric, Plutarch hopes to accomplish the 
express purpose of his diagnosis: revealing the "injuries and shame" (JH $8V$"H 
6"Â JH "ÆFPb<"H [510 D]) of •*@8,FP\", so that his readers will embrace the 
practical treatment he offers in the second part of his treatise.15  
 Having made his diagnostic case against talkativeness, Plutarch turns to a 
course of treatment (–F60F4H), offering specific exercises (§24F:@4) designed to 
rid the moral agent of talkativeness by inculcating verbal self-control 
(¦(6DVJ,4").These exercises work by orchestrating a contest of power between 
the soul’s rational and non-rational parts—in the case of •*@8,FP\", reason 
contends against ¦B42L:\" as it relates to speech. With each successful 
                                            
14 Garr. 508 D: "[S]ecrets, when they escape, destroy and ruin (•B@88b@LF4 6"Â *4"N2,\D@LF4) those who cannot keep them." 
15 In Garr. 510 D, Plutarch summarizes everything learned from his diagnosis: "Thus, in 
the case of babblers [we perceive] that they are hated when they wish to be liked, that they cause 
annoyance when they wish to please, that they are laughed at when they think they are admired, 
that they spend their money without any gain, that they wrong their friends, help their enemies, 
and destroy themselves." 
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exercise, the moral agent’s capacity to control this type of desire increases, while 
the likelihood of desire usurping reason to engender talkativeness 
correspondingly decreases. Plutarch offers two basic types of ¦24F:`H; the first 
involves refraining from speech for a period of time: 
In the first place (BDäJ@<), then, when questions are asked of neighbors, 
let him accustom himself to remaining silent (¦24.XJT F4TB<) until all 
have refused a response (:XPD4 @â BV<J,H •B,\BT<J"4 J¬< •B`6D4F4<). 
(Garr. 511 F)16 
 
In other words, the moral agent waits to speak and in so doing subjugates and 
restrains desire’s impulse toward the pleasure(s) of speech. Plutarch again 
commends the exercise of delayed response when he considers how the moral 
agent ought to deal with direct questions (Garr. 512 D-F).17 Neatly summarizing 
the thrust of his remarks, he identifies the ultimate goal of these exercises as the 
training of non-rational desire:  
In any case, this ravenous hunger for talking (BDÎH J@×H 8`(@LH Ï>bB,4<@<) must be checked so that it may not seem as though a stream 
(Õ,Ø:") which has long been pressing hard upon the tongue were being 
gladly discharged at the instance of the question. Socrates, in fact, used to 
control his thirst in this manner—he would not allow himself to drink after 
exercise until he had drawn up and poured out the first bucketful, so that 
his non-rational part might be trained to await the time dictated by reason 
(¦2\.0J"4 JÎ< J@Ø 8`(@L 6"4DÎ< •<":X<,4< JÎ –8@(@<). (Garr. 512 F) 
 
                                            
16 Plutarch indirectly labels this abstention an –F60:", because after this first example 
(BDäJ@<) he goes on to describe a second (*,bJ,D@<) –F60:" in Garr. 512 D. He describes this 
sort of exercises as "mastering the disease by habituation" (511 F: §2,4 . . . 6D"J−F"4 J@Ø <@FZ:"J@H). 
 17 NB Garr. 512 D: ¦24FJX@< ¦N4FJV<"4 6"Â B@4,Ã< J4 *4V8,4::" :,J">× J−H ¦DTJZF,TH 6"Â J−H •B@6D\F,TH; 512 E: JÎ< *¥ $@L8`:,<@< ¦:::,8äH •B@6D\<"F2"4 *,Ã . . . •<":,Ã<"4. 
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A second type of ¦24F:`H commended by Plutarch involves not the delay of 
speaking but complete abstinence from speaking on certain topics that incite 
talkativeness because of the excessive pleasure they afford: 
Moreover, just as Socrates used to urge men to be on their guard 
(NL8VJJ,F2"4) against those foods which induce us to eat when we are 
not hungry, and against those liquids which induce us to drink when we 
are not thirsty, so it is with the babbler as regards subjects for talk (Jä< 8`(T<): those in which he takes most delight (@ÍH »*,J"4 :V84FJ") and 
employs ad nauseam he should fear and stoutly resist (•<J4$"\<,4<) when 
they stream in upon him. (Garr. 513 D)18 
 
In terms of moral psychology, the danger of especially pleasurable topics lies in 
their capacity to draw the moral agent into speech for the wrong motive—for 
pleasure itself and not for good reason, such as a legitimate need to speak.19 By 
avoiding such topics, the moral agent develops verbal ¦(6DVJ,4", since rejecting 
pleasure as a motivation amounts to a subjugation of ¦B42L:\" on the part of 
8`(@H. So within Plutarch’s therapeutic program, delay and avoidance represent 
two fundamental techniques of –F60F4H, directed against a passion to develop 
¦(6DVJ,4". 
 Philo’s exposition of the Tenth Commandment exhibits the form and 
function of a Seelenheilungsschrift. First of all, it has as its topic one particular 
                                            
18 Cf. Garr. 514 A: "[H]e that has a greater weakness for one class of subjects than for 
the other should be on his guard against these subjects and force himself to hold back and 
withdraw as far as possible from them (ÏN,\8,4 J@bJ@LH NL8VJJ,F2"4 6"Â •<XP,4< ©"LJÎ< •BÎ J@bJT<), since they are always able, because of the pleasure they give (*4zº*@<Z<), to lure him 
on to dilate upon them." 
19 On the compelling force of pleasurable speech, note also Garr. 513 E: JÎ º*`:,<@< ª86,4 J¬< NT<¬< ¦Nz©"LJ`. On need as the proper measure for speech, see Garr. 513 A-C. 
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passion, ¦B42L:\".20 Second, it essentially divides into the two-part structure 
characteristic of the genre: a "diagnosis" (6D\F4H) and a "treatment" (–F60F4H). In 
Spec. 4.79-94, Philo considers the horrible nature of desire, offering—like 
Plutarch—both broad denouncements of the passion and specific examples of its 
ill effects, especially its capacity to burgeon into §DTH. In Spec. 4.95-130, he 
considers the proper treatment of desire, casting the Mosaic dietary laws as 
therapeutic exercises comparable to those prescribed by Plutarch in De 
garrulitate. The Mosaic exercises in Philo’s exposition mirror not only the ascetic 
techniques used in De garrulitate—for example, delay and avoidance—but also 
the overall purpose of Plutarch’s "treatment": to cure a passion by cultivating 
¦(6DVJ,4" through –F60F4H. 
STRUCTURE OF PHILO’S EXPOSITION21 
 
I. Introduction (§78b)  
 
II.  Diagnosis (5D\F4H) (§§79-94) 
 
A. Problem: Every Passion (§79) 
 
B. Problem: Passionate Desire Burgeoned into Tyrannical Desire 
(§§80-94) 
 
i. Overview of Tyrannical Desire (§§80-83) 
 
a. Origin (§80a) 
 
b. Character (§§80b-83): Insatiable, Oppressive, All-
Consuming 
                                            
20 Not the amoral emotion ¦B42L:\", but the immoral passion ¦B42L:\". 
21 The structure of the commentary follows the text-units marked with boldface type. 
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ii. Tyrannical Desire as "Source of All Ills" (§§84-91) 
 
a. Statement of the Claim (§§84-85) 
 
b. Illustrations (§§86-91) 
 
 1.  Mode of Operation  
 
2. Tyrannical Desire for Money 
 
3. Tyrannical Desire for Fame 
 
4. Tyrannical Desire for Power 
 
5. Tyrannical Desire for Beauty 
 
6. Tyrannical Desire over the Tongue 
 
7. Tyrannical Desire over the Belly 
 
C. Location of z+B42:\" (§§92-94) 
 
III. Treatment (}!F60F4H) (§§95-130) 
 
A. Overview of Moses’ "Paradigmatic Instruction" (§§95-97) 
 
B. Elements of Moses’ "Paradigmatic Instruction" (§§98-125) 
 
i. First Fruits (§§98-99) 
 
ii. Clean and Unclean Animals (§§100-118) 
 
a. Introduction (§100-102) 
 
b. Land Animals (§§103-109) 
 
c. Aquatic Animals (§§110-112) 
 
d. "Reptiles" (§§113-115) 
  
e. Birds (§§116-117) 
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f. Conclusion (§118) 
 
iii. Dead Animals (§§119-121) 
 
iv. Blood and Fat (§§122-125) 
 
C. Concluding Moral Narrative (§§126-131) 
 
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 
 
§78b: Introduction 
[§78b] Let us turn now to the last of the Ten Words, which like each of the 
others was delivered in the form of a summary: "You shall not desire." 
 
Philo finally arrives at the Tenth Commandment, after commenting in depth on 
the other nine in Spec. 1.12 – Spec. 4.78a. He does little more than announce 
his transition to the last of the "Ten Words," noting only that this Commandment, 
like the others, has the form of a summary. Naturally, he also cites the Tenth 
Commandment, providing the basis of his exposition, but he cites an abbreviated 
version (cf. Exod 20:17; Deut 5:21), placing emphasis on ¦B42L:\" itself and not 
any of its objects. 
§79: Problem: Every Passion 
[§79] On the one hand,22 every "passion"23 is reprehensible, since we are 
morally responsible for every unmeasured, "excessive impulse"24 and for 
                                            
22 On the one hand (:X<): Philo here compares the passions as a class (A< :¥< BV2@H) 
with one particular passion in §80 (Jä< *¥ B"2ä<). 
23 "passion" (BV2@H): Philo's use of the terms ¦B\80BJ@< (reprehensible) and ßB"\J4@H 
(morally responsible) indicates an immoral "passion," not an amoral "emotion" (BV2@H). 
24 every unmeasured, "excessive impulse" (BF" –:,JD@H 6"Â B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z): Philo 
cites the Stoic definition of "passion" (B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z) but fundamentally recasts it for Middle-
Platonic use by adding the qualifying term –:,JD@H (cf. DL 7.110: §FJ4 *¥ "ÛJÎ JÎ BV2@H 6"J -Z<T<" . . . ÒD:¬ B8,@<V.@LF"). 
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the soul's "irrational and unnatural movement."25 After all, what do these 
terms describe if not an unleashing of the emotional part of the soul?26 So 
if anyone fails to place limits on the impulses of emotion,27 fails to bridle, 
so to speak, his team of unruly horses, he ends up indulging a malignant 
"passion."28 And by giving free rein to the team’s unruliness, he will careen 
like an unwitting charioteer into some ditch or chasm, from which he will 
barely escape—if at all. 
 
To begin his exposition of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, Philo summarizes the problem 
posed by every passion (A< :¥< BV2@H) and not just desire, which he will 
consider at length beginning in §80 (Jä< *¥ B"2ä< . . . ¦B42L:\"). In agreement 
with the Stoics, he notes that passions categorically indicate a moral lapse by 
using the terms ¦B\80BJ@< and ßB"\J4@H.29 But Philo differs radically in his 
                                            
25 the soul's "irrational and unnatural movement" (J−H RLP−H º –8@(@H 6"Â B"D NbF4< 6\<0F4H): Philo cites an alternative Stoic definition of "passion" (cf. DL 7.110: §FJ4 *¥ "ÛJÎ JÎ BV2@H 6"J -Z<T<" º –8@(@H 6"Â B"D NbF4< RLP−H 6\<0F4H), in which –8@(@H clearly denotes 
a morally problematic "irrational" (vs. "non-rational") movement. 
26 After all, what do these terms describe if not (©6VJ,D@< (D J@bJT< <J\> ¦FJ4< ªJ,D@< ³) an unleashing of the emotional part of the soul (B"8"4Î< BV2@H ¦>0B8T:X<@<): The addition of J\ in PCW seems necessary, since the phrase B"8"4Î< BV2@H ¦>0B8T:X<@< further explains, 
from a Middle-Platonic perspective, the phenomena Philo denotes using Stoic definitions. In the 
explanatory phrase, BV2@H refers to the non-rational part of the soul as seat of emotion(s) (i.e., B"20J46Î< :XD@H; cf. Eclog. 38.5-7: }!8@(@< :XD@H J−H RLP−H . . . ´ BV2@H ´ B"20J46Î< :XD@H). 
So B"8"4`< has the sense of "longstanding," indicating an enduring component of the soul 
activated intermittently (cf. QE 1.7 [Gk. Petit]: J¬< –DJ4 NL@:X<0< •D4FJ@6D"J\"< ¦< RLP± 6"2,8@bF0H J−H B"8"4H ÏP8@6D"J\"H, where ÏP8@6D"J\" stands for the Platonic ¦B42L:0J46`<, 
as in Resp. VIII – IX). B8`T (LSJ, s.v.): to unfold, stretch out. 
27 place limits on the impulses of emotion (:XJD" J"ÃH ÒD:"ÃH ÒD\.,4): Philo undoubtedly 
has in mind non-rational impulses of the emotional part of the soul—in other words, discrete 
impulses of desire, fear, grief, pleasure, etc. requiring the proper "measure" (:XJD@<) of reason 
(cf. Opif. 81: Jä< B"2ä< ÒD:"\; Conf. 90: Jä< B"2ä< ÒD:VH; Mut. 173: JVH . . . B"2ä< ÒD:VH). 
28 indulging a malignant "passion" (BV2,4 PD−J"4 *LF4VJå): Philo speaks of the state 
resulting from a lack of measure: an "emotion" (BV2@H) has become a "passion" (BV2@H). 
29 Philo often uses "reprehensible" (¦B\80BJ@H) as an antonym of "praiseworthy" 
(¦B"4<,J`H) (e.g., Post. 75; Deus 71; Spec. 3.209). As he states elsewhere, the deeds of the 
unjust are reprehensible (¦B\80BJ"), due to lack of measure in their emotions (*4V . . . JH •:,JD\"H Jä< B"2ä<)—i.e., due to "passions" (Spec. 3.209). In addition, the moral agent is 
"morally responsible" (ßB"\J4@H) not for emotion, but for passion. The moment of moral 
accountability lies not in the experience of desire, distress, pleasure, or fear, but in the victory of 
these emotions over reason, which signals reason's failure to properly restrict or measure their 
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concept of what those passions fundamentally are. Reworking a standard Stoic 
definition, he uses the term –:,JD@H to express the Middle-Platonic notion of 
passion as a quantitative excess of the non-rational impulses of emotion.30 In 
similar Middle-Platonic fashion, Philo suggests that the moral agent avoids 
passion by moderating these non-rational impulses (metriopatheia), and he uses 
the Platonic chariot figure to make his point.31 In other words, having framed the 
problem of passion as "unmeasured impulse" (–:,JD@H ÒD:Z), Philo frames the 
solution as "measured impulse" (:XJD" J"ÃH ÒD:"ÃH)—only when the charioteer 
fails, when emotion oversteps the "measure" of reason's directing authority, only 
                                                                                                                                  
activity. Cf. Marguerite Harl, "Adam et les deux arbres du paradis (Gen. II-III) ou l'homme  milieu 
entre deux termes (:XF@H-:,2`D4@H) chez Philon d'Alexandrie," RSR 50 (1962): 321-88, 341, n. 
38: "{KB"\J4@H est typiquement l'épithète de la (<f:0, volonté, lieu de la responsabilité. On 
trouve cependant le plus souvent chez Philon l'opposition ßB"\J4@H-•<LB"\J4@H pour signifier non 
pas « responsable-irresponsable » mais « coupable-innocent »." 
30 In Philo’s view, every instance of passion involves an "unmeasured" (–:,JD@H) 
impulse, one excessive in quantity, not in quality as the Stoics believed. The term –:,JD@H, which 
appears not a single time in SVF (see index, s.v.), is patently not Stoic, but commentators persist 
in labeling –:,JD@H 6"Â B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z a "Stoic" definition without accounting for the anomaly 
of –:,JD@H (e.g., Colson, PLCL 8, 57, n. b; Heinemann, PCH 2, 270, ns. 1-2; Mosès, PAPM 25, 
246, n. 2; also David Charles Aune, "Mastery of the Passions," 126; Bréhier, Idées 
philosophiques et religieuses 253, n. 9; Gaca, Making of Fornication, 200; Lilla, Clement of 
Alexandria, 92; Pohlenz, Philon, 457; Völker, Fortschritt und Vollendung, 80; Reydams-Schils, 
"Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology," 193; Wolfson, Philo, 2:230). The other definition of 
passion Philo cites (J−H RLP−H º –8@(@H 6"Â B"D NbF4< 6\<0F4H) must be understood along 
similar Middle-Platonic lines: An unmeasured impulse entails a movement of the soul inconsistent 
with the dictates of reason and thus "irrational" (vs. non-rational). Such a movement is also 
"unnatural," since Nature prescribes the rule of the superior over the inferior, in this case reason 
over the emotions. Philo’s reference to an "unleashing of the emotional part of the soul" appears 
as a clarification of the Middle-Platonic moral psychology underlying the Stoic terminology he has 
just used. An unmeasured (excessive) impulse of desire, distress, fear, or pleasure indicates not 
the sudden genesis of passion as something qualitatively distinct within the soul, but instead the 
"unleashing" (¦>"B8`T—in the sense of a "loosening" or removal of restraint) of a preexisting 
emotional faculty (B"8"4Î< BV2@H). Elsewhere, Philo allegorically interprets the biblical 
prescription for "girded loins" (ÏFNØH B,D4,.äF2"4) as an injunction against just this sort of 
"slackening" (P"8VT) of the emotions (e.g., Leg. 3.151-54). 
31 Cf. Mosès, PAPM 25, 246, n. 3. On Philo’s chariot figure, see above, 111-18. 
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then does passion arise in the soul (BV2,4 PD−J"4 *LF4VJå). Finally, he portrays 
the disaster in store for all who allow passion to arise in their souls, all who allow 
otherwise useful emotions to run wild, usurping the directing authority of reason. 
This lack of restraint (•N0<4"F:`<) "wrecks" the soul, as the non-rational 
"horses" are given free rein. 
 By commending moderation at the outset of his exposition, Philo gives an 
early indication of how he interprets @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H. While obviously a 
prohibition, the Tenth Commandment does not prohibit ¦B42L:\" per se, since 
Philo recommends the limitation of impulse, not its elimination. In other words, 
the Tenth Commandment prohibits passionate desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\"), 
understood as the impulse(s) of the emotion ¦B42L:\" exceeding the measure 
set by reason. 
§79 Excursus: Parallel Material in Decal. 142-46 
In Decal. 142-46, Philo introduces his preliminary comments on the Tenth 
Commandment with similar :X< . . . *X comparisons of all BV20 (BV<J" :¥< (D 
J RLP−H BV20; Jä< :¥< –88T<) to the one BV2@H desire (P"8,BfJ"J@< *z 
¦B42L:\"; :`<0 *z¦B42L:\"). But unlike Spec. 4.79, which emphasizes the moral 
culpability of a failure to moderate the impulses of emotion—in other words, the 
moral culpability of a "passion"—Philo notes merely that all BV20 are 
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"troublesome" (P"8,BV), without condemning them explicitly.32 In fact, his 
analysis of pleasure (º*@<Z), distress (8bB0), and fear (N`$@H) ascribes virtually 
no moral culpability to these BV20, since they originate from without and compel 
the moral agent to experience their effects involuntarily (•6@bF4@<).33 As Philo 
explains in Decal. 143-45, the perceptions of a present good (•("2`<), an 
impending ill (6"6`<), or a present ill (6"6`<) automatically generate the 
sensations of the corresponding BV20. Although Philo's account of the 
sensations of pleasure, distress, and fear echoes Stoic terminology, his account 
of the mechanics of these passions flatly contradicts Stoic doctrine.34 Above all, 
Stoics maintained the full accountability of the moral agent for all passions, which 
all result from voluntary, rational assent (FL(6"JV2,F4H).35 So Philo's association 
of BV20 with involuntary responses to external stimuli clearly reflects a different 
perspective. 
Decal. 142-46 in fact represents a Middle-Platonic account of emotions 
(BV20), not—as in Spec. 4.79—of passions (BV20). Philo gives an unusual 
account of ¦B42L:\" because he needs to show why the Decalogue restricts only 
                                            
32 Emotions are "troublesome" in their capacity to "unnaturally move and jar the soul, 
preventing its healthy operation (64<@Ø<J" 6"Â F,\@<J" "ÛJ¬< B"D NbF4< 6"Â ß(4"\<,4< @Û6 ¦ä<J")” (Decal. 142). 
33 Cf. Mut. 241: Jä< *z•6@LF\T< @Û*¥< ßB"\J4@< (also Deus 48). 
34 I.e., he does not offer a Stoic account of the passions, pace Colson (PLCL 7, 612).  
35 See Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 42-101 [="The Psychology of Action"], e.g., 44: 
"the power to give or withhold assent . . . makes men morally responsible for their actions"; 54: 
"Man is responsible because of assent"; 72: "Assent . . is vital to the Stoic analysis of action 
because it is the locus of moral responsibility." The term FL(6"JV2,F4H appears nowhere in 
Decal. 142-46 nor anywhere in Philo's analysis of the passions (see Pohlenz, Philon, 456, n. 1). 
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this emotion, but he otherwise reflects standard Middle-Platonic views 
comparable to Didaskalikos 32.1 [185.24-42].36 For example, both Decal. 142-46 
and Didask. 32.1 speak of emotions as movement in the soul, with the 
Didaskalikos stating explicitly what Philo certainly presumes: that the movement 
occurs in the soul's non-rational part.37 Both speak of emotions as involuntary 
responses to the perception of an apparent good or ill.38 Both speak of four 
cardinal emotions, and describe the respective causes of pleasure, distress, and 
fear in similar terms.39 Since Philo, as a Middle-Platonist, acknowledges the 
existence of both emotions (BV20) and passions (BV20), he attempts to 
distinguish ¦B42L:\" both from other emotions (BV20), as in Decal. 142-46, and 
from other passions (BV20), as in Spec. 4.79-80. Given the unique prohibition of 
¦B42L:\" over against other BV20, Philo must articulate a fundamental difference 
between ¦B42L:\" and other BV20, discernable both at the level of emotion per 
                                            
36 Didask. 32.1 clearly speaks of "emotion" (BV2@H), not "passion" (BV2@H), since the 
Middle-Platonic concept of passion appears later in 32.4 [186.14-29], which contrasts "wild" 
(–(D4") and "tame" (»:,D") emotions: "'Tame' are such as belong naturally to man (6"J NbF4<), 
being necessary and proper to him (•<"(6"ÃV J, 6"Â @Æ6,Ã"). They remain in this state as long as 
they preserve moderation (ªTH —< Fb::,JD" ßBVDP®); if they come to exhibit lack of moderation 
(•:,JD\"H), they become bad (º:"DJ0:X<")" (trans. Dillon).  
37 Decal. 142: 64<@Ø<J" 6"Â F,\@<J"; Didask. 32.1 [185.26]: 6\<0F4H –8@(@H RLP−H; 
Didask. 32.1 [185.27-29]: }!8@(@H :¥< @Þ< ,ÇD0J"4 6\<0F4H ÓJ4 @Û 6D\F,4H J BV20 @Û*¥ *`>"4 •88 Jä< •8`(T< J−H RLP−H :,Dä< 64<ZF,4H.  
38 Involuntary: Decal. 142: Jä< :¥< –88T< . . . •6@bF4@<; Decal. 144: –6@LF"<; Didask. 
32.1 [185.31-32]: }!6@LF4 (@Ø< ¦< º:Ã< ¦((\<,J"4 B@88V64H 6"Â •<J4J,\<@LF4<. Response to 
perception of good or ill: esp. Decal. 143: J@Ø B"D`<J@H 6"Â <@:4F2X<J@H •("2@Ø N"<J"F\" *4,(,\D,4 6"Â *4"<\FJ0F4 J¬< RLP¬< (NB N"<J"F\" as subject, causing a response in the soul); 
Didask. 32.1 [185.38-39]: BV<J" (D [BV20] FL<\FJ"J"4 ´ 6"J •("2@Ø §:N"F4< ´ 6"J 6"6@Ø.  
39 º*@<Z: J@Ø B"D`<J@H 6"Â <@:4F2X<J@H •("2@Ø N"<J"F\" (Decal. 143); •("2Î< (D ¦< :¥< B"D,Ã<"4 ßB@8V$T:,<, º*`:,2" (Didask. 32.1 [185.39-40]); 8bB0: JÎ *z¦<"<J\@< •("2è 6"6`<, ¦6$4"FV:,<@< (cf. B"D,Ã<"4) (Decal. 144); 6"6Î< (D ¦< :¥< B"D,Ã<"4 ßB@8V$T:,<, 
159 
 
 
 
se (Decal. 142-46) and at the level of passion—i.e., the excessive, unmeasured 
expression of emotion (Spec. 4.79-80).  
§§80 – 83: Overview of Tyrannical Desire 
 
[§80] On the other hand, among the passions, none proves quite so 
agonizing as a passionate desire for objects of fantasy that seem valuable 
but really are not,40 because longing of this kind eventually gives birth to 
oppressive tyrannical desires incapable of fulfillment.41 And consider the 
plight of those subject to tyrannical desire!42 Free of restraint and fixed on 
the thought of a beloved object,43 desire just keeps stretching and driving 
the soul farther and farther out into a boundless expanse, pursuing a 
pesky mocker who flees backwards in a brazen taunt. [§81] The quarry 
notices desire trying hard to catch up, then stops for a moment—just long 
enough to provide a teasing hope of capture—only to pull away out of 
reach, jeering mercilessly. And so desire, constantly eluded, constantly 
                                                                                                                                  8LB@b:,2" (Didask. 32.1 [185.41]); N`$@H: ÓJ"< *¥ JÎ 6"6`< . . . :X88® . . . •N46<,ÃF2"4 (Decal. 
145); JÎ *¥ :X88@< [6"6Î<] N@$@b:,2" (Didask. 32.1 [185.41-42]).  
40 a passionate desire for objects of fantasy that seem valuable but really are not 
(¦B42L:\" Jä< •B`<JT< ÓF" Jè *@6,Ã< •("2ä<, BDÎH •8Z2,4"< @Û6 Ð<JT<): In light of his 
introductory remarks on "passion" (§79), Philo must have in mind passionate desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\"), although he simply refers to it as ¦B42L:\". He notes two characteristics of the objects 
desired: (1) they are not present to the moral agent, and (2) they are "false goods." The first 
characteristic speaks to how the objects are desired: they are not materially present, so they must 
be visualized in the mind in order to be desired (cf. Decal. 146: ¦B,4*< *¥ 8"$f< J4H §<<@4"< •("2@Ø :¬ B"D`<J@H). The moral agent compulsively "fantasizes" about the objects, because 
desire has captured the mind, compelling it to incorrectly esteem as "good" (valuable) something 
that is not. Only people enmeshed in the world and its system of values care about such things—
Philo says as much in Spec. 4.82: ÓF" 6"J JÎ< •<2DfB4<@< $\@< .08TJ 6"Â B,D4:VP0J" ,É<"4 *@6,Ã (cf. Deus 148: JÎ< $"F48X" Jä< N"4<@:X<T< BV<JT< •("2ä< JÎ< (Z4<@< z+*ã:—Ð<JTH (D J Jè *@6,Ã< •("2 BV<J" (Z4<").   
41 longing of this kind eventually gives birth to oppressive tyrannical desires incapable of 
fulfillment (P"8,B@×H 6"Â •<0<bJLH §DTJ"H ¦<J\6J@LF"): The participial clause explains why ¦B42L:\" Jä< •B`<JT< (subj. of ¦<J\6J@LF") proves so "agonizing" (•D("8X@<)—because it gives 
birth to "tyrannical desires" (§DTJ"H), whose harmful effects ("oppressive . . . incapable of 
fulfillment") Philo describes in §§80b-83. Mosès also takes the clause as explanatory: "Mais 
aucune d’entre les passions n’est aussi cruelle que le dèsir des biens absent, biens d’opinion qui 
n’en sont pas en réalité: car ils engendrent interminablement des caprices tyranniques." 
42 And consider the plight of those subject to tyrannical desire! ((VD): Philo now turns to a 
detailed characterization of life for those subject to tyrannical desire.      
43 Free of restraint and fixed on the thought of a beloved object: Philo presupposes but 
does not explicitly state these conditions. Desire has triumphed over reason (cf. Decal. 149: Ó J, 6D"J02,ÂH ¦B42L:\‘), whose restraining force consequently no longer exists. The birth of §DTH 
signals the involvement of the mind (see above, 87-93). 
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deprived, struggles endlessly in vain,44 dooming the poor soul to a 
Tantalus fate. You remember that wretch. As the story goes, he could 
never quench his thirst, because the water would instantly recede every 
time he tried to take a drink. Likewise, whenever he reached for some fruit 
on the nearby trees, it would all disappear—the loaded branches would 
suddenly turn barren. [§82] Now, just as those hard, implacable 
taskmasters hunger and thirst rack the body more painfully than an 
inquisitor cranking his torture wheel—often to the point of death, unless 
someone appeases their savagery with food and drink—desire can create 
even harsher taskmasters for the soul by creating a grumbling emptiness 
within. People forget what's right in front of them and become obsessed 
with what’s somewhere off in the distance, working themselves into a 
frenzied and unending madness. They become just like Tantalus, racked 
with "hunger" and "thirst," but not for something to fill the void in their 
bellies—they hunger for money, fame, power, voluptuous bodies, or any of 
the countless other things that seem to them enviable and worthy of 
struggle.45 And don’t think that passionate desire, once indulged, will ever 
stop short of this full-blown agony.46 [§83] Just as what physicians call the 
"creeping disease" never stays in one place, but moves about and as its 
name suggests "creeps" through the whole body, spreading and seeping, 
taking over the different parts of the body one after another, from head to 
toe, so too desire spreads quickly and eventually infects every last part of 
the soul in its drive for absolute tyranny. Think of it as a fire with plenty of 
fuel, which keeps burning once it's lit until the flames consume everything. 
  
Having sketched briefly the problem posed by passions in general, Philo now 
considers ¦B42L:\" in particular. Any emotion (BV2@H) can become a passion 
(BV2@H) when reason fails to set proper limits—and passion, understood in this 
way as a failure of restraint, typically brings disaster to the soul (§79). Of course, 
                                            
44 struggles endlessly in vain (FN"*’.,4): Cf. Praem. 140: §>T *¥ J@Ø FN"*’.,4< @Û*¥< ¦D(VF"F2"4 *L<ZF@<J"4. 
45 Cf. Decal. 151: PD0:VJT< §DTH ´ (L<"46ÎH ´ *`>0H ´ J4<@H –88@L Jä< º*@<¬< •B,D(".@:X<T<. 
46 Some such thought underlies Philo’s introduction of disease and fire imagery in §83, 
which otherwise seems out of place. The agony he has just described inevitably comes once 
desire oversteps the bounds of reason unchecked. Philo states this more plainly in Decal. 150: òFB,D J, J ©DB0<f*0 Jä< <@F0:VJT<, ,Æ :¬ BD@"<"6D@LF2,\0 J@:"ÃH ´ 6"bF,F4<, ¦B42X@<J" Fb:B"F"< ¦< 6b68å 6"J"8":$V<,4 J¬< J@Ø Ff:"J@H 6@4<T<\"< @Û*¥< •B"2¥H :XD@H, @àJTH, 
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this general rule applies also to ¦B42L:\", which turns from useful emotion to 
destructive passion when it oversteps the measure of reason. But passionate 
desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\") poses a unique problem and deserves unique 
censure, because it fosters the awful menace of tyrannical desire (§DTH). Philo 
wants to describe that menace in detail and so illustrate just how bad ¦B42L:\" 
can be, not ¦B42L:\" per se—and certainly not ¦B42L:\" the moderated, useful 
emotion—but ¦B42L:\" at its full-blown worst, ¦B42L:\" burgeoned into §DTH. In 
§§80-83, Philo introduces the topic of tyrannical desire (§DTH) then begins his 
"diagnosis" (6D\F4H) in earnest by explaining its torturous effect on the soul. 
 Philo first makes a precise statement of the type of desire he has in mind 
(§80a): a longing (¦B42L:\" Jä< •B`<JT<) after false goods gives birth to 
tyrannical desires (§DTJ"H ¦<J\6J@LF").47 Here Philo repeats the close Platonic 
association of §DTH with B`2@H, a distinct aspect of §DTH.48 Both terms suggest 
an obsessive desire, but with different emphases. A`2@H specifically involves 
objects not in the subject's physical presence.49 As Philo plainly states, the desire 
                                                                                                                                  8`(@H Ò 6"J N48@F@N\"< Æ"JD@Ø *\60< •("2@Ø ÕX@LF"< J¬< ¦B42L:\"< ¦B\FP@4, BV<Jz¦> •<V(60H J J@Ø $\@L BDV(:"J" 64<02ZF,J"4 B"D NbF4<. 
47 Cf. Resp. 586 C: §DTJ"H . . . ¦<J\6J,4<; Leg. 870 A: §DTJ"H :LD\@LH ¦<J\6J@LF"; Her. 
269: ÓJ"< *¥ ¦B42L:\" 6D"JZF®, §DTH ¦((\<,J"4 Jä< •B`<JT<. 
48 Symp. 197 D: Ê:XD@L, B`2@L B"JZD [§DTH] (cf. Phaedr. 250 D). Philo elsewhere notes 
the association explicitly: Opif. 5 (also Opif. 111): §DTJ4 6"Â B`2å; Opif. 77 (also Somn. 2.150; 
Spec. 4.161): §DTJ" 6"Â B`2@<; Congr. 166: §DTH ¦FJÂ 6"Â B`2@H. Cf. Ps-Andr. 231.93: A`2@H *¥ ¦B42L:\" 6"J §DTJ" •B`<J@H [=ESE 10c]. The phrase @ÉFJD@< 6"Â :"<\"< •6V2,6J@< (§82) 
also suggests the involvement of §DTH (e.g., Phaedr. 240 D: ßBz•<V(60H J, 6"Â @ÇFJD@L ¦8"b<,J"4; 251 D: º RLP¬ @ÆFJD”; 241 A: •<Jz§DTJ@H 6"Â :"<\"H; 256 D: J−H ¦DTJ46−H :"<\"H). 
49 Crat. 420 A: "B`2@H" "Þ 6"8,ÃJ"4 F0:"\<T< @Û J@Ø B"D`<J@H ,É<"4 •88 J@Ø –88@2\ B@L Ð<J@H 6"Â •B`<J@H. 
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is Jä< •B`<JT<, which makes it a longing, a pining, for something remote and 
invisible. Since there is by definition nothing to perceive through the senses, the 
moral agent must produce and hold in mind an image of the beloved object. And 
§DTH specifically involves objects deemed "good" (•("2`H) and thus worthy of 
ultimate pursuit. So tyrannical desire, as Philo points out, tragically involves a 
mistaken perception of what is good, compelling the moral agent to pursue 
fervently as good what really is not (ÓF" Jè *@6,Ã< •("2ä<, BDÎH •8Z2,4"< @Û6 
Ð<JT<). In terms of Middle-Platonic moral psychology, this happens when the 
emotion ¦B42L:\" not only oversteps the bounds of reason to become 
passionate desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\"), but defeats reason entirely, compelling 
the vanquished moral agent to embrace its false notion of the good—namely, 
pleasure, which various false goods seem to afford.50 
 Once he identifies tyrannical desire (§DTH) as his topic, Philo explains its 
characteristic ill effects, beginning with the tortuous insatiability §DTH creates in 
the soul (§§80b-82). Philo uses both the image of a maddening, futile chase and 
the mythical figure of Tantalus to portray vividly the same dreadful experience: 
fervently, endlessly reaching for something but never getting hold of it.51 While 
                                            
50 In Phaedr. 237 D – 238 C, the term §DTH applies to one in whom ¦B42L:\" has 
conquered (238 B: 6D"JZF"F" ¦B42L:\"; cf. Leg. 870 A: ¦B42L:\" 6D"J@ØF" . . . §DTJ"H :LD\@LH ¦<J\6J@LF"; Her. 269: ÓJ"< *¥ ¦B42L:\" 6D"JZF®, §DTH ¦((\<,J"4 Jä< •B`<JT<; Decal. 149: Ó J, 6D"J02,ÂH ¦B42L:\‘, *4Rä< •,Â Jä< •B`<JT<). 
51 Note Philo’s language of "stretching" and "driving" (¦B4J,\<,4 (D 6"Â ¦B,8"b<,4). Cf. 
Gig. 18: JH :06\FJ"H ¦< ©"LJ@ÃH J,\<@<J,H ¦B42L:\"H; Migr. 132: ¦B4J,\<T< *¥ JÎ< •6V2,6J@< B`2@< J@Ø 6"8@Ø; Spec. 3.44: §DTH @Û :,JD\TH ¦B4J,\<,J"4; Praem. 159: BDÎH ¦B42L:\"H ¦8"b<,J"4 (cf. Phaedr. 240 D: ßBz•<V(60H J, 6"Â @ÇFJD@L ¦8"b<,J"4). Elsewhere, Philo 
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the chase image conveys an impression of the experience, Philo's commentary 
on Tantalus provides a genuine analysis in terms of moral psychology. Hunger 
and thirst are desires of the soul especially linked to physical states of 
"emptiness."52 As long as the physical emptiness remains, ¦B42L:\" (JÎ 
¦B42L:0J46`<) remains activated, in reflexive pursuit of the pleasure of a physical 
"filling" with food or water.53 The physical emptiness acts as an inherent trigger, 
constantly goading the "taskmasters" hunger and thirst, which in turn compel the 
moral agent to eat and drink. But the goading and compelling disappear when 
the emptiness disappears. Similarly, tyrannical desire creates something like a 
physical emptiness, insofar as it creates an inherent trigger for the soul's 
¦B42L:\" (JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<). Obsessed with a false good, the moral agent 
continually brings an image of that "good" to mind, and because that "good" 
promises pleasure, ¦B42L:\" remains in a state of continual arousal in pursuit of 
that pleasure. Unlike physical hunger, which can end once the physical 
emptiness is filled, this "hunger" cannot end, because there is no corresponding 
                                                                                                                                  
associates §DTH with the "unreachable" (•<,N46J`H): e.g., Leg. 1.75: •<,N\6JT< ¦Dä<; Spec. 
1.44: Jä< •<,N\6JT< §DTH. On Tantalus, see Od. 11.582-92 (cf. Her. 269: *4R± :¥< (D •,\, B4,Ã< *¥ •*L<"J,Ã J"<JV8,4@< J4:TD\"< ßB@:X<@LF"). 
52 On the relation of hunger and thirst, as desires of the soul, to physical states of the 
body, see Phileb. 31 E – 35 D (cf. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure, 61; also 79, n. 4, 
112, n. 2., 140, n. 2). 
53 Of course, reason may or may not authorize the pursuit of food or water, depending on 
the circumstances. In Resp. 439 C-D, Plato describes the moral agent who simultaneously 
desires something to drink but refuses to drink, because reason keeps desire in check. 
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physical emptiness to fill.54 So the soul under tyrannical desire endures an 
oppressive, agonizing (•D("8X@<) fate with no hope of relief.55   
Next, Philo notes the all-consuming nature of tyrannical desire (§83). If left 
unchecked, desire eventually spreads throughout the entire soul (*4zÓ80H . . . J−H 
RLP−H), just as disease consumes all of the body (BF"< J¬< 6@4<T<\"< Jä< J@Ø 
Ff:"J@H :,Dä<) and fire consumes all available fuel (BF"< "ÛJZ<).56 These 
images suit Philo's Middle-Platonic psychology, because they portray desire as a 
distinct power capable of malignant, independent operation—of spreading its 
influence from one part of the soul to another. Once desire has broken free of 
reason's restraint, it settles for nothing less than complete domination.57 In this 
way, tyrannical desire represents the terminal stage of desire's unrestrained 
activity: ¦B42L:\" has "consumed" the rational part of the soul, replacing any 
proper notion of "the good" with its singular focus on pleasure. 
§§80 – 83 Excursus: Parallel Material in Decal. 146-50 
In Decal. 146-50, Philo gives a similar account of tyrannical desire, 
describing its insatiability and all-consuming nature. The initial context, however, 
deals with desire, pleasure, fear, and distress as emotions (BV20), not passions 
                                            
54 Cf. Agr. 36: 6—< "Ê J−H ("FJDÎH •B@B80DT2äF4 *,>":,<"\, FB"D(äF"< §J4 6"Â :"4:äF"< J¬< •,Â 6,<¬< ¦B42L:\"< B,D4$8XB,F2"4 6"Â B,D4N@4J< . . . Ë<" 6"Â J@ØJ@ B":NV(@L BLDÎH *\60< ¦B484P:ZF0J"4. 
55 Cf. Ebr. 6: •B80FJ\"H *¥ ["ÇJ4@<] º •D(8,TJVJ0 B"2ä< RLP−H ¦B42L:\". 
56 On passion as "disease," see Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and 
Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (MCL n.s. 2; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 13-77. 
57 See A. Pelletier, "Les passions à l’assaut de l’âme d’après Philon." REG 78 (1965): 52-
60. Cf. Decal. 142: <,TJ,D@B@4Î< 6"Â ¦B\$@L8@< J¬< ¦B42L:\"< ,Æ*fH. 
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(BV20), addressing the question of how ¦B42L:\" (which alone the Decalogue 
prohibits) differs from the other three (§142). Philo claims that desire alone is 
"voluntary" (©6@bF4@H), because desire alone has its origin within us (J¬< •DP¬< 
¦> º:ä< "ÛJä< 8":$V<,4), and he carries this idea into the ensuing descriptions 
of how each emotion works (§§143-45).58 In the case of pleasure, distress, and 
fear, the perceptions of present good, present ill, or impending ill—perceptions 
that originate outside the moral agent—cause the corresponding emotion to 
occur involuntarily, and Philo signals this grammatically by making the perception 
the subject in each description.59 But when he comes to desire (§146), the 
subject of his description becomes the moral agent (J4H), who himself brings an 
apparent "good" to mind (8"$f< . . . §<<@4"< •("2@Ø :¬ B"D`<J@H). So Philo's 
descriptions of the four cardinal emotions do in fact support his initial claim about 
the unique genesis of desire, but only because he manipulates his account of 
¦B42L:\" to that end. He elsewhere understands ¦B42L:\" to operate according 
to the same non-rational mechanism of stimulus and response underlying the 
other emotions.60 So consistency of doctrine would have required him to give an 
account of the emotion desire similar to his accounts of pleasure, distress, and 
fear. But instead, beginning in §146 and continuing through §150, he describes 
                                            
58 Wolfson (Philo, 2:232-35) explains the unique “voluntary” aspect of desire in light of 
Philo’s concept of human free will (choice). But from a Platonic perspective, non-rational ¦B42L:\" moves reflexively and so independently of the moral agent’s “will.” 
59 §143: N"<J"F\" *4,(,\D,4 6"Â *4"<\FJ0F4 J¬< RLP¬<; §144: J` . . . 6"6`< . . . "ÛJ¬< •<"B\:B80F4< –6@LF"<; §145: JÎ 6"6Î< . . . BJ@\"< 6"Â •(T<\"< . . . BD@,6BX:B,4. 
60 E.g., Leg. 3115: ¦B42L:\" = ÐD,>4H –8@(@H (cf. above, 67, n. 76). 
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not the emotion ¦B42L:\" but its vicious offspring, tyrannical desire (§DTH), in 
terms that mirror Spec. 4.80-83. 
 Although Philo does not use the term §DTH in §146 when he introduces his 
topic (as he does in Spec. 4.80 using the term §DTJ"H), he nevertheless speaks 
of tyrannical desire. The moral agent holds in mind a concept (§<<@4"<) of an 
absent "good" (•("2@Ø :¬ B"D`<J@H) and "reaches" to get it (ÏDX(0J"4 JLP,Ã< 
"ÛJ@Ø). Setting the mind on what is deemed good signals Platonic §DTH—in 
particular, a tyrannical desire set on any number of false goods and the 
pleasures they promise.61 Philo states the involvement of tyrannical desire 
explicitly in §151: PD0:VJT< §DTH ´ (L<"46ÎH ´ *`>0H ´ J4<@H –88@L Jä< º*@<¬< 
•B,D(".@:X<T<. The absence of the beloved object (:¬ B"D`<J@H) suggests 
Platonic B`2@H, to which Philo refers explicitly in §146: R"ØF"4 J@Ø B@2@L:X<@L 
(84P`:,<@H (cf. B`2@H in §148).62 With the beloved "good" set up in the mind, 
¦B42L:\" (JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<) reflexively "reaches" (ÏDX(0J"4) to attain the 
pleasure it offers.63 Desire has completely defeated the moral agent, imposing its 
ultimate "good" of pleasure upon the rational faculty and so establishing an 
object of hopeless pursuit for the non-rational ¦B42L:\" within.64 As in Spec. 
                                            
61 As in Spec. 4.80: ÓF" Jè *@6,Ã< •("2ä<, BDÎH •8Z2,4"< @Û6 Ð<JT<. 
62 Plato also links (8\P@:"4 with §DTH, as in Phaedr. 248 A: (84P`:,<"4 . . . J@Ø –<T. Cf. 
Philo, Opif. 166: (8\P,J"4 JLP,Ã< ¦D"FJ@Ø. 
63 Cf. Plato's use of ÏDX(,J"4 to indicate the "reaching" or "yearning" of JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`< 
to drink (Resp. 439 A). 
64 §149: Ó J, 6D"J02,ÂH ¦B42L:\‘, *4Rä< •,Â Jä< •B`<JT<. 
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4.80-83, Philo vividly portrays the endless, futile striving to grasp an ever-elusive 
object. 
 Instead of elaborating the image of an exasperating, futile chase 
(mentioned summarily in §146), Philo appeals in §§147-149a to the senses of 
sight and hearing to illustrate the straining, agonizing, fruitless effort to 
apprehend the beloved object of tyrannical desire.65 The eyes, he says (§147), 
are often hard pressed for the "apprehension" (6"JV80R4H) of some far-off object. 
Despite their intense and continued effort, they are unable to get hold of what 
they "desire" and exhaust themselves.66 Likewise, the ears (§148-149a) can be 
"aroused" (•<,(,D2X<J")67 by an indistinct, far-off noise, which produces a 
"longing" (B`2@H) for clarity. The sound, however, remains indistinct, provoking 
an even greater yearning for "apprehension" (J@Ø 6"J"8"$,Ã< Ë:,D@<).68 These 
analogies from the realm of sense-perception not only present a novel image of 
insatiability—they also reflect the Middle-Platonic moral psychology underlying 
Philo's exposition. By choosing to compare the mechanism of tyrannical desire 
                                            
65 Philo introduces the analogy in §147: Ó:@4@< *X J4 6"Â B,DÂ JH "ÆF2ZF,4H §@46, FL:$"\<,4<. 
66 In Philo's account (§147), note esp. J,\<@<J,H "ßJ@bH (cf. §146: ¦6J,\<T<; §149: ¦B4J,\<,F2"4; Spec. 4.80: ¦B4J,\<,4); B8X@< J−H *L<V:,TH; FN"8X<J,H; Jè $4"\å 6"Â FL<J`<å J−H •J,<@ØH BD@F$@8−H •F2,<ZF"<J,H. 
67 Philo often uses •<,(,\DT in connection with the emotions (e.g., Ebr. 98, Fug. 91), 
which makes sense in light of the moral psychology of §DTH: the rational part of the soul, 
consumed with tyrannical desire, holds in mind an image that continually arouses the emotion ¦B42L:\", creating the maddening experience of insatiability (cf. Spec. 1.92: ¦B42L:\"H ¦(,\D@LF"4; Spec. 2.193: ¦(,\D,4 . . . ¦B42L:\"H; Spec. 4.129: ¦B42L:\"< ¦(,\D"<J,H). 
68 Like B`2@H, Ë:,D@H represents an aspect of §DTH for both Plato and Philo. Examples for 
Plato: Symp. 197 D: Ê:XD@L, B`2@L B"JZD [§DTH] (cf. Phaedr. 251 C-E); for Philo: Opif. 70-71: 
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with the non-rational mechanism of sense-perception ("ÇF20F4H), Philo reaffirms 
his understanding of ¦B42L:\" as a fundamentally non-rational power, which 
non-rationally pursues the "good" (pleasure) set before it.69 
 As in Spec. 4.81-82, Philo cites the mythical figure Tantalus to illustrate 
the operation of tyrannical desire (§149b). Although brief, his remarks plainly 
state the condition of someone consumed by §DTH, someone "conquered by 
desire" (6D"J02,ÂH ¦B42L:\‘). Desire, in other words, has reached the height of 
power, supplanting reason and making its own goal of pleasure the goal of the 
moral agent. In this condition, the moral agent "thirsts" always for what is absent 
(*4Rä< •,Â Jä< •B`<JT<) without ever being "filled" (@Û*XB@J, B80D@ØJ"4). In 
fact, there is no possibility of being filled, since the appetite aroused by an image 
of false goods has no capacity for fulfillment—it is an "empty," in the sense of 
"vain" or "pointless," appetite (6,<Z< . . . J¬< ÐD,>4<). 
 As in Spec. 4.83, Philo compares desire to disease and fire (§150), both of 
which spread until they have consumed everything available to them. Again, the 
imagery reflects Middle-Platonic moral psychology by depicting ¦B42L:\" as a 
destructive force originating in one part (of the body, of the combustible mass, of 
the soul) and spreading to other parts.70 Revealing his Middle-Platonic affinities 
                                                                                                                                  ©B`:,<@H §DTJ4 F@N\"H . . . (,:4F2,ÂH Ê:XD@L 6" ÂB`2@L; Somn. 1.36: §DTJ,H . . . •6V2,6J@4 6"Â 8,8LJJ06`J,H Ë:,D@4. 
69 Cf. Philo’s bipartite model of reason over against "ÇF20F4H (see above, 72-75). 
70 Philo describes a disease spreading throughout the body leaving no "part" (:XD@H) 
unaffected (•B"2XH) (§150). 
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even further, Philo uses this imagery to reflect the adversarial relationship 
between parts (between reason and desire) so fundamental to the Platonic 
perspective. He notes that the soul will suffer infection "lest philosophical reason 
hold back the stream of desire" (,Æ :¬ 8`(@H Ò 6"J N48@F@N\"< . . . ÕX@LF"< 
J¬< ¦B42L:\"< ¦B\FP@4).71 Here reason acts to restrain desire, in order to 
preclude an overpowering of reason by desire. If reason fails to hold back the 
stream, then desire will have its way, ultimately overrunning the entire soul with 
the tyranny of  §DTH. Similarly, if the "flame" of desire is granted "freedom" 
(–*,4")72 and "leisure" (¦6,P,4D\")73—in other words, if reason fails to restrain 
desire and gives it free rein instead—then it will eventually spread and destroy 
everything through the tyranny of §DTH. Philo deploys the imagery in this way 
because he understands the importance of ¦(6DVJ,4": reason must either 
impose its rule on non-rational ¦B42L:\" or in the end suffer the rule of desire's 
tyrannical offspring §DTH. 
§§84 – 91: Tyrannical Desire as "Source of All Ills" 
 
[§84] So great and egregious an ill, then, is passionate desire. In fact, if 
truth be told, it is the source of all the world’s ills. Think for a minute about 
the underlying cause of looting, robbery, and swindling; of flattery and 
insult; of seduction, adultery, murder—of all wrongdoing involving matters 
private or public, sacred or secular. Do these ultimately have any source 
other than desire? [§85] For this reason, among the passions, only 
                                            
71 Cf. Legat. 65: J¬< B@88¬< "ÛJ@Ø Õb:0< Jä< ¦B42L:4ä< ¦NX>@<J". On "stream of 
desire," see also Resp. 485 D-E; cf. Crat. 419 E – 420 B. 
72 Cf. esp. Leg. 2.91, where Philo associates this same "freedom" (–*,4") with the 
eventual rise of tyranny within the soul (JLDV<<@L JD`B@<) (also Post. 98; Congr. 158).  
73 Cf. Philo's use of ¦6,P,4D\" in connection with the Sabbath (e.g., Mos. 2.22; Spec. 
2.69). 
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passionate desire deserves the name "Master Vice," whose one little 
offspring tyrannical desire has repeatedly filled the world with unspeakable 
disasters74—which, too numerous for land, have spilled out into the sea. 
Everywhere the vast watery expanse has been filled with ships of war and 
all the terrible inventions of war. Charging out to sea, their violence runs 
its course then crashes back like a tide upon the shores of home. [§86] 
We can better understand the effect of passionate desire75 by thinking of it 
as a venomous creature or lethal poison, both of which cause an overall 
change for the worse anytime they take hold of someone. What exactly do 
I mean by that? Think of tyrannical desire as the fatal "bite" of passionate 
desire, a terminal "taking hold" akin to a "taking over."76 [§87] For 
example, if a tyrannical desire for money takes over of the soul,77 it turns 
people into thieves and pickpockets, larcenists and burglars—it makes 
them likely to swindle and scam, to accept bribes, to violate sacred trusts, 
to perform any other similar act of greed. [§88] If a tyrannical desire for 
reputation takes over, it makes people pretentious, arrogant, unsteady and 
unsettled in character. With eager ears they listen for the pronouncements 
of other people,78 becoming at the same time dejected and elated as they 
                                            
74 among the passions, only passionate desire deserves the name "Master Vice," whose 
one little offspring tyrannical desire (•R,L*äH —< 8,P2¥< •DPX6"6@< BV2@H ¦FJ4< ¦B42L:\", ½H «< JÎ $D"PbJ"J@< §((@<@<, §DTH): Here taking JÎ $D"PbJ"J@< not as the littlest of many, but simply 
as very little (cf. Her. 155: JÎ $D"PbJ"J@< .ä@<, –<2DTB@<) In other words, the genesis of §DTH in 
the soul seems slight in comparison with the "unspeakable disasters" (•:L2ZJT< . . . FL:N@Dä<) 
it eventually creates. 
75 the effect of passionate desire (J@Ø BV2@LH ¦<XD(,4"<): Reading ¦<XD(,4"< with MSS 
(SM) rather than ¦<VD(,4"< proposed by Mangey and adopted by Cohn-Wendland. Philo, after 
all, explains in §§87-91 the work of desire in the soul (cf. Leg. 2.101: Ò •B@B\BJT< Jä< B"2ä< 6"Â ßFJ,D\.T< J−H ¦<,D(,\"H "ÛJä<; Leg. 3.22: J"ÃH Jä< B"2ä< ¦<,D(,\"4H). 
76 Think of tyrannical desire as the fatal "bite" of passionate desire, a terminal "taking 
hold" akin to a "taking over." Since the Greek of §86 ends with J\ *z¦FJÂ< Ô 8X(T ("What exactly 
do I mean by that?"), this sentence attempts to clarify the logic of Philo's venom/poison simile in 
light of the examples given in §§87-91. He presupposes passionate desire as the condition from 
which tyrannical desire—the worst, terminal grade of desire—is born. Passionate desire 
represents a genuine danger to the soul, but it fatally "bites" the soul by burgeoning into 
tyrannical desire, which consumes the moral agent and thoroughly corrupts the character.  
77 if a tyrannical desire for money takes over of the soul (,Æ BDÎH PDZ:"J" (X<@4J@): Philo 
uses (X<@4J@ to indicate the "birth" of tyrannical desire (cf. §85: JÎ $D"PbJ"J@< §((@<@<, §DTH) 
relative to a particular beloved object, in this case PDZ:"J". He envisions the same phenomenon 
relative to other objects (*`>", etc.) in subsequent paragraphs. 
78 With eager ears they listen for the pronouncements of other people (NT<"ÃH J ìJ" B,ND"6`J"H): The phrase NT<"ÃH J ìJ" B,ND"6`J"H most likely represents a play on words. 
The verb ¦B4NDVFFT with J ìJ" means "to stop one's ears" (see LSJ, s.v.), an idiom attested in 
Philo (e.g., Leg. 2.25; Migr. 191). But treating NDVFFT as an equivalent of ¦B4NDVFFT yields a 
sense directly opposite to what the context demands: people concerned with reputation clearly do 
not "stop their ears"—they want to know what people are saying about them, and because they 
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hear from the fickle masses, who deal out praise and blame by 
indiscriminate whim. Because they care only for what others have to say 
about them, they readily exchange love for hatred, or hatred for love, 
depending on what they hear—without a moment's consideration. You'll 
find them doing other things like this, always for the same reason. [§89] If 
a tyrannical desire for power takes over, it makes people contentious, 
inequitable, domineering by nature, cruel at heart. They become enemies 
of their own land, harsh masters of anyone weaker, irreconcilable enemies 
of their equals in strength, and deceitful flatterers of anyone stronger. If a 
tyrannical desire for voluptuous bodies takes over, people become 
seducers, adulterers, pederasts, devotees of indulgence and lust—they 
consider the greatest of evils to be the happiest of goods. [§90] Overtaking 
even the tongue, tyrannical desire has stirred up endless troubles, since 
we know that people are often gripped with a desire to keep quiet when 
they ought to speak or a desire to speak when they ought to keep quiet—
and both receive their just deserts. [§91] And when tyrannical desire 
seizes the belly, it produces hopeless, insatiable gluttons, devotees of a 
life of ease and dissipation, people who revel in guzzling and gorging, 
base slaves of drinks and delicacies, who forage around at parties and 
banquets like ravenous little dogs. Such people end up with a miserable, 
accursed life more painful than any death.  
 
Proceeding with his "diagnosis" (6D\F4H), Philo turns from the agonizing 
experience tyrannical desire works in the individual (§§80-83) to consider the 
moral corruption and chaos it works in society through such individuals (§§84-
91). Philo makes one central claim in this section: that all moral and social ills 
stem from ¦B42L:\". Such a claim both expands the scope of Philo's 
programmatic condemnation of desire and justifies the Decalogue's prohibition of 
only one BV2@H as an efficient preclusion of all wrongdoing. And Philo 
undoubtedly does mean passionate desire when he calls ¦B42L:\" the "source of 
                                                                                                                                  
are listening intently to praise and blame, their mood rises and falls accordingly. Philo plays with 
the ¦B4NDVFFT idiom, substituting NDVFFT, which can connote fortification (see LSJ, s.v.; cf. Virt. 
186; Prob. 152). The original effect must have been something like: "Their ears are not stopped, 
they're propped—eager to hear what people are saying." 
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all ills" (BV<JT< B0(¬ Jä< 6"6ä< in §84) and "Master Vice" (•DPX6"6@< in §85), 
although he means it in a qualified sense.79 He indicts passionate desire insofar 
as it gives birth to tyrannical desire (§DTH), and tyrannical desire then does the 
real work of corrupting character and engendering corrupt behavior. As Philo 
puts it in §85, ¦B42L:\" is the Master Vice, "whose one little offspring tyrannical 
desire (§DTH) has repeatedly filled the world with unspeakable disasters."  
Using a series of concrete examples, Philo goes on to explain in §§86-91 
just how tyrannical desire operates. Philo's argument presumes a direct stepwise 
progression from useful ¦B42L:\", to passionate ¦B42L:\", to §DTH, which bears 
full responsibility for the corruption of character. In other words, unrestrained 
desire gives birth to §DTH, whose hegemony in turn transforms the moral agent 
into an evildoer who stops at nothing in pursuit of the beloved object. To clarify 
the mechanism of this transformation, Philo compares desire to poison, 
suggesting that both effect an overall change for the worse in whomever they 
afflict.80 Poison, for instance, when introduced into the body (by venomous 
creatures or lethal drugs), despite its initial localization, eventually transforms the 
entire body from healthy to sick, from living to dead. Similarly, ¦B42L:\", despite 
the "localization" of its initial break with reason, eventually burgeons into §DTH 
and transforms the entire soul from healthy to sick, from virtuous to vicious. And 
                                            
79 Philo makes the same claim in Decal. 173: J¬< Jä< •*460:VJT< B0(Z<, ¦B42L:\"<, •Nz½H ÕX@LF4< "Ê B"D"<fJ"J"4 BDV>,4H.  
80 §86: ÓFT< —< . . . BD@FVR0J"4, :,J"$@8¬< •B,D(V.,J"4 J¬< BDÎH JÎ P,ÃD@<. 
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people display different forms of moral corruption depending on which false 
goods they pursue under tyrannical desire's control: whether money (PDZ:"J"), 
reputation (*`>"), power (•DPZ), or voluptuous bodies (Ff:"J@H 6V88@H) (§§87-
89).81 In each case, the moral agent's obsessive drive for that particular "good" 
ultimately leads to a distinct profile of reprehensible behaviors detrimental to both 
self and society. For example, an §DTH for money yields thieves and swindlers 
(§87); an §DTH for reputation yields pretentious braggarts (§88);82 an §DTH for 
power yields ruthless oppressors (§89); an §DTH for voluptuous bodies yields 
sexual offenders (§89). In this way, Philo traces a huge spectrum of wrongdoing 
to one source, tyrannical desire. To complete this spectrum of wrongdoing, Philo 
adds to his list of four false goods (§§87-89) two parts of the body over which 
tyrannical desire can reign (§§90-91): the tongue ((8äJJ") and the belly (J B,DÂ 
("FJXD"). 
As for the tongue, Philo mentions the reprehensible desire of some either 
to keep quiet what ought to be said or to say what ought to be kept quiet (§90).83 
He describes a situation of desire having "reached" the tongue (¦BÂ (8äJJ"< 
N2VF"F")—that is, desire having extended its influence even so far as to 
overtake the tongue, causing people to act (speak) contrary to reason. Just as 
the tyranny of §DTH over people enamored of false goods causes corruption and 
                                            
81 Cf. Philo’s list in §82: PDZ:"J", *`>", º(,:@<\"4, ,Û:@DN\"4.  
82 On §DTH for *`>" see also Plutarch, Suav. viv. 1100 B. 
83 §90: §<4@4 (D ¦B42L:@ØF4< ´ J 8,6JX" F4TB< ´ J ºFLP"FJX" 8X(,4<. Cf. Garr.  
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wrongdoing, the tyranny of §DTH over the tongue causes all sorts of troubles. 
Philo does not consider at length the immoralities caused by speech and silence, 
because tracing them to ¦B42L:\"-turned-§DTH confirms his central claim that all 
moral and social ills—including these—stem from desire.  
Finally, Philo speaks of desire "getting hold of the belly" (R":X<0 *¥ Jä< 
B,DÂ ("FJXD"), which clearly indicates more than just reasonable desires for food 
and drink. He has in mind people overcome by tyrannical desire (§DTH), who 
have established the pleasure derived from eating and drinking as their ultimate 
"good." Tyrannical desire has made them "base slaves" (6"6@×H *@b8@LH) of 
drinks and delicacies, who lead a "miserable and accursed life" (•28\"< 6"Â 
¦BVD"J@< . . . .TZ<) more "agonizing" (•D("8,TJXD"<) than any death.84 As with 
every case of §DTH, a particular object of affection produces a particular brand of 
immorality: those who adore the pleasures of food and drink become, above all, 
"gluttons" (("FJD4:VD(@LH).85  
§§84 – 91 Excursus: Parallel Material in Decal. 151-53 
In Decal. 151-53, Philo likewise indicts desire as the source of countless 
troubles. He initially asks whether §DTH for money, a woman, reputation, or 
"anything else producing pleasure" becomes the cause of only "small and 
                                            
84 Cf. §80: @Û*¥< •D("8X@< ñH ¦B42L:\" Jä< •B`<JT< ÓF" Jè *@6,Ã< •("2ä<, BDÎH •8Z2,4"< @Û6 Ð<JT<, P"8,B@×H 6"Â •<0<bJLH §DTJ"H ¦<J\6J@LF". 
85 In the course of Phaedr. 237 C – 238 C, Socrates labels §DTH as it relates to food 
"("FJD4:"D(\"" (esp. 238 A-B: B,DÂ :¥< (D ¦*T*¬< 6D"J@ØF" J@Ø 8`(@L J@Ø •D\FJ@L Jä< 
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incidental ills."86 This rhetorical question functions as the thesis for §§151-53 and 
reflects real convictions about desire crucial to Philo’s exposition of the Tenth 
Commandment: tyrannical desire (§DTH), which can arise in connection with any 
number of pleasurable aims, in turn becomes responsible for ("ÇJ4@H (\<,J"4) 
great and innumerable ills. In §§152-53, Philo considers warfare in particular, 
ultimately concluding that "all wars flow from one source: desire (¦B42L:\") for 
money, or reputation, or pleasure."87 He essentially restates here the thesis of 
§151, but with less precision, metonymically replacing the specific term §DTH with 
the generic term ¦B42L:\", replacing also the carefully worded "things that 
produce pleasure" (Jä< º*@<¬< •B,D(".@:X<T<) with a generic reference to 
"pleasure" (º*@<−H). 
§§92 – 94: Location of z+B42:\" 
 
[§92] And this overpowering desire for food and drink explains88 why those 
who had not simply "tasted" philosophy but had lavishly "feasted" on its 
sound doctrines—once they had investigated the nature of the soul and 
                                                                                                                                  –88T< ¦B42L:4ä< ¦B42L:\" ("FJD4:"D(\"). Philo elsewhere associates ("FJD4:"D(\" with an 
absolute dominance of desire for food (e.g., Agr. 36). 
86 §151: PD0:VJT< §DTH ´ (L<"46ÎH ´ *`>0H ´ J4<@H –88@L Jä< º*@<¬< •B,D(".@:X<T< ˜DV (, :46Dä< 6"Â Jä< JLP`<JT< "ÇJ4@H (\<,J"4 6"6ä<. 
87 §153: B`8,:@4 BV<J,H •BÎ :4H B0(−H ¦DDb0F"<, ¦B42L:\"H ´ PD0:VJT< ´ *`>0H ´ º*@<−H. 
88 this overpowering desire for food and drink explains (J"bJ0H ª<,6" J−H "ÆJ\"H). Philo 
does not name the reason philosophers decided to distribute (•BX<,4:"<) the soul’s parts as they 
did, but J"bJ0H . . . J−H "ÆJ\"H must refer to some aspect of §91, because §§92-94 bear obvious 
connections to only that paragraph. Fundamentally, §91 and §§92-94 have in common the 
association of ¦B42L:\" with the same general region of the body (§91: J B,DÂ ("FJXD"; §93: Ò B,DÂ JÎ< Ï:N"8Î< 6"Â JÎ 6"8@b:,<@< *4VND"(:" PäD@H) and the use of language related to 
eating (§91: @Æ<@N8L(\"4H, ÏR@N"(\"4H, FL:B`F4", JD"BX."H; §92: (,LFV:,<@4, ©FJ4"2X<J,H). 
Since §91 describes corrupt, compulsive eating and drinking, J"bJ0H . . . J−H "ÆJ\"H undoubtedly 
refers to the overpowering desire for food and drink underlying such behavior.    
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recognized its tripartite structure89 (reason, spirit, desire)—distributed the 
various parts as they did. They put reason, which rules the soul, in the 
most appropriate place, the head, which is the topmost part of the body. 
The head also serves as headquarters for the senses, which together form 
a sort of entourage for the soul's "king," the mind. [§93] Next, they 
determined that spirit must reside in the chest, for two reasons: first, in the 
chest, spirit wears a breastplate, just like a soldier, and this added 
protection makes it very difficult to defeat, although certainly not invincible; 
second, in the chest, dwelling near the mind, spirit receives help from its 
neighbor, whose wise counsel lulls it into compliance. Finally, they 
determined that desire must reside in the area around the navel known as 
the "diaphragm." [§94] Since desire has the least to do with reason, it 
clearly must reside as far as possible from reason's royal domain—
practically at the outskirts. Naturally, the pasture of this most insatiable 
and licentious of beasts is the area of the body associated with primal 
drives for food and sex. 
  
Paragraphs 92-94 represent an excursus framed as a review of Platonic doctrine 
on the physical location of each of the soul’s three parts.90 Just before this 
excursus (§§86-91), Philo had been describing how §DTH functions as the source 
of all wrongdoing, using a series of examples that matched specific false goods 
pursued under tyrannical desire’s hegemony with specific types of moral 
corruption. His final example (§91) noted the ability of ¦B42L:\"-turned-§DTH to 
"seize the belly" and so corrupt the moral agent in matters of eating and drinking. 
But in §92, Philo no longer considers the mechanism of §DTH, choosing instead 
to reflect further on the association of ¦B42L:\" with a particular region of the 
body, which he now refers to as Ò B,DÂ JÎ< Ï:N"8Î< 6"Â JÎ 6"8@b:,<@< 
                                            
89 recognized its tripartite structure (JD\JJ@< ,Ç*@H ¦<4*`<J,H "ÛJ−H): PCW rightly emends 
the JD\J@< of MSS to JD4JJÎ<. Philo’s immediate listing of the three Platonic ,Ç*0 (8`(@H, 2L:`H, 
and ¦B42L:\") indeed suggests an original reference to "threefold [i.e., tripartite] form" rather than 
"third form." Cf. Aet. 86: BLDÎH JD4JJÎ< ,Ç*@Hq JÎ :¥< –<2D">, JÎ *¥ N8`>, JÎ *¥ "Û(Z.  
90 On Plato’s theory, see Tim. 69 C – 71 D (cf. Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, 301-14). 
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*4VND"(:" PäD@H (§93) instead of simply J B,DÂ ("FJXD" (§91). Although Philo 
retains from §91 an interest in the connection between ¦B42L:\" and "belly," his 
question has changed from how ¦B42L:\" (JÎ ¦B42L:0J46`<) tyrannizes the soul 
to how knowledgeable philosophers determined its location. 
Philo’s manner of juxtaposing §91 and §§92-94 implies that philosophers 
connected the ¦B42L:0J46`< with the the belly because so many people 
experience an overpowering, tyrannical desire for food and drink. He clearly 
notes in §§92-94 that these philosophers posited the connection "for this reason" 
(J"bJ0H ª<,6" J−H "ÆJ\"H), and the placement of the phrase requires the 
"reason" to be somewhere in §91, most likely in the gluttonous immorality Philo 
portrays in that paragraph. But when he actually spells out the reason in §94, he 
says nothing about gluttonous immorality, merely citing the logical necessity that 
(1) the faculty having "least to do with reason" reside farthest from reason and (2) 
the "most insatiable and licentious of beasts" (¦B42L:\") inhabit the bodily 
regions associated with food and sex. But Philo does not simply abandon the 
logic of his transitional phrase in favor of an allusion to Plato’s Timaeus91—he 
moves his train of thought in an entirely new direction. And, in fact, when viewed 
in the context of Philo’s entire exposition, §§92-94 do not so much advance the 
argument as provide a transition within the exposition from the diagnosis section 
(6D\F4H) to the treatment section (–F60F4H).   
                                            
91 Cf. Tim. 70 D – 71 A.  
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Most importantly, §§92-94 function as a transition by introducing new 
material crucial to Philo’s upcoming argument. Part one of his treatise, designed 
to expose the shameful character of tyrannical desire, essentially ends with §91, 
since §§92-94 both derive and digress from that paragraph and bear no direct 
connection to earlier material. But nothing in part one of his exposition, up to and 
including §91, gives Philo a theoretical basis for asserting the preeminence of 
desires for food and drink over against any other type of desire. In fact, the desire 
for food and drink appears as only part of his list, last among desires for money, 
reputation, etc.—all of which are equally capable of causing moral ruin after 
burgeoning into their respective versions of tyrannical desire. Yet in his 
explanation of the rationale underlying Moses’ therapeutic program (§96), Philo 
will argue that management of "the desire having to do with the belly" (J¬< B,DÂ 
("FJXD" BD"(:"J,L@:X<0< ¦B42L:\"<) serves as the paradigmatic model for 
managing all corruptible desires, since that one desire is fundamental, being the 
"eldest" (J¬< BD,F$LJVJ0<) and "chief" (º(,:@<\*") of them all. Paragraphs 92-
94 give Philo the theoretical justification for such a claim, because they endorse 
a Platonic view of the soul, which grants preeminence to desires for food and 
drink while still tracing all corruptible desires to one part of the soul.  
In addition, §§92-94 effect a smooth transition from part one (esp. §91) to 
part two (esp. §§95-97) by considering ¦B42L:\" in a new light without disrupting 
a basic continuity of content involving the nexus of desire, food and drink, and 
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the belly. Before §§92-94, Philo considers ¦B42L:\" in a decidedly negative light, 
limiting his concern almost exclusively to the disastrous tyranny of §DTH, which 
represents the terminal stage of ¦B42L:\" overstepping the bounds of reason. 
But the treatment section of Philo’s exposition concerns itself with how to prevent 
¦B42L:\" from overstepping the bounds of reason. In other words, the topic of 
part two is not tyrannical desire, but useful desire—the kind a moral agent may 
rightly condone and exercise without compromising virtue, provided reason stays 
in control. By commenting in §§92-94 on the location of ¦B42L:\" within Platonic 
tripartition, Philo shifts the emphasis from desire as raging tyrant to desire as a 
natural component of the soul, without entirely losing sight of its dangerous 
capacity for misconduct (§94: BV<JT< •B80FJ`J"J@< 6"Â •6@8"FJ`J"J@< . . . 
2D,::VJT<). He can then begin in §§95-97 his consideration of how best to 
manage ¦B42L:\", particularly the ¦B42L:\" for food and drink, which—though 
prone to excess—forms a natural part of every human life.  
§§95 – 97: Overview of Moses’ "Paradigmatic Instruction" 
[§95] Now, the most holy Moses, in my view, took all of this into account 
when he designed a special set of laws for managing desire.92 His goal 
was to eliminate passionate desire,93 having come to detest it as both a 
horrible disgrace in itself and—as I just explained—the ultimate cause of 
disgraceful behavior, a sort of siege-engine within us, bent on overtaking 
                                            
92 he designed a special set of laws for managing desire (•B,ÃB,< ¦< J@ÃH :V84FJ" J¬< ¦B42L:\"<): Unlike the Tenth Commandment itself, which categorically prohibits passionate 
desire, Moses' prohibition (•B,ÃB,<) operates through the cumulative effect of a whole set of 
dietary laws promoting virtuous management of the emotion desire. 
93 to eliminate passionate desire (¦6*bF"F2"4 JÎ BV2@H): Moses' goal is that of the Tenth 
Commandment: to eliminate the passion desire (JÎ BV2@H [¦B42L:\"]). 
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and corrupting the soul.94 He understood that a life free of passionate 
desire, in which desire obeys the commanding authority of reason,95 would 
be filled with peace, order, and genuine prosperity, resulting in perfect 
happiness. [§96] And since Moses cherishes brevity and tends to address 
innumerable cases with just one paradigmatic instruction, he builds a 
comprehensive therapeutic program on the chastisement and training of 
just one desire, desire involving the belly.96 He reasons that once the most 
primal and commanding desire has learned to submit to the laws of self-
mastery, all other desires will likewise become obedient to the rein and 
accept the authority of reason. [§97] So what sort of instruction lies at the 
heart of Moses’ therapeutic program? Obviously, its two fundamental 
concerns are food and drink, and Moses left neither of these unregulated. 
Instead, he curtailed their use by means of dietary laws whose 
observance leads to self-control, not to mention philanthropy and—most 
important of all—piety. 
 
Philo begins the "treatment" section (–F60F4H) of his exposition by summarizing 
briefly the "diagnosis" section (6D\F4H) he has just completed (§§79-94). He 
                                            
94 a sort of siege-engine within us, bent on overtaking and corrupting the soul (òH J4<" J−H RLP−H ©8XB@84<): A ©8XB@84H was a machine of war, designed for hostile assault of an enemy 
fortification. By using this term, Philo suggests that ¦B42L:\" seeks to overthrow reason. By 
"storming the citadel" and taking over the soul, ¦B42L:\"-turned-§DTH becomes the cause of 
disgraceful behavior ("òH" demands some connection between "disgraceful" and "siege-engine"). 
The independent, hostile agency of ¦B42L:\" conveyed by the metaphor illustrates Philo's 
fundamentally Platonic perspective. See Pelletier, "Passions à l’assaut de l’âme," esp. 57-58. Cf. 
Abraham Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," HTR 76 (1983): 143-73, esp. 
145-47.  
95 a life free of passionate desire, in which desire obeys the commanding authority of 
reason (½H [¦B42L:\"H] •<"4D,2,\F0H ´ B,42"DP@bF0H 6L$,D<ZJ® 8@(4F:è): At face value, the 
Greek suggests two ways of managing ¦B42L:\" to achieve peace and happiness: abolish ¦B42L:\" entirely (•<"4D,2,\F0H) or (³) make it obedient to reason (B,42"DP@bF0H . . . 8@(4F:è). 
But Philo's statement of the issue reflects the inherent Middle-Platonic ambiguity of the term ¦B42L:\", which refers either to the passion desire or the emotion desire. He clearly calls for the 
abolition of passionate desire (cf. ¦6*bF"F2"4 JÎ BV2@H [§95]), but this amounts to the emotion 
desire obeying reason. In other words, the ³ indicates not an alternative solution to the problem 
of desire but an alternative formulation of a single solution: the elimination of passionate desire—
id est, the obedience of desire to reason. 
96 he builds a comprehensive therapeutic program on the chastisement and training of 
just one desire (B"D"*,4(:"J46± *4*"F6"8\‘ :\"< J¬< B,DÂ ("FJXD" BD"(:"J,L@:X<0< ¦B42L:\"< –DP,J"4 <@L2,J,Ã< J, 6"Â B"4*,b,4<): Philo believes that by training the desire for 
food and drink Moses expected to train all desire(s). So the training of this one desire stands as 
the foundation (–DP,J"4) for what amounts to a "comprehensive therapeutic program," insofar as 
all desires are in view. 
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attributes to "the most holy Moses" (Ò Ê,DfJ"J@H 9TLF−H) an understanding of 
everything (BV<J") he has just explained about the nature, function, and 
problematic malfunction of ¦B42L:\". This philosophical insight created in Moses 
a determination that Philo expects the reader to share at this point in the 
exposition: a determination "to eliminate passionate desire (¦6*bF"F2"4 JÎ 
BV2@H), having come to detest it (:LF">V:,<@H) as both a horrible disgrace in 
itself (ñH "ÇFP4FJ@<) and—as I just explained—the ultimate cause of disgraceful 
behavior (Jä< "ÆFP\FJT< "ÇJ4@<)."97 Passionate desire, in other words, proves 
not only reprehensible in itself—it also generates reprehensible behavior 
whenever it overtakes and tyrannizes the soul. For this reason, Moses sought to 
eliminate the passion desire by training the emotion to obey the commanding 
authority of reason ([¦B42L:\"H] B,42"DP@bF0H 6L$,D<ZJ® 8@(4F:è)—which 
calls for the exercise of "self-control" (¦(6DVJ,4") on the moral agent’s part.98 He 
addressed this critical need for self-control through his legislation, as Philo 
explains in §§96-97. 
                                            
97 Cf. Garr. 510 C-D: "[W]e get well by the diagnosis and treatment of our ailments (Jä< (D B"2ä< 6D\F,4 6"Â •F6ZF,4 B,D4(4<`:,2"), but the diagnosis must come first (BD@JXD" *zº 6D\F4H ¦FJ\<); since no one can become habituated to shun or to eradicate from his soul what 
does not distress him (@Û*,ÂH (D ¦2\.,J"4 N,b(,4< 6"Â •B@JD\$,F2"4 J−H RLP−H Ô :¬ *LFP,D"\<,4), and we only grow distressed with our ailments (*LFP,D"\<@:,< *¥ J BV20) when 
we have perceived, by the exercise of reason, the injuries and shame which result from them 
(ÓJ"< JH $8V$"H 6"Â JH "ÆFPb<"H JH •Bz"ÛJä< Jè 8`(å 6"J"<@ZFT:,<)." 
98 The term 6L$,D<ZJ0H invokes Philo's premier model of ¦(6DVJ,4", the chariot figure 
(cf. §79): e.g., Leg. 3.224: Ò J−H RLP−H º<\@P@H ´ 6L$,D<ZJ0H Ò <@ØH; Sacr. 45: Jä< 6"J RLP¬< •8`(T< *L<V:,T< º<\@P`H J, 6"Â 6L$,D<ZJ0H. 
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 According to §96, Moses ingeniously crafted one "paradigmatic 
instruction" (B"D"*,4(:"J46¬ *4*"F6"8\") for the management of ¦B42L:\", 
which—though ostensibly geared only to the desire for food and drink—applies in 
fact to every type of desire.99 Of course, this "instruction" appears nowhere in the 
Pentateuch as a distinct, coherent, continuous discourse. Instead, Philo must 
gather the scattered elements of Moses’ instruction and cobble them together 
into a meaningful unit. He believes that as a set the various precepts governing 
food and drink reveal, upon careful examination, an ulterior motive on Moses’ 
part: to inculcate self-control relative to gastric desire, which extends in turn to all 
desire. And because the dietary laws promote the management of ¦B42L:\", 
Philo identifies them as the specific laws falling under the generic heading @Û6 
¦B42L:ZF,4H.  
To explain a single therapeutic program whose benefits extend throughout 
the whole range of desires, Philo relies on the principle of transference, which 
gives him a much-needed warrant for reconciling parts one and two of his 
exposition.100 Without it, he is left "diagnosing" in part one a problem involving 
many desires (for money, reputation, etc.), while "treating" in part two only one 
desire (for food and drink). By casting the Mosaic dietary laws as a paradigmatic 
instruction, Philo effectively accounts for all of the desires mentioned in part one, 
                                            
99 Cf. Philo’s notion of circumcision as a sort of "paradigmatic instruction" in Spec. 1.9: "Æ<4JJ@:X<@4H B,D4J@:¬< B,D4JJ−H ¦6J@:¬< 6"Â B8,@<".@bF0H º*@<−H, @Û :4H, •88 *4 :4H . 
. . 6"Â Jä< –88T< B"Fä<; also QG 3.48. 
100 On the principle of transference, see above, 135-37. 
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since their successful management follows from the successful management of 
gastric desire. This approach not only solves a practical problem for Philo—it 
also makes good sense in light of Middle-Platonic theoretical principles. First, the 
idea that gastric desire predominates—being, as Philo puts it, J¬< BD,F$LJVJ0< 
6"Â ñH º(,:@<\*"—comes from Plato himself, who highlights desires for food 
and drink in his characterizations of ¦B42L:\".101 Second, Philo believes that 
gastric desire’s ability "to obey the laws of self-mastery" (J@ÃH FTND@Fb<0H 
<`:@4H B,42"DP,Ã<) yields restraint among the other desires (@Û6X2zÒ:@\TH 
•N0<4VF,4< . . . FJ"8ZF,F2"4), reasoning that because desires for food and 
drink are most powerful, their compliance necessarily engenders compliance 
among other desires stemming from the ¦B42L:0J46`<, which are by definition 
less powerful.102 Plutarch envisions a similar transference of the moral agent’s 
capacity to manage desire—but in his method of training, restraint develops first 
in less difficult situations then applies stepwise to progressively more difficult 
situations.103 Moses’ method exhibits greater efficiency by reversing the 
                                            
101 E.g., Resp. 437 D. 
102 Philo's language of restraint in this passage—esp. his use of •N0<4VF,4< and FJ"8ZF,F2"4 (FJX88T)—reflects his Middle-Platonic view of passion. For example, within the 
model of ¦(6DVJ,4" posed by Philo's chariot figure, the term •N0<4V.T (cf. •N0<4"F:`H) denotes 
"excess"—namely, the excess movement responsible for transforming an emotion into a passion 
(see above, 111-18). By claiming that all other types of ¦B42L:\" will no longer •N0<4VF,4< upon 
successful implementation of Moses' therapeutic dietary program, Philo means that they will 
become moderate in the Middle-Platonic sense of measured or without excesss. In other words, 
they will become restrained (FJ"8ZF,F2"4) in the very sense he suggests elsewhere in his 
writings: e.g., Prov. 2.70: J¬< •:,JD\"< [cf. •N0<4"F:`H] Jä< ¦B42L:4ä< FJ,Ã8"4; Virt. 113: ¦FJ,\8"J@ JÎ FN@*DÎ< [cf. •N0<4"F:`H] "ÛJ−H [sc. ¦B42L:\"H]; Det. 25: FJX88@<J,H JÎ Jä< ¦B42L:4ä< :X(,2@H [cf. •N0<4"F:`H]. 
103 See Ingenkamp, Schriften, 105, esp. the first on his list of three ¦24F:@\. 
184 
 
 
 
progression, training the most difficult desire first and so removing the need to 
address less demanding calls for self-control from less difficult desires.  
In §97, Philo summarizes the method of Moses’ paradigmatic instruction. 
Clearly, the instruction must deal with food and drink, since they are the objects 
of gastric desire. As Philo explains, Moses restricted their use (¦B,FJ`:4F,) with 
specific ordinances whose observance leads to self-control (*4"JV(:"F4 . . . 
BDÎH ¦(6DVJ,4"< . . . •(T(@JVJ@4H).104 In other words, Moses designed the 
dietary laws as ascetic precepts to promote ¦(6DVJ,4" among members of his 
commonwealth—first with respect to food and drink, but ultimately with respect to 
every object of desire.105 Viewed in terms of moral philosophy, Moses’ method 
looks much like the recommendation of practical exercises aimed at eliminating a 
passion (BV2@H) through the practice (–F60F4H) of self-control (¦(6DVJ,4"). His 
"ordinances" (*4"JV(:"J") serve the same function as the ¦24F:@\ of Plutarch’s 
Seelenheilungsschriften. In the case of De garrulitate, followers of Plutarch’s 
philosophy will eliminate the passion of talkativeness (•*@8,FP\") from their lives 
                                            
104 Philo's use of ¦B,FJ`:4F, again suggests the chariot figure (see above, 111-18). 
Along with the inculcation of ¦(6DVJ,4", Philo mentions also philanthropy and piety, but these do 
not figure prominently in his exposition until the end, where he revisits the notion of piety in 
§§128-131. He mentions them here because he sees each of the Ten Commandments as 
promoting the more generic virtues, although each has its special purpose(s). On Philo’s view of 
piety (,ÛFX$,4"), see esp. Gregory E. Sterling, "‘The Queen of the Virtues’: Piety in Philo of 
Alexandria," SPhA 18 (2006): 103-23. 
105 Philo actually names ¦(6DVJ,4" here, but note further indications of ¦(6DVJ,4" in 
§§95-97: §95: [¦B42L:\"H] B,42"DP@bF0H 6L$,D<ZJ® 8@(4F:è; §96: ¦B42L:\"< . . . –DP,J"4 <@L2,J,Ã< J, 6"Â B"4*,b,4<; JH –88"H [¦B42L:\"H] @Û6X2zÒ:@\TH •N0<4VF,4<; JH –88"H 
[¦B42L:\"H] . . . FJ"8ZF,F2"4; Jè J¬< BD,F$LJVJ0< 6"Â ñH º(,:@<\*" :,:"206X<"4 J@ÃH FTND@Fb<0H <`:@4H B,42"DP,Ã<. 
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by developing ¦(6DVJ,4" with respect to speaking, as they engage in behaviors 
enjoined by his ¦24F:@\. Similarly, followers of Moses’ philosophy will eliminate 
the passion of gluttony (("FJD4:"(\") from their lives by developing ¦(6DVJ,4" 
with respect to eating and drinking, as they engage in behaviors enjoined by his 
¦24F:@\, the dietary laws. But with Moses’ ingenious program, as Philo presents 
it, the elimination of gluttony entails the elimination of all passions similarly 
characterized by excessive desire for a certain object (wealth, reputation, etc.). 
While Plutarch treats passions one at a time, Moses treats passions all at once.  
§§98 – 99: First Fruits106 
[§98] For example, Moses commands the people to bring as first fruits 
some of their grain, wine, oil, livestock, and other goods. They are 
instructed to designate one portion of these first fruits for sacrifice and 
another portion for the priests—the former out of gratitude to God for 
bountiful produce and abundance of goods, the latter out of gratitude for 
the sacred temple-service, in order that the priests might receive a reward 
for their performance of holy duties. [§99] He completely forbids anyone to 
sample these goods or take hold of them until the first fruits are duly 
apportioned. This command functions as an exercise in the self-control 
that proves so beneficial to all of life.107 You see, Moses knew that by 
learning to restrain their eager rush to enjoy the season's harvest, by 
waiting for the consecration of the first fruits, the people were in fact 
training themselves to check the unruliness of their impulses, quieting any 
passionate desire within. 
  
Philo begins his study of Moses’ "paradigmatic instruction" with the law of First 
Fruits, which of course involves food and drink: Philo lists "grain, wine, oil, and 
                                            
106 See Deut 18:4. 
107 This command functions as an exercise in the self-control that proves so beneficial to 
all of life (:" 6"Â BDÎH –F60F4< J−H $4TN,8,FJVJ0H ¦(6D"J,\"H): In other words, obedience to 
this command, insofar as it enjoins the practice (–F60F4H) of ¦(6D"J,\", amounts to an exercise 
in self-control—i.e., an ascetic precept. 
186 
 
 
 
livestock" as items falling under the commandment’s purview. His reference here 
to "wine" (@É<@H) stands alone in the treatment portion of the exposition, which 
cites no other laws mentioning wine or any other drink.108 So despite his earlier 
framing of Moses’ instruction as a matter of ¦*T*¬ 6"Â B`F4H (§97), Philo really 
ends up discussing only food. He mentions both because he knows that 
¦B42L:\" of the belly theoretically involves both eating and drinking, a fact duly 
noted in the diagnostic portion of his exposition (§91). But Philo does not see any 
significant role for laws governing drink(s) or drinking in Moses’ instruction on 
desire.   
 Philo explicitly identifies the law of First Fruits as an exercise in self-
control (BDÎH –F60F4< . . . ¦(6D"J,\"H). Essentially, the law requires people 
eager to consume fresh stores of food and drink to wait (•<":X<T<) until a 
ceremonial dedication has first taken place. In terms of moral psychology, this 
involves ¦B42L:\" activated by the pleasurable prospect of consuming a variety 
of goods but forcibly restrained for a time by reason. To indulge the initial impulse 
to eat and drink, ignoring the law, would be to act strictly on a motive for 
pleasure, which amounts to indulging an unmeasured, excessive impulse—or, in 
this case, indulging a passionate desire. By waiting until reason authorizes the 
indulgence of desire, the moral agent effectively removes the excessiveness of 
                                            
108 Cf. Colson 67, n. b: "This is the only way in which restraint in drinking is enjoined 
throughout these sections." But note liquor (•6DVJ@L) in §113. 
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the impulses of desire (JÎ< •N0<4"F:Î< Jä< ÒD:ä< . . . •<"P"4J\.,4<),109 which 
amounts to a quieting of the passionate aspect of the desire (¦>,L:"D\.T< JÎ 
BV2@H).110 This exercise clearly employs a delay technique, which appears both 
elsewhere in Philo’s writings and in Plutarch’s De garrulitate.111  
§§100 – 102: Introduction to Clean and Unclean Animals112 
[§100] As for foods not otherwise regulated by the law of First Fruits,113 
Moses did not in the least allow members of the sacred commonwealth 
simply to eat whatever they wanted without restriction. In fact, he strictly 
prohibited all of the richest, most succulent types of meat—meat that 
tickles and teases our treacherous foe pleasure—by prohibiting just the 
right animals from land, sea, and sky. He knew that these meats could 
bring about the insatiability of tyrannical desire, once they had ensnared 
the most slavish of the senses, taste.114 And insatiability represents a 
practically incurable problem not only for souls but also for bodies, since 
an insatiable desire for food naturally leads to overeating, which in turn 
leads to indigestion, a foundation and wellspring of diseases and 
infirmities. [§101] Now, the most obvious prohibitions of pleasurable fare 
involve the pig, whose meat everyone acknowledges as the most 
delectable among land animals, and scaleless sea creatures.115 In these 
                                            
109 Cf. Spec. 2.18: JÎ< •N0<4"F:Î< Jä< ¦B42L:4ä< •<"P"4J\F"4. With •N0<4"F:`< and •<"P"4J\.,4<, Philo again invokes the chariot figure (see above, 111-18). 
110 Cf. Opif. 81: ¦>,L:"D4F2,Ã,< "Ê –:,JD@4 Jä< B"2ä< ÒD:"\. 
111 Cf. §99: •<":X<T<, –PD4H —< "Ê •B"DP"Â 6"2@FT2äF4; Garr. 511 F: ¦24.XJT F4TB< :XPD4 @â BV<J,H •B,\BT<J"4 J¬< •B`6D4F4<. On the same technique at work in other ascetic 
precepts, see above, 130-35.  
112 See Lev 11; Deut 14:1-21 
113 As for foods not otherwise regulated by the law of First Fruits (?Û :¬< @Û*¥ J¬< Jä< –88T< :,J@LF\"<): Philo moves on to foods not under the purview of the First Fruits regulation 
(cf. Mosès 259, n.10: "Ceux qui ne sont pas assujettis à une offrande préalable"). 
114 He knew that these meats could bring about the insatiability of tyrannical desire, once 
they had ensnared the most slavish of the senses, taste (,Æ*ãH ÓJ4 J¬< •<*D"B@*T*,FJVJ0< Jä< "ÆF2ZF,T< *,8,VF"<J" (,ØF4< •B80FJ\"< ¦D(VF,J"4): Pace Colson, •B80FJ\" indicates 
"insatiability," not "gluttony" (cf. Heinemann: "Unersättlichkeit"; Mosès: "l'insatiabilité"). And •B80FJ\" signals the presence of tyrannical desire (§DTH) in the soul—in this case, §DTH as it 
relates to food. 
115 PCW posits a lacuna in the Greek text of §101: ¦<b*DT< *¥ J (X<0 Jä< •8,B\*T< 
[...] BDÎH (D ¦(6DVJ,4"<, ,Æ 6"\ J4H –88@H, Ë6"<ÎH ë< •8,ÃR"4 J@×H ,ÛNLäH §P@<J"H BDÎH –F60F4< •D,J−H. Cohn's note suggests the emendation J@bJT< *¬ PDZF,TH •<XP,4< 6,8,b,4. 
The text, however, makes sense as it stands. Philo mentions the prohibitions of pork and 
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and other restrictions, self-control was Moses’ ultimate concern, and he—
if anyone—had the philosophical expertise to train those with natural 
aptitude in the practice of virtue. He accomplishes this inculcation of self-
control by training and drilling people to be sparing and easily satisfied, 
targeting the removal of extravagance. [§102] Determined to promote 
neither a life of austerity, like the Lacedaemonian lawgiver, nor of 
daintiness, like the man who introduced habits of feebleness and luxury to 
the Ionians and Sybarites—cutting instead a straight path right between 
the two—Moses relaxed what was too severe in one and tightened what 
was too lax in the other. As with a musical instrument, he sought to blend 
the excesses of either end of the scale into a moderate tone, promoting a 
life of harmony and blameless integrity. So he was not at all haphazard 
when he drew up his legislation on dietary matters. On the contrary, he 
took the utmost care in determining foods to be eaten and foods to be 
avoided. 
 
Philo devotes by far the majority of his discussion of the content of Moses’ 
"paradigmatic instruction" to the legislation governing various species of clean 
(6"2"DV) and unclean (•6V2"DJ") animals (.è").116 The designations "clean" 
and "unclean" of course refer to an animal’s legal status as either a permitted or 
prohibited food source.117 So with this new topic Philo abides by his initial framing 
of Moses’ instruction as a matter of "food and drink" (§97: ¦*T*¬ 6"Â B`F4H)—or, 
in this case, only food—but the issue now becomes whether or not the people 
may eat a certain meal, not how or when, as with the law of First Fruits. In any 
case, his exegetical task remains the same: to explain how these dietary laws 
                                                                                                                                  
scaleless sea creatures, emphasizing the pleasure they afford, because they illustrate Moses' 
real purpose for the dietary laws: the promotion of ¦(6DVJ,4". 
116 Compare Clean-Unclean Animals (§§100-118) to First Fruits (§§98-99), Dead Animals 
(§§119-121), and Blood and Fat (§§122-125). On Philo’s discussion of clean-unclean animals in 
§§100-118, see especially Rhodes, "Diet and Desire." 
117 E.g., §113: N0FÂ< ,É<"4 BDÎH ¦*T*¬< @Û 6"2"DV. 
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promote ¦(6DVJ,4" in service to the Tenth Commandment’s prohibition of 
passionate desire, @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H.  
According to Philo, the legislation on clean and unclean animals reflects in 
general an unwillingness on Moses’ part to permit the "unrestricted use" (PD−F4< 
•*,) of foods not otherwise regulated by the law of First Fruits.118 In particular, 
Moses selected for prohibition the "fattest" (,ÛF"D6`J"J") and "richest" (B4`J"J") 
animals from land, sea, and sky, knowing that they yield the tastiest meats. He 
did this because he understood the dangerous capacity of delicious foods to 
"ensnare" (*,8,VF"<J") the palate and, in so doing, cause people to eat strictly 
for the pleasure of eating.119 In terms of moral psychology, eating for pleasure 
represents a victory of ¦B42L:\" over reason: in particular, a victory of ¦B42L:\" 
as motivating disposition (whose aim is pleasure) over reason as motivating 
disposition (whose aim is rational benefit: survival, good health, etc.). The victory 
of ¦B42L:\" produces in the soul an "insatiability" (•B80FJ\"), which in turn 
causes overeating and leads to indigestion, a "foundation and wellspring" (•DPZ 
J, 6"Â B0(Z) of diseases and infirmities. Philo’s incidental remark here on the 
danger of tasty meat echoes and corroborates his earlier, extended remarks in 
§§79-91 on the danger, broadly speaking, of passionate desire. In either case, he 
envisions a torturous Tantalus fate of insatiable desire—the mark of tyrannical 
                                            
118 Cf. PD−F4< •*, in Prov. 2.70, where Philo also speaks of restricting desires for food 
(NB @ÍH ¦:X80F, J¬< •:,JD\"< Jä< ¦B42L:4ä< FJ,Ã8"4). 
119 Cf. Garr. 514 B: *,8,".@:X<0 (D ßBz"ÛJä< º •*@8,FP\". 
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desire (§DTH)—looming as the eventual outcome of ¦B42L:\" gaining the upper 
hand over reason. And just as he earlier associated the terminal grade of desire 
with a condition of soul generating further moral decline (§§86-91), Philo here 
associates the terminal grade of eating for pleasure with a condition of body 
generating further physical decline.120 These parallels suggest an attempt on 
Philo’s part to coordinate the "diagnosis" and "treatment" portions of his 
exposition by using similar terms to frame both problem and solution. Here, the 
solution Moses offers amounts to a simple principle: avoiding especially 
pleasurable meats eliminates the risk of indulging passionate desire, which in 
turn eliminates the even greater risk of suffering tyrannical desire.121 But 
understood in this way, Moses’ prohibitions only steer the moral agent away from 
a specific—and thus limited—set of dietary incitements to passionate desire, 
without addressing the broader concern of cultivating ¦(6DVJ,4" in observance of 
the general prohibition @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H. In §§101-102, Philo traces a broader 
connection between avoiding tasty meats and a lifestyle of ¦(6DVJ,4".  
 He begins by citing two examples, presumably his best, of prohibited 
animals commonly acknowledged "by those who partake" (B"D J@ÃH PDT:X<@4H) 
                                            
120 In §100, Philo calls "insatiability" (•B80FJ\"<) a *LF\"J@< 6"6Î< RLP"ÃH J, 6"Â Ff:"F4<. Philo described its harm to souls at length in the diagnosis portion of his exposition, 
using images like the frustrated pursuit and Tantalus (§§80-81). He describes its harm to bodies 
in §100, where he links it to indigestion. 
121 Philo earlier described those enslaved to a tyrannical desire for food and drink in §91. 
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as "delicious" (»*4FJ@<): pigs and scaleless sea creatures.122 Philo then 
immediately deploys the agon motif in order to cast these prohibitions as 
exercises designed by Moses to train moral athletes in the practice of 
¦(6DVJ,4".123 But how exactly does Moses’ training program work? Since Moses 
prescribed these exercises in an effort to remove extravagance (•N,8,Ã< 
B@8LJX8,4"<), he evidently considered anything done for pleasure’s sake to be 
an extravagance by definition. No one, in other words, ever needs to eat 
something delicious—one only needs to eat. By prohibiting delicacies, Moses in 
effect trained the people to eat according to their need—not their pleasure—
instilling the virtues of "frugality" (Ï84(@*,Ä"H) and "contentment" (,Û6@8\"H).124 
And the consistent practice of living according to need amounts to the consistent 
practice of ¦(6DVJ,4", since it represents, in terms of moral psychology, the 
consistent dominance of reason (as motivating disposition seeking the rational 
                                            
122 Philo’s reference to creatures of both land (pigs) and sea (scaleless creatures) proves 
that he still speaks in general, introductory terms at this point (cf. §100: P,DF"\T< ´ ¦<b*DT< ´ BJ0<ä<). His failure to give an example of an especially tasty bird may stem from his not having 
one to give. Cf. Heinemann PCH 2, 276, n. 2: "Auf die Vögel wird hier nicht eingegangen, da 
bekanntlich, was Philo §100 allerdings ausser acht lässt, sehr wohlschmeckende Vögel zum 
genusse erlaubt sind." His discussion of each distinct domain of creatures begins in earnest with 
land animals in §103.  
123 §101: BDÎH (D ¦(6DVJ,4"< . . . BDÎH –F60F4< •D,J−H [sc. ¦(6D"J,\"H]. Note esp. the 
terms in §101 associated with Moses' training: •8,ÃR"4 (to anoint with oil [before gymnastic 
exercises]), (L:<V.,4 (to train), FL(6D@J,Ã (to drill). Cf. Spec. 2.98: JÎ B"D"B8ZF4@< :X<J@4 6"Â J@×H •8,\BJ"H §FJ4< Æ*,Ã< *Dä<J"H ¦BÂ Jä< •280Jä<q ÓJ"< (D "ÛJ@×H FL(6D@JZFTF4< ¦B"888Z8@4H 6"Â FL<,PXF4 (L:<"F\"4H, BDÂ< ,ÆH –6D@< 6":,Ã<, •<"6Jä<J"4 B"DXP@<J,H •<XF,4H . . . Jä< ¦< •28ZF,4 B`<T<. On Philo's agon motif, see above, 125-30.  
124 Philo elsewhere connects ¦(6DVJ,4" and (esp.) Ï84(@*,Ä": e.g., Opif. 164: º 
[¦(6DVJ,4"] ,ÛJX8,4"< 6"Â Ï84(@*,Ä"< 6"Â ÓF@< •<"(6"Ã@< . . . •FBV.,J"4; Mos. 1.28-29: ("FJD\ J, (D §>T Jä< •<"(6"\T< *"F:ä<, @áH º NbF4H §J">,<, @Û*¥< B8X@< ¦P@DZ(,4 . . . (,<`:,<`H J, *4"N,D`<JTH •F60J¬H Ï84(@*,,\"H; QG 4.172 (Petit): Ò *¥ FB@L*"Ã@H @Û 
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benefit of sustenance) over desire (as motivating disposition seeking the 
pleasure of delicious food). In other words, ¦B42L:\" trained to accept the 
measure set by reason never becomes passionate. At the same time, since the 
challenge of limiting indulgence to reasonable need accompanies any expression 
of ¦B42L:\" (for food, wealth, etc.), the habits of ¦(6DVJ,4" Moses cultivates by 
prohibiting voluptuous foods apply more broadly to any situation requiring the 
moral agent to abstain from extravagant (i.e., unnecessary) pleasures. 
According to Philo, the lifestyle of ¦(6DVJ,4" Moses promotes through his 
legislation on clean and unclean animals strikes a perfect balance between two 
extreme positions. On the one hand, Moses avoids the overly austere approach 
(F680D"(T(\"<) of Lycurgus (Ò 7"6,*"4:`<4@H <@:@2XJ0H), "loosening" the 
severity of the Spartan way (JÎ :¥< FN@*DÎ< ¦PV8"F,).125 On the other hand, he 
avoids the overly indulgent (JÎ $D@*\"4J@<) approach of Sardanapalus—"the 
man who introduced habits of feebleness and luxury to the Ionians and 
Sybarites" (Ò J@ÃH }3TF4 6"Â GL$"D\J"4H J B,DÂ 2DbR4< 6"Â P84*¬< 
,ÆF0(0FV:,<@H)—"tightening" the laxity of his dissolute way of life (JÎ 
*z•<,:,\<@< ¦BXJ,4<,).126 To convey the harmonious moderation of Moses’ 
approach, Philo uses the image of a musical instrument (ÏD(V<å :@LF46è) 
                                                                                                                                  B8,@<X6J0H, J, Ï84(@*,,\"H 6"Â ¦(6D"J,\"H ©J"ÃD@H; Spec. 1.173: ¦(6DVJ,4"<, ¼ *@DLN@D,ÃJ"4 BDÎH ,ÛJ,8,\"H 6"Â ,Û6@8\"H 6"Â Ï84(@*,Ä"H. 
125 Cf. Contemp. 69: J¬< . . . 7"6T<46¬< F680D"(T(\"<. 
126 On Sardanapalus, see also §122 (cf. Sandnes, Belly and Body, 65-68; Abraham 
Malherbe, "The Beasts of Ephesus," JBL 87 (1968): 71-80, esp. 76-77). The tomb of 
193 
 
 
 
sounding a beautiful "middle chord" (J± :XF®) in place of extreme tones.127 
Despite the obvious rhetorical function of these appeals, Philo has in mind 
genuine ethical concerns. Moral agents of the Sardanapalus type, for example, 
would eat the delicious foods Moses prohibited, indulging in pleasure for 
pleasure’s sake because desire rules their souls without the restraint or 
"measure" of reason. Moral agents of either the Lycurgus or Moses type would of 
course avoid overly pleasurable foods, but Philo gives no clear indication of what 
would otherwise distinguish their respective dietary habits. Presumably, Philo 
envisions the Spartan approach as determined avoidance of any pleasure: food 
serves only to sustain life, and pleasure—because it contributes nothing to that 
purpose—has no place in the Spartan diet.128 Philo seems to envision Moses’ 
approach as less severe, but similarly geared toward eating for sustenance over 
pleasure. While strictly opposed to eating for pleasure’s sake, Moses 
nevertheless allows for the incidental pleasures accompanying a healthful diet. 
After all, he prohibits only the most delectable meats, generously allowing the 
people to enjoy a variety of other meats as they choose. 
                                                                                                                                  
Sardanapalus supposedly read: §F24,, BÃ<,, B"Ã., (see Sandness, Belly and Body, 66; 
Malherbe, "Beasts of Ephesus," 76). On the Sybarites, see also Spec. 3.43.  
127 §102: JH ¦Nz©6"JXDT< Jä< –6DT< ßB,D$@8H ñH ¦< ÏD(V<å :@LF46è 6,D"FV:,<@H J± :XF® (cf. Mut. 87). Cf. Resp. 443 D-E; Plutarch, Virt. mor. 444 E; Ps.-Metop. 121.8-9. On the 
relevant music theory, see Martin L. West, Ancient Greek Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 219-23. More generally, see also Louis Feldman, "Philo’s Views on Music," JJML 9 (1986): 
36-54. 
128 Some Spartan dishes notoriously offered no pleasure to the palate, esp. "black broth" 
(:X8"H .T:`H), a pork stew (e.g., see Plutarch Lyc. 12.6-7). 
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 Plutarch offers similar praise of balanced moderation in De garrulitate, 
though he has in mind ¦B42L:\" affecting the tongue, not the stomach.129 Just as 
Philo acknowledges three basic approaches to eating, Plutarch acknowledges 
three basic approaches to answering questions: "the barely necessary" (JÎ 
•<"(6"Ã@<), "the polite" (JÎ N48V<2DTB@<), and "the superfluous" (JÎ 
B,D4FF`<).130 And, like Philo, Plutarch associates the "barely necessary" with 
Spartan austerity: 
For example, if someone asks, "Is Socrates at home?" one person may 
reply . . . "Not at home" (@Û6 §<*@<). And if he wishes to adopt the Laconic 
style (8"6T<\.,4<), he may omit the "At home" (§<*@<) and only utter the 
bare negative ("ÛJ¬< :`<0< . . . J¬< •B`N"F4<). So the Spartans, when 
Philip wrote to ask if they would receive him into their city, wrote a large 
"No" on the paper and sent it back. (Garr. 513 A) 
 
Plutarch disapproves of the Spartan refusal to speak beyond what absolute 
necessity requires, just as Moses disapproves of the austere Spartan diet’s 
emphasis on necessity at the expense of pleasure. But Plutarch disapproves also 
of excessive indulgence in speech, which involves a failure of "the indulgent and 
talkative man" (Ò *¥ B,D4JJÎH 6"Â •*@8XFP0H) to tailor his answer to the 
questioner’s need (J± PD,\‘ J@Ø BL<2"<@:X<@L). In fact, Plutarch identifies the 
questioner’s "need" (PD,\") as the "measure" (:XJD@<) of a proper response 
(Garr. 513 C). Here Plutarch deploys the same Middle-Platonic concept of 
¦B42L:\" attested in Philo’s writings, understanding "passionate" desire as 
                                            
129 Garr. 513 A-C. 
130 Garr. 513 A. 
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immoderate desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\"). In Plutarch’s example, a desire to speak 
becomes passionate when it oversteps the reasonable measure (:XJD@<) of 
politely providing needed information and motivates the moral agent to indulge in 
speaking for the sake of speaking, in particular for the pleasure derived from 
speaking. In Philo’s example, a desire to eat becomes passionate (–:,JD@H) 
when it oversteps the reasonable measure (:XJD@<) of amply providing needed 
sustenance and motivates the moral agent to indulge in eating for the sake of 
eating, in particular for the pleasure derived from eating.  
Taken as a unit, §§100-102 undoubtedly serve as a thesis governing all of 
Philo’s comments on Moses’ legislation concerning clean and unclean animals. 
Not only do §§100-102 form a discrete text-unit preface to the detailed analyses 
of specific laws, but they also speak in the broad, synoptic terms characteristic of 
an overarching claim. Philo asserts, in sum, that Moses recognized throughout 
the animal kingdom (land, sea, and sky) the dangerous incitement to ¦B42L:\" 
posed by delicious meats, and he obviated the risk by declaring those animals 
"unclean." By removing the incitement, he sought to lessen the incidence of 
passionate desire, which so easily burgeons into tyrannical desire.  Although 
Philo explains how such prohibitions promote also a lifestyle of ¦(6DVJ,4" 
(§§101-102)—thereby subsuming all of §§100-118 under his earlier, express 
purpose of showing how all dietary laws promote ¦(6DVJ,4" (§§95-97)—his 
thesis regarding the legislation on clean and unclean animals specifically asserts 
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Moses’ intention to eliminate passionate desire by prohibiting delicious meats. He 
makes this claim prospectively in §§100-102, but also retrospectively in §118, 
where he recapitulates it, creating an unmistakable interpretive frame for §§103-
117.131 So Philo ostensibly draws just one fundamental conclusion from his 
investigation of clean and unclean animals—a conclusion he prompts the reader 
to accept by placing it prominently at both the beginning and end of his work. 
Composing §§100-118 in this way, Philo inadvertently offers a criterion for 
assessing his work, since each consideration of a certain animal or type of 
animal either does or does not support the overarching thesis. If it does, then 
Philo reveals consistency in his analysis of the clean and unclean animals. If it 
does not, then Philo reveals an inconsistency, which calls for some sort of 
explanation. And a consideration of the inconsistencies in Philo’s work helps to 
illustrate his underlying expository agenda.  
§§103 – 109: Land Animals132 
 
[§103] Take the case of man-eating beasts. Someone might easily 
consider it perfectly just for them to endure from man the same fate they 
impose. But Moses, carefully considering what befits a gentle soul, thinks 
we should abstain from enjoying the meat of such creatures—which do 
provide, by the way, a most suitable and delicious feast. You see, while 
perpetrators certainly deserve to suffer in kind, it should not be at the 
hands of their victims, lest we become beasts unknowingly by indulging a 
passionate desire for revenge against man-eaters.133 [§104] In fact, Moses 
                                            
131 Rhodes ("Diet and Desire," 133) notes the "inclusio" formed by §§100-102 and §118. 
132 See Lev 11:1-8; Deut 14:3-8 
133 lest we become beasts unknowingly by indulging a passionate desire for revenge 
against man-eaters (:¬ 8V2TF4< ßBzÏD(−H, •(D\@L BV2@LH, 20D4T2X<J,H): Philo’s consideration 
of ÏD(Z in an exposition of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H makes sense in light of Aristotle’s consideration of ÏD(Z in Rhetoric 1378a30 – 1378b10, where he defines it as an appetite (ÐD,>4H) for retribution 
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makes so extreme an effort to prevent such behavior as to forbid 
categorically the eating of all carnivorous animals, wanting to restrain 
preemptively the impulse for revenge against man-eaters.134 He 
designated instead the herbivores as suitable livestock fit for eating, since 
they are tame by nature and eat only the gentle yield of the earth. Such 
creatures never plot mischief against anyone. [§105] Now, of the 
herbivores, Moses lists ten approved for eating: the calf, the lamb, the kid, 
the deer, the gazelle, the fallow deer, the ibex, the addax, the oryx, and 
the giraffe. Because of his constant devotion to numerical theory, which he 
acutely understood as being of the greatest possible significance in every 
matter, Moses legislates nothing great or small without first considering 
the appropriate number and, as it were, affixing that number to the 
precepts. And of the numbers following the monad, the decad represents 
absolute perfection—a most holy and sacred number, as Moses declares. 
Here he places it on the various types of clean animals as a seal of 
approval, once he decided to grant their use to members of his 
commonwealth. [§106] He also provides a simple way of authenticating 
and approving these ten animals, based on a pair of traits they all exhibit: 
each has split hooves and chews its cud. Animals that exhibit neither of 
these traits, or only one of them, are in Moses' view unclean. You see, 
these two traits are really symbolic representations of the most 
enlightened methods of teaching and learning, which can, when put into 
practice, lead to the clear discernment of moral excellence from its 
opposite. [§107] Consider the ruminating animal. After taking a few initial 
bites, the food settles in its gullet. Then after a short while, bringing it up 
again, the animal works it into a smoother substance, before finally 
sending it down into the stomach. In the same way, a student takes in 
through his ears various philosophical doctrines and theories from his 
teacher. But unable to comprehend immediately and grasp the lesson 
                                                                                                                                  
(J4:TD\") (cf. Ps.-Andr. 231.81: z?D(Z . . . ¦FJ4< ¦B42L:\" J4:TD\"H J@Ø ²*4606X<"4 *@6@Ø<J@H), 
conceivable in broader terms as an appetite (ÐD,>4H) for pleasure (º*@<Z)—namely, the pleasure 
of retribution (cf. Spec. 3.85). The issue here is not a desire for revenge per se, but the danger of 
such a desire becoming excessive (passionate) due to the personal involvement of the agent of 
justice. On ÏD(Z and other terms for "anger," see William V. Harris, Restraining Rage: The 
Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 50-70 [="The Greek and Latin Terminology"]. On the likelihood of Philo’s concept of ÏD(Z 
being similar to Aristotle’s, note esp. Harris, Restraining Rage, 61: "All or most of the many 
definitions of orgē which later writers offer are more or less simplified versions of the one in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, not that most of their authors will have know the Aristotelian text."  
134 wanting to restrain preemptively the impulse for revenge against man-eaters 
($@L8`:,<@H J¬< ¦BÂ J 8,P2X<J" ÒD:¬< •B"(@D,ØF"4): The ÒD:Z Philo has in mind of course 
involves eating the meat of man-eaters, but for him such eating amounts to an act of revenge. In 
other words, Moses sought to legislate against the ÒD:Z (cf. ÐD,>4H, ¦B42L:\") for J4:TD\", which 
could too easily become excessive (passionate) when killing and eating this type of animal. 
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firmly, he continues to hold onto it, until by bringing it up again over and 
over in his memory through repeated exercises, which act as a sort of 
cement for ideas, he imprints it securely onto his soul. [§108] But the firm 
grasp of ideas, it seems, does no good at all without the added ability of 
sorting through them and making decisions about which to accept and 
which to reject. This ability to discriminate appears under the symbol of 
the split hoof, indicating that there are just two roads in life: one leading to 
vice and one leading to virtue. Of course we must turn from one and never 
leave the other. [§109] So animals whose hooves are either not split at all 
or split more than once are equally unclean, but for different reasons. The 
first kind represents the idea that good and evil have one and the same 
nature—in the sense that one spherical surface has both a concave and a 
convex aspect, or one road runs both up and down a hill at the same time. 
The second kind, far from offering no choice at all, deceives the traveler 
by presenting many different roads in life. With a multitude of options, 
finding the best and most productive path becomes difficult. 
 
Philo’s consideration of land animals begins at §103, continues through §109, 
and divides easily into three sections: (1) an explanation of why Moses did not 
sanction the slaughter of man-eating animals (or any carnivores) for food (§§103-
104a), (2) an introduction and listing of the ten "clean" herbivores, with special 
emphasis on the number ten (§§104b-105), and (3) a symbolic interpretation of 
Moses’ criteria for designating a land animal "clean" (§§106-109).135 Of these, 
only his discussion of man-eating animals bears any clear relation to the issues 
of ¦B42L:\", ¦(6DVJ,4", and –F60F4H raised more broadly throughout his 
exposition—but even here the relation seems contrived in two respects. First, 
Moses never explicitly prohibits man-eating animals—or any carnivorous land 
animals, for that matter—despite their obvious failure to meet the criteria for 
                                            
135 Philo gives no formal introduction to this section, but note his retrospective comment 
in §110: J@bJ@LH ¦BÂ Jä< P,DF"\T< J@×H ÓD@LH 2,\H. 
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clean animals.136 So Philo’s decision to make any comment at all on man-eating 
animals stems from his own agenda, not an exegetical imperative. Second, the 
case of man-eaters does not, strictly speaking, confirm the thesis Philo has just 
formulated in §100 about how Moses’ dietary restrictions promote ¦(6DVJ,4". But 
the "prohibition" of man-eaters does resemble the type of restriction, and the 
accompanying strategy for promoting ¦(6DVJ,4", that Philo’s thesis attributes to 
Moses. All of this suggests an effort on Philo’s part to find at least one other 
example, in addition to the pig, of a land animal whose flesh incites ¦B42L:\" and 
whose removal from the diet is meant therefore to obviate passion. 
While man-eating animals, in Philo’s estimation, no doubt make "a most 
suitable and delicious feast" (§103), he evidently does not consider them as 
dangerously delicious as pigs and scaleless sea creatures (§101), because he 
explains their prohibition on different—though analogous—grounds. Because 
these animals kill and eat human beings, retributive justice warrants their being 
killed and eaten in return.137 Moses, however, recognized a great moral danger 
whenever victims take the place of dispassionate agents of justice in executing a 
sentence, since victims easily succumb to their own desire for revenge—
succumb, in other words, to the emotion of "wrath" or "anger" (ÏD(Z). If the 
followers of Moses were, for example, allowed to eat lions, they might do so not 
                                            
136 Which Philo reviews in §§106-109. This technicality may account for Philo’s wording: 9TLF± *¥ J−H J@bJT< •B@8"bF,TH •<XP,4< *@6,Ã. 
137 §103: *\6"4@< ,É<"4 J "ÛJ BDÎH •<2DfBT< BVFP,4< @ÍH *4"J\20F4; J@ÃH *4"J42,ÃF4< D:`JJ,4 J B"D"B8ZF4" B"2,Ã<. 
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from a reasonable desire to nourish their bodies but from a passionate desire to 
avenge all who have fallen prey to lions. As Philo puts it, they might "become 
beasts" (20D4T2X<J,H) by indulging the "savage passion of wrath" (ßBzÏD(−H, 
•(D\@L BV2@LH). So the lion, like the pig, represents a delectable meal, but in a 
fundamentally different sense. The pig incites ¦B42L:\" by promising abundant 
pleasure through the sweet taste of delicious meat. The lion incites ¦B42L:\" by 
promising abundant pleasure, too, but through the sweet taste of revenge. 
Moses, understanding the meat of man-eating animals to be especially 
pleasurable in this qualified sense, recognized a danger and did not allow his 
followers to consider such animals a source of food. In fact, as Philo goes on to 
explain in §104, Moses was so eager to protect against the dangerous "impulse" 
(ÒD:Z) to kill and eat with a vengeance, that he forbade as a precaution the 
consumption of any animal that kills and eats other animals—let alone human 
beings.138 Herbivores, Moses reasoned, never plot mischief against anyone, man 
or animal (:0*¥< ,ÆH ¦B4$@L8¬< BD"(:"J,L`:,<"), so no one runs the risk of 
eating them with a vengeance. In other words, no one could ever reasonably 
perceive herbivores as reprehensible aggressors, so no one could ever 
reasonably harbor a dangerous, potentially overwhelming desire to punish them. 
In some respects, Philo’s discussion of man-eating land animals, including 
his ensuing remarks on carnivores and herbivores, invites comparison with 
                                            
138 §104: òFJ, :"6D`2,< •<,ÃD>"4 $@L8`:,<@H J¬< ¦BÂ J 8,P2X<J" ÒD:Z<. 
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Eleazar’s discussion of clean and unclean birds in the Letter of Aristeas.139 Both 
discussions highlight the contrasting characteristics of carnivores and herbivores, 
both label the former "savage" or "wild" (–(D4@H) and the latter "gentle" or "tame" 
(»:,D@H), and both draw attention to correspondingly "savage" (–(D4@H) and 
"gentle" (»:,D@H) characteristics in human beings. But despite these notable 
similarities, the two discussions represent radically different understandings of 
what Moses sought to accomplish through his dietary legislation.140 The Letter of 
Aristeas, on the one hand, believes that the ethical benefit of Moses’ legislation 
on unclean, savage, carnivores and clean, gentle, herbivores derives from a 
symbolic application.141 The animals exemplify certain noble and ignoble 
character traits, which Moses either commends or condemns symbolically 
through the designations "clean" and "unclean." To eat or abstain as prescribed 
does not in itself affect the character of the moral agent, who must first correctly 
discern and then embrace the moral exhortations Moses expresses symbolically 
through his legislation. Philo, on the other hand, believes that the ethical benefit 
of the carnivore-herbivore legislation derives from a strictly literal application.142 
                                            
139 See esp. Rhodes, "Diet and Desire," 123-25. 
140 Pace Rhodes, "Diet and Desire," esp. 125: "[B]oth Philo and Aristeas discern a similar 
logic operative in the dietary legislation." 
141 Let. Arist. 148-49: "By such examples, then, the lawgiver has commended to men of 
understanding a symbol (F0:,4@ØF2"4) that they must be just and achieve nothing by violence, 
nor, confiding in their own strength, must they oppress others. For if it is lawful not even to touch 
the creatures aforementioned because of their several natures, how must we not in every way 
guard our characters from degenerating to a similar state."  
142 In other words, Philo attributes no symbolic significance to Moses’ legislation on 
unclean, savage, carnivores and clean, gentle, herbivores. Philo obviously does engage in 
symbolic interpretations through much of §§100-118: namely, §§106-109 (criteria for clean land 
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Man-eating animals do not, in Philo’s view, represent a reprehensible character 
trait. They actually eat human beings—who might actually eat them in return, 
indulging an actual vengeance that overshadows reason. By literally abstaining 
from the meat of man-eaters, the soul literally abstains from a troublesome 
passion. Similarly, Moses does not prohibit carnivores as a class because they 
represent violence, oppression, or some other vicious trait, but because a person 
accustomed to eating all sorts of carnivores will have difficulty abstaining from 
one particular sort, the man-eaters.143 As for herbivores, both Eleazar and Philo 
commend them as "gentle" (»:,D@H) creatures satisfied with the fruit of the 
                                                                                                                                  
animals), §§110-112 (criteria for clean aquatic animals), §§113-115 (clean and unclean 
"creeping" animals). But he invariably announces his symbolic interpretations: J"LJÂ *¥ J F0:,Ã" •:N`J,D" Fb:$@8" (§106), Fb:$@8" *¥ 6"Â J"ØJz¦FJ\ (§112), BV84< "Æ<4JJ`:,<@H *4 :¥< ©DB,Jä< (§113), BV84< *4 FL:$`8T< (§114). He makes no such announcement in §103-105. 
Heinemann (Bildung, 161) acknowledges: "Philon kennt für die Speisegesetze allegorische und 
wörtliche Begründungen"—and he gives examples of the two approaches (161-66). Under 
"wörtliche Begründungen," Heinemann mentions first the prohibition of "besonders 
wohlschmeckende Tiere" (such as pork), recognizing Moses' goal of "zur Selbstbeherrshung 
anregen" (163). In Heinemann's view, the prohibition of man-eaters involves "wörtliche 
Begründungen" as well, but he does not situate this prohibition within the larger context of 
promoting self-control in service to the Tenth Commandment. 
143 Pace Rhodes, "Diet and Desire," 123: "Philo advances an allegorical argument that 
explains why no carnivores are among those permitted for food." Unlike Eleazar (Let. Arist. 146-
149), Philo attributes to Moses no objection to carnivores per se, on allegorical, symbolic, or any 
other grounds. In Philo’s view, Moses prohibits all carnivores only to increase the likelihood of his 
followers successfully abstaining from the one type of carnivore whose meat endangers the 
soul—namely, man-eaters (cf. Heinemann, Bildung, 164: "Das Verbot anderer Fleischfresser 
betrachtet Philon als Schutzmaßnahme, um die Begier nach menschenfressenden Tieren zu 
unterdrücken). In other words, Moses’ tacit prohibition of all carnivores really only targets 
creatures that grievously offend human beings. The behavior of carnivores as carnivores has at 
best an incidental significance. Eleazar, by contrast, understands Moses to have concerned 
himself first with the nature of carnivores per se, whose aggression happens to affect human 
beings in some cases: "But of the winged creatures which are forbidden you will find that they are 
wild and carnivorous and with their strength oppress the rest and procure their food with injustice 
at the expense of the tame fowl mentioned above. And not only these, but they also seize lambs 
and kids, and they do violence to men too (6"Â J@×H •2DfB@LH *¥ •*46@ØF4), both the dead and 
the living" (Let. Arist. 146).  
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earth.144 But they again differ as to the symbolic or literal significance of this 
disposition. For Eleazar, a person who merely follows Moses’ instruction to eat 
only herbivores misses Moses’ real purpose, which was to promote the sort of life 
herbivores represent: a life of justice that oppresses no one.145 For Philo, the 
person who eats only herbivores—even with no reflection on the significance of 
the rule—fulfills Moses’ purpose, which was to safeguard his followers from a 
passionate desire for revenge by allowing them to eat only harmless creatures.  
So despite superficial similarities, Philo’s remarks in §§103-104 represent 
a radical departure from Eleazar’s discussion of clean (herbivorous) and unclean 
(carnivorous) birds in the Letter of Aristeas. Eleazar, for his part, understood the 
dietary laws in terms of moral exhortation. Once decoded properly, obscure 
regulations about "clean" and "unclean" animals become straightforward ethical 
maxims—such as, "Be just and achieve nothing by violence" (Let. Arist. 148). But 
while they inform a moral agent’s theoretical conception of what virtue requires, 
actual observance of the dietary laws yields no practical benefit, no training in 
virtue. In other words, they involve learning (:V20F4H) and not practice (–F60F4H). 
Philo, by contrast, understands these dietary laws in terms of moral psychology, 
construing them as practical exercises designed to eliminate passionate desire 
                                            
144 Let. Arist. 145: BV<J" »:,D"; Let. Arist. 147: J . . . »:,D" .è" J NL`:,<" Jä< ÏFBD\T< ¦BÂ (−H *"B"<”; Spec. 4.104: º:XD@LH •(X8"H, ¦B,Â 6"Â J¬< NbF4< ¦FJÂ J42"FV, JD@N"ÃH º:XD@4H "ÍH •<"*\*TF4 (− PDf:,<". 
145 Let. Arist. 147: ¦6 *46"\@L J J@Ø $\@L 6L$,D<”< . . . @Û 6"J"*L<FJ,b,4 BDÎH J¬< ¦B"<"\D,F4< Jä< FL((,<46ä<. 
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and promote ¦(6DVJ,4".146 Everyone who puts them into practice benefits from 
them, with or without an awareness of the ethical theory Moses used to formulate 
them.147 In fact, only those who put them into practice benefit from them. The 
relative unimportance of knowledge and understanding stems from the fact that 
these laws involve the training and management of the soul’s non-rational part. In 
other words, they ultimately involve practice (–F60F4H), not learning (:V20F4H)—
and this fits Philo’s overall agenda in the exposition. In fact, his effort to construe 
the dietary laws as a matter of –F60F4H explains his treatment of split hooves and 
rumination. 
After a brief listing of the ten species of clean herbivores (§105), Philo 
considers the two authenticating "signs" (F0:,Ã") common to all ten: split hooves 
and rumination (§§106-109).148 Because he ascribes a symbolic significance to 
these two traits, Philo’s commentary begins at this point to resemble more 
closely the Letter of Aristeas, which also interprets split hooves and rumination 
symbolically (Let. Arist. 150-60). But despite his application of the same mode of 
interpretation to the same material, Philo manages to draw different conclusions 
because of his different interpretive agenda. Although Philo cannot make split 
hooves and rumination speak directly to issues of ¦B42L:\" and ¦(6DVJ,4", he 
                                            
146 This fits the overall purpose(s) of his exposition. NB the discourse of moral psychology 
in Spec. 4.103-04: ÏD(−H, •(D\@L BV2@LH; J¬< ¦BÂ J 8,P2X<J" ÒD:Z<. 
147 In other words, not eating man-eaters helps to eliminate passionate desire for 
revenge, whether or not someone understands why it helps. 
148 See Rhodes, "Diet and Desire," 125-27. Philo considers the same "signs" in a similar 
way in Agr. 131-45. 
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can make them speak to the issue of –F60F4H, which in turn allows him to 
maintain the coherence of his work by tying this particular portion to his broader 
expository agenda.149 Philo engages the notion of –F60F4H primarily through his 
remarks on rumination, which both he and Eleazar identify as a symbol of 
"memory" (:<Z:0).150 But unlike Eleazar—who interprets rumination in terms of 
the content of memory: namely, remembrance of God151—Philo interprets 
rumination in terms of the faculty of memory per se: namely, memory as a type of 
–F60F4H, which serves the learning process by making thoughts of whatever 
content secure in the mind through repetition (§107).152 This type of –F60F4H 
obviously differs from the type of –F60F4H used to acquire ¦(6DVJ,4", which 
involves forcibly training a non-rational power (¦B42L:\") to obey reason. But in 
both cases the moral agent must actively engage certain faculties to achieve 
                                            
149 So §§106-109 fit sensibly into Philo’s exposition, even though he seems to have lost 
all sight of issues pertinent to the Tenth Commandment—namely, ¦B42L:\" and ¦(6DVJ,4". 
Because Colson misses the importance of –F60F4H to Philo’s expository agenda, he does not see 
the relevance of §§106-109: "In [§§100-105] the prohibition of certain kinds of beasts, fishes, and 
birds is based on the supposition that they are the most appetizing and to abstain from them 
encourages self-control. It will be seen that from §106 onwards a totally different line of argument 
is adopted, viz. that philosophical and moral lessons are intended by the distinctions" (68, n. a); 
cf. Rhodes, "Diet and Desire," 127: "One cannot help but think that in his discussion of rumination 
and cloven hooves, Philo has wandered from his initial theme of desire and self-control." Rhodes, 
however, does not miss the relevance of Philo’s other symbolic interpretations (§§110-115) to 
issues of ¦(6DVJ,4" and ¦B42L:\" ("Diet and Desire," 127-31). 
150 Philo’s special interest in memory comes through in the ordering of his commentary 
on the two traits: first rumination (memory), then the split hoof, despite his initial listing of first the 
split hoof, then rumination (§106: J` J, *4P08,Ã< 6"Â JÎ :0DL6F2"4). The Pentateuch mentions 
first the split hoof, then rumination (Lev 11:3; Deut 14:6)—and Eleazar naturally comments on the 
traits in that order. Philo’s reversal suggests a deliberate reorganizing of the material.  
151 E.g., Let. Arist. 155: :<,\‘ :<0F2ZF® 6LD\@L; Let. Arist. 157: :<0:@<,b,4< J@Ø 6D"J@Ø<J@H 2,@Ø; Let. Arist. 158: BDÎH JÎ :<,\"< . . . 2,@Ø (cf. Let. Arist. 160). 
152 In Leg. 3.18, Philo lists Jä< 6"8ä< :<−:"4 among the :XD0 J−H •F6ZF,TH. On Philo’s 
understanding of the role of :<Z:0 in the learning process, see Post. 148-49 (cf. Agr. 131-35). 
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certain ends. Furthermore, in both cases the engagement takes the form of 
discrete exercises, since memory employs "constant exercises" (FL<,PXF4 
:,8XJ"4H) as the "cement of thoughts" (6`88" <@0:VJT<).153 So in the symbolic 
interpretations that follow (§§110-115), Philo does not construe the dietary laws 
as practical exercises designed to inculcate ¦(6DVJ,4", as he did, for example, 
with the prohibition of pork. Rather, he construes them as repositories for the 
principles of ¦(6DVJ,4", which—once properly discerned—are indeed mastered 
and secured in the mind through practice.154 Here Philo’s symbolic method 
corresponds to that of the Letter of Aristeas, which likewise extracts ethical 
principles from the dietary laws with little concern for the practical implications of 
their literal observance. Yet even when Philo does replicate Eleazar’s technique, 
the technique serves a different agenda. Philo ultimately has in mind a very 
practical program of desire management, which the theoretical principles outlined 
in §§110-115 commend.155 
 
                                            
153 On the association of :,8XJ0 with –F60F4H, see, e.g., Leg. 3.18: :XD0 J−H •F6ZF,TH . 
. . :,8XJ"4; Sacr. 85-86: :,8XJ0< 6"Â –F60F4< "ÛJä< B@4,ÃF2"4 FL<,P− . . . FL<,P¬H (D –F60F4H ¦B4FJZ:0< BV(4@< ¦D(V.,J"4 (cf. Gig. 26; Conf. 110; Migr. 31). See also Pierre Hadot, 
"La philosophie antique: une éthique ou une pratique?," in Problèmes de la Morale Antique (ed. 
Paul Demont; Amiens: Université de Picardie-Jules Verne, 1993), 7-37, esp. 23-24; and Mosès, 
264-65, n. 4: "La :,8XJ0 mémorisante peut être également évoquée à travers l’image de la 
simple mastication (Leg. I, 98) ou à travers le symbole de la manne concassée (Sacrif. 86). Ce 
type d’exercice mental appartient à la plupart des ascèses philosophiques de l’époque." 
154 Cf. §107: J F@N\"H *`(:"J" 6"Â 2,TDZ:"J". 
 155 Cf. Somn. 1.169: "There being, then, three methods by which virtue accrues, it is the 
first and third that are most intimately connected (J@×H –6D@LH :V84FJ" FL:$X$06,< º<äF2"4); 
for what comes by practice is the offspring and product of that which comes by learning (JÎ (D •6ZF,4 §((@<@< J@Ø :"2ZF,4) . . .." 
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§§110 – 112: Aquatic Animals156 
 
[§110] After establishing these restrictions for land animals, Moses begins 
to list aquatic animals that are clean and approved for eating. Here again 
he clearly marks the clean species with a pair of traits—fins and scales—
rejecting with disapproval any animal that exhibits neither or only one of 
them. Now, this requires an accurate explanation. [§111] You see, 
creatures lacking either or both of these traits get dragged along by the 
current, unable to withstand the force of its movement. But creatures 
equipped with both face the current head-on and repel it. Eager to contend 
with the opponent, they train themselves with zeal and invincible daring: 
pushed they push back, chased they turn and charge, hemmed in they 
clear wide swaths for an easy escape. [§112] As with the land animals 
mentioned earlier, these two types of aquatic creatures are also symbols: 
the first represents the soul of a lover of pleasure, the second represents 
the soul enamored of endurance and self-control. After all, the road to 
pleasure is downhill all the way—easier than any other. So instead of a 
path for walking, it ends up being more like a slippery slope. By contrast, 
the road to self-control is a steep uphill climb—laborious, to be sure, but 
more beneficial than any other. The road to pleasure whisks us away and 
compels our descent, bearing us down headlong until at last it flings us off 
into the lowest depths. But the other road leads upward to heaven, 
granting immortality to those who do not grow weary, who have the 
strength to endure its rough and challenging climb.  
 
In his symbolic interpretation of the criteria for clean land animals, Philo had to 
reckon with a traditional, perhaps even authoritative, understanding of the 
significance of rumination and split hooves, but his interpretation of fins and 
scales, the criteria for clean aquatic animals, seems like a novel venture. While 
he does use the traditional technique of correlating animal behavior with human 
character—just as Eleazar did in the case of carnivorous birds (Let. Arist. 145-
49)—Philo’s results seem original, given their tailored fit to his expository 
agenda. He begins with a characterization of the unclean aquatic animal, which 
                                            
156 See Lev 11:9-12; Deut 14:9-10. 
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lacks fins, or scales, or both. Such a creature, he notes, get swept away by the 
current, "unable to withstand the force of its movement" (•<JXP,4< •*L<"J@Ø<J" 
J± $\‘ J−H N@DH) (§111). Since Philo commonly uses the term N@DV 
("movement") as a synonym for the technical term ÒD:Z ("impulse"), his wording 
here mirrors the discourse of moral psychology deployed elsewhere in his 
writings.157 In particular, he portrays the plight of someone mastered by the non-
rational impulse(s) of ¦B42L:\", someone identified explicitly in §112 as the 
N48Z*@<@H RLPZ. Consistent with his Middle-Platonic view of the soul, Philo 
portrays a contest of power within the moral agent whose reason (8`(@H) suffers 
abject defeat, unable (•*L<"J@Ø<J") to withstand the force (J± $\‘) of the 
dominating non-rational power (¦B42L:\"). Just as the current absolutely directs 
the movement of a finless, scaleless creature, so ¦B42L:\"-turned-§DTH 
absolutely directs the movement of a N48Z*@<@H RLPZ, as it travels along the 
easy path to pleasure (¦Nzº*@<Z<).158 By contrast, aquatic animals with fins and 
                                            
157 On J± $\‘ J−H N@DH, cf. Leg. 1.73: J± $\‘ J−H ÒD:−H; Agr. 94: ¦B4FJ@:\.,4< J−H B8,@<".@bF0H J¬< N@D< ÒD:−H. On the virtual synonymy of ÒD:Z and N@DV, note the generic 
Stoic definition of impulse: 8X(@LF4< . . . ÒD:¬< ,É<"4 N@D< RLP−H ¦B\ J4 6"J JÎ (X<@H (ESE 9). 
On Philo’s use of N@DV in the context of moral psychology, note e.g. Leg. 3.134: Ë<z@âJ@H º<4`P@L JD`B@< ¦B4FJ@:\.® J¬< ¦BÂ B8X@< [Jä< B"2ä<] N@DV<; Leg. 3.155: ¦B4FJ@:4,Ã (D Ò 8`(@H 6"Â ¦(P"84<fF,4 J¬< Õb:0< 6"Â N@D< J@Ø BV2@LH; Agr. 88: J−H 6"J RLP¬< •8`(@L 6"Â •:XJD@L 6"Â •B,42@ØH N@DH; Fug. 91: J¬< Jä< B"2ä< •<,(,\D,4 N@DV<; Virt. 14: ßBÎ J−H Jä< B"2ä< N@DH 6"J"68b.,F2"4. Philo elsewhere equates water (à*TD) with the N@DV of the 
passions (BV20), e.g. Leg. 2.103: ßBÎ JÎ à*TD J@LJXFJ4< ßBÎ J¬< N@D< Jä< B"2ä<; Conf. 70: 
"ßBÎ JÎ à*TD" . . . J@LJXFJ4< ßBÎ J¬< B"2ä< N@DV<. 
158 The N48Z*@<@H RLPZ, mastered by tyrannical desire (§DTH), orients its life toward the 
"good" invariably sought by desire, which is pleasure (º*@<Z) (see above, 87-94). In §112, Philo 
signals the presence of harmful §DTH in the N48Z*@<@H RLPZ by contrasting it with the soul 
enamored of endurance and self-control (6"DJ,D\"< 6"Â ¦(6DVJ,4"< B@2@bF0H), whose longing 
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scales stoutly oppose the current (§111). Philo characterizes their behavior using 
the agon motif, portraying the sort of struggle against ¦B42L:\" engaged by 
those who acquire ¦(6DVJ,4" through practice (–F60F4H).159 In his view, these 
creatures symbolize the soul that yearns for endurance and self-control 
(6"DJ,D\"< 6"Â ¦(6DVJ,4"< B@2@bF0H [RLP−H]).This soul travels a difficult, yet 
profitable, path, which leads not only to ¦(6DVJ,4" but ultimately to heaven (,ÆH 
@ÛD"<`<) for those strong enough to endure it. By highlighting issues of 
¦B42L:\", ¦(6DVJ,4", and –F60F4H, Philo incorporates his interpretation of clean 
aquatic animals into the larger purpose of his exposition. 
§§113 – 115: "Reptiles"160 
 
[§113] Moses applies the same idea to reptiles, declaring both creatures 
with no feet, which wriggle about by sliding on their stomach, and four-
legged creatures with many feet unclean for eating—but he is once again 
hinting here at something else. Reptiles with no feet represent people who 
live for their bellies, who gorge themselves like cormorants, bringing a 
series of endless tributes to their sovereign ruler, the wretched belly. With 
liquor, pastries, seafood, and in general whatever baked treat or tasty 
relish the exacting culinary arts produce for every sort of dish, these 
people fan and stoke their boundless and insatiable desires. Reptiles with 
four legs and many feet represent the miserable slaves of not just one 
passion, desire, but of all passions, which generically are four in number, 
each having many species. The tyranny of one passion is hard enough—
how oppressive and unbearable the tyranny of many! [§114] But among 
reptiles, Moses designates as "clean" creatures with legs above their feet 
enabling them to leap up off of the ground. These are the various kinds of 
grasshoppers, along with the creature known as the "snake fighter." Once 
                                                                                                                                  
(B`2@H) indicates the presence of beneficial §DTH (on the §DTH-B`2@H connection, see above, 
161, n. 48). 
159 §111: BDÎH JÎ< •<J\B"8@< . . . (L:<V.,J"4. Cf. Spec. 1.149: •<J\B"8@< *¥ ¦B42L:\"H ¦(6DVJ,4". For "resisting current," the passions, and the agon motif, see esp. Mut. 214-15. 
160 See Lev 11:2-23, 41-45. Here "reptiles" in the broad sense of creatures that "creep" 
(Jä< ©DB,Jä<) (cf. Lat. repere). 
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again, Moses is using symbols to carefully examine the different habits 
and dispositions of a rational soul. In this case, we learn that the powerful 
pull of the body naturally weighs foolish people down, strangling and 
crushing them as it adds its force to the great sinking mass of mortal 
existence. [§115] Some happy souls, however, can resist the downward 
force of that pull with a superior counterforce. Taught by the principles of 
proper instruction to leap upward from earth and all earthly concerns into 
the ethereal circuits of heaven, these souls glimpse a vision deemed 
worthy of envy and struggle by all who forgo half-hearted efforts and attain 
it through determined resolve. 
 
In his explicit references to the structure of his commentary on clean and unclean 
animals, Philo acknowledge only three major elements—animals of land, sea, 
and sky—leaving no place in his outline for the reptiles (J ©DB,JV) of §§113-
115, except as part of his discussion of aquatic animals (§§110-112).161 He 
obviously does not place reptiles in the same physical domain, but they do, in his 
view, share with aquatic creatures the same symbolic domain, which justifies 
their standing together with aquatic creatures under the same rubric. In Philo’s 
view, Moses formulated dietary restrictions for the reptiles using "the same idea" 
(J−H *z"ÛJ−H Æ*X"H) he had used when formulating restrictions for aquatic 
creatures (§113).162 Generally speaking, Moses’ "idea" involved the correlation of 
animal behavior with human character, a correlation noted also by Eleazar in the 
Letter of Aristeas (esp. 145-49). But specifically, Moses saw in both aquatic 
                                            
161 When he finally begins his discussion of birds in §116, Philo claims to have 
considered only two classes of animal (land and aquatic) up to that point, so apparently none of 
the creatures mentioned in §§113-115 represent a distinct class (§116: z+B,808L2ãH @Þ< Jè 8`(å JH J, Jä< P,DF"\T< 6"Â JH Jä< ¦<b*DT< .æT< Æ*X"H). Elsewhere, Philo plainly states 
that his discussion of clean and unclean animals involves only three distinct varieties of creature: 
of land, sea, and sky (§100: ÓF" Jä< P,DF"\T< ´ ¦<b*DT< ´ BJ0<ä<; cf. §118). 
162 Cf. §113: BV84< "Æ<4JJ`:,<@H *4 :¥< ©DB,Jä<. 
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creatures and reptiles certain physiological traits indicative of ¦(6DVJ,4": either 
its abject absence, amounting to N480*@<\", or its salutary presence. By 
designating creatures either "clean" or "unclean" in accordance with their traits, 
Moses instructs students of his dietary laws in matters bearing on the Tenth 
Commandment, either commending the vigorous management of ¦B42L:\" 
(¦(6DVJ,4") or denouncing enslavement to ¦B42L:\" (N480*@<\"). In the case of 
aquatic creatures, Moses explores the symbolic significance of fins and scales, 
while in the case of reptiles, he considers the symbolic significance of feet.  
 Philo subdivides the unclean reptiles into those "with no feet" (–B@*") and 
those "with four legs and many feet" (J,JD"F6,8− 6"Â B@8bB@*"), and both 
represent souls utterly devoid of ¦(6DVJ,4" (§113).163 By creatures "with no feet," 
Philo clearly means serpents, which of necessity "wriggle about by sliding on 
their stomach" (FLD:è J−H ("FJDÎH Æ8LFBf:,<").164 Symbolically, serpents 
represent people who live for their bellies (¦BÂ 6@48\"H), specifically for the 
pleasure derived from eating and drinking. Holding pleasure as their ultimate aim, 
such people embody N480*@<\", the condition of soul indicative of tyrannical 
                                            
163 The actual terms Philo uses to classify unclean reptiles do not appear in the biblical 
prohibition in Lev 11:41-42: 6"Â B< ©DB,J`<, Ô ªDB,4 ¦BÂ J−H (−H, $*X8L(:" J@ØJ@ §FJ"4 ß:Ã<, @Û $DT2ZF,J"4. 6"Â BH Ò B@D,L`:,<@H ¦BÂ 6@48\"H (cf. –B@*") 6"Â BH Ò B@D,L`:,<@H ¦BÂ JXFF"D" *4 B"<J`H (cf. J,JD"F6,8−), Ô B@8LB802,Ã B@FÂ< (cf. B@8bB@*") ¦< BF4< J@ÃH ©DB,J@ÃH J@ÃH ªDB@LF4< ¦BÂ J−H (−H, @Û NV(,2, "ÛJ`, ÓJ4 $*X8L(:" ß:Ã< ¦FJ4< (Lev 11:41-42). 
Philo offers a similar interpretation of Lev 11:42 in Leg. 3.139. 
164 Cf. Lev 11:42: BH Ò B@D,L`:,<@H ¦BÂ 6@48\"H. Cf. the serpent’s curse in Gen 3:14: ¦BÂ Jè FJZ2,4 F@L 6"Â J± 6@48\‘ B@D,bF® (on which see Leg 3.65, 114-16,160). 
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desire.165 Philo further suggests the involvement of tyrannical desire with his 
description of those who live "for their bellies," echoing his earlier description of 
those consumed by tyrannical desire affecting the belly (§91).166 Instead of 
controlling desire with ¦(6DVJ,4", such people end up constantly stimulating 
desire, which in their case can never reach satiety because the deposed rational 
faculty sets no limit.167 Similarly, creatures "with four legs and many feet" 
represent people who, in general, fail to master the soul’s non-rational forces 
through ¦(6DVJ,4" and become instead mastered by those forces. In particular, 
Philo has in mind souls dominated by all of the passions (BV20): not just the four 
generic passions (J,JD"F6,8− [¦B42L:\", º*@<Z, N`$@H, 8bB0]), but also their 
many various species (B@8bB@*"). Philo’s symbolical reflection at this point 
involves all passions, clearly transcending the scope of his overarching topic, the 
prohibition of one passion in @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H. But he still singles out ¦B42L:\" 
for special mention in his description of reptilian souls, comparing their 
subjugation to many passions to the miserable slavery and harsh despotism 
                                            
165 Cf. Leg. 3.159: Ò :¥< N48Z*@<@H ¦BÂ 6@48\"< $"*\.,4.  
166 Apart from general similarities, note especially the terms common to both passages: ("FJXD" (§91) and ("FJD`H/("FJD\ (§113); •6@DXFJ@LH (§91) and •6@DXFJ@LH (§113); •6DVJ@L 
(§91) and •6DVJ@L (§113); ÆP2bT< (§91) and ÆP2bT< (§113); ¦*,F:VJT< (§91) and ¦*,F:VJT< 
(§113); Æ8LFBT:X<@LH (§91) and Æ8LFBf:,<" (§113). Philo does, however, compare gluttonous 
people to other sorts of animals in the two passages: dogs in §91 (JD`B@< 6L<4*\T<) and 
cormorants in §113 (JÎ< "Æ2L\0H JD`B@<). The cormorant ("Ç2L4"; genus Phalacrocorax), a 
voracious bird emblematic of gluttony (see also Leg. 3.155; Det. 101; Contemp. 55), would have 
fit perfectly into Philo’s discussion of birds (§§116-117), had Moses designated it "unclean." 
167 §113: •<"DD4B\.@F"4 6"Â BD@F"<"N8X(@LF"4 JH •B8ZFJ@LH 6"Â •6@DXFJ@LH ¦B42L:\"H. 
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imposed by one passion, ¦B42L:\", whose tyranny brings trouble enough.168 By 
framing such a comparison, Philo presumes to have already spoken on the 
nature and effects of tyrannical desire. And indeed he has, in both his symbolic 
interpretations (§§110-113) and the theoretical reflections of the exposition’s 
"diagnosis" portion (esp. §§80-91). So even though Philo’s remarks on four-
legged multipeds deny a particular significance to tyrannical desire in the 
interpretation of that restriction, they nevertheless confirm the preeminence of 
tyrannical desire in Philo’s exposition.     
 Philo interprets also the clean reptiles symbolically (§§114-115), exploring 
the significance of their distinguishing trait: legs above their feet enabling them to 
leap from the ground (B0*< •BÎ J−H (−H *b<"F2"4).169 Like their unclean 
counterparts, these reptiles represent for Philo a certain type of soul, which in 
this case Moses sought to commend, not condemn.170 In particular, Philo 
correlates their ability to leap from the ground (B0*< •BÎ J−H (−H) with the 
ability of souls to "leap" upward from the earth and from all earthly concerns (–<T 
B0*< . . . •BÎ (−H 6"Â Jä< P":"4.Z8T<), which secures for them a vision of the 
divine (º 2X" .08TJ¬ 6"Â B,D4:VP0J@H).171 Here Philo deploys the agon motif in 
                                            
168 NB in §113: J@×H :¬ ©<ÎH BV2@LH, ¦B42L:\"H, . . . 6"6@×H *@b8@LH; P"8,B¬ :¥< @Þ< 6"Â º ©<ÎH *,FB@J,\". 
169 Cf. Lev 11:21: Ÿ §P,4 F6X80 •<fJ,D@< Jä< B@*ä< "ÛJ@Ø B0*< ¦< "ÛJ@ÃH ¦BÂ J−H (−H. NB Philo’s emendation of ¦BÂ J−H (−H to •BÎ J−H (−H to suit his exegetical purpose. 
170 §114: BV84< *4 FL:$`8T< ³20 6"Â JD`B@LH 8@(46−H RLP−H *4,D,L<f:,<@H. 
171 Cf. Her. 239: "Conversely Moses gives high approval to those reptiles which can leap 
upwards (–<T *b<"J"4 B0*<). Thus he says, ‘These shall ye eat of the flying reptiles which go 
on four legs, which have legs above their feet (Ÿ §P,4 F6X80 •<TJXDT Jä< B@*ä<), so as to leap 
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its distinctively Platonic aspect, casting the practice of ¦(6DVJ,4" as a means of 
escaping the body’s entanglement with the sensible realm.172  While he does not 
use the term ¦(6DVJ,4", the concept undoubtedly informs his notion of a 
"leaping" soul that wrestles successfully against the "pull of the body" (º J@Ø 
Ff:"J@H Ò86Z) by resisting with superior strength (6D"J"4@JXD‘ *L<V:,4 BDÎH 
J¬< Õ@B¬< J−H Ò86−H •<J4$4VF"F2"4).173 Also, Philo’s specific mention of the 
"snake fighter" (ÏN4@:VP0H) suggests an effort on his part to characterize this 
type of soul as a model of ¦(6DVJ,4", since he elsewhere interprets the snake 
fighter in precisely those terms: 
                                                                                                                                  
with them from the earth (òFJ, B0*< ¦< "ÛJ@ÃH •BÎ J−H (−H).’ These are symbols of the souls 
(J"ØJ" *z¦FJÂ Fb:$@8" RLPä<) which though rooted like reptiles to the earthly body (ÓF"4 JD`B@< ©DB,Jä< BD@F,DD4.T:X<"4 Jè (0\<å Ff:"J4) have been purified and have strength to soar on 
high (6"2"D2,ÃF"4 :,J,TD@B@8,Ã< ÆFPb@LF4<), exchanging earth for heaven (@ÛD"<Î< •<J46"J"88">V:,<"4 (−H), and corruption for immortality (N2@DH •2"<"F\"<)."  
172 On the Platonic aspect of Philo's agon motif, see above, 127, n. 53. 
173 On "escaping the body," see Gig. 31; Somn. 1.43-44. By the term "pull of the body" (º J@Ø Ff:"J@H Ò86Z), Philo undoubtedly means the compelling force of primal desires (¦B42L:\"4) 
for pleasure (º*@<Z) closely associated with the body yet residing in the soul (cf. Gig. 33: J"ÃH N\8"4H 6"Â FL((,<XF4 Ff:"J@H º*@<"ÃH; Gig. 60: (−H :¥< @Ê 20D,LJ46@Â Jä< Ff:"J@H º*@<ä< •B`8"LF\< J, 6"Â PD−F4< ¦B4J0*,b@<J,H "ÛJä<; Somn. 2.13: "Ê Ff:"J@H º*@<"\). In other 
words, Philo envisions in this passage a moral agent resisting ¦B42L:\", which amounts to a 
moral agent exercising ¦(6DVJ,4" (cf. Somn. 2.106: Ff:"J@H º*@<Z< . . . •B@FJDXN0J"4 *4 B`2@< ¦(6D"J,\"H). On Philo and the body, see Pierre Courcelle, "Tradition platonicienne et 
traditions chrétiennes du corps-prison (Phédon 62 b; Cratyle 400 c)," REL 43 (1965): 406-43, 
esp. 413-14; Kenneth Fox, "Paul's Attitude toward the Body in Romans 6-8: Compared with Philo 
of Alexandria" (Ph.D. diss., University of St. Michael’s College, 2001), 215-58 [="Philo's Double 
Attitude toward the Body"]; Josef Groß, Philons von Alexandreia Anschauungen über die Natur 
des Menschen (Inaugural Dissertation, University of Tübingen, 1930), 10-21 [="Der Körper des 
Menschen"]; Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, 258-78 [="(M)an's descent into the body"], 321-22; 
Alexander Sand, Der Begriff "Fleisch" in den paulinischen Hauptbriefen (BU 2; Regensburg: 
Pustet, 1967), 281-84 [="Philo von Alexandrien"]; Eduard Schweizer, "Die hellenistische 
Komponente im neutestamentlichen FVD>-Begriff," ZNW 48 (1957): 237-53, 246-50 [="Philo"]; 
David Winston, "Philo and the Rabbis on Sex and the Body," in The Ancestral Philosophy: 
Hellenistic Philosophy in Second Temple Judaism: Essays of David Winston (ed. Gregory 
Sterling; SPhM 4; BJS 331; Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2001), 199-219. 
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For the snake-fighter is, I think, nothing but a symbolic representation of 
self-control (FL:$@846äH ¦(6DVJ,4" ,É<"\ :@4 *@6,Ã), waging a fight that 
never ends and a truceless war against intemperance and pleasure (BDÎH •6D"F\"< 6"Â º*@<Z<). (Opif. 164)174 
 
So Philo equates the clean reptiles with souls possessed of ¦(6DVJ,4", which 
prove themselves superior to their unclean counterparts by rejecting pleasure 
instead of embracing it (N480*@<\").  
§§116 – 117: Birds175 
 
[§116] Having provided a rational account of the nature of land-based and 
aquatic animals, and having made the most appropriate distinctions 
among them by the laws he enacted, Moses begins to examine the 
essence of the last type of creature—the myriad kinds of winged 
creatures. He rejects a great number of birds, in particular those that prey 
either on other animals or on human beings. The prohibition includes 
every carnivorous, every venomous bird, and in general every bird that 
uses aggressive force of any kind. [§117] But Moses includes ring-doves, 
pigeons and turtle-doves, and the various types of cranes, geese, and 
birds of that sort all in one class of tame and gentle creatures. He allows 
these birds without restriction to anyone who chooses to use them for 
food. 
 
Philo completes his survey of clean and unclean animals from land, sea, and sky 
with a short consideration of the legislation governing birds ((X<0 Jä< BJ0<ä<). 
Philo’s brevity contrasts sharply with Eleazar’s elaborate interpretation of these 
same laws in the Letter of Aristeas.176 While Philo does recognize along with 
                                            
174 Cf. Leg. 2.105. Philo’s symbolic interpretation of the snake fighter, although modeled 
on Eleazar’s method, reveals Philo’s unique appropriation of that method. Eleazar’s method 
assumes some animal trait reasonably analogous to a human ethical trait. Nothing about "fighting 
snakes," as an animal trait, suggests a comparison with human self-control. The snake-fighter 
can only represent self-control if the "snake" represents pleasure (see Calabi, "Il serpent e il 
cavaliere"; Siegfried, Philo, 247), and this identification involves Philo’s allegory of the soul (on 
which see Tobin, Creation of Man, 135-76). 
175 See Lev 11:13-19; Deut 14:11-18. 
176 Let. Arist. 145-49. 
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Eleazar the Mosaic correlation of "clean" with docility (herbivores) and "unclean" 
with aggression (carnivores), he does not make Eleazar’s connection between 
these behavioral traits and similar character traits. In fact, Philo makes no 
application to the realm of ethics at all, taking the laws neither literally as practical 
exercises in ¦(6DVJ,4" nor symbolically as theoretical promotions of ¦(6DVJ,4". 
Such an omission clearly defeats the purpose of Philo’s exposition, which 
presumes to show how Moses’ dietary laws promote the observance of @Û6 
¦B42L:ZF,4H by fostering proper management of ¦B42L:\" within the soul. By 
citing a set of dietary laws and tracing no connection to his overall expository 
agenda (¦B42L:\", ¦(6DVJ,4", –F60F4H), Philo seems to deny the existence of 
any connection.  
But Philo earlier proved his creative ability to find such connections for the 
sake of his expository agenda, using a variety of literal and symbolic 
techniques.177 So his failure to produce an interpretation here along lines of 
moral psychology hardly stems from an inability to do so, but more likely from an 
unwillingness. The reluctance makes sense, if in fact Philo knew the Letter of 
Aristeas, or at least the symbolic interpretation of clean and unclean birds it 
contains. After all, the careful explication of how Moses ingeniously used obscure 
regulations about eating birds to commend justice and condemn violent 
                                            
177 In fact, the logic of Philo’s interpretation of the prohibition of man-eaters (§§103-104), 
however strained, could just as well apply here to the prohibition of carnivorous birds, since they 
too—as both Philo and Eleazar acknowledge—injure human beings and could therefore incite 
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oppression stands as the highlight of Eleazar’s discourse on the dietary laws. 
Such a notable interpretation probably either was standard before its inclusion in 
the Letter of Aristeas or became standard as a result. In either case, a well-
established traditional understanding of the laws governing birds, especially one 
at odds with his expository agenda, would put Philo in an awkward exegetical 
position. According to Eleazar, Moses had one clear objective in prohibiting or 
permitting certain species of birds: the promotion of *46"4@Fb<0. But, according 
to Philo, Moses formulated the dietary laws in an effort to promote ¦(6DVJ,4", 
not *46"4@Fb<0. Rather than flatly contradict a venerable traditional 
interpretation, Philo offers no interpretation at all. As a result, he gives absolutely 
no support to one element of his original thesis about the laws of clean and 
unclean (§§100-102), which states that Moses regulated the consumption of 
animals from land, sea, and sky with a view to eliminating passionate desire. Yet 
when he summarily concludes his discussion of the laws of clean and unclean, 
he speaks as if he had. 
§118: Conclusion of Clean and Unclean Animals 
 
[§118] So, as you can see, Moses withdrew from our use certain animals 
from every region of the earth: creatures from the land, from the sea, and 
from the sky. He was, in a sense, withdrawing fuel from a fire, intending all 
along to extinguish passionate desire.178  
                                                                                                                                  
passionate vengeance (§116: ÓF" . . . 6"Jz•<2DfBT< N@<”; Let. Arist. 146: J@×H •<2DfB@LH •*46@ØF4).  
178 He was, in a sense, withdrawing fuel from a fire, intending all along to extinguish 
passionate desire (6"2VB,D à80< BLD`H [ßN"4Dä<], F$XF4< J−H ¦B42L:\"H •B,D(V.,J"4): These 
restrictions do nothing to "extinguish" ¦B42L:\" itself, since even those who abstain from 
prohibited animals indulge the amoral emotion ¦B42L:\" when they eat, and Philo nowhere 
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In §118, Philo completes the interpretive frame he began in §§100-102, 
suggesting that Moses crafted his legislation on clean and unclean animals 
primarily to remove incitements to ¦B42L:\" and obviate the risk of passionate 
desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\"). He made the claim explicitly in §100, citing Moses’ 
prohibition of the "fattest" (,ÛF"D6`J"J") and "richest" (B4`J"J") animals from 
land, sea, and sky—animals with especially delicious meats likely to cause the 
moral agent to eat strictly for the sake of pleasure. Here in §118, Philo uses more 
general terms to make the same essential point: Moses’ strategic prohibition of 
certain animals from land, sea, and sky amounts to the withdrawal of "fuel from a 
fire" in order to "extinguish" passionate desire.179 By framing his entire discussion 
of the laws governing clean and unclean animals with one distinct claim about 
the purpose of those laws, Philo implies that each one of his analyses 
corroborates, or at least should corroborate, that claim. But only two of the 
animals he considers in fact support his claim: pigs and scaleless sea creatures, 
both of which Philo clearly identifies as especially pleasurable to eat and morally 
dangerous for that reason. He does manage to fit one other type of prohibited 
animal, the land carnivores, into his interpretive scheme, but only through a 
                                                                                                                                  
advocates the elimination (extinguishing) of ¦B42L:\" per se. The ¦B42L:\" Philo has in mind 
must be passionate desire, which Moses’ dietary regulations are designed to eliminate. 
179 Cf. Gemünden, "Culture des Passions," 341: "[L]es homes imparfaits doivent lutter, ils 
doivent faire des efforts pour avancer (Her. 275). Dans cette lutte, c’est surtout le logos qui 
combat les passions. Pour cette lutte, le prokoptôn doit se référer à la philosophie et à la Loi. 
Cette dernière peut éteindre par exemple le désir (epithumia), comme Philon le démontre dans 
De specialibus Legibus IV, 118 au sujet des lois alimentaires qui peuvent éteindre le désir 
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strained notion of man-eaters being delicious (§103-104). Otherwise, he offers 
strictly symbolic interpretations of the various clean and unclean species, 
avoiding any sort of claim about how they actually taste. He discontinues the 
symbolic mode when he gets to the legislation concerning birds, but instead of 
interpreting that legislation in light of his claim about delicious fare, he offers no 
interpretation at all. So Philo hardly succeeds in demonstrating a systematic 
tendency on Moses’ part to designate delicious animals "unclean" in an effort to 
combat passionate desire. 
But in §§100-118 Philo does succeed in promoting the broader expository 
agenda he brings to all of the dietary laws, despite his failure to unite the laws of 
clean and unclean animals under one interpretive claim. In other words, Philo 
finds a way of making this subset of the dietary laws speak to issues of ¦B42L:\", 
¦(6DVJ,4", and –F60F4H, confirming their essential relation—as species to 
genus—to the Tenth Commandment’s prohibition of desire. In particular, he 
shows how the Mosaic legislation on clean and unclean species, with almost 
perfect consistency, addresses the problem of –:,JD@H ¦B42L:\" by posing the 
solution of ¦(6DVJ,4" acquired through –F60F4H.180 The prohibitions of pork and 
scaleless sea creatures of course support not only Philo’s specific thesis for 
                                                                                                                                  
«comme un feu auquel on refuse du bois»." Note fire imagery also in Spec. 4.83; Decal. 150, 173 
(cf. Fug. 158; Mos. 2.58; Sobr. 43; Congr. 55; Provid. 2.40). 
180 With two significant exceptions: the laws regarding rumination and split hooves 
(§§106-109) and the laws governing birds (§§116-117). In the case of rumination, Philo does the 
best he can, turning the interpretation toward his exegetical agenda by highlighting the role of 
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§§100-118 but also his general thesis about the dietary laws overall, since the 
consistent avoidance of excessive pleasure fosters a lifestyle of ¦(6DVJ,4", 
which accepts only rational (moderate) indulgences of ¦B42L:\". The prohibition 
of land carnivores promotes ¦(6DVJ,4" through a similar mechanism, even 
though no one—including Philo—considers the meat of such animals especially 
tasty. Philo ascribes a symbolic function to all of the other regulations, explaining 
how the designations "clean" and "unclean" respectively either commend 
¦(6DVJ,4" and –F60F4H or condemn the excessive indulgence of ¦B42L:\", quite 
apart from the palatability of the animals involved. 
§§119 – 121: Dead Animals181 
 
[§119] In other regulations concerning food, Moses commands the 
avoidance of dead animals, whether dead by natural causes or savaged 
by a predator. As the second prohibition suggests, a human being should 
not dine with wild beasts, all but feasting with them on their meal of flesh. 
As for the first prohibition, there seem to be at least two possible reasons. 
To begin with, eating a creature dead by natural causes is harmful and 
likely to cause disease, since the vital fluid of the creature has died inside 
the body along with the blood. Also, a creature already claimed by death 
should be left untouched out of respect for the forces of nature to which it 
succumbed. [§120] Now, great hunters, the kind trained as expert 
marksmen who down their prey with rarely a miss, receive praise from 
most lawgivers among Greeks and barbarians. Such men boast in their 
successful exploits, especially when they share some of the catch with the 
dog handlers and even with the dogs themselves. They are praised for 
their character, as men who are not only brave but also generous. But the 
architect of our sacred commonwealth would obviously condemn such 
behavior, having forbidden outright the consumption of animals either 
dead by natural causes or—as applies in this case—savaged by a 
predator, for the reasons previously stated. [§121] Suppose, however, one 
                                                                                                                                  –F60F4H in connection with :<Z:0. In the case of birds, Philo's failure to promote his exegetical 
agenda likely derives from deference to the interpretive tradition found in the Letter of Aristeas. 
181 See Exod 22:30; Lev 17:15; Deut 14:21. 
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of our commonwealth's athletes of virtue becomes fond of physical training 
and the hunt,182 expecting in this way to undergo exercises and 
preparations for wars and dangerous engagements with his enemies. 
Whenever he has a successful expedition, he should simply give the catch 
to his dogs for them to feast on, as a payment or prize for their courage 
and impeccable service. He himself should never even touch the dead 
animals, so as to learn in his dealings with non-rational creatures a proper 
attitude toward human enemies. In particular, he should never do battle 
with them in order to gain something he does not already own, which is 
the business of robbers, but in an effort either to avenge past wrongs or to 
deal with ones he considers imminent. 
 
As part of an overarching thesis for §§100-118, Philo claimed that Moses 
prohibited animals yielding delicious meats in order to promote ¦(6DVJ,4", but 
his discussion in §§119-121 of animals dead from either natural causes 
(2<0F4:"Ã@<) or violent attack (20D4V8TJ@<) clearly requires a different 
approach.183 Since these prohibitions presume edibility under different 
circumstances of death, they must involve only the moderately tasty "clean" 
animals, whose demise from old age, disease, or mauling can only make them 
less appetizing. Philo can no longer broach the topic of moral psychology, as he 
did earlier, by analyzing the dietary laws in terms of the pleasure (º*@<Z) certain 
                                            
182 Suppose, however, one of our commonwealth's athletes of virtue becomes fond of 
physical training and the hunt (,Æ *X J4H Jä< •F60Jä< N48@(L:<"FJ¬H (X<@4J@ 6"Â N48`20D@H): 
Philo considers the case of a moral athlete (J4H Jä< •F60Jä<) who becomes enamored of 
physical training and an actual sport, the hunt (N48@(L:<"FJZH . . . 6"Â N48`20D@H). Both 
Heinemann and Mosès read the passage in this way: "Wenn aber ein tugendbeflissener Mann 
auch Freund von Körperübungen und Jagd ist"; "Et si tel athlète de la vertu est aussi un amateur 
des exercices physiques et de la chasse"). Colson does not identify J4H Jä< •F60Jä< with a 
moral athlete, "based on the belief that •F60JZH is not used absolutely in this way" (PLCL 8, 83, 
n. b). But Philo uses •F60JZH in precisely this way in Post. 154: J4<,H Jä< •F60Jä<, @ÍH J¬< ¦Bz•D,J¬< –(@LF"< Ò*Î< JD"P,Ã"< 6"Â *LFV<J0 6"Â P",8B¬< <@:4F2,ÃF"< JÎ BDäJ@<. 
183 See Exod 22:30: 6"Â –<*D,H (4@4 §F,F2X :@4. 6"Â 6DX"H 20D4V8TJ@< @Û6 §*,F2,, Jè 6L<Â •B@DD\R"J, "ÛJ`; Lev 17:15: 6"Â BF" RLPZ, »J4H NV(,J"4 2<0F4:"Ã@< ´ 20D4V8TJ@< ¦< 
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animals afford when eaten. In fact, nothing in his initial explanation of why Moses 
prohibited the 2<0F4:"Ã@< and the 20D4V8TJ@< (§119) speaks at all to the issues 
of ¦B42L:\", ¦(6DVJ,4", and –F60F4H raised elsewhere in his exposition. To 
create a connection between these two prohibitions and his exegetical agenda, 
Philo uses a convoluted bit of legal reasoning to derive from them a brand new 
prohibition, found nowhere in the Pentateuch, which in his view counts as an 
exercise in ¦(6DVJ,4".  
 Philo contrasts Greek and barbarian lawgivers, who praise the generosity 
of expert huntsmen who share the catch even with their hounds (F6b8">4), with 
Moses, who presumably would find fault with such a practice based on his 
prohibition of 2<0F4:"Ã@< and 20D4V8TJ@<, particularly the latter. In other words, 
Moses’ prohibition of mauled animals (20D4V8TJ@<), which Philo characterized in 
§119 as a prohibition of sharing a meal of flesh with animals (FL<,LTP@b:,<@< 
J"ÃH F"D6@N"(\"4H), would forbid a hunter from sharing with his dogs. But Philo 
still has no clear application to moral psychology, so he poses yet another 
scenario, which holds at best a tertiary relation to Moses’ original prohibition of 
20D4V8TJ@<. Suppose, says Philo, someone fond of training becomes an avid 
hunter (N48`20D@H), in order to train for warfare.184 Philo suggests that such 
                                                                                                                                  J@ÃH "ÛJ`P2@F4< ´ ¦< J@ÃH BD@F08bJ@4H . . . •6V2"DJ@H §FJ"4; Deut 14:21: B< 2<0F4:"Ã@< @Û NV(,F2,; cf. Lev 5:2; 11:39-40, 22:8. 
184 §121: :,8XJ"H 6"Â BD@V(T<"H ßB@8":$V<T< ,É<"4 B@8X:T< 6"Â 64<*b<T< Jä< BDÎH ¦P2D@bH. In other words, Philo poses the very specialized case of someone who hunts not for 
food, but for martial training. 
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hunters should not even touch their dead quarry (:¬ R"LXJT), but simply give the 
dogs a well-deserved feast. And because he characterized the hunt as strictly a 
preparation for warfare, Philo can interpret the practice of abstaining from the 
catch in a brand new way, which does not involve the condition of the deceased 
animal(s) but does—at long last—involve the moral condition of the hunter. 
 By avoiding all contact with the dead quarry, the hunter as moral agent 
learns through practice with animal opponents to battle human enemies not for 
"unjust gain" (*4 6XD*@H –*46@<), but only for the just causes of retaliation or 
preemptive self-defense. Since he has painstakingly managed to cast the law of 
20D4V8TJ@< as an exercise in abstaining from 6XD*@H –*46@<, Philo can now rest 
assured of its relevance to moral psychology and the management of ¦B42L:\", 
though he chooses not to explore that relevance in detail. Elsewhere, however, 
Philo clearly associates the pursuit of 6XD*@H –*46@< with the indulgence of 
passionate desire, with a failure to limit ¦B42L:\" properly, particularly in his 
interpretation of the law against sowing more than one type of seed in a 
vineyard.185 Trying to get more than one crop from one piece of land represents 
an act of egregious avarice.186 Whoever makes the attempt incites unjust desires 
(•*\6@LH ¦B42L:\"H), failing to restrict them with proper limits (:XJD@4H "ÛJH :¬ 
                                            
185 Deut 22:9: @Û 6"J"FB,D,ÃH JÎ< •:B,8ä<V F@L *4VN@D@<. For Philo’s interpretation, 
see esp. Spec. 4.212-18. 
186 Spec. 4.212: N48@PD0:"J\"H ßB,D$"88@bF0H §D(@<. 
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B,D4@D\.T<) in the pursuit of "unjust gain" (6XD*@H –*46@<).187 While seeking gain 
from one crop represents a just and reasonable course of action, seeking more 
represents an overstepping of reason’s authority on the part of desire. Philo’s 
case of the just warrior suggests a similar dynamic: while going to war for a just 
cause represents a reasonable course of action, going to war for gain represents 
a triumph of ¦B42L:\" over 8`(@H, since the violence no longer bears justification 
on rational grounds.188 So in Philo’s mind, a hunter training for battle who gives 
his catch to the dogs not only obeys a semblance of Moses’ prohibition of 
20D4V8TJ@<—he also, more importantly, is training himself in going to war with a 
rational motivation, not a motivation based on ¦B42L:\". And by encouraging the 
dominance of reason over desire, such training promotes ¦(6DVJ,4".  
§§122 – 125: Blood and Fat189 
 
[§122] Of course, some devotees of Sardanapalus, greedily extending 
their ever dainty lack of self-control beyond all bounds and limits, cleverly 
devise new kinds of pleasure. For their culinary delight, they prepare meat 
unfit for any sacrifice by strangling and choking the animals to death. In 
this way, they entomb the blood, the essence of the soul, within the 
body—blood that should have been liberated and released from the body. 
They should be content to enjoy the flesh alone, without touching anything 
akin to the soul. [§123] This explains Moses' decision to legislate 
elsewhere concerning blood, as he does when he prohibits the 
consumption of both blood and fat. Blood is prohibited for the reason I 
mentioned: it is the essence of the soul. I do not mean the intelligent and 
rational soul, but the soul that operates through the senses—the soul that 
                                            
187 Spec. 4.217-18. 
188 Philo suggests in §121 that those who go to war for unjust gain essentially engage in 
robbery (8TB@*LJ@b<JT< BDV>,4H), which is precisely the sort of behavior expected from those 
taken captive by a tyrannical desire for wealth (§87: ,Æ BDÎH PDZ:"J" (X<@4J@, 68XBJ"H •B@J,8,Ã 6"Â $"8"<J4@J`:@LH 6"Â 8TB@*bJ"H). 
189 See Lev 3:17. 
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provides both to us and to non-rational animals the same capacity for life 
in the sensible world. But the essence of the other type of soul is divine 
spirit, especially from Moses' perspective. In his account of the creation of 
the world, Moses states that God infused the first man and founder of our 
race with a "breath of life" into his "face," the most commanding part of the 
body, where the senses are stationed like an entourage for the mind as for 
a great king. Clearly, what God infused was ethereal spirit, and, if you will, 
something better than ethereal spirit: an effulgence of the blessed, the 
triply blessed, Nature. [§124] As for the fat of the animal, Moses prohibits 
its consumption because it is most succulent. Here again he wants to 
teach self-control and zeal for an austere life—a life that forgoes what is 
easiest and convenient and instead endures voluntarily the mental efforts 
and other labors needed to acquire virtue. [§125] For this reason, the 
blood and the fat are taken from every sacrificial animal and given as a 
whole burnt offering, as a sort of first fruits. The blood is poured out onto 
the altar as a drink offering, while the fat, on account of its richness, is 
brought instead of oil to fuel the flame of the sacred and holy fire. 
 
Philo now turns to the prohibitions of blood and fat, taking first the prohibition of 
blood (§§122-123).190 In the case of unclean animals, Philo cast the dietary laws 
as exercises in ¦(6DVJ,4" by presuming to identify Moses’ tacit rationale for 
prohibiting certain species—the pig, for example, tastes delicious and incites 
¦B42L:\", and Moses prohibits the pig for that reason. In the case of blood, 
however, Philo must account for a dietary prohibition whose explicit rationale has 
little or nothing to do with ¦B42L:\", ¦(6DVJ,4", or –F60F4H. Moses instead 
forbids blood because of its unique relation to the soul (RLPZ).191 But despite 
biblical data at odds with his expository agenda, Philo still broaches the topic in 
terms of moral psychology, characterizing the consumption of blood as one of the 
                                            
190 For the two prohibitions together, note esp. Lev 3:17: <`:4:@< ,ÆH JÎ< "Æä<" ,ÆH JH (,<,H ß:ä< ¦< BVF® 6"J@46\‘ ß:ä<q B< FJX"D 6"Â B< "Í:" @Û6 §*,F2,. 
191 Lev 17:10-14 (e.g., v. 11: º (D RLP¬ BVF0H F"D6ÎH "Í:" "ÛJ@Ø ¦FJ4<). Philo clearly 
knows the biblical prohibition (JÎ :¥< "Í:" *4z¼< ,ÉB@< "ÆJ\"< ÓJ4 @ÛF\" RLP−H ¦FJ\< [§123]). 
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decadent pleasures (º*@<VH) enjoyed by some "Sardanapalus types" 
(G"D*"<VB"88@4).192 These people strangle the animals they eat, "entombing" 
the blood within the body, and so demonstrate an egregious, effeminate lack of 
self-control.193 The reprehensible luxury of such a practice lies in its being done 
strictly for the sake of pleasure by those unwilling to content themselves with the 
more reasonable indulgence of eating only the flesh drained of blood.194 So Philo 
effectively frames the prohibition of blood as a deterrent to passionate desire, 
deploying the same 8`(@H–¦B42L:\" dynamic that informs his exposition of the 
laws of clean and unclean animals. He implies that reason, imposing proper 
measure (:XJD@<) on ¦B42L:\", would in fact endorse the eating of meat properly 
drained of its life force. But someone subject to passionate desire (–:,JD@H 
¦B42L:\"), acting on the basis of desire’s motivation for pleasure, oversteps this 
reasonable limit in order to enjoy the delectable but unreasonable indulgence of 
blood-infused meat. By avoiding such meat, the moral agent learns by practice 
(–F60F4H) to avoid eating for pleasure’s sake, to operate on the basis of a 
rational motivation, and to develop the moderate lifestyle possessed of 
¦(6DVJ,4". Of course, Philo must acknowledge, as he clearly does, that Moses 
did not have the pleasures of blood in mind when he made the prohibition, but 
                                            
192 On Sardanapalus, see §102. 
193 On –(P@<J,H 6"Â •B@B<\(@<J,H, cf. Acts 15:29: •BXP,F2"4 . . . "Í:"J@H 6"Â B<46Jä< 
(see A. J. M. Wedderburn, "The ‘Apostolic Decree’: Tradition and Redaction," NovT 35 [1993], 
362-89, esp. 366-68). 
194 NB §122: F"D6ä< (D "ÛJÎ :`<@< •B@8"b,4< "ÜJ"D6,H μ<. 
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rather its property of kinship with the soul. But Philo cannot limit his commentary 
to the biblical data without losing the overall thrust of his exposition, which 
programmatically seeks to draw some connection between the individual dietary 
laws and the management of ¦B42L:\". And Philo does draw the connection—in 
fact, he highlights it by discussing it first. Although the "Sardanapalus types" 
Philo mentions ought to abstain from blood primarily because it carries life, they 
clearly would also derive the secondary benefit of a more moderate lifestyle. And 
followers of Moses, who would first avoid the meat of strangled animals because 
it still contains the essence of life, nevertheless derive the same benefit of 
eliminating a dangerously titillating food from their diet.  
The Mosaic prohibition of fat, by contrast, perfectly suits Philo’s expository 
agenda, since it corresponds exactly to the prohibition of pork in its theoretical 
mechanism.195 As Philo explained in §100, Moses prohibited animals, like the 
pig, whose flesh is "most succulent" (B4`J"J"), knowing that abstinence from 
delectable fare facilitates proper management of ¦B42L:\". Echoing these 
remarks, Philo attributes the prohibition of fat (JÎ FJX"D) to its being "most 
succulent" (B4`J"J@<), noting that Moses here "again" (BV84<)—with this dietary 
restriction—offers a lesson in self-control (*4*"F6"8\"< ¦(6D"J,\"H). By 
abstaining from fat, the moral agent learns to reject the life of luxury, which 
pursues pleasure for pleasure’s sake at the prompting of ¦B42L:\". Of course, 
                                            
195 Noted also by Heinemann, Bildung, 163. 
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the life of ¦(6DVJ,4", which pursues only necessities at the prompting of reason, 
demands strenuous exercise (–F60F4H)—a point duly made by Philo through 
deployment of the agon motif. In particular, the command to abstain from fat 
promotes "zeal for an austere life" (.−8@< "ÛFJ0D@Ø $\@L), a life that voluntarily 
forgoes what is easy (J Õ”FJ") to endure hardships (B`<@LH), in order to acquire 
virtue (ª<,6" 6JZF,TH •D,J−H).196 In his exposition of criteria for clean aquatic 
creatures (§112), Philo deployed the same figure in the same way, contrasting 
the "easy" (Õ’FJ0) road to pleasure with the "toilsome" (¦B\B@<@H) road BDÎH 
¦(6DVJ,4"<.   
§§126 – 131: Concluding Moral Narrative197 
 
[§126] Finally, remember that Moses condemns some of his 
contemporaries as gluttons, as people who consider the experience of 
pleasure to be the pinnacle of happiness. A luxurious life in the city was 
not enough for them, where the supplies and provisions for all their 
necessities were inexhaustible. They wanted the same thing in the 
desolate, trackless wilderness, expecting to find vendors of fish, meat, and 
every kind of seasonable produce. [§127] When scarcity did come, they 
joined forces in shouting down, denouncing, and disparaging their leader 
with shameless audacity. And they did not stop their revolt until they got 
what they wanted. Their demands were met for two reasons: first, to show 
that all things are possible for God, who finds a way in the midst of 
impossible and irresolvable situations; second, to punish the people, who 
were slaves of their belly and shirkers of holiness. [§128] As the story 
goes, a great cloud of quail, swept in from over the sea, poured out of the 
sky at dawn. So thick was this mass of birds that the encampment and the 
surrounding area—in every direction, as far as a fit man could walk in a 
day—were overshadowed. In addition, they were flying only a few feet off 
of the ground, which made them easy to capture. [§129] Now, you would 
                                            
196 Cf. Det 27: @ÍH ßB¥D 6JZF,TH •D,J−H B`<@H *4"28,ÃJ"4; Migr. 200: •28@Ø<J@H 6"Â ßB¥D 6JZF,TH •D,J−H; Mut. 14: ßB¥D 6JZF,TH •D,J−H Ò •F60J¬H ¦BV8"4F,. 
197 See Num 11:4-34. 
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think that the people, struck with amazement by such a marvelous 
demonstration of power on God’s part, would have been satisfied simply 
with what they saw—that filled with reverence, and amply fed by 
reverence,198 they would have abstained from eating any of the meat. 
Instead, goading their desire to an even greater pitch, they went after what 
seemed to them the greatest possible good fortune. Raking in the quail 
with both hands, they packed the folds of their garments. Storing those 
birds away in their tents, they went back outside to catch others, 
demonstrating that greedy cravings for more have no limit. Preparing their 
game in a variety of ways, they gorged themselves insatiably, about to be 
destroyed—the fools—by their bloat. [§130] And, in fact, they did perish 
before long in a pool of noxious discharges. So in keeping with the 
passion that destroyed them, that place was named "Tombs of Desire." 
Clearly, as our story teaches, there is no evil in the soul greater than 
desire. [§131] Taking all of this into consideration, we can admire what 
Moses so admirably says in his exhortations, "Let no one do what is 
pleasing in his own sight." He is saying, in effect, "Let no one indulge his 
own desire." If a person expects to become truly noble, let him be pleasing 
to God, the world, Nature, laws, and wise men by rejecting the love of self.     
 
At §126, Philo abruptly turns from his serial treatment of discrete dietary laws to a 
moralized retelling of God’s provision of quail to the Israelites in the wilderness. 
Philo’s narrative ends in §130 with an explicit statement of what the story 
ultimately teaches: that "there is no greater evil (:,Ã.@< 6"6`<) in the soul than 
desire."199 This sweeping indictment of ¦B42L:\" clearly resembles earlier 
material from the diagnosis (6D\F4H) portion of Philo’s exposition (§§79-94), which 
sought above all to illustrate the reprehensible nature and harmful effects of 
                                            
198 filled with reverence, and amply fed by reverence ((,:4F2X<J"H ,ÛF,$,\"H 6"Â J"bJ® JD"NX<J"H): Reading, with Colson and Mosès, 6"\ (MSS) instead of 6•< (PCW). 
199 [¦B42L:\"H] @Û6 §FJ4< ¦< RLP± . . . :,Ã.@< 6"6`<. Philo takes the epithet "Tombs of 
Desire" (LXX Num 11:34: 9<Z:"J" J−H ¦B42L:\"H) as an indication of the story’s concern with 
the passion (BV2@H) desire (§130). Cf. Philo's comments on Num 11:4 in Migr. 155, esp. his 
interpretation of ¦B,2b:0F"< ¦B42L:\"< as a reference to the genus ¦B42L:\" itself ("ÛJ@Ø J@Ø (X<@LH), not any particular species of ¦B42L:\" (@ÛP ©<`H J4<@H Jä< ,Æ*ä<). In other words, the 
story from Numbers speaks in Philo's view to more than just gastric desire, and for this reason it 
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desire, particularly of its most egregious manifestation, tyrannical desire (§DTH). 
Insofar as the material in §§126-130 serves to depict tyrannical desire in a 
negative light, it too bears analysis as part of Philo’s diagnosis, although it 
appears at the very end of his exposition. 
 Philo undoubtedly sees tyrannical desire as the distinct manifestation of 
¦B42L:\" at work in the people’s clamoring for meat and later gorging 
themselves with quail. In particular, they suffered from tyrannical desire affecting 
the belly, which turned them into "gluttons" (§126: ("FJD4:VD(@LH), the very 
effect Philo described as part of the exposition’s first and more extensive 
diagnosis.200 But despite the incidental involvement of the stomach as the sphere 
of desire’s influence, the real issue—as with any instance of tyrannical desire—is 
the involvement of the rational faculty, in particular its being overthrown by 
desire, which results in the moral agent designating pleasure as "the good." As 
Philo puts it in §126, the people "supposed" (ßB@8":$V<@<J"H) that "the 
experience of pleasure" (JÎ 6"20*LB"2,Ã<) was the "pinnacle of happiness" 
(,Û*"4:@<46Î< ¦< J@ÃH :V84FJ").201 And because they, under the tyranny of 
¦B42L:\"-turned-§DTH, sought the experience of pleasure per se, instead of a 
clear, rational objective such as maintaining life, their desire for meat had no limit 
                                                                                                                                  
suits the broader scope of his exposition of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H. On "Tombs of Desire," see also 
Francis Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 363-69. 
200 §91: [¦B42L:\"] R":X<0 *¥ Jä< B,DÂ ("FJXD" B"DXP,J"4 ("FJD4:VD(@LH. 
201 Cf. §129: ¦B42L:\"< ¦(,\D"<J,H ñH ¦BÂ :X(4FJ@< •("2Î< Ë,<J@.  
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(:XJD@<).202 They literally ate themselves to death, illustrating the destruction 
attending tyrannical desire.203 Consistent with the generic aims of a "diagnosis" 
(6D\F4H), Philo not only illustrates the disastrous results of indulging a given 
passion (in this case, ¦B42L:\"), but also emphasizes the morally reprehensible 
nature of such indulgence.204 In this way, §§126-130 essentially restate the case 
made in §79-94, but through a biblical narrative rather than a philosophical 
discourse. This change in literary vehicle allows Philo to explore for the first time 
the relation between ¦B42L:\" and piety—a relation he only hinted at in §97, 
when he claimed that observance of the dietary laws leads not only to ¦(6DVJ,4" 
but also to ,ÛFX$,4".205  
 Philo’s retelling of Numbers 11:4-34 portrays the states of tyrannical 
desire and piety as radically incompatible, if not mutually exclusive. He 
recognizes two distinct breaches of piety within the story, and both stem from the 
hegemony of desire within the soul. First, because tyrannical desire compelled 
Moses’ followers to seek pleasure per se, they unreasonably craved—and 
demanded—the luxury of meat in a trackless desert. In Philo’s view, this made 
them "shirkers of holiness" (•N0<4"FJH ÒF4`J0J@H), since the truly pious would 
                                            
202 §129: "Ê (D –("< B8,@<,>\"4 :XJD@< @Û6 §P@LF4. 
203 §129: @Ê 6,<@Â ND,<ä< ßBÎ J−H B80F:@<−H •B`88LF2"4 (cf. §127: ¦BzÏ8X2Då). 
204 §126: :X:N,J"4; §127: •<"4FPb<Jå 2DVF,4 . . . J4:TDZF"F2"4. 
205 On Philo’s understanding of ,ÛFX$,4" ("piety"), see esp. Sterling, "‘Queen of the 
Virtues,’" (also Wolfson, Philo, 2:213-15). Philo often pairs ",ÛFX$,4"" with "ÒF4`J0H" (e.g., Sacr. 
37). The two terms are practically synonymous, insofar as they both denote piety in a general 
sense (Sterling, "‘Queen of the Virtues," 113: "Philo used the two terms as virtual synonyms to 
refer to the human response to and perception of God."). 
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have gratefully sated their necessary desires for food with the manna God 
provided.206 Second, after God’s miraculous provision of quail the people ought 
to have abstained from eating any meat, getting instead a nourishing fill of piety 
((,:4F2X<J"H ,ÛF,$,\"H 6"Â J"bJ® JD"NX<J"H). But an obsession with pleasure 
kept them from properly recognizing both the provision and the power of God—
they were unable to see any greater good beyond their own myopic indulgence 
of ¦B42L:\". In other words, as the story illustrates, those ruled by ¦B42L:\" 
cannot count anything or anyone, including God, as more valuable than their 
personal experience of pleasure (º*@<Z), since ¦B42L:\" compels them to 
accept its reflexive aim (º*@<Z) as their ultimate good. 
 Philo concludes his analysis of the quail narrative, and his entire 
exposition of the Tenth Commandment, with a brief reflection on Deuteronomy 
12:8, which he paraphrases as, "Let no one do what is pleasing in his own 
sight."207 To make the passage more directly relevant to both the biblical story 
(§§126-130) and his overall exposition of @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H (§§79-125), he 
interprets its meaning as, "Let no one indulge his own desire (¦B42L:\‘)."208 
                                            
206 §127: 6"Â J@Ø J4:TDZF"F2"4 J@×H ("FJDÎH •6DVJ@D"H 6"Â •N0<4"FJH ÒF4`J0J@H. 
207 §131: @Û B@4ZF,4 ª6"FJ@H JÎ •D,FJÎ< ¦<fB4@< "ßJ@Ø. Deut 12:8 actually reads: @Û B@4ZF,J, BV<J", Ÿ º:,ÃH B@4@Ø:,< ô*, FZ:,D@<, ª6"FJ@H JÎ •D,FJÎ< ¦<fB4@< "ÛJ@Ø. By 
opening §131 with *4`, Philo signals a logical connection with the preceding narrative, which 
began in §126. §§126-131 stand as the final text unit in Philo’s exposition, since he announces in 
§132 the completion of his commentary on laws pertaining to the Tenth Commandment, which in 
turn signals the end of his entire commentary on the Decalogue: "In these remarks we have 
discussed the matters relating to desire or lust (Jä< ,ÆH ¦B42L:\"< •<"N,D@:X<T<) as adequately 
as our abilities allow, and thus completed our survey of the ten oracles, and the laws which are 
dependent on them."    
208 §131: :0*,ÂH J± ¦B42L:\‘ J± "ßJ@Ø P"D4.XF2T.  
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Obviously, such an exhortation applies to the cautionary tale Philo has just 
related in §§126-130, since that indulgence led unmistakably to a shameful, 
impious death. And just as the exhortation makes sense in light of Philo’s biblical 
"diagnosis" (§§126-130), it makes sense also in light of his earlier philosophical 
"diagnosis" (§§79-94). In fact, the earlier case against desire represents a more 
extensive elaboration of the threats to moral and physical well being posed by 
¦B42L:\", so Philo’s version of Deuteronomy 12:8 pertains at least as much to 
the first (roughly) third of his exposition as it does to the last few paragraphs—if 
not more.  
But Philo apparently intends this simple proscription against indulging desire 
to conclude his entire exposition of the Tenth Commandment, not just the 
diagnosis elements—and it does so in two respects. First, :0*,ÂH J± ¦B42L:\‘ J± 
"ßJ@Ø P"D4.XF2T reformulates with greater precision the vague prohibition @Û6 
¦B42L:ZF,4H, offering the reader a final, more definitive encapsulation of what the 
Tenth Commandment actually prohibits. When Philo speaks elsewhere of 
"indulging" desire, or other emotions, he has in mind an indulgence at the 
expense of reason—in other words, a "giving in" to emotion that signals the 
overpowering of reason and the moral agent’s consequent departure from 
rational motivation. In Ios. 153, for example, Philo explains how for the sake of 
pleasure (desire’s aim) the masses disregard virtue (reason’s aim) and instead 
indulge (P"D4.`:,<@4) their "unbridled desires," yielding to whatever those 
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desires command.209 So :0*,ÂH J± ¦B42L:\‘ J± "ßJ@Ø P"D4.XF2T calls not for 
the elimination of desire but for its moderation, for a management of ¦B42L:\" 
that forbids its indulgence beyond the measure set by reason. In other words, 
Philo takes Moses’ Deuteronomy exhortation as a prohibition of passionate 
desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\"), just as he takes @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H as a prohibition of 
passionate desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\"). So here at the end of his exposition, Philo 
appropriately offers a compact summary of what he understands the Tenth 
Commandment to mean in terms of moral psychology. But Philo adds one final 
thought on what he understands the Tenth Commandment to mean in terms of 
the overall orientation of the moral agent’s life. To indulge one’s own desire (J± 
¦B42L:\‘ J± "ßJ@Ø), Philo suggests, amounts to a reprehensible love of self 
(N48"LJ\").210 After all, the subjective experience of pleasure—which ¦B42L:\" 
invariably seeks—involves only one person, the self. So valuing pleasure above 
all other concerns, as those tyrannized by desire must do, truly represents a self-
                                            
209 Ios. 153: Ò N48Z*@<@H –(@<`H ¦FJ4 Jä< •<"(6"4@JVJT<, FTND@Fb<0H, "Æ*@ØH, ¦(6D"J,\"H, *46"4@Fb<0H, BVF0H •D,J−Hq @Û*¥< (D @àJTH ¦P2DÎ< –88@ –88å,ñH •D,J± º*@<Z, *4z¼< •8@(@ØF4< @Ê B@88@Â ô< :`<@< –>4@< B,ND@<J46X<"4, J"ÃH •6"2X6J@4H ¦B42L:\"4H P"D4.`:,<@4 6"Â @ÍH —< BD@FJVJJTF4< ,Ç6@<J,H. Cf. Leg 3.84: Ò (D <@ØH . . . :¬ J º*X" P"D4.`:,<@H [J± RLP±], J *¥ FL:NXD@<J" 6"Â •6@bF® *4*@bH; Spec. 4.220: :0*¥< ÏD(± BDÎ 8@(4F:@Ø P"D4.@:X<0. 
210 NB Philo’s correlation in §131 of :0*,ÂH J± ¦B42L:\‘ J± "ßJ@Ø P"D4.XF2T and N48"LJ\"< B"D"4J@b:,<@H. On Philo’s concept of N48"LJ\", see esp. Frédéric Deutsch, "La 
philautie chez Philon d’Alexandrie," in Philon d’Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie (ed. 
Carlos Lévy; Turnhout: Brepolis, 1998), 87-97; also Walter Warnach, "Selbstliebe und Gottesliebe 
im Denken Philons von Alexandrien," in Wort Gottes in der Zeit: Festschrift Karl Hermann 
Schelkle (ed. Helmut Feld and Josef Nolte; Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1973), 198-214. Cf. Pearce, 
Land of the Body, 149-51. 
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centered life, since the chief aim necessarily involves only the self.211 Captive to 
self-interest, the N\8"LJ@H lacks a proper concern not just for other people, but 
also for God.212 In fact, love of self and love of God represent for Philo two 
radically opposed and incompatible modes of life.213 And by drawing this contrast 
here at the end of his exposition, Philo revisits and substantiates his earlier claim 
that Moses’ dietary laws lead to self-control (¦(6DVJ,4"), philanthropy 
(N48"<2DTB\"), and—most of all—piety (,ÛFX$,4").214 By inculcating ¦(6DVJ,4", 
the dietary laws promote observance of the Tenth Commandment, which forbids 
passionate desire. But by training the moral agent to exercise ¦(6DVJ,4"—in 
other words, not to indulge in ¦B42L:\"—those laws also undermine love of self, 
allowing instead a life of devotion to God. 
                                            
211 In Post. 180, Philo pairs N48"LJ\" and N480*@<\", suggesting an equivalence. 
212 Cf. Q.G. unidentified fragments 11 (Marcus) [cf. Petit], which begins, @Ê ©"LJä< :`<@< ª<,6" BV<J" BDVJJ@<J,H N48"LJ\"<, :X(4FJ@< 6"6`<, ¦B4J0*,b@LF4<. 
213 E.g., Spec. 1.344: ßBÎ N48"LJ\"H ¦68"2`:,<@4 J@Ø BDÎH •8Z2,4"< Ð<J@H 2,@Ø; 
Praem. 12: N48"LJ\"< BDÎ ,ÛF,$,\"H •FB"FV:,<@4. Allegorically, Philo identifies Abel as the N48`2,@H *`(:", while Cain represents the N\8"LJ@H *`(:" (e.g., Det. 32). Cf. Harl, "Deux 
arbres," 379: "[L]’homme est libre d’opter pour l’un ou l’autre movement, pour l’amour de lui-
même et ce qui est proche de lui, la N48"LJ\", ou au contraire pour l’attitude proprement 
religieuse de l’,ÛFX$,4"." 
214 §97: ¦B,FJ`:4F, *4"JV(:"F4 6"Â BDÎH ¦(6DVJ,4"< 6"Â BDÎH N48"<2DTB\"< 6"Â--JÎ :X(4FJ@<--BDÎH ,ÛFX$,4"< •(T(@JVJ@4H. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY AND LINES OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
SUMMARY 
In the course of larger, systematic exposition of the Decalogue, Philo 
offers in Spec. 4.78b-131 an extended, detailed exposition of the Tenth 
Commandment, which he reads—despite its clear biblical formulation as a 
prohibition of desire for the goods of a neighbor—as a prohibition of desire itself 
(@Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H). Capitalizing on the prominence of ¦B42L:\" in contemporary 
ethical discourse about the "passions" (BV20), Philo frames his interpretation of 
the Tenth Commandment along philosophical lines, justifying the prohibition in 
light of Middle-Platonic conceptions of how desire operates within, and 
endangers, the human soul. Philo couples this theoretical reflection with a 
consideration of the Mosaic dietary laws, which in his view fall under the rubric of 
the Tenth Commandment (as species under genus) and promote its observance 
by design. This two-part structure—(1) theoretical reflection on a problem 
(¦B42L:\") and (2) practical consideration of a solution (dietary laws)—signals an 
effort on Philo’s part to frame his philosophical exposition of the Tenth 
Commandment in an appropriately philosophical way: as a 
"Seelenheilungsschrift," a type of philosophical literature consisting of (1) the 
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diagnosis of a moral problem (6D\F4H) and (2) a proposal for practical treatment 
(–F60F4H). Ultimately, then, Philo offers a philosophical essay on the problem of 
¦B42L:\", but he never loses sight of the biblical warrant for his essay, the simple 
prohibition @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H. In fact, by answering the two fundamental questions 
raised by this prohibition, the essential points of Philo’s essay on ¦B42L:\" 
emerge:  
1. In Philo’s view, what does the Tenth Commandment prohibit? (All 
desire? A certain type? What type?)  
 
2. In Philo’s view, how is the Tenth Commandment observed? (What are 
the mechanics of its observance? What role do the dietary laws play in 
its observance?) 
 
The first question deals with Philo’s concept of ¦B42L:\", especially its 
problematic malfunction. The second question deals with Philo’s concept of 
¦(6DVJ,4", especially the role played by –F60F4H in its acquisition. 
 What, then, does the Tenth Commandment prohibit? From a strictly verbal 
standpoint, @Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H simply prohibits any instance of ¦B42L:\". But the 
term ¦B42L:\" has a fundamental ambiguity in Philo’s Middle-Platonic system of 
thought, due to the ambiguity of the broader rubric BV2@H, which designates 
either an amoral emotion or an immoral passion. In other words, the abbreviated 
Tenth Commandment offers no clear moral imperative, except in the context of 
Philo’s interpretation. And Philo clearly interprets it as a prohibition of passionate 
desire, which—by his own definition—means excessive desire (B8,@<V.@LF" 
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¦B42L:\"), understood as immoderate desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\"). So the Tenth 
Commandment prohibits any instance of the non-rational emotion desire 
(¦B42L:\") overstepping the limit (:XJD@<) set by reason (8`(@H). In practical 
terms, the moral agent violates the Tenth Commandment whenever desire’s 
reflexive aim of pleasure (º*@<Z) becomes the predominate motivation for human 
action over against rational considerations such as necessity. By indulging 
passionate desire in this way, the moral agent not only violates the Tenth 
Commandment but also risks a much greater ill, tyrannical desire (§DTH), which 
Philo sees as the final ruinous outcome of letting desire usurp reason. From an 
initial break with reason’s hegemony, ¦B42L:\" proceeds to overtake the entire 
soul, including the rational faculty, which tragically sets desire’s aim of pleasure 
as the moral agent’s ultimate good. Philo makes such a strong presumption of 
the eventual progression from passionate to tyrannical desire that his theoretical 
reflection on the ills of ¦B42L:\", in part one of his exposition (the "diagnosis"), 
deals mainly with the ills of §DTH. So despite his explicit identification of @Û6 
¦B42L:ZF,4H as a prohibition of passionate desire (–:,JD@H ¦B42L:\"), Philo 
sees it in effect as a preemptive prohibition of tyrannical desire (§DTH) as well.  
 And how is the Tenth Commandment observed? Essentially, obedience to 
the Tenth Commandment requires the exercise of ¦(6DVJ,4", since regular 
enforcement of the dictates of 8`(@H over against ¦B42L:\" (when the two 
conflict) precludes the sort of passionate desire prohibited by the injunction @Û6 
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¦B42L:ZF,4H, while eliminating also the risk of tyrannical desire. In other words, 
the Tenth Commandment’s proscription of –:,JD@H ¦B42L:\" amounts to a 
prescription of ¦(6DVJ,4". Moses understood this, so he devised a way of 
equipping his followers with ¦(6DVJ,4", by formulating a set of dietary laws that 
engender ¦(6DVJ,4" through practice (–F60F4H). Primarily, the dietary laws 
promote ¦(6DVJ,4" through specific practical exercises: either the temporary 
restraint of desire or the avoidance of especially pleasurable foods. The first type 
of exercise orchestrates a subjugation of desire that increases the moral agent’s 
capacity for ¦(6DVJ,4"—just as weight training builds physical strength and so 
increases a wrestler’s capacity to overthrow an opponent in a contest. The 
second type of exercise obviates the risk of passionate desire by eliminating 
incitements to passionate desire—but more broadly it promotes a lifestyle of 
¦(6DVJ,4" by training the moral agent to act from a motive of necessity rather 
than a motive of pleasure, which amounts to the rule of reason over desire. 
Secondarily, the dietary laws—in particular, certain laws regarding clean and 
unclean animals—symbolize broader ideals and principles of ¦(6DVJ,4", 
reinforcing and promoting the goal of Moses’ practical regimen. Taken as one 
comprehensive program, the dietary laws represent a course of "treatment" for 
the problem of passionate desire "diagnosed" in part one of Philo’s exposition, 
even though they ostensibly deal only with the desire for food and drink. This 
apparent limitation actually reveals to Philo the genius of Moses’ plan: due to the 
240 
 
 
 
preeminence of this one type of desire among all others, its successful 
management through ¦(6DVJ,4" necessarily—a maiore ad minus—entails 
successful management of any other type of desire. 
LINES OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
A detailed study of Philo’s exposition of the Tenth Commandment 
suggests various lines of further research. Citing one desideratum for the 
respective fields of Philonic studies, Hellenistic Judaism, early Christianity, and 
Middle Platonism illustrates the range of possibilities. 
In order to understand the moral psychology presumed in his exposition of 
@Û6 ¦B42L:ZF,4H, Philo’s conception of the soul as a bipartition between rational 
and non-rational parts received considerable attention. The significance of this 
basic, bipartite model lies in its ability to accommodate every other model of the 
soul Philo cites. In other words, Philo does not endorse different—even 
contradictory—models of the soul according to exegetical necessity. He instead 
endorses one model of the soul, which he then cites ad hoc in various equivalent 
formulations.1 The idea of Philo's having just one coherent model of the soul 
should be further tested and either confirmed or discarded. Settling the issue in 
favor of one model would provide a helpful framework for further research. 
Philo’s exposition relates also to Hellenistic Judaism broadly, especially 
the issue of Alexandrian exegetical traditions. Philo undoubtedly reworks a 
                                            
1 Cf. Dillon, Middle Platonists, 174-75, on Philo’s reference to different soul divisions: 
"This is not chaotic eclecticism . . .; for Philo each of these divisions expresses some aspect of 
the truth, but the most basic truth remains the division into rational and irrational."  
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prominent traditional interpretation of clean and unclean winged creatures from 
the Letter of Aristeas to suit his own exegetical agenda. With respect to the 
animal traits of carnivorous (vs. herbivorous) and wild (vs. tame), Philo turns an 
originally symbolic interpretation promoting justice (*46"4@Fb<0) into a literal 
interpretation promoting self-control (¦(6DVJ,4"). In general, this reveals 
something about the communal aspect of biblical exegesis in Alexandria, but it 
specifically reveals a nexus of text, interpretation, and cultural—especially 
philosophical—milieu worth investigating further.2 The Letter of Aristeas found 
significance in otherwise obscure dietary laws by correlating its interpretation with 
current trends in contemporary philosophy, namely Pythagorean philosophy and 
its symbolic interpretation of dietary laws.3 Philo correlated his interpretation with 
what he knew as current trends in contemporary philosophy, namely Middle-
Platonic philosophy. Both reflect an apologetic aspect of the relation between 
exegesis and cultural milieu, as they attempt to demonstrate the parity of Mosaic 
legislation with the highest cultural achievements of their Gentile 
contemporaries.4 
                                            
2 Thomas Tobin investigated this nexus in The Creation of Man—i.e., studying different 
levels of interpretation "involves the analysis of the thought patterns used in the interpretations, 
and the relationship of those thought patterns to the biblical text and to the philosophical milieu of 
Alexandria during the period" (9). Philo’s interaction with an earlier level of interpretation in the 
case of dietary laws represents precisely the sort of interaction Tobin identifies in the case of the 
story of man’s creation. The call for further research into this nexus amounts to a call for further 
corroboration and refinement of Tobin’s approach. 
3 See Berthelot, "L’interprétation symbolique." 
4 On the valorization of ¦(6DVJ,4" among Philo’s contemporaries as a context for his own 
emphasis on ¦(6DVJ,4" in regard to the Tenth Commandment (and dietary laws), see Stowers, 
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In terms of early Christianity, Philo’s exposition of the Tenth 
Commandment relates most directly to the letters of Paul, especially to issues 
raised in Galatians and Romans about the role and purpose of Mosaic law. 
Paul’s proclamation of Christ involves at some level a marginalization, if not 
repudiation, of "works of the Law" (e.g., §D(" <`:@L in Gal 2:16), and this effort 
on Paul’s part implies the existence of an opposing viewpoint in which "works of 
the Law" figure prominently. So properly understanding Paul requires a 
historically plausible reconstruction of a role for "works of the Law" that accounts 
for their valorization within first-century Judaism. James Dunn’s "new perspective 
on Paul" correctly rejects anachronistic and theologically loaded notions of §D(" 
<`:@L, such as "works which earn God’s favour, as merit-amassing 
observances," arguing instead for the notion of cultural "badges" that "mark out 
the Jews as God’s people."5 The food laws, for example, as "works of the Law," 
establish an ethnic identity—and Paul ultimately disputes the foisting of this 
identity on Gentiles as an addendum to their faith in Christ.6 Without undermining 
Dunn’s assessment, Philo’s view of the food laws nevertheless calls for the 
consideration of another possibility. Clearly for some Jews of the first century, 
"works of the Law" functioned as a means to virtue, in particular the virtue of 
                                                                                                                                  
Rereading of Romans, 46-56; also Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture, 75-110 
[="Jewish Values: Religion and Self-Restraint"]; cf. Anthony Long, "Philosophical Power." 
5 James D. G. Dunn, "The New Perspective on Paul," in The New Perspective on Paul 
(rev. ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 99-120, 111. 
6 On the food laws as identity markers, see Dunn, "New Perspective," 109-10 (e.g., 108: 
"[B]y ‘works of the law’ Paul intended his readers to think of particular observances of the law like 
circumcision and the food laws" [original emphasis]). 
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¦(6DVJ,4".7 Further research into first-century perspectives on the Law that Paul 
opposed should take into account the possibility of §D(" <`:@L representing the 
sort of ascetic exercises Philo describes in his exposition.8 
Finally, Philo’s exposition of the Tenth Commandment brings to light not 
just a Middle-Platonic concept of "passion," but a distinct Middle-Platonic 
definition of "passion": –:,JD@H 6"Â B8,@<V.@LF" ÒD:Z (Spec. 4.79). 
Understanding this as a deliberately revised Stoic definition, which uses –:,JD@H 
to reinterpret B8,@<V.@LF" in light of a radically different moral psychology, 
reveals not a superficial eclecticism within Middle Platonism but a thoughtful 
effort to appropriate terminology without compromising principles. Furthermore, 
Philo provides extensive evidence not only for the definition B8,@<V.@LF" 
(–:,JD@H) ÒD:Z but also for its consistent application in matters of moral 
psychology in first-century Alexandrian Middle Platonism—for example, in 
connection with the Phaedrus chariot figure. Philo’s use of a working Middle-
Platonic definition of passion holds significance for further research into the 
historical development of ethical theory within Middle Platonism. 
 
                                            
7 Stowers makes this point in Romans, esp. 58-65 [="Judaism as a School for Self-
Mastery] (cf. idem, "Paul and Self-Mastery," 531-34). The scope of Stowers work, however, does 
not allow him to consider in depth either the moral psychology of Philo or precisely how the 
observance of Mosaic law leads to ¦(6DVJ,4".  
8 Cf. Stowers, Romans, 66-74 [="Audience, Opponents, and Self-Mastery in Paul"]; e.g., 
67: "Paul’s attack on these opponents who taught judaizing practices to gentiles suggests that 
their appeal may have centered on claims that gentiles could learn self-mastery by association 
with the Jewish community and by adopting certain practices that were described as methods of 
self-mastery." 
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